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Intellectual Property - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 141 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.


 
 Prince Albert -v- Strange; ChD 8-Feb-1849 - (1849) 1 H & Tw 1; 2 De G & SM 293; (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; [1849] EWHC Ch J20; [1849] EngR 255; (1849) 41 ER 1171; [1849] EngR 261; (1849) 47 ER 1302; (1849) 2 De Gex & Sim 652
 
In Re Hardy's Patent [1849] EngR 295; (1849) 6 Moo PC 441; (1849) 13 ER 754
12 Feb 1849
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Bodmer's Patent Present: [1849] EngR 401; (1849) 6 Moo PC 468; (1849) 13 ER 764
16 Mar 1849
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Patterson's Patent [1849] EngR 761; (1849) 6 Moo PC 469; (1849) 13 ER 765
21 Jun 1849
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of The Patent Elastic Pavement And Kamptulicon Company And In The Matter Of The Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Acts, 1848 And 1849 Armstrong's Case [1849] EngR 1156; (1849) 3 De G & Sm 140; (1849) 64 ER 416
6 Dec 1849


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of The Patent Elastic, Pavement And Kamptulicon Company And In The Matter Of The Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act, 1848 Price And Brown's Case [1850] EngR 152; (1850) 3 De G & Sm 146; (1850) A)
17 Jan 1850


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Pettit Smith's Patent [1850] EngR 277; (1850) 7 Moo PC 133; (1850) 13 ER 830
11 Feb 1850
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Berry's Patent [1850] EngR 385; (1850) 7 Moo PC 187; (1850) 13 ER 851
13 Mar 1850
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Noble's Patent [1850] EngR 389; (1850) 7 Moo PC 191; (1850) 13 ER 853
15 Mar 1850
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Claridge's Patent [1851] EngR 495; (1851) 7 Moo PC 394; (1851) 13 ER 932
15 May 1851
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Boosey -v- Jefferys [1851] EngR 504; (1851) 6 Exch 580; (1851) 155 ER 675
20 May 1851


Intellectual Property, International

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Patent Fuel Company -v- Walstab [1851] EngR 752; (1851) 14 Beav 219; (1851) A)
29 Jul 1851


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Lowe's Patent [1852] EngR 202; (1852) 8 Moo PC 1; (1852) 14 ER 1
2 Feb 1852
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Bridson's Patent [1852] EngR 218; (1851-1852) 7 Moo PC 499; (1852) 13 ER 973
7 Feb 1852
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of Fawcett's Patent [1852] EngR 848; (1852) 2 De G M & G 439; (1852) 42 ER 942
17 Jul 1852


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Burgess -v- Burgess [1853] LR 14 CD 748; (1853) De G M&G 896; [1843-60] All Er Rep 90; [1853] 22 LJ Ch 675; [1853]
1853


Intellectual Property
The plaintiff had carried on a business selling 'Burgess's Essence of Anchovies'. His son set up a business with a similar name and purpose. Held: the court would not restrain the use of his own name by a person in trade, save only if an intention to defraud was shown.
1 Citers


 
In Re Heath's Patent [1853] EngR 223; (1853) 8 Moo PC 217; (1853) 14 ER 83
8 Feb 1853
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Bodmer's Patent [1853] EngR 391; (1853) 8 Moo PC 282; (1853) 14 ER 108
13 Apr 1853
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Hornby's Patent [1853] EngR 639; (1853) 7 Moo PC 503; (1853) 13 ER 974
2 Jun 1853
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Young -v- White; 2-Dec-1853 - [1853] EngR 1051; (1853) 17 Beav 532; (1853) 51 ER 1141
 
Palmer -v- Wagstaff And Another [1854] EngR 97; (1854) 9 Exch 494; (1854) 156 ER 211
14 Jan 1854


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Milner's Patent [1854] EngR 205; (1854) 9 Moo PC 39; (1854) 14 ER 212
1 Feb 1854
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Jones' Patent [1854] EngR 221; (1854) 9 Moo PC 41; (1854) 14 ER 213
8 Feb 1854
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Aube's Patent [1854] EngR 220; (1854) 9 Moo PC 43; (1854) 14 ER 214
8 Feb 1854
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Charles Jefferys -v- Thomas Boosey [1854] EngR 816; (1854) 4 HLC 815; (1854) 10 ER 681; [1854] UKPC 28
1 Aug 1854

Brougham, St Leonard LL
Intellectual Property, International
The object of 8 Anne, c. 19, was to encourage literature among British subjects, which description includes such foreigners as, by residence here, owe the Crown a temporary allegiance; and any such foreigner, first publishing his work here, is an "author" within the meaning of the statute, no matter where his work was composed, or whether he came here solely with a view to its publication.
Copyright commences by publication; if at that time the foreign author is not in this country, he is not a person whom the statute meant to protect.
An Englishman, though resident abroad, will have copyright in a work of his own first published in this country.
B, a foreign musical composer, resident at that time in his own country, assigned to R, another foreigner, also resident there, according to the law of their country, his right in a musical composition of which he was the author, and which was then unpublished. The assignee brought the composition to this country, and, before publication, assigned it, according to the form required by the law of this country, to an Englishman. The first publication, took place in this country :
Held, reversing the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that the foreign assignee had not, by the law of this country, any assignable copyright here in this musical composition.
Per Lords Brougham and St. Leonards.-Copyright did not exist at common law; it is the creature of statute.
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Talbot -v- La Roche [1854] EngR 826; (1854) 15 CB 310; (1854) 139 ER 442
2 Nov 1854


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Normandy's Patent [1855] EngR 5; (1855) 9 Moo PC 452; (1855) 14 ER 370
1855
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Farina -v- Silverlock (1855) 1 K & J 509
1855

Sir William Page Wood VC
Intellectual Property
The defendants sold Eau de Cologne labels which infringed the plaintiff's trade marks. However they made it clear to the purchasing retailers that they were produced by them and not by the plaintiff, and had made no misrepresentation to the retailers; they were not deceived. Held: An injunction was granted. The court explained the relationship between the law relating to trade marks and that of passing off. "But if it be stated that the Defendant is manufacturing that which is known to be the trade mark which the Plaintiff alone has the right to use, and the use of which on the goods of a third party would be a fraud upon the Plaintiff; and that the Defendant is selling such labels to anyone who asks for them, and is thus scattering over the world the means of enabling parties to commit frauds upon the Plaintiff, and that such frauds have been committed; that is, I think, a sufficient averment to entitle the Plaintiff to an injunction. The ground of the jurisdiction being fraud, if the Defendant be committing fraud, either by selling goods under the Plaintiff's trade mark, or enabling others to do so by distributing the means of doing so, it cannot be said that this Court has no power to interfere by injunction to arrest the evil at its source, without compelling the Plaintiff to wait until the whole fraud is brought to a completion by the sale of the goods." The jurisdiction was based on fraud and an injunction would be granted to inter alia prevent the defendant from enabling passing-off.
1 Citers


 
In Re Foarde's Patent [1855] EngR 47; (1855) 9 Moo PC 376; (1855) 14 ER 339
10 Jan 1855
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Honiball's Patent [1855] EngR 190; (1855) 9 Moo PC 378; (1855) 14 ER 340
2 Feb 1855
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Cobbett -v- Ludlam, Executor of Oldfield [1855] EngR 839; (1855) 11 Exch 446; (1855) 156 ER 906
26 Nov 1855


Wills and Probate, Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice
O, the defendant’s testator, instituted a suit in Chancery for the administration of the estate and effects of C, the plaintiffs testator. An order was made by the Court of Chancery, that the plaintiff be restrained by injunction from interferlng with the estate or effects of C. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for an alleged infringement by O of C’s copyright in certain books Held: First, that the action was in disobedience of the order of the Court of Chancery, since the damages, when recovered, would be assets of C. in the plaintiff‘s hands. Secondly, that under the 226th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, this Court had jurisdiction to stay proceedings in the action, although no writ of injunction had issued.
Common Law Procedure Act 1852 226
[ Commonlii ]
 
Re Adamson's Patent [1856] EngR 410; (1856) 6 De G M & G 420; (1856) 43 ER 1296
19 Apr 1856


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Tolson's Patent [1856] EngR 483; (1856) 6 De G M & G 422; (1856) 43 ER 1297
3 May 1856


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Lee's Patent [1856] EngR 684; (1856) 10 Moo PC 226; (1856) 14 ER 478
16 Jun 1856
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Cardwell's Patent [1856] EngR 980; (1856) 10 Moo PC 488; (1856) 14 ER 576
1 Dec 1856
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Jarrold -v- Houlston (1857) 3 K&J 708
1857

Page Wood V-C
Intellectual Property
The plaintiff had written a work which 'collects and reduces into the form of a systematic course of instruction those questions which he may find ordinary persons asking in reference to the common phenomena of life, with answers to those questions, and explanations of those phenomena.' He had provided answers to those questions out of works consulted by him and had arranged the whole 'under certain heads and in a scientific form'. Held: The court expressed the principle thus: "if, knowing that a person whose work is protected by copyright has, with considerable labour, compiled from various sources a work in itself not original, but which he has digested and arranged, you, being minded to compile a work of a like description, instead of taking the pains of searching into all the common sources, and obtaining your subject matter from them, avail yourself of the labour of your predecessor, adopt his arrangements, adopt moreover the very questions he has asked, or adopt them with but a light degree of colourable imitation, and thus save yourself pains and labour by availing yourself of the pains and labour which he has employed, that I take to be illegitimate use."
1 Citers


 
Re Green's Patent [1857] EngR 397; (1857) 24 Beav 145; (1857) 53 ER 312
16 Apr 1857


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Maxwell -v- The Port Tennant Patent Steam Fuel And Coal Company [1857] EngR 845; (1857) 24 Beav 495; (1857) 53 ER 449
5 Nov 1857


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of Russell's Patent Ex Parte John James Russell [1857] EngR 958; (1857) 2 De G & J 130; (1857) 44 ER 937
4 Dec 1857


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Morey's Patent [1858] EngR 769; (1858) 25 Beav 581; (1858) 53 ER 759
2 Jun 1858


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Patent Bottle Envelope Compnay -v- Seymer [1858] EngR 949; (1858) 5 CB NS 164; (1858) 144 ER 65
5 Jul 1858


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Price's Patent Candle Company, Limited, -v- Bauwen's Patent Candle Company, Limited [1858] EngR 982; (1858) 4 K & J 727; (1858) 70 ER 302
13 Jul 1858


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of Spence's Patent [1859] EngR 178; (1859) 3 De G & J 523; (1859) 44 ER 1370
12 Jan 1859


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re The National Patent Steam Fuel Company Ex Parte Worth [1859] EngR 350; (1859) 4 Drew 529; (1859) 62 ER 203
19 Feb 1859


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re The National Patent Steam Fuel Comapany Barton's Case [1859] EngR 428; (1859) 4 Drew 535; (1859) 62 ER 205
19 Mar 1859


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re The National Patent Steam Fuel Company Barton's Case [1859] EngR 469; (1859) 4 De G & J 46; (1859) 45 ER 19
16 Apr 1859


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Patent Type-Founding Company -v- Richard [1859] EngR 828; (1859) Johns 381; (1859) 70 ER 470
8 Jul 1859


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of M'Kean's Patent [1859] EngR 926; (1859) 1 De G F & J 2; (1859) B)
2 Nov 1859


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Edelsten -v- Edelsten [1863] 1 De G J & Sm 185; [1863] 7 LT 768; [1860] 9 Jur NS 479; [1860] 11 WR 328; [1860] 46 ER 72
1860
LC

intellectual Property
The plaintiff sought an injunction and damages for infringement by the defendant of his trade mark. Held: The infringement was innocent. The plaintiff was entitled to an injunction, but for damages only after the defendant had become aware of the trade mark.
1 Citers


 
In Re Markwick's Patent [1860] EngR 436; (1860) 13 Moo PC NS 310; (1860) 15 ER 116
8 Feb 1860
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re National Patent Steam Fuel Company Baker's Case [1860] EngR 463; (1860) 1 Dr & Sm 55; (1860) 62 ER 298
11 Feb 1860


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Thames Iron Works Company -v- The Patent Derrick Company [1860] EngR 617; (1860) 1 J & H 93; (1860) 70 ER 676
19 Apr 1860


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Dent -v- Turpin (1861) 2 J & H 139
1861


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
In Re Napier's Patent [1861] EngR 268; (1861) 13 Moo PC 543; (1861) 15 ER 204
1 Feb 1861
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Newton's Patent [1861] EngR 269; (1861) 14 Moo PC 156; (1861) 15 ER 265
1 Feb 1861
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of Brennard's Patent [1861] EngR 623; (1861) 3 De G F & J 695; (1861) A)
27 May 1861


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Hutchison's Patent [1861] EngR 825; (1861) 14 Moo PC 364; (1861) 15 ER 343
19 Jul 1861
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hill -v- Evans (1862) 31 LJ(NS) 457
1862
HL
Lord Westbury LC
Intellectual Property
The House considered what would amount to disclosure of an invention.
Lord Westbury LC said: "I apprehend the principle is correctly thus expressed: the antecedent statement must be such that a person of ordinary knowledge of the subject would at once perceive, understand and be able practically to apply the discovery without the necessity of making further experiments and gaining further information before the invention can be made useful. If something remains to be ascertained which is necessary for the useful application of the discovery, that affords sufficient room for another valid patent."
1 Citers


 
In Re Newton's Patent [1862] EngR 877; (1862) 15 Moo PC 176; (1862) 15 ER 460
2 Jul 1862
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Bakewell's Patent [1862] EngR 1115; (1862) 15 Moo PC 385; (1862) 15 ER 540
26 Nov 1862
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Bett's Patent [1862] EngR 1118; (1862) 1 Moo PC NS 49; (1862) 15 ER 621
27 Nov 1862
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Re The Patent Screwed Boot And Shoe Company [1863] EngR 101; (1863) 32 Beav 142; (1863) A)
12 Jan 1863


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Norton's Patent [1863] EngR 350; (1863) 1 Moo PC NS 339; (1863) 15 ER 729
4 Mar 1863
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Bovill's Patent [1863] EngR 390; (1863) 1 Moo PC NS 348; (1863) 15 ER 733
14 Apr 1863
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Hills' Patent [1863] EngR 791; (1863) 1 Moo PC NS 258; (1863) 15 ER 698
7 Jul 1863
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In The Matter Of Hadfield's Patent Cask And Package Company, Limited; And In The Matter Of The Joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856, 1857 Ex Parte Greenwood [1863] EngR 849; (1863) 3 De G J & S 603; (1863) 46 ER 770
22 Jul 1863


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Samuel -v- Rogers [1864] EngR 257 (A); (1864) 1 De G J & S 396
17 Feb 1864


Intellectual Property
This was an appeal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Wood refusing leave to serve the sole Defendant, who was described in the bill as resident at Dublin, out of the jurisdiction, with a copy of the bill and interrogatories, and notice of motion for an injunction "at Dublin or elsewhere in Ireland.”
The bill sought an injunction against the Defendant, restraining him from advertising for sale any articles of clothing under any name in which the word "Sydenham", to the use of which, as a prefix, the Plaintiff claimed an exclusive right, occurred ; and from selling any articles of clothing as and for "Sydenham" articles, and from selling or offering for sale any articles of clothing not manufactured by the Plaintiff, in such manner and form as to represent or lead to the belief that the same had been produced by the PIaintiff ; and for an account and costs.
[ Commonlii ]
 
The Colonial Life Assurance Company -v- The Home And Colonial Assurance Company, Limited [1864] EngR 457; (1864) 33 Beav 548; (1864) 55 ER 482
9 May 1864


Intellectual Property
Application by "The coloniaI Life Assurance Company" for an injunction to restrain another company (lately established) from using the style of "The Home and Colonial Assurance Company, Limited," refused.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Cogent -v- Gibson [1864] EngR 494 (B); (1864) 33 Beav 557
30 May 1864

Lord Romilly
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice
A contract for the sale of a patent was specifically enforceable at the suit of the vendor, although all he required was the payment of the purchase money.
[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Lancaster's Patent [1864] EngR 585; (1864) 2 Moo PC NS 189; (1864) 15 ER 872
16 Jun 1864
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Re The Patent Artificial Stone Company (Limited) [1864] EngR 854; (1864) 34 Beav 185; (1864) 55 ER 605
10 Dec 1864


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Southorn -v- Reynolds (1865) 12 LT (NS) 75
1865


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
Leather Cloth Co Ltd -v- American Leather Cloth Co Ltd (1865) 11 HL Cas 523 HL(E)
1865
HL
Lord Kingsdown
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
"Nobody doubts that a trader may be guilty of such misrepresentations with regard to his goods, as to amount to a fraud upon the public, and to disentitle him on that ground, as against a rival trader, to the relief in a court of equity which he might otherwise claim. What would constitute a misrepresentation of this description, may in particular cases be a reasonable subject of doubt, and it was in the present case the ground of the difference between the two judgments under consideration. The general rule seems to be that the mis-statement of any material fact calculated to deceive the public, will be sufficient for this purpose."
1 Citers



 
 Feather -v- The Queen; 1865 - (1865) 6 B&S 257
 
In Re Goucher's Patent [1865] EngR 599; (1865) 2 Moo PC NS 532; (1865) 15 ER 1001
19 Jun 1865
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Trotman's Patent [1866] EngR 113; (1866) 3 Moo PC NS 488; (1866) 16 ER 185
28 Feb 1866
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Bovill -v- Goodier [1866] EngR 135; (1866) 35 Beav 427; (1866) 55 ER 961
18 Apr 1866


Intellectual Property, Equity

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Mallet's Patent [1866] EngR 196; (1866) 4 Moo PC NS 175; (1866) 16 ER 282
27 Nov 1866
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Herbert's Patent [1867] EngR 3; (1867) 4 Moo PC NS 300; (1867) 16 ER 330
1 Feb 1867
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Allan's Patent [1867] EngR 28; (1867) 4 Moo PC NS 443; (1867) 16 ER 385
15 Jul 1867
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Poole's Patent [1867] EngR 31; (1867) 4 Moo PC NS 452; (1867) 16 ER 388
19 Jul 1867
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Mcdougal's Patent [1867] EngR 35; (1867) 5 Moo PC NS 1; (1867) 16 ER 415
5 Dec 1867
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Mcinnes' Patent [1868] EngR 5; (1868) 5 Moo PC NS 72; (1868) 16 ER 443
24 Feb 1868
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Blacks -v- Murray (1870) 8 SLR 261
1870


Intellectual Property
The court considered what constituted originality for a literary work, and set down a test. It was necessary to make extensive and substantial alterations in order to create a new literary work, not just a few emendations and the addition of a few unimportant notes.
1 Citers


 
Pike -v- Nicholas (1870) LR 5 Ch App 251
1870


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
In Re Normand's Patent [1870] EngR 12; (1870) 6 Moo PC NS 477; (1870) 16 ER 805
7 Feb 1870
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Saxby's Patent [1870] EngR 22; (1870) 7 Moo PC NS 82; (1870) 17 ER 31
17 Jun 1870
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Clark's Patent [1870] EngR 49; (1870) 7 Moo PC NS 255; (1870) 17 ER 97
5 Dec 1870
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
Levy -v- Rutley (1871) LR 6 CP 523
1871
CCP
Keating J
Intellectual Property
There can be no finding of joint authorship in a copyright work in the absence of a common intention to that effect. It is implicit in the concept of 'collaboration' that there must be "joint labouring in the furtherance of a common design."
1 Citers


 
Ford -v- Foster (1871-1872 ) 7 Ch App 611
1871


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
In Re Johnson's Patent (Willcox And Gibbs) [1871] EngR 22; (1871) 8 Moo PC NS 282; (1871) 17 ER 318
17 Jun 1871


Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Pitman's Patent [1871] EngR 51; (1871) 8 Moo PC NS 293; (1871) 17 ER 322
4 Dec 1871
PC

Intellectual Property
As the recommendation to the Crown for the prolongation of the term of Letters Patent is a matter of discretion in the Judicial Committee, it is imperatively necessary that the petition for such prolongation should state fairly and fully everyting relating to the Patent: an omission to do so is fatal to the application. Where the Petition omitted to state that the Patent was, in fact, a communication from a Foreigner living abroad, who had previously to the English Patent patented the same invention in America, and that the American Patent had expired, though afterwards renewed in America, the Judicial Committee, in the circumstances refused the application.
[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Wield's Patent [1871] EngR 53; (1871) 8 Moo PC NS 300; (1871) 17 ER 325
7 Dec 1871
PC

Intellectual Property, Costs
Accounts of profits and loss filed by a Patentee on his application for a prolongation of the term of Letters Patent being prima facie unsatisfactory, the Judicial Commiittee directedt the question of accounts to be taken before considering the merits of the invention. As the accounts were not satisfactory explained, the application for a prolongation was refused. Considerations which induce the Judicial Committee to give costs to bona fide Opponents.
[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Winans' Patent [1872] EngR 1; (1872) 8 Moo PC NS 306; (1872) 17 ER 327
11 Jan 1872
PC

Intellectual Property

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Carr's Patent [1873] EngR 2; (1873) 9 Moo PC NS 379; (1873) 17 ER 556
14 Jan 1873


Intellectual Property
In circumstanes showing a want of adequate remuneration, an extension of the term of Letters Patent granted for six years.
In estimating the profits derived from the Patent, the Judicial Committee mill take into consideration a deduction. from the profits of the Patent for the personal expenses of the Patentee for the exclusive devotion of his time in bringing the Patent into practical operation and public notice.
[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Blake's Patent [1873] EngR 1; (1873) 9 Moo PC NS 373; (1873) 17 ER 554
14 Jan 1873


Intellectual Property
EngR A Patent was first, taken out in America, afterwards in England, and two days after the date of the English Patent the invention was patented in France. The French patent was allowed to drop. On an application for prolongation of the English Patent, Held: Following Winan's Patent (8 Moore’s P.C. Cases, (NS) 306; S.C. Law Rep. 4 P.C. 93)-that, although the Judicial Cominittee might have jurisdiction under the 25th section of the 15th and 16th Vict c 83, to entertain the application, yet, on the ground of public policy, as the French Patent had been allowed to expire, they would not in the exercise of the discretion vested in them, reoommend the extension of the term of the English Patent.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Townsend -v- Haworth (1879) 48 LJ Ch 770
1875
CA
Sir George Jessel MR, Mellish LJ
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
The defendant sold chemicals to be used by the purchaser in infringement of patent and agreed to indemnify the purchaser if the patent should prove to be valid. Held: Only the person who actually manufactures or sells infringing goods is the infringer except where the direct infringer is the "mere cat's-paw" of someone else.
Mellish LJ said: "Selling materials for the purpose of infringing a patent to the man who is going to infringe it, even although the party who sells it knows that he is going to infringe it and indemnifies him, does not by itself make the person who so sells an infringer. He must be a party with the man who so infringes and actually infringe."
1 Citers


 
Smith -v- Buller (1875) LR 19 EQ 473
1875

Sir R Malins V-C
Intellectual Property, Costs
The plaintiff in a patent case had failed, and objected to the amount of costs. Held: Sir R Malins V-C said: "It is of great importance to litigants who are unsuccessful that they should not be oppressed by having to pay an excessive amount of costs." and “I think he ought to bear no more than the necessary costs. I adhere to the rule which has ready been laid down, that the costs chargeable under a taxation as between a party and party are all that are necessary to enable the adverse party to conduct the litigation, and no more. Any charges merely for conducting litigation more conveniently may be called luxuries and must be paid by the party incurring them. The plaintiff is the attacking party, and has failed, and he must therefore pay all charges necessary to the litigation. But if the Defendants give greater facilities for the conduct of the case than are strictly necessary, they ought not to be allowed to throw them upon the plaintiff.”
1 Citers



 
 Baird -v- Moule's Patent Earth Closet Co Ltd; CA 3-Feb-1876 - Unreported, 3 February 1876

 
 Clark -v- Adie; HL 1877 - (1877) 2 App Cas 315
 
Flower -v- Lloyd [1877] 6 ChD 297
1877
CA
Jessell MR, James and Baggallay JJ
Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property
The plaintiffs tried to restrain the defendant from infringing their patent. They succeeded at first instance but the order was overturned on appeal. An expert went to inspect the process at the defendant's works. Later, employees gave affidavits suggesting that, on that visit, the defendant had fraudulently concealed a part of the process. The plaintiffs sought to have the appeal reheard. Held: The application failed. Applying the 1873 Act, the High Court could exercise the powers formerly conferred on the Court of Chancery and rectify any miscarriage by setting aside the judgment on grounds of fraud. That was the appropriate remedy; reopening the appeal was not.
Lord Justice James made general observations about the proper procedure where a judgment was allegedly obtained by fraud: "I agree with what has been said by the Master of the Rolls, that in the case of a decree (or judgment as we now call it) being obtained by fraud there always was a power, and there still is a power, in the Courts of Law in this country to give adequate relief. But that must be done by putting in issue that fraud, and that fraud only. You cannot go to your adversary and say "You obtained a judgment by fraud and I will have a re-hearing of the whole case" until that fraud is established. The thing must be tried as a distinct and positive issue; "You, the defendants" or "You, the plaintiff" obtained that judgment or decree in your favour by fraud; you bribed the witness, you bribed my solicitor, you bribed my counsel, you committed some fraud or other of that kind, and I ask to have the judgment set aside on the ground of fraud." That would be tried like anything else by evidence properly taken directed at that issue and wholly free from and unembarrassed by any of the matters originally tried."
Judicature Act 1873
1 Citers



 
 Baker -v- Selden; 1879 - (1879) 101 US 99

 
 Orr Ewing -v- Registrar of Trade Marks; HL 1879 - (1879) 4 App Cas 479
 
Singer Manufacturing Co -v- Loog (1880) 18 ChD 395
1880
CA
James LJ, Cotton LJ
Intellectual Property
The defendant wholesalers imported sewing machines from Germany which they sold using documents which referred to the machines as using the Singer system. The word Singer was a trade mark of the plaintiffs. The retailers were told that the machines were not made by the plaintiffs. Held: "No man is permitted to use any mark, sign or symbol, device or other name whereby, without making a direct false representation himself to a purchaser who purchases from him, he enables such a purchaser to tell a lie or to make a false representation to somebody else who is the ultimate customer."
James LJ: "I have often endeavoured to express what I am going to express now (and probably I have said it in the same words, because it is very difficult to find other words in which to express it); that is, that no man is entitled to represent his goods as being the goods of another man; and no man is permitted to use any mark, sign or symbol, device or other means, whereby, without making a direct false representation himself to a purchaser who purchases from him, he enables such a person to tell a lie or to make a false representation to somebody else who is the ultimate customer."
Cotton LJ: "But it was urged ... that it might be used as an instrument of deception by the purchasers from the defendant when they were selling again. In my opinion, if a man does that, the natural consequence of which (although it does not deceive the person with whom he deals, and is therefore no misrepresentation to him) is to enable that other person to deceive and pass off his goods as somebody else's, for that he is answerable. But this is confined to those things which in their necessary or natural uses accompany the things sold. For instance, the corks of champagne bottles marked 'Moet and Chandon' must be in the bottles sold and must accompany the bottles. They must necessarily accompany the thing to the retail buyer, and so must labels to be put on the bottles. The very reason for their existence is that they must be put on the bottles and if they are deceptive and fraudulent, then the person who prepares them is answerable for it. Such things must not be used if their natural and legitimate consequence is, not to deceive the person to whom they are sold, but to enable the seller to pass off the goods as being the goods of other persons."
1 Citers


 
Mitchell -v- Henry (1880) 15 Ch D 181
1880


Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Passing off actions remained unaffected by the passing of the 1875 Act.
Trade-Marks Registration Act 1875
1 Citers



 
 Edison Telephone Company -v- India Rubber Company; 1881 - (1881) 17 ChD 137

 
 Dicks -v- Yates; ChD 1881 - (1881) 18 Ch 76
 
Smith -v- Day (1882) 21 Ch D 421
1882


Intellectual Property

1 Citers



 
 Singer Manufacturing Co -v- Loog; HL 1882 - (1882) 8 App Cas l5
 
Ager -v- Collingridge (1886) 2 Times LR 291
1886

Kay J
Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
Newman -v- Pinto (1887) 4 RPC 508
1887


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
Lever -v- Goodwin (1887) 36 Ch D 1; (1887) 4 RPC 492
1887
CA
Cotton LJ, Chitty J
Intellectual Property, Damages
In trade mark and patent cases the plaintiff was entitled, if he succeeded in getting an injunction, to take either of two forms of relief: he might claim from the defendant either the damage he had sustained from the defendant's wrongful act or the profit made by the defendant from the defendant's wrongful act.
Chitty J described a class of case where relief was approriate in a passing off case: "In the second class of cases which I am considering, the trade is not deceived. I am speaking from my large experience in these matters. The retail buyers know from whom they are buying, and, if there is anything like a fraudulent device, such as I am referring to, they are not taken in, they are not deceived. But what is done by the manufacturer is this - he puts an instrument of fraud into their hands. It has been said more than once in this case, in substance, that the manufacturer ought not to be held liable for the fraud of the ultimate seller, that is, the shop-keeper, or the shop-keeper's assistant. But that is not the right view of the case. Have the Defendants in this case, or not, knowingly put into the hands of the shopman, who is more or less scrupulous or unscrupulous, the means of deceiving the ultimate purchaser? That is the question which I have to try, and that is a question of fact, and nothing else."
1 Citers


 
The United Horse-Shoe and Nail Co Ltd -v- John Stewart & Co 13 AC 401; (1888) 5 RPC 260
1888
HL
Lord Macnaughton
Intellectual Property, Damages
Two patents were held valid and infringed. The first patent was for an invention for improvements in a process for manufacturing horse-shoe nails designed to avoid blanks, from which the nails were made, from being obstructed during movement towards two rolls. The second related to a mechanism for punching out nails from blanks and for producing the blanks. Held: The measure of damages will then normally be the profit which would have been realised by the owner of the patent if the sales had been made by him.

 
Pollard -v- Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch Div 345
1888

North J
Intellectual Property, Contract
Mrs Pollard had contracted with the defendant for photographs to be taken of herself for her own purposes. She found that the defendant was using the photograph for quite different purposes. She argued that, she having contracted for the photograph to be taken for one purpose, there was an implied term that it should not be used for any other. Held: Such an implied term did exist.
1 Citers


 
Proctor -v- Bayley (1889) 42 Ch D 390; (1889) 6 RPC 538
1889
CA
Fry LJ, Cotton LJ
Litigation Practice, Intellectual Property
A final injunction was refused in a patent case because, although the defendant had been found to infringe, the court did not accept there was any basis to infer that there would be a continuance of the wrongful activity to justify a quia timet order. Fry LJ said: "Now an injunction is granted for prevention, and where there is no ground for apprehending the repetition of a wrongful act there is no ground for an injunction. It was pressed on us that Mr Hares insisted on their having a right to do what they had done, but, looking at all the circumstances of the case, this foolish attempt to justify a past act does not raise any presumption that they intend to repeat it. The injunction therefore falls . ."
Cotton LJ said: "That the patent is valid, and that the Defendants have infringed it, is not in dispute, the question is whether there is any ground for an injunction. It does not follow that because a man has done a wrongful act an injunction will be granted against him, though he is liable to damages for the wrong. The Court of Chancery said, "Where a man threatens and intends to do a wrongful act, we will, before it is done, grant an injunction to prevent his doing it, and we will grant it where the act has been done and is likely to be repeated" - the jurisdiction is simply preventive . . Where a patent is infringed the patentee has a prima facie case for an injunction, for it is to be presumed that an infringer intends to go on infringing, and that the patentee has a right to an injunction to prevent his doing so. . . In the present case the Defendants have infringed the patent, but we must look at all the circumstances to see whether there is any ground for inferring that they intend to continue to infringe it."
1 Citers


 
Turton -v- Turton (1889) 42 Ch D 128
1889


Intellectual Property
The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from trading under the same name. Held: The possibility of blunders by the public did not to disentitle the defendant from trading in his own name even though the plaintiff had for a long time traded in the same name.
1 Citers


 
Re Dunn's Trade Mark (1890) 7 RPC 311
1890

Lord Macnaghten
Intellectual Property
Section 11 raises a matter between the applicant and the public, and therefore any member of the public can rely on it.
Trade Marks Registration Act 1875 11
1 Citers



 
 Kenrick & Co -v- Lawrence & Co; 1890 - (1890) 25 QBD 99
 
Montgomery -v- Thompson [1891] AC 217
1891
HL

Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Thompson had registered Stone Ale as a trade mark. He had sued the plaintiff, his competitor and the said mark was removed from the register. Nevertheless Thompson succeeded in an action to restrain Mr Montgomery from using the mark in relation to his beer. The cause of action in passing off was independent of the trade mark rights.
1 Citers


 
Caproni -v- Alberti (1891) 65 LT 785
1891


Intellectual Property
The defendant copied three casts made by the plaintiff of various arrangements of fruit and leaves. His defence was that the 1814 Act did not refer to casts of flowers, leaves or fruit and that such casts did not fall within the words "any subject being matter of invention in sculpture". It was not suggested that the casts which were copied were not otherwise works of sculpture. Held: The judge rejected this argument. The cast had been produced by carving an artistic reproduction of the fruit and leaves.
Sculpture Copyright Act 1814
1 Citers


 
Ungar -v- Sugg (1899) 9 RPC 117
1892

Lord Esher MR
Intellectual Property
Lord Esher MR discussed the cost of patent infringement litigation: "A man had better have his patent infringed, or have anything happen to him in this world, short of losing all his family by influenza, than have a dispute about a patent. His patent is swallowed up, and he is ruined. Whose fault is it? It is really not the fault of the law: it is the fault of the mode of conducting the law in a patent case. That is what causes all this mischief."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Boyd -v- The Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co (1894) 11 RPC 175
1894


Intellectual Property, Damages
In a claim for damages for infringement of a patent, the plaintiff manufacturers proved that a profit of 7s. per spindle would have been made, and settlements of litigation for lesser rates were discarded.
1 Citers


 
Gilbert -v- The Star Newspaper Co Ltd (1894) 51 TLR 4
1894
ChD
Chitty J
Intellectual Property, Media
W.S. Gilbert had found that, in breach of the implied obligation upon cast members and theatre employees not to disclose the plot of the play in respect of which they were engaged, the plot of his comic opera "His Excellency" had been disclosed to the defendant. Without proof of an assignment or as to joint ownership but relying upon the factual situation the court required the joinder of the theatre manager as a co-plaintiff and granted an appropriate injunction in favour of both Plaintiffs.
1 Citers


 
Hollinrake -v- Truswell (1894) 3 Ch D 420
1894
CA
Davey LJ
Intellectual Property
'Now, a literary work is intended to afford either information and instruction, or pleasure, in the form of literary enjoyment. The sleeve chart before us gives no information or instruction. It does not add to the stock of human knowledge or give, and is not designed to give, any instruction by way of description or otherwise; and it certainly is not calculated to afford literary enjoyment or pleasure.'
1 Citers


 
Saunders -v- Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada [1894] 1 Ch 537
1894

Stirling J
Intellectual Property
Even though the defendant's customers habitually and understandably used an abbreviation of the defendant company's name, the defendant was not entitled to use the name "The Sun" or "the Sun Life" without the addition of the words "of Canada."
1 Citers


 
Nobel's Explosive Co Ltd -v- Anderson (1894) 11 RPC 519
1894
CA
Lord Esher MR
Intellectual Property
The principles guiding construction of a patent are not significantly different from the principles applicable to the construction of any other written instrument. The relevant state of knowledge is that obtaining at the time of the publication of the specification. The construction of a patent is not to be derived from the alleged infringement: "as if we had to construe it before the defendant was born".
Lord Esher MR said: "Now as to the law of the case, - Here is a patent, and an alleged infringement. What is the course that the Court ought to take? In my opinion it is perfectly plain that the first thing that the Court must do is to construe the Specification. How can you consider at all the question whether what is alleged is an infringement of the patent until you have made up your mind what is the true construction of the Specification."
As to construction, he said: "Now what is the very first canon of construction of all written business documents? Why, that the Court ought to construe them the day after they were published. That is the first. Therefore in construing this patent, one has no right to do what Mr Moulton so often invited us to do, by considering what the Defendant has done. I adjure that altogether, and I say we are bound to construe the patent as if we had to construe it before the Defendant was born, if the patent was before that time."

 
Cooper -v- Stephens [1895] 1 Ch 567
1895


Intellectual Property

1 Citers



 
 Hanfstaengl -v- HR Baines & Co Ltd; HL 1895 - [1895] AC 20
 
Re Deeley's Patent [1895] 1 Ch 687
1895


Intellectual Property
A revocation of a patent for which the Attorney General's fiat has been obtained is an action taken on behalf of the public at large.
1 Citers


 
Reddaway & Co Ltd -v- Banham & Co Ltd [1896] AC 199; (1895) 1 QB 286; 13 RPC 218; [1895-96] All ER 133
1896
HL
Lord Herschell, Lord Macnaughten
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
The plaintiff manufactured and sold Camel Hair Belting. The defendant also began to sell belting made of camel's hair in the name of Camel Hair Belting. The trader claimed a right in the term 'Camel Hair'. Held: The term was descriptive. Where a trader uses a mark or a name which is descriptive of its products or services, the trader must show that the public understands that the products or services come from him when they see the mark so that the mark has in this way acquired a "secondary meaning" in order to found a claim for a trade mark. In this case the phrase had come to be associated with the plaintiff's business and the defendants must adopt some other device to distinguish his goods. Whether the words are descriptive of the goods or not, the true test in determining is whether, as it is commonly used, it is reasonably indicative and descriptive of the thing intended.
In order to be descriptive, within the condemnation of the Rule, it is sufficient if information is afforded as to the general nature or character of the articles and it is not necessary that the words or marks used shall compromise a clear, completes and accurate description.
Lord Macnaughten said that fraud is infinite in variety: sometimes it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and retiring; it would be honesty itself if it could only afford it. If facts amounting to fraud are plainly alleged it is no defect in the pleading if the word ‘fraud’ is not used. "Cases of this sort must depend upon their particular circumstances. The facts of one case are little or no guide to the determination of another."
Lord Herschell said: "In my opinion, the doctrine on which the judgment of the Court of Appeal was based, that where a manufacturer has used as his trade-mark a descriptive word he is never entitled to relief against a person who so uses it as to induce in purchasers the belief that they are getting the goods of the manufacturer who has theretofore employed it as his trade-mark, is not supported by authority, and cannot be defended on principled. I am unable to see why a man should be allowed in this way more than in any other to deceive purchasers into the belief that they are getting what they are not, and thus to filch the business of a rival".
1 Citers


 
Shoe Machinery Company -v- Cutlan (No 2) (1896) 13 RPC 141
1896

Romer J
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice
Prior litigation had been an infringement action in which the Defendants denied both validity and infringement, and succeeded on infringement but failed on validity and were ordered to pay costs of the validity issue. By the time of the second infringement action the Defendants said they had found new evidence of prior art. Held: They were not allowed to challenge validity, it having been decided against them in the first proceedings. It was a matter res judicata.
1 Citers


 
Shoe Machinery Company -v- Cutlan [1896] 1 Ch 10
1896

AL Smith LJ, Bowen LJ
Intellectual Property, Litigation Practice
The patentee had succeeded at trial in obtaining a declaration of validity and a determination of infringement, and, in subsequent proceedings, the infringer sought to challenge the validity of the patent by raising a fresh argument based on anticipation. Held: He was not entitled to do so because the question was res judicata as between the parties.
Bowen LJ: 'it is a well established principle that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance of their rights.... I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or grace.... It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right.'
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Clarke's Registered Design (1896) 13 RPC 351; (1896) 2 Ch 38
1896
CA
Lindley LJ
Intellectual Property
Lindley LJ said: "The Act is confined to designs applicable to manufactured articles, and to the application of designs to such articles. Again, the Act does not apply to the things to which design is applied; the Act applies to the design applied to them. The distinction is obvious enough when the design is for a pattern or ornament; but when, as in this case, the design is for the shape of a thing, the distinction is reduced to the difference between the shape of a thing and a thing of that shape . . A design applicable to a thing for its shape can only be applied to the thing by making it in that shape."
1 Citers


 
John Hopkinson (Reasons) -v- Westinghouse Electricity Company Limited [Patent No. 3576 of 1882] (Whitehall Court Chamber) [1896] UKPC 60
16 Dec 1896
PC

Commonwealth, Intellectual Property

[ Bailii ]
 
Innes -v- Short and Beal (1898) 15 RPC 449
1898

Bigham J
Torts - Other, Intellectual Property
The defendant Short sold powdered zinc and gave instructions to a purchaser to enable the purchaser to infringe a process patent. The plaintiff patent holder sought damages saying that he was a joint tortfeasor. Held; Bingham J said: "There is no reason whatever why Mr. Short should not sell powdered zinc, and he will not be in the wrong, though he may know or expect the people who buy it from him are going to use it in such a way it will amount to an infringement of Mr. Innes' patent rights. But he must not ask the people to use it in that way, and he must not ask the people to use it in that way in order to induce them to buy his powdered zinc from him."
1 Citers



 
 Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik -v- Johnson; HL 1898 - [1898] AC 200
 
In re J Batt & Co 's Trade Marks (1899) 16 RPC 411 HL(E); (1898) 15 RPC 534 CA; (1898) 15 RPC 262
1898


Intellectual Property

1 Citers


 
Coppen -v- Moore (No 2) (1898) 2 QB 306
1898

Lord Russell CJ
Consumer, Intellectual Property
Section 2(2) of the Act made it an offence to sell or expose for sale goods to which a forged trade mark or false description was applied unless the alleged offender could prove what amounted to due diligence. Salesmen at one of the appellant's shops sold American Ham as Scotch Ham, despite instructions from the appellant to branch managers that breakfast hams should only be sold as such, without reference to any place of origin. He was nevertheless convicted. It was contended on his behalf that he should not be held criminally liable for the unauthorised acts of his servants. Held: "In our judgment it was clearly the intention of the Legislature to make the master criminally liable for such acts, unless he was able to rebut the prima facie presumption of guilt by one or other of the methods pointed out in the Act. Take the facts here, and apply the Act to them. To begin with, it cannot be doubted that the appellant sold the ham in question, although the transaction was carried out by his servants. In other words, he was the seller, although not the actual salesman."
Merchandise Marks Act 1887
1 Citers


 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd -v- Puncture Proof Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd (1899) 16 RPC 209
1899


Intellectual Property, Damages
There are two essential principles in valuing a claim for damages: first, that the plaintiffs must prove their loss: second, that the defendants being wrong-doers, damages should be liberally assessed but that the object is to compensate the plaintiffs and not punish the defendants.
1 Citers


 
(Un-named)
30 Dec 1899
TMR
Mr D Landau
Intellectual Property
PO Revocation
[ ]
 
Miscellaneous Only (Smell Mark)
30 Dec 1899
TMR
Mr Hobbs Qc
Intellectual Property
PO Trade Marks - Appeals to the Appointed Person Decisions - Application No: 2000169
[ PO ]
 
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