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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Immigration - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 06 August 2015.

 
Puttick -v- Attorney General etc [1980] Fam 1; [1981] QB 767
1980
FD
Sir George Baker P
Children, Immigration
Astrid Proll, a former member of the Baader-Meinhof gang absconded while awaiting trial in Germany. She entered the UK using a passport which she had bought in the name of Senta Sauerbier, and married Robin Puttick under that name. The German authorities discovered her true identity and location, and applied to extradite her. She applied under section 6 of the 1948 Act. Section 6 gave an apparently unqualified right to any woman married to a United Kingdom citizen to be registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom. She sought a declaration that the marriage was a valid and subsisting marriage, as she had acquired a domicile of choice in England. Held: Her leave to enter had been obtained by the fraudulent production of an invalid passport, and she was barred from acquiring a domicile of choice here. A fugitive from foreign justice will not acquire habitual residence in this jurisdiction simply by reliance on a temporal period during which the claimant has outwitted authority. Sir George Baker P cited Dicey & Morrs: "It has been held that a domicile of choice cannot be acquired by illegal residence. The reason for this rule is that a court cannot allow a person to acquire a domicile in defiance of the law which that court itself administers."
British Nationality Act 1948 6
1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Nazari (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 84; (1980) 71 Cr App R 87
1980
CACD
Lawton LJ
Criminal Sentencing, Immigration
The CACD heard several appeals together, giving guidance as to the general principles to be applied in deciding on recommendations for deportation under the Act. Lawton LJ said that "no court should make an order recommending deportation without making full enquiry into all the circumstances", and gave guidance, according to the seriousness of the offence and the criminal record. The courts should not be concerned with the political systems which operate in other countries, having no knowledge of them, and should not express views about external regimes. It is for the Home Secretary to decide whether an offender’s return to his country of origin would have consequences which would make his compulsory return unduly harsh. The Home Secretary can inform himself where the courts can not. "First, the Court must consider, as was said by Sachs LJ in Caird's case, whether the accused's continued presence in the United Kingdom is to its detriment. This country has no use for criminals of other nationalities, particularly if they have committed serious crimes or have long criminal records. That is self-evident. The more serious the crime and the longer the record the more obvious it is that there should be an order recommending deportation . . . Secondly, the Courts are not concerned with the political systems which operate in other countries. . . . The next matter to which we invite attention by way of guidelines is that the effect that an order recommending deportation will have upon others who are not before the Court and who are innocent persons."
Immigration Act 1971 6(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Zamir [1980] AC 930 HL; [1980] UKHL 14; [1980] 2 All ER 768; [1980] 3 WLR 249
1980
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Salmon, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Russell of Killowen
Immigration
A person who obtained leave to enter, but did so by fraud, was an illegal entrant, on the basis that the fraud had the effect of vitiating the leave to enter which had been granted: "it is clear on general principles of law that deception may arise from conduct, or from conduct accompanied by silence as to material fact." The Divisional Court: "cannot possibly act as, in effect, a Court of Appeal as to the facts on which the Immigration Officer decided. What it is able to do, and this is the limit of its powers, is to see whether there was evidence on which the Immigration Officer, acting reasonably, could decide as he did." The Secretary of State's decision to deport the applicant was reviewable under habeas corpus.
Immigration Act 1971
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Kassam [1980] 1 WLR 1037
1980
CA
Stephenson LJ
Immigration, Discrimination
Discrimination was alleged against the immigration authorities. Held: In dealing with people coming in under the immigration rules, the immigration authorities were not providing "services" within the meaning of the Act. The words the 'circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act' are the circumstances in which discrimination is prohibited by the Act.
Sex Discrimination Act 1975
1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Hillingdon London Borough Council ex parte Streeting [1980] 1 WLR 1425
1980
CA
Dunn LJ
Housing, Immigration

1 Citers


 
Halil and Another -v- Davidson [1980] UKHL 13; [1979-80] Imm AR 164
3 Jul 1980
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Salmon, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Russell of Killowen
Immigration
The appellants, Turkish Cypriots, arrived on visitor permits, but after extensions, were given notice that their leave to stay would come to an end. Held. The appeal failed. The notice given was in the form disapproved in Suthendram, but the adjudicator had been correct to refuse jurisdiction.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina -v- Stanislaus Pieck C-157/79
3 Jul 1980
ECJ

European, Immigration
Europa The right of community workers to enter the territory of a member state which community law confers may not be made subject to the issue of a clearance to that effect by the authorities of that member state. The restriction which article 48 of the EEC Treaty lays down concerning freedom of movement in the territory of member states, namely limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, must be regarded not as a condition precedent to the acquisition of the right of entry and residence but as providing the possibility, in individual cases where there is sufficient justification, of imposing restrictions on the exercise of a right derived directly from the treaty. It does not there- fore justify administrative measures requiring in a general way formalities at the frontier other than simply the production of a valid identity card or passport.
Article 3(2) of council directive no 68/360 prohibiting member states from demanding an entry visa or equivalent requirement for community workers moving within the community must be interpreted as meaning that the phrase ' entry visa or equivalent requirement ' covers any formality for the purpose of granting leave to enter the territory of a member state which is coupled with a passport or identity card check at the frontier, whatever may be the place or time at which that leave is granted and in whatever form it may be granted.
The issue of the special residence document provided for in article 4 of directive no 68/360 has only a declaratory effect and, for aliens to whom article 48 of the eec treaty or parallel provisions give rights, it cannot be assimilated to a residence permit such as is prescribed for aliens in general. A member state may not therefore require from a person enjoying the protection of community law that he should possess a general residence permit instead of the document provided for by the combined provisions of article 4 of and the annex to directive no 68/360, or impose penalties for the failure to obtain such a permit.
The failure on the part of a national of a member state of the community, to whom the rules on freedom of movement for workers apply, to obtain the special residence permit prescribed in article 4 of directive no 68/360 may not be punished by a recommendation for deportation or by measures which go as far as imprisonment.
[ Europa ]

 
 Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Parvaz Akhtar; CA 1981 - [1981] QB 46

 
 Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Darsham Singh Sohal; QBD 1981 - [1981] Imm AR 20

 
 Fernandes -v- Secretary of State; CA 1981 - [1981] Imm AR 1

 
 A -v- United Kingdom; ECHR 1982 - 9773/82; [1982] 5 EHRR 296

 
 Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Margueritte; CA 1982 - [1982] 3 WLR 753; [1983] QB 180
 
Regina -v- Kraus (1982) 4 Crim App R (S) 113
1982
CACD

Criminal Sentencing, Immigration

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina -v- The Secretary of State for The Home Department, Ex Parte Shiekh [1982] EWHC 1 (Admin)
4 Feb 1982
Admn
Woolf J
Immigration

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Alexander; HL 5-Jul-1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 1076; [1982] UKHL 11; [1982] 2 All ER 766; [1982] Imm AR 50

 
 Regina -v- Barnet London Borough Council, Ex parte Shah; HL 1983 - [1983] 2 AC 309; [1983] 1 All ER 226; [1983] 2 WLR 16

 
 Regina -v- Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, Ex parte Amin; HL 1983 - [1983] 2 All ER 864; [1983] 3 WLR 258; [1983] 2 AC 818

 
 Khera -v- Secretary of State for The Home Department; Khawaja -v- Secretary of State for The Home Department; HL 10-Feb-1983 - [1983] 2 WLR 321; [1984] 1 AC 74; [1982] UKHL 5; [1983] UKHL 8; [1983] 1 All ER 765; [1982] Imm AR 139
 
Regina -v- Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704; [1984] All ER 983; [1983] Imm AR 198; [1983] EWHC 1 (QB)
13 Dec 1983
QBD
Woolf J
Immigration, Prisons, Administrative
An offender had been recommended for deportation following conviction. He had served his sentence and would otherwise have been released on parole. He had no passport and no valid travel documents. He complained that the length of time for which he had then been detained was too long and that the detention had become unlawful, and he sought habeas corpus to secure release. Held: The detention was on the borderline of being unlawful, and unless an order was made within a few days, Mr Singh's application should succeed. A short adjournment was granted on this basis.
The power of the Secretary of State was subject to limitation to a period which is reasonably necessary for that purpose, depending on the circumstances of the particular case. If it is apparent to the Secretary of State that he is not going to be able to remove someone intended to be deported within a reasonable period, it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to seek to exercise his power of detention.
In relation to the power of deportation, Woolf J said: "Although the power which is given to the Secretary of State in paragraph 2 to detain individuals is not subject to any express limitation of time, I am quite satisfied that it is subject to limitations. First of all, it can only authorise detention if the individual is being detained . . pending his removal. It cannot be used for any other purpose. Secondly, as the power is given in order to enable the machinery of deportation to be carried out, I regard the power of detention as being impliedly limited to a period which is reasonably necessary for that purpose. The period which is reasonable will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. What is more, if there is a situation where it is apparent to the Secretary of State that he is not going to be able to operate the machinery provided in the Act for removing persons who are intended to be deported within a reasonable period, it seems to me that it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to seek to exercise his power of detention.
In addition, I would regard it as implicit that the Secretary of State should exercise all reasonable expedition to ensure that the steps are taken which will be necessary to ensure the removal of the individual within a reasonable time."
Immigration Act 1971 Sch 3 Para 2
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Kwawaja -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [1984] AC 74
1984


Immigration
There is no positive duty of candour on the part of a person seeking permission to enter the country, approximating to a duty of the utmost good faith.
1 Citers


 
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