swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
International - From: 2003 To: 2003
This page lists 11 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.
A -v- S (Financial Relief after Overseas US Divorce) [2003] 1 FLR 431
2003
Family, International
1 Citers
Gas Natural SDG SA -v- The Argentine Republic ARB/03/10
2003
ICSID
International, Arbitration
"The scheme of both the ICSID Convention and the bilateral investment treaties is that in this circumstance, the foreign investor acquires rights under the Convention and Treaty, including in particular the standing to initiate international arbitration."
1 Citers
Cruz-Vargas -v- R J Reynolds Tobacco Company [2003] 348 F3d 271 (1st Cir.2003)
2003
Negligence, International
(United States Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit) Relatives of a deceased smoker brought a negligence and strict liability suit against a tobacco company, alleging that it was responsible for his death. The action was brought in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. There was evidence that "the average consumer in Puerto Rico during the 1950's, during the 1960's" was aware both of health risks, such as cancer and cardiovascular disease, associated with smoking and that "smoking was or could be difficult to quit". In discussing the evidence regarding common knowledge, the Court of Appeals said: "This case calls for us to evaluate application of the common knowledge doctrine in the context of tobacco litigation. The doctrine stems from the principle that a manufacturer cannot be held liable under either strict liability or negligence for failure to warn of a danger commonly known to the public. See, e.g., Guevara v Dorsey Labs., Div. of Sandoz, Inc., 845 F 2d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 1988) ('The duty to warn in general is limited to hazards not commonly known to the relevant public'); Aponte Rivera v Sears Roebuck, 44 P.R. Offic. Trans. 7, 144 D.P.R. 830 (1998) ('[A] manufacturer need not warn of a hazard if the average consumer ordinarily has knowledge of the dangers of the product.'). [...]
A products liability plaintiff alleging failure to warn must prove
'(1) the manufacturer knew, or should have known of the risk inherent in the product; (2) there were no warnings or instructions, or those provided were inadequate; (3) the absence of warnings made the product inherently dangerous; (4) the absence of adequate warnings or instructions was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.'
Aponte Rivera, 44 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 6. Under the common knowledge doctrine, however, a defendant neither breaches a duty nor causes the product to be inherently dangerous when the allegedly omitted warning concerns a danger of which the public is well aware. [...]
The crux of appellants' entreaty on appeal is that neither the strict liability nor the negligence claim requires any affirmative showing, and thus the burden rested entirely on Reynolds. Whether or not this is a correct view of the law, after searching the record we have found no evidence which supports appellants' allegations that there was a lack of common knowledge and thus we are compelled to find that Reynolds met its burden in any event."
(5) In Roysdon v R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), a smoker and his wife brought an action against a tobacco manufacturer to recover for disease allegedly caused by smoking. The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, inter alia affirmed the dismissal by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee of the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim. At p.236, para.10, the Court of Appeals said:
"[T]he district court took judicial notice that 'tobacco has been used for over 400 years and that its characteristics have also been fully explored. Knowledge that cigarette smoking is harmful to health is widespread and can be considered part of the common knowledge of the community.'
Roysdon, 623 F.Supp. at 1192. Remembering that this action was limited to the ten years preceding the filing of this complaint [on 5 July 1984], we think this approach was appropriate. The extensive information regarding the risks of smoking available to the public during that time precluded the existence of a jury question as to whether cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous. We find that whether there was knowledge regarding Mr Roysdon's specific medical problem is irrelevant in light of the serious nature of the other diseases known at that time to be caused by cigarette smoking."
1 Citers
Fletcher -v- The Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland [2003] 1 IR 465
21 Feb 2003
International, Personal Injury, Damages
(Irish Supreme Court)
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Barnette -v- Government of the United States of America; United States Government -v- Montgomery (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 392; Times, 28 March 2003; Gazette, 05 June 2003; [2003] 1 WLR 1916
24 Mar 2003
CA
Lord Justice Scott Baker Lord Chief Justice Of England And Wales Lord Justice Kennedy
Criminal Practice, Human Rights, Jurisdiction, International
The appellant sought to resist the registration here of a confiscation order made in the US. She argued it would be contrary to the interests of justice to register it, that the US procedure would be unlawful here under the Convention, the appeal having been held in her absence. Held: It could not be said that the registration here of the order would lead to a breach of the applicant's human rights. Any breach of the applicant's human rights in the US was not flagrant. English law itself allowed such a hearing in limited circumstances. The US proceedings were seen as civil. In the interests of comity, the order should be registered.
Criminal Justice Act 1988 97 - European Convention on Human Rights 6.1
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
AIC Limited -v- The Federal Government of Nigeria, the Attorney General of the Federation of Nigeria [2003] EWHC 1357 (QB)
13 Jun 2003
QBD
Stanley Burnton J
Jurisdiction, Banking, International
AIC had used the 1920 Act to register a judgment obtained in Nigeria against the Nigerian Government. The underlying matter was a commercial transaction. Nigeria applied to set the registration aside, saying that registration was an adjudicative act and that Nigeria was protected by state immunity by reason of section 1 of the 1978 Act. AIC argued that their application to register the judgment was a "proceeding relating to a commercial transaction" within section 3(1)(a). Held: The submissions was rejected: "In my judgment, the proceedings resulting from an application to register a judgment under the 1920 Act relate not to the transaction or transactions underlying the original judgment but to that judgment. The issues in such proceedings are concerned essentially with the question whether the original judgment was regular or not."
Section 9 of the 1978 Act excludes immunity "as respects proceedings . . which relate to [an] arbitration" where the state has entered into a written arbitration agreement. Since most arbitrations relate to commercial transactions, section 9 would be unnecessary if a claim in respect of an arbitration constituted a "proceeding relating to the commercial transaction" to which the arbitration related, for that would fall within 3(1)(a). It would also be illogical to exempt from immunity the enforcement of a judgment in relation to a commercial transaction, but not the enforcement of a judgment in relation to any of the other matters in respect of which the 1978 Act provided exceptions to immunity under sections 3 to 11 of the Act.
It was unsurprising that the defendants were immune from proceedings for the registration of the Nigerian judgment: "the underlying principle of the State Immunity Act is that a state is not immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom if it enters into commercial transactions or undertakes certain activities having some connection with this jurisdiction. Purely domestic activities of a foreign state are not the subject of any exception to immunity. Sections 3(1)(b), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 all contain territorial qualifications to the exceptions to immunity to which they relate. Section 3(1)(a) does not include any such qualification, but even there the claimant wishing to bring proceedings must establish a basis for jurisdiction under CPR Part 6.20, normally under paragraphs (5) or (6), relating to contractual claims."
Lord Denning MR when advancing the restrictive doctrine of state immunity in Rahimtoola v Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] AC 379, 422, in Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v Government of Pakistan, Directorate of Agricultural Supplies [1975] 1 WLR 1485, 1491 and in Trendtex Trading v Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529, 558 had emphasised the significance not merely of the fact that the proceedings related to a commercial transaction, but that the transaction was connected with the United Kingdom.
Administration of Justice Act 1920 9
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
In re B (Children) (Removal from jurisdiction); In re S (Child) (Removal from jurisdiction) [2003] EWCA Civ 1149; Times, 29 August 2003
30 Jul 2003
CA
Thorpe, Judge, Sedley LLJ
Children, International
Mothers appealed refusal of leave to remove their children from the jurisdiction so that they could make a life with a new partner. Held: The case of Payne was not directly of effect, because the mother there was returning to her home country. It did show the need to see where the new family would naturally live. The degree of attachment and commitment of the new partners was a factor which could be decisive. It was not a question of putting the mother's interests before the child but of recognising that if the child was to be with the mother and if the mother's life would take her abroad, the child should follow in reality. To act otherwise would unduly restrict proper migration.
1 Cites
[ Bailii ]
Amiri Flight Authority -v- BAE Systems Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1447
17 Oct 2003
CA
Lord Justice Potter, Lord Justice Mance And Lord Justice Rix
International, Contract
The appellant had contracted to purchase maintenance from the defendant of aircraft it had also purchased from them. They sought damages for negligence, saying the defendants had failed to prevent a known risk of corrosion. The defendants argued that its contract excluded liability, and under the Act, that clause was not subjected to a test of reasonableness, being an international supply contract. Held: The exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous. The Act required the contract to govern the supply of goods delivered abroad. The scheme of section 26 leads to narrow or even arbitrary distinctions. The history of the legislation did not suggest that the effect of the simple words should be departed from. The contract was not a contract for the delivery of goods, and so was not exempt. Appeal allowed.
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 26
1 Cites
[ Bailii ]
Lund -v- JL Tiedemanns Tobaksfabrik A.S HR - 2002 - 00753a
31 Oct 2003
Judge Flock
International, Negligence
(Supreme Court of Norway) A request was made for a declaratory judgment finding that a tobacco manufacturer was liable for damages on a strict liability basis with respect to an injured party who after over 40 years of cigarette smoking developed lung cancer and died. Held: "The parties have in their arguments before the Supreme Court concentrated to a large degree on what knowledge of the health risks of smoking the normal consumer had during the space of time from 1950 to 1975. The appellant has acknowledged that the knowledge of both the general public as well as that of [the deceased] Robert Lund of the risks in 1975 had been brought to such a level that continued smoking after that took place at his own risk." The judge commented on the evidence: "The parties are in agreement that the question of the relationship between smoking and damage to health is not related to what the individual injured party - Robert Lund in our case - knew or did not know." he referred to various reports, including one by the Norwegian General Director of Health in 1964, and concluded: "Despite the fact that extremely many cigarette smokers continued not to accept the consequences of the medical knowledge that the research had brought to light, I am of the opinion that the consumers had in any event received such information in 1964 concerning health damage that a normally intelligent person would include it in his assessment of how he wished to conduct his life. Such as I see it, there cannot be any doubt that Robert Lund's smoking after this point in time took place at his own risk." The judge then considered the ten year period between 1954, when Robert Lund began smoking the particular brand of tobacco in question, to 1964: "My overall impression of the material that was submitted on the situation from the first half of the 1950s up to 1964 is that medical science at that time had still not secured reliable knowledge concerning a direct causal relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer and other serious injuries to health." However: "During this last 10-year period prior to the final conclusions being able to be drawn, the relationship between smoking and damage to health was not unknown to the average man or woman. However due to the lack of completely clear evidence it was to a greater degree than later left to the individual as to the extent to which one wished to believe what one read and heard now and then about the harmful effects of tobacco. And then as now, it was completely up to the individual as to whether one chose to take the chance. What is crucial for me is that it also must have been generally known at the time that cigarette smoking could involve a risk of serious health damage, and that the risk of such damage in any event to some extent would increase if the consumption of cigarettes was large. Such as I view the case, no more fine-meshed of an analysis is needed on this point."
1 Citers
Heine -v- Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH 2 O 294/02
14 Nov 2003
International, negligence
(Second Chamber for Civil Matters of the Arnsberg Regional Court, Germany) The Plaintiff claimed damages and compensation for pain due to harm to his health from smoking cigarettes manufactured by the Defendant. He also sought information about the addition of addiction-promoting substances and a finding with regard to consequential damages. He cited the Defendant's failure to provide warnings, product manipulation and a fundamental flaw in the cigarette product. Held: There was no liability from the point of view of producer liability due to a fault in construction or instruction: "There is no construction fault in cigarettes. Cigarettes are not a faulty product, in spite of the health risks arising from their consumption. The dangers arising from this have indisputably been known to consumers and the Plaintiff for a long time and were consciously accepted. Everyone knows that in the long term smoking can lead to serious, potentially even fatal harm to health, that it can lead to addiction which makes it hard to stop smoking. Consumers cannot justifiably expect that cigarettes are constructed in such a way that they do not give rise to these dangers. For instance, in the jurisdiction which this chamber follows it has long been recognised that the producer does not have to avert dangers which are typically linked with the use of a product and known to the users or recognised and accepted by them [...]. The decisive aspect therefore is that smokers are responsible for their own acts. They must themselves bear the consequences of their independent behaviour and cannot pass them on to the cigarette manufacturers." and "The Defendant has also not committed a so-called instruction fault by neglecting warnings on his products. The Plaintiff did not concretely assert that the Defendant had not met the legal duty of information and this is not evident. There are no further duties of information for the Defendant. . . The manufacturer of a product must only indicate the most important features. He must not meet any special duties of information if certain product risks are generally known. . . However, all risks linked with the consumption of cigarettes have been known to the consumers for a long time. This also includes the possible addictive effect of cigarette consumption. This does not concern special knowledge - such as how health is harmed by cigarette consumption. Therefore the judiciary has basically unanimously rejected a further duty of information [...]. Thus there does not have to be separate information about an allegedly addiction-increasing effect of additives. Because the effect of these substances, i.e. in lay terms that smoking is addictive - as always - is not news to the consumer."
1 Citers
Collector of Stamp Revenue -v- Arrowtown Assets Ltd; 4-Dec-2003 - [2003] HKCFA 46