Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Insurance - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 41 cases, and was prepared on 08 August 2015.

 
Re a Policy No 6402 of the Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Society [1902] 1 Ch 282
1902

Joyce J
Insurance, Trusts
Mr Sanderson effected insurance on his own life “for the behoof” of his sister-in-law, Miss Stiles. The policy moneys were payable to Miss Stiles or her personal representatives but the premiums were paid throughout by Mr Sanderson. The personal representatives of Mr Sanderson claimed the policy moneys from those of Miss Stiles to whom they had been paid. Held: “Now, in the present case a policy was taken out by Mr. Sanderson a great many years ago, and the name of Miss Stiles appears in the policy as the person to whom the money is to be paid. The policy was never handed to her, and she is now dead, and the premiums were always paid, and were paid for many years after her death, by Sanderson. That, really, is a case of a man taking a policy out in the name of another, that other person being a sister of his wife, and, therefore not standing in any relation to him “that would meet the presumption,” as Lord Eldon expressed it. It comes really to this: a purchase by one in the name of another with no other circumstances at all proved. Therefore, in my opinion, although the legal personal representative of the lady in this case would be the person entitled to receive the money at law and to give a receipt for it, in equity the money belongs to the legal personal representatives of Mr. Sanderson, who took out the policy.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Greenock Steamship Co -v- Maritime Insurance Co [1903] 1 KB 36
1903


Insurance

1 Citers



 
 Prudential Insurance Co -v- Inland Revenue Commissioners; 1904 - [1904] 2 KB 658

 
 Anderson -v- Martin; 1907 - [1907] 2 KB 253
 
Andersen -v- Marten [1908] 1 KB 601
1908
CA

Insurance
The vessel was first taken captive and then lost. The insurer said that actual loss was caused by the capture, which was excepted. Held: The right to claim as a constructive total loss had not been affected.
1 Citers



 
 Andersen -v- Marten; HL 2-Jan-1908 - [1908] AC 334
 
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp -v- Hunter [1908] ScotCS CSIH_7
24 Nov 1908
SCS

Scotland, Insurance

[ Bailii ]
 
Griffiths -v- Fleming [1909] 1 KB 805
1909


Insurance
It is not uncommon for one partner to insure the life of another; or for two partners to insure the life of a third. A husband can be presumed to have an insurable interest in the life of his wife.
1 Citers


 
Hunter -v- General Accident [1909] AC 404; 1909 SC (HL) 30; [1909] UKHL 2; 1909 2 SLT 99
29 Jun 1909
HL

Scotland, Insurance, Contract

[ Bailii ]
 
Mentz, Decker & Co -v- Maritime Insurance Co [1910] 1 KB 132
1910


Insurance

1 Citers



 
 Wallis -v- Pratt; HL 1911 - [1911] AC 394

 
 E D Sassoon & Co -v- Western Assurance Co; PC 1912 - [1912] AC 561
 
Re Bradley and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society [1912] 1 KB 415
1912
CA
Cozens-Hardy MR, Farwell LJ
Insurance
A policy provided an indemnity against employer's liability under the 1906 Act, but required employers to keep a wages book and to notify the insurers of details of all remuneration paid during the period of insurance within one month from the end of the period, with provision for retrospective adjustment of the premium if the figures differed from those which had been used to calculate the original premium. The insurers repudiated liabilitysaying the insured, who was a small farmer with one employee, did not keep a wages book. The policy contained a clause providing that observance "of the conditions of this policy" should be a condition precedent to insurer's liability. Held (by majority): Since the sole object of the condition was to provide for the adjustment of premiums, compliance with it was not a condition precedent to liability. The clause could not have been intended to refer to all the provisions of the policy as some were incapable of being conditions precedent. Having analysed the wages clause and held that parts of it were not so capable, he concluded that the condition: "… is one and entire, and it is to my mind unreasonable to hold that one sentence in its middle is a condition precedent while the rest of the condition cannot be so considered. A policy of this nature, in case of ambiguity or doubt, ought to be construed against the office and in favour of the policy-holder, and it seems to me unreasonable to hold that the office can escape from all liability by reason only of the omission to duly record in a proper wages book the name of every employee and the amount of his wages. This is only required for the purpose of the statement which, by the proposal, the insured agreed to render at the end of each period of insurance. In my opinion, it ought not to be regarded as in any sense a condition precedent, and it follows that, in my opinion, the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs." Farwell LJ, concurring, stated: "It is especially incumbent on insurance companies to make clear, both in their proposal forms and in their policies, the conditions which are precedent to their liability to pay, for such conditions have the same effect as forfeiture clauses, and may inflict loss and injury to the assured and those claiming under him out of all proportion to any damage that could possibly accrue to the company from non-observance or non-performance of the conditions. Accordingly, it has been established that the doctrine that policies are to be construed "contra proferentes" applies strongly against the company: In Re Etherington."
Workmen's Compensation Act 1906
1 Citers


 
British Dominions General Insurance Co Ltd -v- Duder [1915] 2 KB 394
1915
KBD
Buckley LJ
Insurance
The court was asked whether the insurers, having settled the owners' claim for a constructive total loss at 66 per cent. of the sum insured could recover 100 per cent. from their re-insurers. Bailhache J. held that they could, with the result that the insurers would have made a profit out of the re-insurance. Held. The appeal succeeded. The contract of re-insurance is a contract of indemnity. Accordingly the insurers could not recover more than they had lost. In English law a contract of reinsurance in relation to property is a contract under which the reinsurers insure the property that is the subject of the primary insurance; it is not simply a contract under which the reinsurers agree to indemnify the insurers in relation to any liability that they may incur under the primary insurance.
Buckley L.J said: "A contract of insurance and a contract of reinsurance, are independent of each other. But a contract of reinsurance is a contract which insures the thing originally insured, namely, the ship. The reinsurer has an insurable interest in the ship by virtue of his original contract of insurance. The thing insured, however, is the ship, and not the interest of the reinsurer in the ship by reason of his contract of insurance upon the ship." and "The plaintiffs are, however, entitled to indemnity, and this is not necessarily confined to the 66 per cent. They are entitled to such further sum, if any, as is required to give them an indemnity. The costs, for instance, of obtaining the compromise at 66 per cent. should be added to the 66 per cent."
1 Citers



 
 Jureidini -v- National British and Irish Millers Insurance Company Limited; HL 1915 - [1915] AC 499
 
Thomas -v- Tyne and Wear SS Freight Insurance Association [1917] 1 KB 938
1917


Transport, Insurance
For an insurer to set up a defence under claim for the loss of a ship on the grounds of the unseaworthiness of the vessel, the unseaworthiness must have been causative of the relevant loss.
1 Citers



 
 Leyland Shipping Co Ltd -v- Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd; HL 1918 - [1918] AC 350

 
 Britain Steamship Company Limited -v- The King and Others ("The Matiana"); CA 1919 - [1919] 2 KB 670
 
Woodall -v- Pearl Assurance Co Ltd [1919] 1 KB 593
1919
CA
Bankes LJ, Warrington LJ
Insurance

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Re Hooley Hill Rubber and Royal Insurance Co; CA 1920 - [1920] 1 KB 257
 
Simmonds -v- Cockell [1920] 1 KB 843
1920

Roche J
Insurance
The insurance policy warranted that the premises would be always occupied. The premises were damaged while the insured and his wife were absent for a few hours. Held: The warranty did not require a permanent continuous presence, and the insurer did not avoid liability. If the insurers had wanted a "continuous presence of some one in the premises", they could have stipulated that "the premises were never to be left unattended".
1 Citers


 
Tinline -v- White Cross Insurance [1921] 3 KB 327
1921

Bailhache J
Insurance
the plaintiff had been convicted of manslaughter by reckless driving. The court was debarred by public policy from obtaining an indemnity under his insurance policy in respect of his civil liability. Held: He was not: "If the law is not logical, public policy is even less logical, for, by common consent, these third party indemnity insurances have been treated as valid and effective".
1 Citers


 
British and Foreign Insurance Co Ltd -v- Wilson Shipping Co Ltd [1921] 1 AC 188
1921
HL

Insurance
The vessel was insured against perils of the sea and suffered damage by a risk covered by the policy. Before the damage was repaired she was lost, still during the currency of the policy, but by a risk which is not covered by the policy. Held: The insurer was not liable for the unrepaired damage.
1 Citers



 
 Mountain -v- Whittle; HL 1921 - [1921] AC 615
 
Condogianis -v- The Guardian Assurance Company Limited [1921] UKPC 55; [1921] 2 AC 125
2 May 1921
PC
Lord Shaw
Commonwealth, Insurance
Australia - The insured had filled out a proposal form for fire insurance incorrectly having failed to mention in his answer to a question about a second of two fires for which he had previously claimed. The proposal form contained a declaration stating that the proposal was the "basis of the contract [and] is to be taken as part of the policy and . . the particulars to be deemed express and continuing warranties furnished by" the insured; there was also an express clause about material misdescription and misrepresentation. Held: Lord Shaw said: "The case accordingly is one of express warranty. If in point of fact the answer is untrue, the warranty still holds, notwithstanding that the untruths might have arisen inadvertently and without any kind of fraud. Secondly, the materiality of the untruth is not an issue; the parties having settled themselves-by making the fact the basis of the contract, and giving a warranty-that as between them their agreement on that subject precluded all enquiry into the issue of materiality. In the language of Lord Eldon in Newcastle Fire Insurance Co v Macmorran (1815) 3 Dow 255,262: "It is a first principle in the law of insurance, on all occasions, that where a representation is material it must be complied with-if immaterial, that immateriality may be inquired into and shown; but that if there is a warranty it is part of the contract that the matter is such as it is represented to be. Therefore the materiality or immateriality signifies nothing." This rule has been repeated over and over again and is too well-settled to be questioned…"
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Sanderson & Son -v- Amour & Co Ltd; HL 1922 - 1922 SC (HL) 117
 
Dawsons Ltd -v- Bonnin [1922] SC (HL) 156; [1922] 2 AC 413
1922
HL
Lord Haldane, Lord Cave, Lord Dunedin
Contract, Insurance, Scotland
The House considered whether a provision was a warranty rather than a representation, allowing the contract to be avoided for its breach. It was an inadvertently inaccurate statement by the insured in the proposal form which was expressly incorporated in the policy, as was a clause which expressly rendered the policy void for material misstatement. Held: The inaccuracy was found to be immaterial but a majority of the House decided that there could be no claim under the insurance.
Lord Haldane said: "It is clear that the answer was textually inaccurate. I think that the words employed in the body of the policy can only be properly construed as having made its accuracy a condition. The result may be technical and harsh, but if the parties have so stipulated, we have no alternative, sitting as a Court of justice, but to give effect to the words agreed on. Hard cases must not be allowed to make bad law…It was a specific insurance, based on a statement which is made of foundational if the parties have chosen, however carelessly, to stipulate that it should be so. Both on principle and in the light of authorities such as those I have already cited, it appears to me that when the answers, including that in question, are declared to be the basis of the contract this can only mean that their truth is made a condition exact fulfilment of which is rendered by stipulation foundational to its enforceability."
Lord Cave said: "But it is contended . . that the "basis" clause is limited or qualified by the fourth condition on the back of the policy [relating to material misstatement"].
And it is argued that, having regard to this condition, a misstatement in the proposal does not avoid the policy unless it is a material misstatement. I do not take that view. The "basis" clause and the fourth condition do not cover the same ground. The former includes promissory statements which are apparently not within the condition; and the condition covers misstatements and concealments outside the proposal with which the "basis" clause is not concerned. I think the two clauses are independent and cumulative provisions, each of which must take effect"
Lord Dunedin said: "I think that "basis" cannot be taken as merely pleonastic and exegitical of the following words, "and incorporated therewith". It must mean that the parties held that these statements are fundamental - ie go to the root of the contract - and that consequently if the statements are untrue the contract is not binding"
1 Citers


 
Abraham Steamship -v- Westville [1923] A C 773; [1923] A C 773
1923
HL

Insurance

1 Citers


 
La Compania Martiartu -v- Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation [1923] 1 KB 650
1923
CA
Scrutton LJ
Insurance
The court found, on limited evidence, that the ship in respect of which her owners had claimed for a total loss of perils by sea, had in fact been scuttled with the connivance of those owners. Scrutton LJ said: 'This view renders it unnecessary finally to discuss the burden of proof, but in my present view, if there are circumstances suggesting that another cause than a peril insured against was the dominant or effective cause of the entry of seawater into the ship . . and an examination of all the evidence and probabilities leaves the court doubtful what is the real cause of the loss, the assured has failed to prove his case.'
1 Citers



 
 Scottish Metropolitan Assurance Co Ltd -v- Groom; CA 1924 - (1924) 19 LI L Rep 131; 41 TLR 35; 20 Ll Rep 44

 
 In re Englebach; 1924 - [1924] 2 Ch 348
 
Forsikringsaktieselskabet National (of Copenhagen) -v- Attorney-General (1924) 19 Ll LR 32
1924
CA
Scrutton LJ
Insurance

1 Citers



 
 Hewitt -v- London General Insurance Co; 1925 - [1925] 23 Ll L Rep 243

 
 Macaura -v- Northern Assurance Company Limited; HL 1925 - [1925] AC 619; (1925) 133 LT 152; [1925] All ER 51;

 
 Forsikringsaktieselskabet National (of Copenhagen) -v- Attorney-General; HL 1925 - [1925] AC 639

 
 Verelst's Administratrix -v- Motor Cross Union Insurance Company Limited; 1925 - [1925] 2 KB 137
 
The Spathari [1925] UKHL 1; 1925 SLT 322; 1925 SC (HL) 6; (1925) 21 Ll L Rep 265
23 Mar 1925
HL
Lord Chancellor Cave
Scotland, Torts - Other, Insurance

Marine Insurance Act 1906 17
[ Bailii ]
 
Lek -v- Mathews [1927] 29 Ll LR
1927

Viscount Sumner
Insurance
Part of an insurance claim was fraudulent. The policy required that if one part fell, all the claim fell: "As to the construction of the false claim clause, I think that it refers to anything falsely claimed, that is, anything not so unsubstantial as to make the maxim de minimis applicable, and is not limited to a claim which as to the whole is false. It means the claim as to particular subject-matters in respect of which a right to indemnity is asserted, not the mere amount of money claimed without regard to the particulars or the contents of the claim; and a claim is false not only if it is deliberately invented but also if it is made recklessly, not caring whether it is true or false but only seeking to succeed in the claim."
1 Citers


 
Rozanes -v- Bowen (1928) 32 Ll L Rep 98
1928
CA
Scrutton, Sankey LJJ
Insurance
The court considered a proposal form for a jewellers block policy as filled in by the insured or his agent which incorrectly identified only one previous loss although there were several previous losses. The form stated that "It is understood that this proposal will serve as the basis of the contract if a policy is issued". Held: Scrutton LJ said: "The second point [taken by the insured's Counsel] was that the answers were not in any way incorporated with the policy so that the correct answering was a condition precedent. The answer to that appears to be at the bottom of the form: "This proposal is to serve as the basis of the contract"; and, if so, the truth of the statements in it is equally the basis of the contract."
Lord Sankey said: "The same law was laid down by the Court of Appeal by Lord Esher . . in Hambrough v Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York 72 L.T. 140, which was decided as far back as 1895. There the words in the proposal were not quite the same as the words in the proposal in the present case, but the Lord Chief Justice in the Court below said in his judgment that in his view the proposal was made the basis of the contract, and that the legal effect of the express warranty of the truth of the statements in the proposal is that if any of the statements is untrue the policies cannot be enforced by anyone. He was therefore following almost exactly the law laid down in the House of Lords by Lord Eldon in 1815 in the Newcastle Fire Insurance Company v Macmorran & Co., 3 Dow (H.L.) 255. I only refer to those cases to show that the law in this country at any rate has been settled in that respect for, it appears to me, over a century."
1 Citers


 
Re Harrington Motor Co Ltd, Ex parte Chaplin [1928] Ch 105
1928

Eve J
Insurance, Insolvency
A person injured in a road accident had obtained judgment for damages against the company, but had been unable to enforce the judgment before the company went into liquidation. The company's motor insurers paid the amount of the judgment to the liquidator, who then treated the injured person as an unsecured creditor with no special interest in the insurance monies. Held: The liquidator had been right to deal with the matter in that way.
1 Citers


 
Hood's Trustees -v- Southern Union General Insurance Company of Australasia Ltd [1928] Ch 793
1928

Tomlin J
Insurance
H, being insured by the defendant company against liability to third parties, negligently injured C in a road accident. C subsequently brought an action against H for damages, but before he could obtain judgment, H was made bankrupt and the official receiver was appointed trustee in the bankruptcy. The trustee informed the defendant company in reply to a question that he did not intend to take any part in C's action against H. H later purported, for an agreed sum much below the value of the claim to release the defendant company from its obligation under the policy to indemnify him in respect of any judgment obtained against him by C. Shortly afterwards C obtained judgment against H for damages for the personal injuries sustained by him. Later H was made bankrupt a second time and another trustee in bankruptcy was appointed. Held: Where a person was injured or killed in a motor accident, for which a second (negligent and insolvent) motorist was liable and in respect of which that motorist was insured, that person was confined to his remedy in the negligent motorist's bankruptcy; Any insurance monies went to swell the sum available to the general body of creditors.
1 Citers


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.