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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Immigration - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 24 cases, and was prepared on 06 August 2015.

 
Jonah -v- Secretaty of State for the Home Department [1985] Imm AR 7
1985

Nolan J
Immigration
The Ghanaian applicant asylum seeker had been a senior trade union official. He had lost his job and been ill-treated following political changes in Ghana. He had hidden in a remote village before seeking asylum in this country. The adjudicator acknowledged that he would be in jeopardy if he resumed his former activities, but concluded that he would be in no danger if he lived quietly in retirement. The Immigration Tribunal had found no reason to interfere with the adjudicator's finding of fact and dismissed his appeal. Held: The court had to decide was whether the adjudicator had adopted the appropriate standard of proof when he said that he could not be satisfied, even on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Jonah's declared fears of persecution if he was to return to Ghana were well-founded and to apply paragraph 134 of the Immigration Rules, entitling to Secretary of State to remove an asylum-seeker if he was not satisfied that his fear of persecution was well-founded. Appplying Fernandez as to the difference between establishing the existence of facts and prophesying what can only happen in the future, since the court was obliged to make an informed guess as to what might happen in the future it could only do so on the basis of the facts proved on the balance of probabilities. The likelihood of persecution contemplated by the paragraph was different from proof on the balance of probabilities that persecution would occur, but the matter could not usefully be carried further without the danger of creating purely semantic problems where none existed for a tribunal applying its common sense and judgment to the facts proved before it.
1 Citers



 
 Abdulaziz etc -v- The United Kingdom; ECHR 28-May-1985 - 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/80; (1985) 7 EHRR 471; [1985] ECHR 7
 
Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Bari [1986] Imm AR 26
1986


Immigration

1 Citers



 
 Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Bakhtaur Singh; HL 1986 - [1986] 1 WLR 910

 
 Regina -v- Diggines, ex parte Rahmani; HL 1986 - [1986] 2 WLR 530; [1986] AC 475; [1986] 1 All ER 921

 
 Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Begum; QBD 1986 - [1986] IAR 385
 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Deaprtment ex parte Swati [1986] 1 WLR 477
1986
CA
Sir John Donaldson MR
Immigration
A notice refusing leave to a visitor to enter which simply gave as the reasons:- "I am not satisfied that you are genuinely seeking entry only for this limited period." was sufficient compliance with the duty to give reasons for the decision imposed by the relevant Regulations: "The answer [to the question why did the person concerned take that decision or action] provides the reasons which have to be stated. No doubt those reasons, if rational, will be based upon a process of reasoning applied to evidence and, to this extent, may be described as a conclusion from that evidence. But this does not prevent that conclusion being the reason for the decision or action which is appealable and it is for this reason that the registrations call. In the instant appeal, the immigration officer, by specifying that she was not satisfied that the applicant was genuinely seeking entry for the limited period of one week, but only told the applicant why she was refusing him leave to enter, but also told him, by implication, that he had satisfied her on all other matters upon which he had to satisfy in accordance with [the Rules]." and 'By definition, exceptional circumstances defy definition.'
1 Citers



 
 Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Bugdaycay; HL 19-Feb-1986 - [1987] AC 514; [1987] 2 WLR 606; [1986] UKHL 3; [1987] 1 All ER 940; [1987] Imm AR 250
 
P -v- United Kingdom (1987) 54 DR 211
13 Oct 1986
ECHR

Human Rights, Immigration

European Convention on Human Rights
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Musisi; HL 1987 - [1987] AC 514
 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Rajinder Kaur [1987] Imm AR 278
1987
CA
Glidewell LJ, Schiemann J
Immigration, Constitutional
The court considered a provision requiring refusal of leave to enter if there was no entry clearance. Held: Such a mandatory rule was intra vires, the Secretary of State retaining a discretion outside the 1971 Act. Glidewell LJ said: "immigration was formerly covered by the royal prerogative and it was a matter which lay entirely within the exercise of that prerogative. Much of the prerogative powers vested in the Crown in this field have now been superseded by a statute but there remains—and this is what the royal prerogative is—a residual power in the Crown, through Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Home Affairs, to exercise such residual power as is necessary for the proper control of immigration.
In my view, the exercise of discretion in relation to leave to enter outside the rules is an exercise of the remaining part of that prerogative power"
Immigration Act 1971
1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Singh Times, 08 June 1987; [1987] Imm AR 489
8 Jun 1987
QBD
Woolf LJ
Immigration
The Refugee Convention had "indirectly" been incorporated under English law. The court considered whether a person allowed entry by an immigration officer was lawfully here irrespective of other considerations. As to the case of Musis in the Bugdaycay case: "Each of the present applicants had only been granted temporary admission and they required, but had not received, leave to enter under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 and by section 11 (1) of that Act a person is deemed not to have entered the United Kingdom so long as he is detained or temporarily admitted or released while liable to detention under the powers conferred by Schedule 2 of the Act. For the purposes of the Convention, a person temporarily admitted is therefore not to be regarded as lawfully in the territory. He is instead in an intermediate position which also differs from those in the country illegally …"
The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 3
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Vilvarajah and Another -v- Secretary of State for The Home Department; CA 26-Oct-1987 - [1987] EWCA Civ 11

 
 Sivakumuran, Regina (on the Application of) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department; HL 16-Dec-1987 - [1988] AC 958; [1988] 1 All ER 193; [1987] UKHL 1; [1988] 2 WLR 92; [1988] Imm AR 147

 
 Regina -v- Home Secretary, ex parte Sivakumaran; HL 16-Dec-1987 - [1988] AC 958; [1987] UKHL 1; [1988] 1 All ER 193; [1988] Imm AR 147; [1988] 2 WLR 92; [2002] INLR 310

 
 Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Patel; HL 1988 - [1988] AC 910; [1988] UKHL 14; [1988] 2 WLR 1165; [1988] Imm AR 434; [1988] 2 All ER

 
 Chundawadra -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal; CA 1988 - [1988] IAR 161
 
Regina -v- Spura (1988) 10 Crim App R (S) 376
3 Jan 1988


Criminal Sentencing, Immigration
The court considered the test for ordering deportation of an EU National after completion of his sentence of imprisonment, applying Bouchereau and Nazari: ". . in the case of Escauriaza . . the Court . . concluded, accepting a submission from an amicus experienced in these matters, that EEC law simply mirrored the law and practice of the United Kingdom. On that basis, one goes back to the test originally laid down in Nazari…where the test was said to be "does the potential detriment to this country justify the recommendation for deportation of this Appellant?...The overall test, as distilled by the European Court in Bouchereau is whether [a full enquiry into the circumstances] reveals that a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy has affected the fundamental interests of society."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Thirukumar, Regina (on the Application Of) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department; QBD 21-Dec-1988 - [1988] EWHC 1 (QB)

 
 Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Thirakumar and others; CA 1989 - [1989] IAR 402
 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Yousuf [1989] Imm AR 554
1989


Immigration

1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Ounejma [1989] Imm AR 75
1989


Immigration

1 Citers


 
Al-Mehdawi -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [1989] 3 WLR 1294; [1989] 3 All ER 843; [1990] 1 AC 876
1989
HL
Lord Bridge
Judicial Review, Immigration, Natural Justice
The applicant, a student had overstayed his leave. Through his solicitor's negligence, he lost his appeal against deportation. He sought judicial review of that decision. Held: Judgment obtained in a party's absence due entirely to the fault of that party or his advisor was not one obtained in breach of the rules of natural justice for the purpose of judicial review. The loss of his right to be heard was not a procedural impropriety or denial of natural justice. Nor was he entitled to certiorari. In the public law context of removal from the jurisdiction of an alien, a litigant must answer for the failings of his legal advisers.
Lord Bridge said that any other decision would come "at the cost of opening such a wide door which would indeed seriously undermine the principle of finality in decision-making."
Immigtaion Act 1971 21
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Home Secretary, Ex parte Thirukumar [1989] Imm AR 402
1989
CA
Bingham LJ
Immigration
The court emphasised the fundamental importance of asylum decisions: "asylum decisions are of such moment that only the highest standards of fairness will suffice."
1 Citers


 
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