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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















International - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 32 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.


 
 Vallee And Others -v- Dumergue; 6-Jul-1849 - [1849] EngR 834; (1849) 4 Exch 290; (1849) 154 ER 1221
 
Boosey -v- Jefferys [1851] EngR 504; (1851) 6 Exch 580; (1851) 155 ER 675
20 May 1851


Intellectual Property, International

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Lumley -v- Gye (2); 14-Jan-1854 - [1854] EngR 95; (1854) 3 El & Bl 114; (1854) 118 ER 1083
 
Charles Jefferys -v- Thomas Boosey [1854] EngR 816; (1854) 4 HLC 815; (1854) 10 ER 681; [1854] UKPC 28
1 Aug 1854

Brougham, St Leonard LL
Intellectual Property, International
The object of 8 Anne, c. 19, was to encourage literature among British subjects, which description includes such foreigners as, by residence here, owe the Crown a temporary allegiance; and any such foreigner, first publishing his work here, is an "author" within the meaning of the statute, no matter where his work was composed, or whether he came here solely with a view to its publication.
Copyright commences by publication; if at that time the foreign author is not in this country, he is not a person whom the statute meant to protect.
An Englishman, though resident abroad, will have copyright in a work of his own first published in this country.
B, a foreign musical composer, resident at that time in his own country, assigned to R, another foreigner, also resident there, according to the law of their country, his right in a musical composition of which he was the author, and which was then unpublished. The assignee brought the composition to this country, and, before publication, assigned it, according to the form required by the law of this country, to an Englishman. The first publication, took place in this country :
Held, reversing the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that the foreign assignee had not, by the law of this country, any assignable copyright here in this musical composition.
Per Lords Brougham and St. Leonards.-Copyright did not exist at common law; it is the creature of statute.
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Secretary of State in Council of India -v- Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859) 13 Moo PCC 22
1859
PC
Lord Kingsdown
International
'The transactions of independent states between each other are governed by other laws than those which municipal courts administer: such courts have neither the means of deciding what is right, nor the power of enforcing any decision which they may make.'
1 Citers


 
Emperor of Austria -v- Day and Kossuth (1861) 2 Giff 628
1861

Lord Campbell LC, Lord Justice Turner
Crime, International
The defendants had printed banknotes in London. Kossuth intended to use the notes in Hungary after overthrowing the Emperor of Austria by revolution. The Emperor obtained an injunction restraining the defendants from continuing to manufacture them. The defendants appealed. Held: The injunction was upheld. One of the defences advanced was that the injunction should be refused because the proceedings were brought to protect the Emperor's political power and prerogatives. Lord Campbell LC:"if the suit were instituted merely to support his political power and prerogatives" he would have denied the Emperor the right to maintain the suit.
Lord Justice Turner agreed and noted that the bill put the plaintiff's case on three grounds: (i) violation of the rights and prerogative of the plaintiff as King of Hungary "by promotion of revolution and disorder and otherwise"; (ii) injury to the State of Hungary by the introduction of a spurious circulation into that kingdom; and (iii) injury to the subjects of the plaintiff by the same cause. There was no doubt that the court did not have jurisdiction to interfere on the grounds that the notes were intended to be used for the purpose of promoting revolution and disorder. He rejected the second ground saying the right of coining and issuing paper money is the prerogative of a sovereign: "so far, therefore, as this bill is founded upon the prerogative rights of the Plaintiff, or upon the political rights of his subjects" the injunction should be refused: "the prerogative rights of sovereigns seem to me, as at present advised, to stand very much upon the same footing as acts of State and matters of that description, with which the municipal courts of this country do not and cannot interfere".
But the court upheld the injunction on the third ground on which the bill was based. Lord Campbell was of the opinion that "if the acts meditated by the defendants and forbidden by this injunction were actually done, a pecuniary loss would be sustained by the plaintiff and by all his subjects, holders of the existing currency". The court has jurisdiction to protect property from an act which, if completed, would give a right of action. Lord Justice Turner said that the third ground on which the bill was based alleged a case of injury to the subjects of the kingdom, "an injury not to the political but to the private rights of the plaintiff's subjects". He concluded: "I agree that the jurisdiction of this Court in a case of this nature rests upon injury to property actual or prospective, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of acts which are merely criminal or merely illegal, and do not affect any rights of property, but I think there are here rights of property quite sufficient to found jurisdiction in this Court."
1 Citers



 
 Henry Wulff Trigge And Alfred Trigge -v- Flavien Lavallee; PC 5-Dec-1862 - [1862] EngR 1147; (1862) 15 Moo PC 270; (1862) 15 ER 497
 
Godfray -v- Godfray (1865) 3 Moo PC Privy Council Cases, 316
1865
PC

International
It is not legitimate to import the principles of English law into Jersey law relating to property rights, even if in any case this could be done.
1 Citers


 
Godard -v- Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139
1870

Blackburn J
Estoppel, International
A judgment in personam of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction cannot be questioned by the parties on the merits when recognition or enforcement of the judgment is sought in England, notwithstanding that it may have been wrong either in fact or law. This derived from the mode of pleading an action on a foreign judgment in debt, and not merely as evidence of the obligation to pay the underlying liability.
1 Citers


 
Rosario Messina -v- Eustachio P Petrococchino [1872] EngR 14; (1872) 8 Moo PC NS 375; (1872) 17 ER 352
3 Feb 1872
PC

International
A foreign judgment of a competent Court is conclusive and not open to examination by another Court, unless the judgment impeached carries on the face of it manifest error; as if it is shown to have been obtained by fraud, or wanting in the condition of natural justice. Such judgment cannot be applied to persons other than those who were parties to the litigation decided by it, except in cases where the judgment is in rem.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 In Re Oriental Inland Steam Company ex parte Scinde Railway Company; CA 1874 - (1874) LR 9 Ch App 557

 
 Regina -v- Keyn; 1876 - (1876) 2 Ex D 63

 
 Hatch -v- Baez; 1876 - (1876) 7 Hun 596
 
Twycross -v- Dreyfus (1877) LR 5 Ch D 605
1877
CA
Sir George Jessel MR
International, Jurisdiction
State immunity is not to be got around by suing the employees of the state. Here, the only possible case was against the state itself.
Sir George Jessel MR said: "the municipal law of this country does not enable the tribunals of this country to exercise any jurisdiction over foreign governments as such. Nor, so far as I am aware, is there any international tribunal which exercises any such jurisdiction. The result, therefore, is that these so-called bonds amount to nothing more than engagements of honour, binding, so far as engagements of honour can bind, the government which issues them, but are not contracts enforceable before the ordinary tribunals of any foreign government . . without the consent of the government of that country."
1 Citers



 
 The Parlement Belge; AdCt 1879 - (1879) 4 P D 129

 
 Baker -v- Selden; 1879 - (1879) 101 US 99
 
The Parlement Belge (1880) LR 5 PD 197
1879
CA
Brett LJ
International
An action in rem indirectly impleaded a sovereign who was the owner of the vessel served because his property was affected by the judgment of the court. An unincorporated treaty cannot change the law of the land and, "the immunity of the sovereign as is as least as great as the immunity of an ambassador."
Brett LJ said that the reason for a sovereign's immunity is "the character of the sovereign authority, its high dignity, whereby it is not subject to any superior authority of any kind," and he referred to Vattel's statement: "S'il est venu en voyageur, sa dignité seule, et ce qui est dû à la nation qu'il représente et qu'il gouverne, le met à couvert de toute insulte, lui assure des respects et toute sorte d'égards, et l'exempte de toute juridiction."
"From all these authorities it seems to us, although other reasons have sometimes been suggested, that the real principle on which the exemption of every sovereign from the jurisdiction of every court has been deduced is that the exercise of such jurisdiction would be incompatible with his regal dignity – that is to say, with his absolute independence of every superior authority. By a similar examination of authorities we come to the conclusion, although other grounds have sometimes been suggested, that the immunity of an ambassador from the jurisdiction of the courts of the country to which he is accredited is based upon his being the representative of the independent sovereign or state which sends him, and which sends him upon the faith of his being admitted to be clothed with the same independence of and superiority to all adverse jurisdiction as the sovereign authority whom he represents would be.
It has been held that an ambassador cannot be personally sued, although he has traded; and in both cases because such a suit would be inconsistent with the independence and equality of the state which he represents. If the remedy sought by an action in rem against public property is, as we think it is, an indirect mode of exercising the authority of the court against the owner of the property, then the attempt to exercise such an authority is an attempt inconsistent with the independence and equality of the state which is represented by such an owner. The property cannot upon the hypothesis be denied to be public property; the case is within the terms of the rule; it is within the spirit of the rule; therefore, we are of opinion that the mere fact of the ship being used subordinately and partially for trading purposes does not take away the general immunity."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 O'Kelly -v- Harvey; 1882 - (1882) 10 LR Ir 287
 
Cowley -v- Pulsifer (1884) 137 Mass 392
1884

Holmes J
International, Defamation
(United States - Supreme Court of Massachusetts) The court discussed the advantage nevertheless of having proceedings in public. Holmes J said: "The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings.
. . The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern, and that which we understand to be intended by the foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of justice.
. . It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed."
and "If these [the principles of open justice] are not the only grounds upon which fair reports of judicial proceedings are privileged, all will agree that they are not the least important ones. And it is clear that they have no application whatever to the contents of a preliminary written statement of a claim or charge. These do not constitute a proceeding in open court. Knowledge of them throws no light upon the administration of justice. Both form and contents depend wholly on the will of a private individual, who may not be even an officer of the court. It would be carrying privilege farther than we feel prepared to carry it, to say that by the easy means of entitling and filing it in a cause, a sufficient foundation may be laid for scattering any libel broadcast with impunity."
and . . "It may be objected that our reasoning tacitly assumes that papers properly filed in the clerk's office are not open to the inspection of the public. We do not admit that this is true, or that the reasons for the privilege accorded to the publication of proceedings in open court would apply to the publication of such papers, even if all the world had access to them. But we do not pause to discuss the question, because we are of opinion that such papers are not open to public inspection."
1 Citers


 
Wisconsin -v- Pelican Insurance Co (1888) 127 US 265
1888


International
(United States Supreme Court) The court considered the rules forbidding the application of foreign penal laws: "The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies, not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanours but to all suits in favour of the state for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue or other municipal laws and all judgments for such penalties".
1 Citers


 
Re Arnott ; ex parte Chief Official Receiver (1888) 60 LTNS 109; [1899] IR 201
1888

Cave J
Legal Professions, International
(Ireland) Cave J was asked whether a witness in bankruptcy proceedings (a solicitor's clerk) should be ordered to disclose the address of the debtor client, which had been communicated in confidence to the solicitor for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in relation to the bankruptcy proceedings. Cave J held that the witness was entitled to refuse to answer the question. He considered that the case was covered by Ex parte Campbell, which was binding on him and which "decides that this address was a matter of professional confidence".
Cave J reject a submission that the bankrupt and his solicitor were engaged in doing something wrong, and concluded: "Here proceedings had been taken against the debtor in bankruptcy, and he might wish to be advised as to them, and, in as much as there is a perfectly legitimate subject-matter for professional advice, we are not to assume, when such exists, that the solicitor was engaged in doing something wrong. I think it is of the highest importance that a man should be able to consult his solicitor without fear, and therefore I refuse this application."

 
Nouvion -v- Freeman (1889) 15 AC 1
1889
HL
Lord Herschell
Litigation Practice, International
A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may be final and binding, even though a right of appeal to a superior court remains open.
Lord Herschell stated on the question of finality or conclusiveness of a foreign judgment: "in order to establish that such a judgment has been pronounced it must be shown that in the court by which it was pronounced it conclusively, finally, and for ever established the existence of the debt of which it is sought to be made conclusive evidence in this country, so as to make it res judicata between the parties. If it is not conclusive in the same court which pronounced it, so that notwithstanding such a judgment the existence of the debt may between the same parties be afterwards contested in that Court, and upon proper proceedings being taken and such contest being adjudicated upon, it may be declared that there existed no obligation to pay the bet at all, then I do not think that a judgment which is of that character can be regarded as finally and conclusively evidencing the debt, as so entitling the person who has obtained the judgment to claim a decree from our Courts for the payment of that debt."
1 Citers


 
Antony Gibbs & Sons -v- La Societe Industrielle et Commerciale des Metaux (1890) 25 QBD 399
1890
CA
Lord Esher MR, Lindley and Lopes LJJ
Contract, International
The defendant had agreed to buy copper to be delivered in England by the plaintiff. The defendant refused to accept the copper and so was liable in damages to the plaintiff. The defendant, a French company, was placed in judicial liquidation in France and it was assumed that as a matter of French law, the defendant was discharged from its liability in damages. Held: Lord Esher MR held (at p.406) that French law was irrelevant because it was "not a law of the country to which the contract belongs, or one by which the contracting parties can be taken to have agreed to be bound; it is the law of another country by which they have not agreed to be bound."
1 Citers



 
 Davis -v- Beason, Sheriff; 3-Feb-1890 - 133 US 333 (1890); 33 L Ed 637; 10 SCt 299
 
New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company -v- Jopes (1891) 142 US 18
1891

Justice Brewer
International, Torts - Other
(United States Supreme Court) The test of necessity as a defence to an accusation of assault is one of the actual presence of imminent danger and a reasonably apparent necessity of taking such action as was taken: "We hold, therefore, that the record shows that the exception to this instruction was duly taken, and pass to a consideration of the principal question, and that is, whether such instruction contains a correct statement of the law applicable. Its import is, that if the conductor shot when there was in fact no actual danger, although, from the manner, attitude and conduct of the plaintiff, the former had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that an assault upon him with a deadly weapon was intended, and only fired to protect himself from such apprehended assault, the company was liable for compensatory damages. In this view of the law we think the learned court erred. It will be scarcely doubted that if the conductor was prosecuted criminally, it would be sufficient defence that he honestly believed he was in imminent danger, and had reasonable ground for such belief. In other words, the law of self-defence justifies an act done in honest and reasonable belief of immediate danger. The familiar illustration is, that if one approaches another, pointing a pistol and indicating an intention to shoot, the latter is justified by the rule of self-defence in shooting, even to death; and that such justification is not avoided by proof that the party killed was only intending a joke, and that the pistol in his hand was unloaded. Such a defence does not rest on the actual, but on the apparent facts and the honesty of belief in danger. … And the same rule of immunity extends to civil as to criminal cases. If the injury was done by the defendant in justifiable self-defence, he can neither be punished criminally nor held responsible for damages in a civil action. Because the act was lawful, he is wholly relieved from responsibility for its consequences."
1 Citers


 
Statham and Statham -v- Gaekwar of Baroda [1892] P 92
1892


International, Crime
The certificate of the Secretary of State confirmed the state immunity of the defendant.
1 Citers


 
D'Autremont -v- Fire Association of Philadelphia 65 Hun 475 (1892)
1892

Macomber J
Insurance, International
(USA) The insured was insane when he started a fire. The insurance company refused to pay. Held: The claim succeeded. Macomber J said: "In actions upon policies to cover damages occasioned by loss through fire, it is not a defence which the insurance company may avail itself of to show that the loss was caused by the carelessness, negligence, or want of care of the insured, or any of his agents or servants. The insurance company, in order to establish such a defence, must go further and show that the act was so grossly negligent as to indicate an intention to commit a fraud on the rights of the insurer . . I am unable to see that an insane person can form a fraudulent or wrongful design in the destruction of his own property, so as to defeat a policy of insurance thereon, any more than I can see that he could form a criminal intent in the commission of crime."
1 Citers


 
In re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385
1893

Vaughan Williams J
Company, Insolvency, International
Vaughan Williams J said: "One knows that where there is a liquidation of one concern the general principle is - ascertain what is the domicile of the company in liquidation; let the court of the country of domicile act as the principal court to govern the liquidation; and let the other courts act as ancillary, as far as they can, to the principal liquidation. But although that is so, it has always been held that the desire to assist in the main liquidation - the desire to act as ancillary to the court where the main liquidation is going on - will not ever make the court give up the forensic rules which govern the conduct of its own liquidation."(
1 Citers



 
 Curtin -v- Barton; 1893 - (1893) 139 NY 505
 
Mighell -v- Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 QB 149
1894
CA
Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ, Kay LJ
International
In 1885 the Sultan of Johore came to England, and according to the plaintiff, Miss Mighell, took the name Albert Baker and promised to marry her. Held: The Sultan was entitled to immunity even though up to the time of suit "he has perfectly concealed the fact that he is a sovereign, and has acted as a private individual." 'When once there is the authoritative certificate of the Queen through her minister of state as to the status of another sovereign, that in the courts of this country is decisive'.
To an argument that he had waived this immunity, the court held that the only way that a sovereign could waive immunity was by submitting to jurisdiction in the face of the court as, for example, by appearance to a writ. If the sovereign ignored the issue of the writ, the court was under a duty of its own motion to recognise his immunity from suit.
1 Citers



 
 Underhill -v- Hernandez; 29-Nov-1897 - (1897) 168 US 250; [1897] USSC 197; 18 SCt 83; 42 L.Ed. 456
 
Pemberton -v- Hughes [1899] 1 Ch 781
1899
CA
Lindley MR
International
Lindley MR said: 'There is no doubt that the courts of this country will not enforce the decisions of foreign courts which have no jurisdiction in the sense explained above - i.e., over the subject matter or over the persons brought before them . . But the jurisdiction which alone is important in these matters is the competence of the court in an international sense - i.e., its territorial competence over the subject matter and over the defendant. Its competence or jurisdiction in any other sense is not regarded as material by the courts of this country.'"
1 Citers


 
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