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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














International - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 36 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.

 
California -v- Green (1970) 399 US 149
1970


International, Criminal Practice
(US Supreme Court) There was no violation of the Sixth Amendment when the defendant was convicted of supplying marijuana on the basis of pre-trial statements of a witness who gave evidence at the trial and who was subject to full and effective cross-examination.
1 Citers


 
Wright -v- McQualter (1970) 17 FLR 305
1970

Kerr J
International
Kerr J said: "If there were in the last analysis no more in this case than a quiet peaceful gathering on the lawn (in front of the premises of the United States Embassy) of persons shouting slogans and carrying placards of the kind in question here, with no risk of intrusion or damage to the premises, I would have some doubt whether there was any basis for believing that such action in such a place could reasonably amount to impairing the dignity of the mission, which is, after all, a political body. As such, it must presumably accommodate itself to the existence of strong disagreement with some of the policies of its government and to the direct and forceful verbal expressions of such disapproval. I appreciate that something may turn on the closeness of those concerned to the premises and on the extravagance or insulting nature of the language used, but, for myself, I would like to keep this whole subject open until, if ever, it arises for decision."
1 Citers


 
Turczak v Turczak [1970] P 198
1970


Family, International
Following a Polish divorce, there was no power to order maintenance under the 1965 Act because the parties were no longer husband and wife.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1965
1 Citers


 
In re Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium -v- Spain) (second phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3
5 Feb 1970
ICJ

International, Company
ICJ The claim arose out of the adjudication in bankruptcy in Spain of Barcelona Traction, a company incorporated in Canada. Its object was to seek reparation for damage alleged by Belgium to have been sustained by Belgian nationals, shareholders in the company, as a result of acts said to be contrary to international law committed towards the company by organs of the Spanish State. The Court found that Belgium lacked jus standi to exercise diplomatic protection of shareholders in a Canadian company with respect to measures taken against that company in Spain. However, it derived from municipal law a limited principle permitting the piercing of the corporate veil in cases of misuse, fraud, malfeasance or evasion of legal obligations.
It is up to the protecting State of the injured national whether and how far to make it available: "The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally. . .
The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular claim."
1 Citers

[ ICJ ]

 
 Welsh -v- United States; 15-Jun-1970 - 398 US 333 (1970); [1970] USSC 147; 90 SCt 1792; 26 Led 2d 308
 
Griggs -v- Duke Power Company (1971) 401 US 424
1971


International, Discrimination
(US) The court examined the arguments relating to indirect discrimination.
1 Citers


 
Chevron Oil Co -v- Huson (1971) 404 US 97
1971


International, Constitutional
(US Supreme Court) The Supreme Court summarised three factors to be taken into account when considering whether a ruling should be applied non-retroactively: whether the decision established a new principle of law, whether retrospective operation would advance or retard the operation of the new rule, and whether the decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retrospectively.
1 Citers


 
Mellenger -v- New Brunswick Development Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 604
1971
CA
Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ, Phillimore LJ
Crime, International
An entity which is constituted in such a way that its purpose is to assist, promote and advance the industrial development, prosperity and economic welfare of the area in which it operates, can be seen as effectively carrying out government policy in the way that a government department does and therefore to assume the position of an organ of government. The New Brunswick Development Corporation was an arm or the alter ego of the Government of New Brunswick which was a sovereign state and so it was entitled to immunity from suits in the courts of this country. A state within a federal state may in certain circumstances partake of the sovereignty of the state as a whole and obtain State Immunity. Against the background of the 1872 Act, the mere fact that New Brunswick did not have control over international relations did not mean that for that reason alone that it could not be entitled to state immunity.
Lord Denning MR: "It was suggested by Mr Kempster that the Province of New Brunswick does not qualify as a sovereign state so as to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity. But the authorities show decisively the contrary. The British North America Act 1867 gave Canada a federal constitution. Under it the powers of government were divided between the dominion government and the provincial governments. Some of those powers were vested in the dominion government. The rest remained with the provincial governments. Each provincial government, within its own sphere, retained its independence and autonomy directly under the Crown. The Crown is sovereign in New Brunswick for provincial powers, just as it is sovereign in Canada for dominion powers: see Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v Receiver-General of New Brunswick [1892] A.C. 437. It follows that the province of New Brunswick is a sovereign state in its own right, and entitled, if it so wishes, to claim sovereign immunity".
Salmon LJ: "There can be no doubt I think, that the Federal Government of New Brunswick is sovereign within its own sphere of influence. That appears from the Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v Receiver General New Brunswick [1892] AC437 and also from Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 132). "
British North America Act 1867
1 Citers


 
Keeble -v- United States (1971) 412 US 205
1971

Brennan J
International, Criminal Practice
(US Supreme Court) Brennan J said: "Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a defendant may be better off without such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction - in this context or any other - precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. In the case before us, for example, an intent to commit serious bodily injury is a necessary element of the crime with which petitioner was charged, but not of the crime of simple assault. Since the nature of petitioner's intent was very much in dispute at trial, the jury could rationally have convicted him of simple assault if that option had been presented. But the jury was presented with only two options: convicting the defendant of assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, or acquitting him outright. We cannot say that the availability of a third option - convicting the defendant of simple assault - could not have resulted in a different verdict."
1 Citers



 
 Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970); ICJ 21-Jun-1971 - General List No 53
 
First National City Bank -v- Banco Nacional de Cuba (1972) 406 US 759; [1972] USSC 189; [1972] 92 SCt 1808
7 Jun 1972


International
(United States Supreme Court) The court worried about just how much confusion can result from executive encroachment on issues of justiciability and that executive interference would lead to arbitrary results as "the Court becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not others'" (Douglas J). "I would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction . Such a notion, in the name of the doctrine of separation of powers, seems to me to conflict with that very doctrine." (Powell J)
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ]
 
Torok -v- Torok [1973] 1 WLR 1066
1973

Ormrod J
Family, International
Ormrod J agreed to an application to accelerate the decree absolute of divorce to preserve the court's jurisdiction to hear a claim for ancillary relief. If a divorce were obtained in Hungary on the basis of the husband's Hungarian nationality, it would have to be recognised, and the English court would have no jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 to deal with the house in England where the wife and children were living, even though the Hungarian court was unlikely to award maintenance.
1 Citers



 
 Anderson -v- New York Telephone Co; 1974 - (1974) 35 NY 2d 746
 
Jugoslavenska Oceanske Plovidba -v- Castle Investment Co Inc [1974] QB 292
1974
CA
Lord Denning MR
International, Arbitration, Damages, Litigation Practice
London arbitrators had made an award for unpaid hire in US dollars, being the currency of the hire contract. An issue arose whether an English court could give leave under the Act to enforce the award in the same manner as a judgment to the same effect. Held: English arbitrators had jurisdiction to make their awards in a foreign currency where that currency was the currency of the contract. Such an award could be enforced with the leave of the court by converting the award into sterling at the rate of exchange ruling at the date of the award.
Lord Denning MR said: "In my opinion English arbitrators have authority, jurisdiction and power to make an award for payment of an amount in foreign currency. They can do this – and I would add, should do this – whenever the money of account and the money of payment is in one single foreign currency. They should make their award in that currency because it is the proper currency of the contract. By that I mean that it is the currency with which the payments under the contract have the closest and most real connection. Likewise, whenever the proper currency of a contract is a foreign currency, English arbitrators can and should make their award in that currency, unless the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed otherwise. The proper currency can usually be ascertained without difficulty. But if the transaction is closely connected with two currencies (as in The the Hu [1970] P 106 Japanese salvors of a Panamanian vessel) the arbitrators can and should make their award in whichever of the two currencies seems to them to produce the most appropriate and just result." and (Roskill LJ) "I would only add on this part of the case that this decision does not amount to a general licence to arbitrators and umpires to make awards in any currency they choose heedless of the provisions of the contract with which they are concerned. The currency of account and the currency of payment will in most cases be easily ascertainable just as the proper law of a contract is in most cases easily ascertainable. In a few cases the problem will be difficult as in a few cases the question of proper law is difficult. But even in a difficult case the problem must ultimately be capable of solution and the arbitrators (if they wish) can – as I would think – always decide as a matter of discretion to make an award in sterling unless either the terms of the contract in question or of the arbitration agreement under which their jurisdiction arises or some other reason prevents them from so doing."
Arbitration Act 1950 26
1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Secretary of State ex parte Thakrar [1974] QB 684 CA
1974
CA
Lord Denning MR
International
The obligation in international law owed by one state to another to admit its nationals expelled by another could not be relied on by an individual, conflicted with immigration legislation and in any event only arose if the national had nowhere else to go.
1 Citers


 
Nuclear Tests Case (Australia -v- France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253
20 Dec 1974
ICJ

International
In its judgment in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), the Court, by 9 votes to 6, has found that the claim of Australia no longer had any object and that the Court was therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon. In the reasoning of its Judgment, the Court adduces inter alia the following considerations: Even before turning to the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, the Court has first to consider the essentially preliminary question as to whether a dispute exists and to analyse the claim submitted to it (paras. 22-24 of Judgment); the proceedings instituted before the Court on 9 May 1973 concerned the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by France in the South Pacific (para. 16 of Judgment); the original and ultimate objective of Australia is to obtain a termination of those tests (paras. 25-31 of Judgment); France, by various public statements made in 1974, has announced its intention, following the completion of the 1974 series of atmospheric tests, to cease the conduct of such tests (paras. 33-44 of Judgment); the Court finds that the objective of Australia has in effect been accomplished, inasmuch as France has undertaken the obligation to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific (paras. 47-52 of Judgment); the dispute having thus disappeared, the claim no longer has any object and there is nothing on which to give judgment (paras. 55-59 of Judgment).
Good faith is one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source.
1 Citers

[ ICJ ]

 
 Miliangos -v- George Frank (Textiles) Ltd; HL 1975 - [1976] AC 443; [1975] 1 WLR 758
 
Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd -v- Government of Pakistan, Directorate of Agricultural Supplies [1975] 1 WLR 1485
1975

Lord Denning
International
Lord Denning said: "a foreign sovereign has no immunity when it enters into a commercial transaction with a trader here and a dispute arises which is properly within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts. If a foreign government incorporates a legal entity which buys commodities on the London market; or if it has a state department which charters ships on the Baltic Exchange: it thereby enters into the market places of the world: and international comity requires that it should abide by the rules of the market."
1 Citers


 
Hearn -v- Rhay (1975) 68 FRD 574
1975

Neil CJ
Legal Professions, International
(United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington) Neill CJ said: "All of these established exceptions to the rules of privilege have a common denominator; in each instance, the party asserting the privilege placed information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit, and to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure of such information would have been manifestly unfair to the opposing party. The factors common to each exception may be summarized as follows: (I) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense. Thus, where these conditions exist, a court should find that the party asserting a privilege has impliedly waived it through his own affirmative conduct."
1 Citers



 
 Massachusetts Board of Retirement -v- Murgia; 1976 - (1976) 438 US 285

 
 Regina -v- Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Ex parte Salamat Bibi; CA 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 979; [1976] 3 All ER 843
 
Oppenheimer -v- Cattermole [1976] AC 249
1976
HL
Lord Cross of Chelsea
International, Torts - Other
The 1941 decree of the National Socialist Government of Germany deprived Jewish emigres of their German nationality and, consequentially, lead to the confiscation of their property. Held: A racially discriminatory and confiscatory law of this sort was so grave an infringement of human rights and of "clearly established rules of international law" that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all.
1 Citers


 
Dublin Port & Docks Board -v- Bank of Ireland [1976] IR 118
22 Jul 1976

Griffin J
Banking, International
(Supreme Court of Ireland) The court discussed a bank's obligation to process cheques issued by its customers: "a banker should pay his customers' cheques in the order in which they are presented, subject to the interest of the customer being taken into account".
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Smelter Corporation -v- O'Driscoll; 1977 - [1977] IR 307

 
 Trendtex Trading Corporation -v- Central Bank of Nigeria; CA 1977 - [1977] 1 QB 529; [1976] 3 All ER 437; [1976] 1 WLR 868
 
Higginbotham -v- Mobil Oil Corporation Long [1977] USCA5 438; [1977] 545 F 2d 422
7 Mar 1977

d'Auvergne J
International, Negligence, Transport
(United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit) The court considered the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an action for damages after a helicopter crash where there was no clear explanation for the crash. Held: d'Auvergne J said: "Major improvements in design and manufacturing technology, in pilot training and in ground control, communications, and navigational aids, among other things, have combined to give air travel an estimable safety record . . Logic, experience and precedent compel us to reject the argument that airplane crashes ordinarily occur in the absence of default by someone connected with the design, manufacture, or operation of the craft".
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ]
 
Edwards -v- National Audubon Society [1997] 556 F. 2d 113
1 May 1977


International, Defamation
(The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) The defendant environmental Society opposed the use of DDT saying it endangered birds. Its proponents argued that without DDT, millions would die of insect-carried diseases and starvation caused by the destruction of crops by insect pests. The Society published an annual Christmas bird count which showed a steady increase in bird sightings despite the growing employment of pesticides in the past 30 years. These statistics were seized upon by the scientists as proof of the fallacy of the Society's claims. In riposte the Society prefaced the next year's bird count with an article explaining that the count was the result not of more birds, but of more "birders" (bird watchers). The article added: "Any time you hear a 'scientist' say the opposite, you are in the presence of someone who is being paid to lie …" A journalist on the New York Times realised that the Society's charges were a newsworthy development in the already acrimonious debate and he accordingly telephoned the author of the article to obtain the names of those the Society considered to be "paid liars". The plaintiffs were named. The reporter sought their comment. The New York Times published an account of the article, of the names given at interview and of the response of the accused men. Held: "At stake in this case is a fundamental principle. Succinctly stated, when a responsible prominent organisation like the National Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their validity. … What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made. We do not believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy comments merely because it has serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press take the cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish them without fear of liability for defamation.
The public interest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for them.
The contours of the press's right of neutral reportage are, of course, defined by the principle that gives life to it. Literal accuracy is not a prerequisite: if we are to enjoy the blessings of a robust and unintimidated press, we must provide immunity from defamation suits where the journalist believes, reasonably and in good faith, that his report accurately conveys the charges made.
It is equally clear, however, that a publisher who in fact espouses or concurs in the charges made by others, or who deliberately distorts these statements to launch a personal attack of his own on a public figure, cannot rely on a privilege of neutral reportage. In such instances he assumes responsibility for the underlying accusation.
It is clear here, that [the journalist] reported Audubon's charges fairly and accurately. He did not in any away espouse the Society's accusations: indeed, [he] published the maligned scientists' outraged reactions in the same article that contained the Society's attack. The Times article, in short, was the exemplar of fair and dispassionate reporting of an unfortunate but newsworthy contretemps. Accordingly, we hold that it was privileged under the First Amendment."
1 Citers


 
Church of Scientology (1978) 65 ILR 193
1978


International
(German Supreme Court) A claim to immunity by the defendant (the “Head of New Scotland Yard”) was not “derived from his person”, but was based on the fact that the act on which the claimant sued was "a sovereign act of State which can only be attributed to the British State and not to him or any other official acting on behalf of that State, because the State is always considered the actor when one of its functionaries performs acts which are incumbent on it”. The acts of the defendant, as the expressly appointed agent of the United Kingdom for the purpose of performance of a treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany, “cannot be attributed as private activities to the person authorised to perform them in any given case” and that “any attempt to subject State conduct to German jurisdiction by targeting the foreign agent performing the act would undermine the absolute immunity of sovereign States in respect of sovereign activity”.
1 Citers


 
I Congreso del Partido (1978) QB 500
1978
CA

International
The trading or commercial activities of states are not protected by state immunity. The basic principle of international law is that all states are equal, the rule is "par in parem non habet imperium".
1 Citers


 
Addington -v- Texas
1979

Burger CJ
Health, International
(US Supreme Court) To commit an individual to a mental institution in civil proceedings, the state was required by the "due process" clause of the US Constitution to prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory preconditions to commitment. That was an intermediate standard, between proof beyond reasonable doubt and proof on the preponderance of the evidence, which was held to strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the state.
1 Citers


 
Joyce -v- Joyce and O'Hare [1979] Fam 93
1979
FD
Lane J
Family, International
The Wife asked the court not to recognise a foreign decree of divorce, saying that it would deprive her of substantial fairness in ancillary relief. Held: Lane J said: "If the courts of this country were empowered to grant ancillary relief on recognition of a foreign decree, the position would be somewhat different" and “The jurisdiction of this court to grant the relief sought by the petitioner depends upon whether or not this court will recognize a decree of divorce pronounced and made absolute in a court of competent jurisdiction in . . Canada. If recognition is given to the Canadian decree, this court cannot adjudicate because there would then be no subsisting marriage to be dissolved.”
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 8(2)
1 Citers



 
 Czarnikow Ltd -v- Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego Rolimpex; HL 1979 - [1979] AC 351

 
 Quazi -v- Quazi; HL 1979 - [1979] 3 All ER 897 HL(E); [1979] 3 WLR 833; [1980] AC 744

 
 Malnak -v- Yogi; 2-Feb-1979 -

 
 Illinois State Board Of Elections -v- Socialist Workers Party Et Al; 22-Feb-1979 - [1979] USSC 27
 
Hutchinson -v- Proxmire [1979] USSC 139; [1979] 443 US 111
26 Jun 1979


International, Constitutional
(United States Supreme Court) Efforts to influence executive agencies are not privileged acts. Not every public employee is a public official.
1 Citers


 
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