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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Insurance - From: 1999 To: 1999

This page lists 48 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.

 
A S Screenprint Ltd -v- British Reserve Insurance Co Ltd [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 430
1999
CA
Hobhouse LJ
Insurance
The Plaintiffs were insured under a policy that indemnified them, "against all sums which the Insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of…loss or damage…during the period of insurance and caused by goods (including containers) … altered … or treated in the course of the Business…". The plaintiffs were supplied with boards by a customer, LMG, to be screenprinted. The plaintiffs carried out the work, and redelivered the boards to LMG which in turn supplied them to Mars to make boxes for Maltesers. Mars complained that the packaging had contaminated the sweets. LMG claimed from the plaintiffs (1) the sum it had paid Mars as compensation for the contamination and (2) loss of profits on further orders from Mars. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were entitled to an indemnity from insurers if they were held liable for LMG's loss of profits. Held: if the plaintiffs were liable for the loss of profits, the liability did not fall within the terms of the cover. (Hobhouse LJ) "The indemnity is in respect of sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay. There is no problem about that because the declaration asked for assumes that there will be such a legal liability. If there is no such legal liability then of course there is no liability to indemnify. It goes on. "Legally liable to pay" has to be "in respect of" - I stress the words "in respect of" - "death, bodily injury, illness, loss or damage happening anywhere in the World (excluding the United States of America and Canada) during the period of insurance". The liability to pay has to be in respect of what, in its context, is clearly some physical event. It is something which can be said to have happened somewhere. It is an event which is happening during the period of the insurance. The event can be death, bodily injury, illness or loss or damage. The words "loss or damage" must, in my judgment, be construed in context as something that relates to a physical event. It goes on: "And caused by goods (including containers) … supplied … or created in the course of the Business" of the insured. There is no difficulty about that last step provided it is understood what it relates to. The plaintiffs in the present case did treat and/or supply printed material. They treated it for LMG or supplied it to them. That supply of those goods has caused further events. It has caused the contamination of the package itself and it has caused the contamination of the Maltesers. So the plaintiffs are able to progress from the third element to the second element, namely they can show the goods which they treated have caused damage - which is a physical event occurring somewhere and occurring during the period of insurance - to the packaging and to the Maltesers. That is the limit of what they can prove as a matter of physical causation. One then asks whether the legal liability to pay is in respect of that loss or damage. It is at this point that, in my judgment, the train of reasoning upon which the plaintiff's argument has to be based breaks down. They have to progress from legal liability in respect of the damage to the packaging and damage to the Maltesers to a loss of goodwill by LMG and loss of profits over a period in the future. The loss of profit in 1990, 1991 and 1992 are not events which are either directly or indirectly covered by this policy. They cannot be correctly described as loss or damage which has happened somewhere; nor have they happened at least partially during the period of insurance. The conclusion at which I arrive is similar to that of the judge: the relevant head of loss is not caused by any defects in the packaging but is caused by Mars choosing not to place further orders with LMG. The same point can be demonstrated by appreciating that causation is, in the context of this cover, a physical concept: the loss or damage has to happen physically during the period of insurance. It is not possible to treat a liability to pay compensation in respect of an economic loss which arises from a loss of goodwill as being in respect of physical loss or damage physically caused. Loss of goodwill is not covered by this policy. The plaintiffs have failed to bring themselves within the relevant part of the cover. The declaration made by the judge was correct."
1 Citers


 
Kingscroft Insurance Company Limited, Walbrook Insurance Company Limited etc -v- The Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Company Limited (No 2) [1999] Lloyd’s Insurance and Reinsurance Law Reports 603
1999


Insurance, Contract
An expert witness: "can, and indeed should inform the court of any aspects of the commercial background which have a bearing on the construction of the contract and explain their relevance".
1 Citers



 
 Sprung -v- Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd; CA 1999 - [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep IR 111
 
Rodan International Limited -v- Commercial Union [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 495
1999
CA
Hobhouse LJ
Insurance
The claimants sold bulk soap powder. The packager packed it in defective cardboard which caused it to cake. The buyer sought damages.for breach of contract against Rodan (i) for the difference between the sound value of the powder and its reduced value in its damaged state; (ii) expenses incurred in extra handling; (iii) the cost of the cartons which had been ordered in anticipation of further deliveries of powder from Rodan which Newbrite did not then order; (iv) loss of future sales by reason of damage to Newbrite's brand name. Rodan were insured with the respodent. Held: The claimants claimed an indemnity against, "all sums which the Insured shall become legally liable to pay for compensation…in respect of any Occurrence to which this cover applies…in connection with the Business." "Occurrences" were defined as, amongst other things, "Loss of or physical damage to physical property not belonging to the Insured...". The soap powder was defective in that it caused the cartons to stain and absorb moisture so that, in turn, the powder itself became caked. The claimants had to pay Newbrite compensation for (1) Newbrite's losses incurred in selling off the balance of the powder at reduced prices; (2) Newbrite's additional costs incurred in the handling rejected and unsold powder; (3) the cost of unused cartons into which Newbrite had intended to pack further soap powder from the claimants; and (4) Newbrite's loss of anticipated profits for eighteen months.
Held: (Majority) Items (1) and (2) to be within the scope of the insuring clause, but outside cover by reason of one of the exclusions; and the whole court found items (3) and (4) to be outside the scope of the insuring clause. (Hobhouse LJ) "In my judgment on the facts found by the Official Referee, Judge Kershaw was right to include as a consequence of that Occurrence the damage that was caused to the commodity itself, that is to say the caking of the powder which was caused by the hygroscopic effect of the staining of the cartons which had been caused by a defect in the commodity. But I do not consider that Judge Kershaw was right to construe the clause as if an Occurrence could include mere damage caused by the commodity to itself. Such a construction fails to give effect to the natural meaning of the language which clearly contemplates that the commodity will cause physical damage to something else. Further, that view would contemplate that, without more, the products liability policy could cover deterioration in the commodity supplied. In my judgment the correct analysis is that that there was an Occurrence - the staining of the cartons - of which a consequence was the damage to the commodity - the caking of the powder. Thus in considering what liability on the part of Rodan has arisen from the Occurrence one also has to take account of that physical consequence of the Occurrence.
The next step in the analysis is to consider which, if any, of the Items of damage are referable to a legal liability of Rodan to pay compensation "in respect of" the Occurrence. It is hard to see what effect Judge Kershaw was giving to the words "in respect of". He seems to have treated them as equivalent to "arising out of the same cause of action as gave rise to the assured's liability for the Occurrence". He does not seem to have asked himself whether the relevant Item represented a liability to pay compensation in respect of the Occurrence. This is most clearly illustrated by his conclusion that Rodan were entitled to an indemnity in respect of their liability for future loss of profits and expenditure thrown away on the purchase of cartons to be used for further powder that it was intended should be supplied by Rodan to Newbrite but never was. These future losses of Newbrite related not to the supply of the 80 tons but to the non-supply or the non-acceptance of further powder. They certainly do not relate to any physical consequence of the damage to the cartons in which the 80 tons were packed by Newbrite's packers. The phrase "in respect of" carries with it a requirement that the liability relate to the identified Occurrence. It is not sufficient that it should simply have had some connection with the Occurrence.
The effect of the decision of the judge to treat the words "in respect of the Occurrence" as meaning no more than "in connection with the same causes of action as gave rise to the liability for the Occurrence" transforms this cover from a products liability cover to a policy covering general contractual liabilities. A products liability policy in which the cover provided is defined in words such as those used in the present policy is confined to liability for physical consequences caused by the commodity or article supplied. The liability of the assured in damages will have to be expressed in terms of money but that liability must be in respect of the consequences of the physical loss or damage to physical property (or some personal - "bodily" - injury).
Provided that the commodity or article supplied has caused the physical consequence, the compensation payable by the assured to the third party will include, and the liability of the insurer to indemnify the assured, will extend to the totality of the loss which the third party is entitled to recover from the assured by way of damages in respect of that physical consequence. Thus, if a defective article supplied by the assured causes bodily injury to the third party disabling him or, for example, causes his premises to be destroyed by fire, the third party will be entitled to recover from the assured the full value of what he has lost which will, in the two examples I have given, include compensation for future loss of earnings. They are part of what the third party has lost as a consequence of the physical loss or injury and they are accordingly part of the liability of the assured in respect of that physical consequence.
Items 3 and 4 in the claim of Newbrite were not of such a character. They relate to the future non-performance of obligations of Rodan towards Newbrite. They do not relate to any quantification of the loss which Newbrite suffered as a result of the relevant physical Occurrence, the staining of the cartons in which Newbrite packed the first 80 tons delivered. In my judgment the judge's decision in favour of Rodan on Items 3 and 4 was clearly wrong and cannot stand."
1 Citers


 
In Re Friends' Provident Life Office Times, 04 January 1999; Gazette, 27 January 1999
4 Jan 1999
ChD

Insurance
When a policy of re-insurance is returned to the re-insurer, the policy is thereby determined, and can no longer be long term insurance business and the policies having been finished were not transferred and the court was unable to approve a transfer.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Burns -v- Shuttlehurst Ltd and Others Times, 12 January 1999; Gazette, 10 February 1999
12 Jan 1999
CA

Personal Injury, Insurance, Litigation Practice
A claim for an indemnity under a contract of insurance though in respect of personal injuries was not itself an action for damages for personal injuries and so no order could be made for pre-action discovery.
Supreme Court Act 1981 33(2)

 
In Re Continental Assurance Company of London Plc (In Liquidation) (2) Gazette, 10 February 1999; Times, 14 January 1999
14 Jan 1999
ChD

Insurance, Insolvency, Company
The rules are intended to provide a comprehensive and unitary scheme of management of company liquidations, and in voluntary liquidation, the date of the resolution commencing the dissolution is to be used as the date of the winding up order.
Insurance Companies (Winding Up) Rules 1985 95 L2


 
 Jacobs -v- Coster, Avon Insurance; CA 25-Jan-1999 - [1999] EWCA Civ 647; [2000] Lloyd's Rep IR 506
 
Printpak -v- Agf Insurance Limited Times, 03 February 1999; [1999] EWCA Civ 683
29 Jan 1999
CA

Insurance
A commercial fire policy which broke its warranties and provisions into sections did not evade cover when a breach of one section did not withdraw cover because that section excluded the provisions of the Act.
Marine Insurance Act 1906 33(3)
[ Bailii ]
 
J. Kirkaldy & Sons Ltd -v- Walker [1999] EWHC 839 (Comm)
9 Feb 1999
ComC

Insurance

[ Bailii ]
 
Sphere Drake Insurance Plc and Another -v- Orion Insurance Company Plc [1999] EWHC 286 (Comm)
11 Feb 1999
ComC
Langley J
Insurance
ComC Multi-party run-off agreement made in 1975 to govern parties’ contributions towards run-off based on estimates of likely claims– asbestos-related claims led to final liabilities being vastly greater than estimates permitted. Orion, administration company under the agreement, sought substantial additional contributions from the other original parties to the 1975 agreement. First instance decision in favour of Orion for increased contribution from Sphere Drake; upheld Court of Appeal – 1975 agreement not intended to be final and binding. Finding dependent largely on evidence of one witness. Sphere-Drake pursuant to Tomlin order sought contribution from other original party (Baloise). New court of first instance held 1975 agreement final and binding. Witness now dead, evidence held to have been unreliable. Sphere Drake sued Orion. Issues: perjury – whether open to court to find deceased witness committed perjury – whether party on whose behalf witness called liable for perjury of witness (“attribution issue”) – whether material – test of materiality – whether Sphere Drake precluded from action against Orion by own election to claim against Baloise. Held: Deceased witness had not committed perjury. Allegations against Orion directors were unfounded. [Issues of law held not to be material to Judge’s findings, but considered.]
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Paldano -v- Sun Alliance Life [1999] EWCA Civ 833
19 Feb 1999
CA

Insurance
The life assured died in an accidental fire - insurance company avoiding policy on basis that had not disclosed adverse health history and smoking habit.
[ Bailii ]
 
Card Protection Plan Ltd -v- Commissioners of Customs and Excise Times, 18 March 1999; C-349/96; [1999] STC 270; [1999] 2 AC 601
25 Feb 1999
ECJ

European, Scotland, VAT, Insurance
A company procuring insurance purchases for credit card protection was as exempt from VAT as was the insurer. A provision which restricted the ability to claim such exemption to those registered as insurers under national was invalid under European Law: "it is for the national court to determine … whether the transactions . . are to be regarded for VAT purposes as comprising two independent supplies . . or whether one of those two supplies is the principal supply to which the other is ancillary, so that it receives the same tax treatment as the principal supply." What matters is "the essential features of the transaction". "There is a single supply in particular in cases where one or more elements are to be regarded as constituting the principal service, whilst one or more elements are to be regarded, by contrast, as ancillary services which share the tax treatment of the principal service. A service must be regarded as ancillary to a principal service if it does not constitute for customers an aim in itself, but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied . ."
As to what amounted to insurance, the court said: "the essentials of an insurance transaction are, as generally understood, that the insurer undertakes, in return for prior payment of a premium, to provide the insured, in the event of materialisation of the risk covered, with the service agreed when the contract was concluded.
It is not essential that the service the insurer has undertaken to provide in the event of loss consists in the payment of a sum of money, as that service may also take the form of the provision of assistance in cash or in kind of the type listed in the annex Directive 73/239 as amended by Directive 84/641. There is no reason for the interpretation of the term 'insurance' to differ according to whether it appears in the Directive on insurance or in the Sixth Directive."
Directive 73/239
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina -v- Commissioners of Customs and Excise ex parte Lunn Poly Limited and Bishopsgate Insurance Limited; CA 26-Feb-1999 - Times, 11 March 1999; Gazette, 31 March 1999; [1999] EWCA Civ 867
 
Commissioners Of Customs & Excise -v- Lunn Poly Limited, Bishopsgate Insurance [1999] EWCA Civ 868
26 Feb 1999
CA

Customs and Excise, Insurance

[ Bailii ]

 
 G and GB Hewitt Ltd -v- SAa Namur-Assurances Du Credit; CA 8-Mar-1999 - Gazette, 10 March 1999; Times, 08 March 1999
 
Wurttembergische Aktiengesellschaft Versicherungs - Beteili Gungsesellschaft (Formerly Wurttembergische Feuerversicherung Ag) and Wurttembergische Versicherung Ag -v- Home Insurance Company [1999] EWCA Civ 934; [1999] EWCA Civ 933
9 Mar 1999
CA
Lady Justice Butler-Sloss Lord Justice Brooke Lord Justice Aldous
Insurance
Insurance was issued by a pool of insurers. One company failed to meet its obligations, and the court had to decide how the defaulted payment was to be contributed from other pool members and the re-insurers. The parties had thought that the risks were merely of run-off liability, but the risks had been massively increased by asbestos claims in the US. Held: The risks covered by the re-insurance related to business written through one syndicate, and did not relate to the instant risks which arose from insolvency. The re-insurance did not cover the obligation to meet the contribution expected from the insolvent pool member. The appeal failed.
[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Kuwait Airways Corporation and Another -v- Kuwait Insurance Company SAK and others; HL 11-Mar-1999 - [1999] UKHL 12
 
Sanger & Apter -v- Beazley [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 424
12 Mar 1999
ComC
Longmore J
Insurance
ComC Unattended vehicle - driver leaving to go to lavatory - asserting he washed hands at tap.

 
Presidential Insurance Company -v- Molly Hosein Stafford [1999] UKPC 14
22 Mar 1999
PC
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Sir Andrew Leggatt
Commonwealth, Insurance
PC (Trinidad and Tobago) Mrs Stafford obtained judgment against a driver insured by the appellant. He was unable to satisfy the claim and she sought recovery from the insurers. They claimed that their liability was limited. Held: The liability was governed by the section, but the limit referred to the amount of the judgment, and did not limit the interest which accrued on it whilst it remained unsatisfied. She was also entitled to the costs of the action and interest upon those costs. Order accordingly.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]

 
 Society of Lloyd's -v- Robinson and Another; HL 25-Mar-1999 - Times, 29 March 1999; Gazette, 03 June 1999; [1999] 1 WLR 756; [1999] UKHL 22
 
Companhia De Seguros Imperio -v- Heath (Rebx) Ltd and others [1999] EWHC 285 (Comm)
30 Mar 1999
ComC
Langley J
Limitation, Insurance, Torts - Other, Agency
ComC Insurer/reinsurer claimed damages from brokers for breach of written binding authority agreements made in 1970s - claim in tort for breaches of fiduciary duties and of duties coextensive to those under the agreements – also claim for negligent misstatement/misrepresentation. Application for leave to amend particulars of claim to claim indemnity. Application to strike out/dismiss for want of prosecution RSC Order 19, r. 1. Limitation – Limitation Act – whether limitation applicable in claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Cape Plc -v- The Iron Trades Employers Insurance Assc Ltd [1999] PIQR Q212
21 Apr 1999

Rix J
Insurance, Personal Injury
ComC An exclusion in an employers' liability policy of "pneumoconiosis" (fibrosis of the lungs caused by the inhalation of dust) does not embrace mesothelioma (cancer of the pleura or peritoneum caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust) - Asbestosis (pneumoconiosis caused by inhalation of asbestos dust) was therefore within the exclusion, but mesothelioma was not. There was no case for rectification of the policy to extend the exclusion to all asbestos related diseases, and even if there had been, the remedy of rectification would fail for laches in circumstances where the issue had been seen by the insurer in 1969 but not raised with the insured until points of defence in the 1995 proceedings. The insurer's case of estoppel by convention or acquiescence failed. The insurer's case of non-disclosure of mesothelioma claims failed, since there were only two relevant such claims, the insurer knew in general that its insured would be receiving such claims, it was not clear that the cause of death was ascribed to mesothelioma as distinct from mesothelioma due to asbestosis, the normal arrangement between the parties was for the insured to provide claims records in only general terms without differentiations as to disease, and in any event no inducement was proved.

 
Cape Plc -v- The Iron Trades Employers [1999] EWHC 840 (Comm); [2004] Lloyd's Rep IR 75; [1999] PIQR Q212
21 Apr 1999
ComC
Rix J
Insurance
The court was asked whether the defendants, who during the policy years 1966/1971 were employers' liability insurers with an exception in respect of "claims arising from Pneumoconiosis or Pneumoconiosis accompanied by tuberculosis" agreed to cover, or to exclude as part of that exception, the plaintiffs' liability to employees in respect of injury or disease caused by mesothelioma. Was the term "pneumoconiosis" used as a catch-all word to cover all asbestos related disease caused by inhalation of asbestos dust ("asbestos related disease"), including therefore mesothelioma, or was it rather used in a strict medical sense as meaning fibrosis of the lungs caused by inhalation of dust, which it is common ground is a different disease from that of mesothelioma?
[ Bailii ]
 
Pride Valley Foods Limited -v- Independent Insurance Company Limited; Lombard General Insurance Company Limited and Bishop Skinner Norther Limited [1999] EWCA Civ 1241
22 Apr 1999
CA

Insurance
Avoidance of insurance policy for non-disclosure.
[ Bailii ]
 
Kapur -v- J W Francis and Co [1999] EWCA Civ 1430
18 May 1999
CA

Insurance, Professional Negligence
Notwithstanding a finding by a High Court Judge that Mr Kapur "had shaded the truth", and "lacked frankness in his evidence", the Court set aside a credibility finding on the basis that not only was there a lack of reasoning as to why the Judge preferred Mr Kapur’s evidence, but that no such finding could appropriately have been made.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Quinta Communications SA (a Body Corporate Under the Laws of France) -v- Malcolm Warrington (Sued on her Own Behalf and on Behalf of and As Representative Lloyd's Underwriter for All Those Underwriters at Lloyd's Subscribing Policy No Bx97/11366165) [1999] EWCA Civ 1450
20 May 1999
CA

Insurance

[ Bailii ]

 
 Gan Insurance Company Limited and Another -v- Tai Ping Insurance Company Limited; CA 28-May-1999 - [1999] EWCA Civ 1524
 
S Rubin -v- New Hampshire Assurance Company [1999] EWCA Civ 1624
18 Jun 1999
CA

Insurance

[ Bailii ]

 
 FNCB Ltd -v- Barnet Devanney and Co Ltd; CA 1-Jul-1999 - Gazette, 14 July 1999; Times, 28 September 1999; [1999] EWCA Civ 1729

 
 FNCB Ltd -v- Barnet Devanney and Co Ltd; CA 1-Jul-1999 - Gazette, 14 July 1999; Times, 28 September 1999; [1999] EWCA Civ 1729
 
In the Matter of Friends Provident Life Office and Friends Provident Linked Life Assurance Limited Times, 26 July 1999; [1999] EWCA Civ 1872
16 Jul 1999
CA

Insurance
Where a re-insurer transferred his entire re-insurance business as one whole, that transfer remained a transfer of long term business requiring the sanction of the court to the scheme. The policies were discharged by operation of law, not by the transfer itself, because of the distinction between the transfer of liabilities, and a surrender of the rights inhering in the insured.
Insurance Companies Act 1982
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Heathfield -v- Owen [1999] EWCA Civ 1863
16 Jul 1999
CA

Insurance, Negligence

1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
MDIS Limited (Formerly Mcdonnell Information Systems Limited) -v- Swinbank London and Edinburgh Insurance Company Limited Aegon Insurance Company (Uk) Limited [1999] EWCA Civ 1884; [1999] EWCA Civ 1883; [1999] 2 All ER (Comm.) 722
19 Jul 1999
CA
Clarke LJ
Insurance, Contract
Clarke LJ discussed the process of construction: "in any process of construction it is appropriate to take the language of the particular clause as the starting point. It is, however, not in dispute that the words used must be considered in the context of the particular clause as a whole and that the clause must in turn be considered in the context of the policy as a whole, which must in its turn be set in its surrounding circumstances or factual matrix. Moreover, as Lord Hoffmann pointed out in the now well-known case of Investors Compensation Ltd v Hopkin & Sons (a firm), Alford v West Bromwich Building Society, Armitage v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98 at 114, [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912-913 interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract, and the meaning of the document is what the parties using the relevant words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean."
[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Prudential Assurance Company Ltd -v- Bibby (Inspector of Taxes); ChD 24-Jul-1999 - Times, 24 July 1999

 
 Aldrich; Day; Civardi; Biggs and others -v- Norwich Union Life Insurance Company Limited (Formerly Known As Norwich Union Life Insurance Society); CA 30-Jul-1999 - [1999] EWCA Civ 2042
 
Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Limited (In Liquidation) -v- Johnson and Higgins Limited [1999] EWCA Civ 2035
30 Jul 1999
CA
Evans LJ, Aldous LJ, Ward LJ
Insurance, Damages

[ Bailii ]
 
Aldrich; Charles Day; Todd Civardi; Henrietta Biggs and others -v- Norwich Union Life Insurance Company Limited (Formerly known as Norwich Union Life Insurance Society) [1999] EWCA Civ 2041
30 Jul 1999
CA

Insurance

[ Bailii ]
 
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society -v- Qureshi and Another; Aldrich and Others -v- Norwich Union Life Insurance Co Ltd Times, 13 August 1999
13 Aug 1999
CA

Financial Services, Equity, Insurance
The provider of endowment insurance, has a duty of utmost good faith to an insured, but need disclose only matters which are material to the risk. Such facts need not include every fact which might affect the decision to enter into any contract collateral to the insurance contract. Duties under the Financial Services Act did not extend this duty.
Financial Services Act 1986 47

 
Martini -v- McGinn [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 313
23 Sep 1999
ComC
Longmore J
Insurance
Volcanic eruption - whether explosion within insurance policy - leave to defend.

 
Kenecott Utah Copper Corp -v- Cornhill Insurance Plc and others [1999] EWHC 288 (Comm)
12 Oct 1999
ComC
Langley J
Insurance
ComC Construction of reinsurance policy terms – whether or not industrial premises where loss suffered had attached to operational policy at time of loss by operation of policy terms, or subsequent endorsement or oral agreement - Misrepresentation – non-disclosure – whether loss excluded by exclusion clause. Issues of causation and loss precluded from consideration by earlier order.
[ Bailii ]
 
Garrow -v- Society of Lloyd's Times, 28 October 1999; Gazette, 03 November 1999
28 Oct 1999
CA

Insurance, Contract
A proper counterclaim against Lloyd's of London for fraudulent misrepresentation with an amount at stake equal to the amount claimed was a proper basis for setting aside a statutory demand for a sum due to Lloyd's, despite the existence of a deed requiring members to 'pay now and sue later' which purported to disallow counterclaims and set-off.
1 Cites


 
Callaghan -v- Hedges [1999] EWHC 846 (Comm); [2000] CLC 360; [2000] Lloyd's Rep IR 125
3 Nov 1999
ComC
David Steel J
Insurance
The claimants owned a discotheque insured through the defendants. When it burned down the defendants refused cover saying that the building had been substantially overvalued.
[ Bailii ]
 
Groupama Navigation Et Transports -v- Catatumbo Ca Seguros [1999] EWHC 845 (Comm)
4 Nov 1999
ComC
David Steel J
Insurance, Transport

[ Bailii ]
 
Lloyd'S Litigation Note Times, 04 November 1999
4 Nov 1999
QBD

Insurance
Any former name at Lloyd's who wished to claim fraud against the Lloyd's underwriters as to the basis on which they subscribed in view of impending asbestos litigation, must contact and notify the solicitors involved in the group action or otherwise risk debarment from later advancing such allegations.

 
Arab Bank Plc -v- John D Wood Commercial Ltd (In Liquidation) and others Times, 25 November 1999; Gazette, 08 December 1999; [2000] 1 WLR 857
25 Nov 1999
CA
Mance L.J
Damages, Insurance, Banking
Having once recovered damages against a valuer for a negligent survey, there was nothing to stop a lender recovering also under a policy of insurance under a mortgage indemnity guarantee, and so the lender was not required to give credit for monies already received. Such policies were taken out for the benefit of the lender not the borrower, and the insurance company being subrogated to the lender, no double recovery was involved.
1 Citers


 
Youell -v- Kara Mara Shipping Company Ltd and others Times, 10 April 2000; [2000] CLC 1058; [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 102
29 Nov 1999
ComC
Longmore J
Jurisdiction, Insurance
The parties were in dispute arising from matters covered by an insurance policy which provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts in settling any such dispute. One party obtained judgment under the laws of Louisiana, and sought to enforce it here. The court refused to do so. The parties had been entitled to an anti-suit action against the action in Louisiana. The action there could only be judged after the court here had looked at jurisdiction. The exclusive jurisdiction clause precluded the validity of the judgment.
ComC Anti-Suit Injunction. Whether application to be heard pending challenge to English jurisdiction.
1 Citers


 
Kuwait Airways Corporation and Another -v- Kuwait Insurance Company SAK and others [1999] EWHC 281 (Comm)
15 Dec 1999
ComC
Langley J
Insurance
Application by Claimant for summary judgment/ interim payment of US $150m. Defendants insured Claimant in respect of war risk – Claimant’s air fleet and substantial quantities of spare parts seized on Iraqi invasion of Kuwait – several aircraft and spares subsequently recovered. At Issue: Basis for division of credit between insured and insurer for recoveries of spares and aircraft – whether losses/recoveries to be disaggregated on “aircraft by aircraft” basis. Valuation – whether value of recoveries to be valued according to schedule in the policy or at actual market value at the time of recovery. Whether aircraft recoveries fall to be credited against aircraft recovery limit in policy only and spares recoveries against spares recovery limits in policy only, or whether combined recoveries fall to be credited top down against total limit. Likely amount of total recovery – Interim payment of $150m ordered against Defendant.
[ Bailii ]
 
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