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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Insurance - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 34 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.

 
Rogerson -v- Scottish Automobile and General Insurance Co Ltd (1931) 48 TLR 17
1931
HL

Insurance


 
Morris -v- Britannic Assurance Co 100 LJ KB 263; [1931] 2 KB 125; 145 LT 45; 75 SJ 206; 47 TLR 318
1931

MacKinnon J
Insurance
Prima facie a reference to a 'child' in a statute or legal instrument means a child born within wedlock, but the word can be read more widely. Under the Act, which dealt with industrial assurance for the funeral expenses of children, the word should be read to include illegitimate children.
Friendly Societies Act 1896 1(b)

 
Holmes -v- Scottish Legal Life Assurance Society (1932) TLR 30
1932
KBD
Swift J
Insurance
There had been an honest misstatement made by a son about his father's health in a proposal form for a life insurance. The proposal form was made "the basis of the contract" and there was a further provision in the policy that it could be avoided if the insured had made any "fraudulent or untrue" statement. Held: Swift J said: "The claimant had stated in the proposal form that his father's health was good, and had agreed that the truth of this statement should be the basis of the contract. The misstatement, therefore, though innocent, was a warranty. And in the body of the policy the claimant further agreed that the policy should be avoided if he had made any untrue statement on matters material to the insurance, and this clearly included innocent misstatements as well as fraudulent statements. The rules [of the defendant society] did not affect the matter and were not inconsistent with the other provisions of the contract. It was unfortunate for the claimant, but, if a person warranted that the statement was true when he had in fact no means of knowing whether it was true of all is, and if ultimately he had to admit that it was false, his insurance was gone."
1 Citers



 
 Ellerbeck Collieries tLd -v- Cornhill Insurance Co; CA 1932 - [1932] 1 KB 401
 
Haseldine -v- Hosken [1933] 1 K B 822
1933


Insurance
The court asked whether an insurance taken for the benefit of third parties was invalidated by the criminal act of the insured. The upholding of the policy was justified in relation to unlawful killing by the manner of driving a motor vehicle on the ground that an overriding public policy requires the existence of valid insurance in such circumstances for the benefit of the family of the victim.
1 Citers


 
Vandepitte -v- Preferred Accident Insurance Corp. of New York [1933] AC 70
1933
PC
Lord Wright
Contract, Insurance
The plaintiff was injured in a motor accident. He failed in a direct claim against the insurers of the negligent defendant driver. The insurance was effected by the father (Mr Berry) of the negligent driver and provided that an indemnity would be available to an authorised driver. Held: The Board rejected the claim as there was no evidence that the father had contracted on behalf of anybody but himself nor that he intended to create a beneficial interest for his daughter. The policy expressly provided that it should benefit a third party (the daughter) and, in effect, a person injured by her negligent driving. However, if a trust is created and if the trust refuses to enforce an obligation, the beneficiary may sue for enforcement, joining the trustee as a defendant
Lord Wright: "No doubt at common law no one can sue on a contract except those who are contracting parties … the rule is stated by Lord Haldane in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co.: "My Lords, in the law of England certain principles are fundamental. One is that only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our law knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio arising by way of contract. Such a right may be conferred by way of property, as, for example, under a trust, but it cannot be conferred on a stranger to a contract as a right to enforce the contract in personam." In that case, as in Tweddle v Atkinson, only questions of direct contractual rights in law were in issue, but Lord Haldane states the equitable principle which qualifies the legal rule, and which has received effect in many cases, as, for instance, Robertson v. Wait; Affrétéurs Réunis Société Anonyme v. Leopold Walford (London), Ld.; Lloyd's v. Harper – namely, that a party to a contract can constitute himself a trustee for a third party of a right under the contract and thus confer such rights enforceable in equity on the third party. The trustee then can take steps to enforce performance to the beneficiary by the other contracting party as in the case of other equitable rights. The action should be in the name of the trustee; if, however, he refuses to sue, the beneficiary can sue, joining the trustee as a defendant. But, though the general rule is clear, the present question is whether R.E. Berry can be held in this case to have constituted such a trust. But here again the intention to constitute the trust must be affirmatively proved: the intention cannot necessarily be inferred from the mere general words of the policy."
1 Citers



 
 Piddington -v- Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd; 1934 - [1934] 2 KB 236
 
Revell -v- London General Insurance Co [1934] 50 Lloyd's Rep 114
1934

MacKinnon J
Contract, Insurance
MacKinnon J said: "if there is an ambiguity in this question so that upon one view of the reasonable meaning which is conveyed to the reasonable reader of it the answer was not false, the company cannot say that on the other meaning of the words the answer was untrue so as to invalidate the policy".
1 Citers


 
Gravesend Corporation -v- Kent County Council [1935] 1KB 339
1935
KBD
Lord Wright
Trusts, Insurance
A school vested in the Corporation had been built with the assistance of financial contributions from the County Council. As a result of various legislative changes the County Council replaced the Corporation as the education authority and as the user of the school. The main questions were whether the County Council had to pay the Corporation rent for their use of the school and whether the County Council, by its contributions to the costs of building and maintaining the school, had acquired an equitable interest in the premises. Held: “... though the legal estate in the school is vested in the Gravesend council, the county council have an equitable estate or interest in it in the proportion that the total sums contributed by the county council bear to the total cost on the principles very simply and clearly stated by Farwell L.J. in The Venture ” and "On this basis the full rent must be reduced in favour of the county council to the extent of this equitable interest or resulting trust pro tanto”.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Beresford -v- Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1937] 2 KB 197
1937
CA
Lord Wright MR, Romer and Scott LJJ
Wills and Probate, Insurance
Major Beresford had shot himself. The court considered the applicability of the forfeiture rule in a case involving a suicide: "suicide when sane is by English law a felony. This has been so from very early times. The law is thus succinctly stated by Stephen in his Digest of the Criminal Law (art. 319): "A person who kills himself in a manner which in the case of another person would amount to murder is guilty of murder, and every person who aids and abets any person in so killing himself is an accessory before the fact, or a principal in the second degree in such murder." Hence, where there has been what is called a suicide pact between two persons and one survives the survivor is guilty of murder . . This being the nature of felo de se by English law, and as the plaintiff, as personal representative, stands in the shoes of the assured who has committed, as it were, murder on himself, the present claim is equivalent technically to a claim brought by a murderer or his representative or assigns on a policy effected by the murderer on the life of the murdered man. In the latter case it is, we think clear that neither the murderer nor his estate nor his assigns could take a benefit under the policy. " Lord Wright discussed the ex turpi principle: "The principle (that the court will not allow a criminal or his representative to reap by the judgment of the court the fruits of his crime) has been applied....in many decisions dealing with varied states of fact and applications of the same or similar principle. These are all illustrations of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio . The maxim itself, notwithstanding the dignity of a learned language, is, like most maxims, lacking in precise definition."
1 Citers



 
 Beresford -v- Royal Insurance Co Ltd; HL 1938 - [1938] AC 586; [1938] 2 All ER 602
 
Herbert -v- Railway Passenger Assurance Company [1938] 60 LlR 143
1938


Insurance

1 Citers


 
Re Sinclair [1938] Ch 199
1938

Sir Christopher Farwell
Insurance, Wills and Probate

1 Citers



 
 Peters -v- General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Ltd; 1938 - [1938] 2 All ER 267

 
 Hall Brothers Steamship Company Limited -v- Young; 1938 - (1938) 43 Com Cas 284

 
 Welch -v- Royal Exchange Assurance; 1939 - [1939] 1 KB 294

 
 Robertson -v- Nomikos; HL 1939 - [1939] AC 371

 
 Hall Brothers Steamship Company Limited -v- Young; CA 1939 - [1939] 1 KB 748

 
 General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation -v- Midland Bank; CA 1940 - [1940] 2 KB 388
 
Canada Rice Mills Ltd -v- Union Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd [1941] AC 55
1941
PC
Lord Wright
Commonwealth, Insurance
Cargo was on a voyage from Rangoon to British Columbia and insured against perils of the sea. It was damaged by reason of heating occasioned when cargo hold ventilators were closed to prevent ingress of water in heavy weather. The Court of Appeal of British Columbia had held that the cause of the loss was not a peril of the sea because the weather encountered was normal, and such as to be normally expected on a voyage of the character, and there was no weather bad enough to endanger the safety of the ship if the ventilators had not been closed. Held: The appeal succeeded. Lord Wright said: "these are not the true tests." Any accidental ingress of water into the vessel was a peril of the sea. The entry of sea water through an opening by which it was not supposed to enter was accidental even if the sea conditions were entirely normal for those waters at that time of year. Thus, storms that were seasonal and frequent, and therefore to be expected, nevertheless "are outside the ordinary accidents of wind and sea [and are therefore fortuitous]. They may happen on the voyage, but it cannot be said that they must happen."
1 Citers


 
Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Co Ltd -v- Morrison [1942] 2 KB 53
1942

Goddard LJ
Road Traffic, Insurance
The statutory requirement for compulsory insurance in the Road Traffic Act 1930 was of little value if it was open to insurers to freely exclude liability for common risks.
Road Traffic Act 1934
1 Citers


 
Heyman -v- Darwins Limited [1942] AC 356; [1942] 1 All ER 337
1942
HL
Viscount Simon LC, Lord Wright, Lord Macmillan, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Porter
Insurance, Contract
An arbitration clause will survive a repudiatory breach: "I agree with the Lord Chancellor in thinking that the true ground of the decision in Jureidini v National British and Irish Millers Insurance Co Ltd was the narrowness of the field of submission and the fact that no dispute had arisen on the only point submitted to arbitration."
If one party to a contract repudiates it and that repudiation is accepted, then "By that acceptance he is discharged from further performance and may bring an action for damages, but the contract itself is not rescinded." The primary obligations under the contract may come to an end, but secondary obligations then arise, among them being the obligation to compensate the innocent party. The original rights may not then be enforced. But a consequential right arises in the innocent party to obtain a remedy from the party who repudiated the contract for his failure in performance.
Lord Porter said that in differentiating between disputes "arising under" and "arising out of" the agreement, the former should be given a narrower meaning.
As to the right to rescind, he said: "The three sets of circumstances giving rise to a discharge of contract are tabulated by Anson as: (1) renunciation by a party of his liabilities under it; (2) impossibility created by his own act; and (3) total or partial failure of performance. In the case of the first two, the renunciation may occur or impossibility be created either before or at the time for performance. In the case of the third, it can occur only at the time or during the course of performance."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd -v- Minister of War Transport; HL 1942 - [1942] AC 691; [1942] 2 All ER 6

 
 Century Insurance -v- Northern Ireland Road Transport Board; HL 4-Mar-1942 - [1942] AC 509; [1942] UKHL 2
 
In re Shebsman [1943] Ch 366
1943
ChD
Uthwatt J
Insurance

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
NE Neter & Co Ltd -v- Licenses and General Insurance Co Ltd [1944] 4 All ER 341
1944

Tucker J
Insurance
A cargo of casks and bags of china clay out-turned damaged, as a result of the stoving in of the casks on a voyage during which there had been heavy weather. Held: The claim failed. The plaintiffs had not proved that the proximate cause of the loss was the rough weather. The causing of the damage was "equally consistent with defects in the casks, accidents during loading, bad stowage, rough weather, or accidents during or after discharge" However, had it been shown to be the heavy weather, he would have held there to have been a loss by perils of the sea, even though there was nothing abnormal or unexpected in the weather on such a voyage in the month in which it occurred. Tucker J said: "Having regard to Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Hamilton, Fraser & Co (1887) 12 App Cas 484, the Xantho case (1887) 12 App Cas 503, and Hamilton, Fraser & Co v Pandorf & Co (1887) 12 App Cas 518, and the recent Privy Council decision in Canada Rice Mills, Ltd v Union Marine and General Insurance Co Ltd [1941] AC 55, I think it is clearly erroneous to say that, because the weather was such as might reasonably be anticipated, there can be no peril of the seas. There must, of course, be some element of the fortuitous or unexpected to be found somewhere in the facts and circumstances causing the loss, and I think such an element exists when you find that properly stowed casks, in good condition when loaded, have become stoved in as a result of the straining and labouring of a ship in heavy weather. It is not the weather by itself that is fortuitous; it is the stoving in due to the weather, which is something beyond the ordinary wear and tear, of the voyage. This appears to me to be "something which could not be foreseen as one of the necessary incidents of the adventure". It was "an accident which might happen, not an event which must happen", to quote the language of Lord Herschell in the Xantho."
1 Citers


 
Larrinaga Steamship Co Ltd -v- The King [1944] KB 124; [1945] AC 246
1944
HL
Lord Findlay LC, Mackinnon LJ and Lords Wright and Porter
Insurance, Transport, Contract
The vessel, discharging at St. Nazaire, was ordered by charterers to return to Cardiff. Despite severely deteriorating weather conditions a Sea Transport Officer instructed the vessel to sail on completion of discharge to Quiberon Bay to join a convoy bound for the Bristol Channel. The master protested but complied. The vessel grounded and suffered damage. The owners claimed against the Crown as charterers, contending that the damage had resulted from the charterers' order to return to Cardiff. Held: A ship owner's underwriters would be entitled to be subrogated to his claim for indemnity against a charterer in respect of losses caused by the master's compliance with the charterer's orders as to the employment of the ship, under a standard term of a charterparty.
Lord Wright said: "The view of the judge was that what he described as the 'sailing orders to Quiberon Bay to be obeyed forthwith . .' were orders as to employment within cl. 9. With the greatest respect, I cannot agree with that view. These sailing orders which the judge found were given were, in my opinion, merely dealing with matters of navigation, in regard to carrying out the orders to proceed to Cardiff".
Lord Porter said: "Three answers to this argument have been made by the respondent. (1) That though an order specifying the voyage to be performed is an order as to employment, yet an order as to the time of sailing is not. That order, it is contended, is one as to navigation, or, at any rate, not as to employment. My Lords, this distinction seems to me to be justified: an order to sail from port A to port B is in common parlance an order as to employment, but an order that a ship shall sail at a particular time is not an order as to employment because its object is not to direct how the ship shall be employed, but how she shall act in the course of that employment. If the word were held to include every order which affected not the employment itself but any incident arising in the course of it almost every other liability undertaken by the charterer would be otiose, since the owners would be indemnified against almost all losses which the ship would incur in prosecuting her voyages."
and "(2) The second answer of the respondents was that even if it were conceded that orders to sail in a storm were orders in respect of which an indemnity is due, they must still be orders of the charterers as charterers and such as under this charterparty they are entitled to give. The mere instruction to sail may be such an order, but such an instruction leaves it to the discretion of the master who is responsible for the safety of his ship to choose the time and opportunity for starting on his voyage. I know of no right on the part of a charterer to insist that the safety of the ship should be endangered by sailing at a time when seamanship requires her to stay in port."
Lord Findlay, LC suggested that, although the parties in Krell v Henry may have contracted in the expectation that the procession would take place, it was difficult to see why the happening of the procession was the basis of the contract.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In re Shebsman [1944] Ch 83
1944
CA
Luxmoore LJ
Insurance

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
PYSBE -v- Beer [1946] 79 LLR 417
1946

Atkinson J
Insurance
The court considered how an event after the insured event may affect the insurance claim: "once you have got a constructive total loss, the mere fact that it may ultimately become an actual loss because of some event that is not within the policy does not affect your right at all to claim as for a constructive total loss." A notice of abandonment, if not accepted, may be revoked, expressly or by conduct: " It is common ground that there is no pleaded case of equitable estoppel, and that if, therefore, the sole basis for the doctrine of revocation of an abandonment is that of equitable estoppel, then the defendants' point is a bad one. It seems to me, however, that if an assured, whether before or after commencement of his action, expressly revokes his notice of abandonment, or declares that he will make no claim for a total loss in circumstances where he has recovered his property, then he has chosen or elected to forego his CTL claim and to retain his property. I do not see why he should not be entitled to do so, nor why he should not be bound by that. If he can do it expressly, he can do it impliedly, or by conduct."
1 Citers


 
Royal Greek Government -v- Minister of Transport (1949) 82 Ll L Rep 196
2 Jan 1949
CA

Transport, Insurance
The charterers had ordered the vessel to sail but her crew refused to do so, except in convoy, because of the war. A dispute arose as to whether, the charterers' order to sail having been disobeyed, the vessel was off-hire. Held. The appeal failed. The charterers could not bring themselves within the off-hire clause, which contained only the printed words "deficiency of men". That wording meant "numerical insufficiency" and resulted in the vessel being off-hire when an adequate complement of officers and crew for working the ship was not available. However, the vessel had a full complement of crew, so that, on the facts, the wording did not assist charterers. "Deficiency of men" did not extend to cover a wilful refusal to work.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Weldrick -v- Essex & Suffolk Equitable Insurance Society Ltd; QBD 1950 - [1950] 83 Ll R 91
 
D'Avigdor-Goldsmid -v- Inland Revenue Commisioners [1953] AC 347
1953
HL

Equity, Insurance
A contingency which makes money payable under a chose cannot affect the proprietary interests in the chose in action and therefore in its proceeds. No fresh beneficial interest in a policy of life assurance accrues or arises on the death of the life assured. The sum assured belongs to the person or persons who were beneficial owners of the policy immediately before the death.
A charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language.
1 Citers


 
Kelman -v- Livanos [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep 120
1955


Transport, Insurance

1 Citers


 
West Wake Price & Co -v- Ching [1957] 1 WLR 45
1957

Devlin J
Insurance
A clerk employed by a firm of accountants defrauded two of the firm's clients of £20,000 over a period of about three years. Held: One can not "pay" a cause of action. Devlin J "I think that the primary meaning of the word 'claim' - whether used in a popular sense or in a strict legal sense - is such as to attach it to the object that is claimed; and is not the same thing as the cause of action by which the claim may be supported or as the grounds on which it may be based."
and "If you say of a claim against a defendant that it is for ,100, you have said all that is necessary to identify it as a claim; but if you say of it that it is for fraud or negligence, you have not distinguished it from a charge or allegation. In particular, if you identify a claim as something that has to be paid . . it must be something that is capable of separate payment: you cannot pay a cause of action. It follows, I think, that if there is only one object claimed by one person, then there is only one claim, however many may be the grounds or the causes of action which can be raised in support of it."
and "The assured cannot recover anything under the main indemnity clause or make any claim against the underwriters until they have been found liable and so sustained a loss."
1 Citers


 
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