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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Immigration - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 18 cases, and was prepared on 06 August 2015.

 
Regina -v- Governor of Richmond Remand Centre, Ex Parte Asghar [1971] 1 WLR 129
1971
QBD
Lord Parker LCJ
Immigration, Torts - Other
The Secretary of State had detained two persons who were awaiting removal with the object that they should testify in a pending criminal trial. Lord Parker J rejected the suggestion that the detention could be justified as reasonable in these circumstances, stating: "it does seem to me that while a reasonable time is contemplated between the giving of the directions and the final removal, that is a reasonable time necessary to effect the physical removal".
He considered the length of time for which the plaintiff had been detained after release from prison but pending deportation saying: "even if . . valid directions were given, the question remains whether, persuant to paragraph 4(1), the applicants continued thereafter, that is after the directions, to be held pending removal in pursuance of such directions. It quite clearly contemplates, of course, that there will be some interval of time between the giving of the directions and their implementation, and for that period of time there is authority to detain. But when one turns to the facts of this case, the reality of the position is that the applicants were being detained pending the trial at the Central Criminal Court at which they were required to give evidence. Accordingly on that second ground I think that detention was not justified.
Mr Slynn has argued very forcibly that of course the period contemplated that may elapse between the giving of the directions and the actual removal must be a reasonable period. He says here that in all the circumstances it was reasonable for the Secretary of State to require the detention of these two men pending the completion of the trial at the Central Criminal Court.
Much as I wish I could accede to that argument, it does seem to me that while a reasonable time is contemplated between the giving of the directions and the final removal, that is a reasonable time necessary to effect the physical removal, the truth of the matter is that the Home Office naturally desires to do nothing which will interfere with the trial. One sympathises with this object, but of course it can be achieved, by giving these applicants conditional permits. There are obvious practical reasons why this course is not adopted, because as experience has shown, nothing may ever be seen of the applicants again."
1 Citers


 
In re Abdul Manan [1971] 1 WLR 859
1971
CA
Lord Denning MR
Immigration
The applicant was a Pakistani seaman who had deserted from his ship and his presence in the UK was unlawful under the 1962 Act. He nevertheless claimed to be entitled to enter and remain as a person who had been ordinarily resident here for two years. Held: The court rejected his claim: "The point turns on the meaning of 'ordinarily resident' in these statutes. If this were an income tax case he would, I expect, be held to be ordinarily resident here. But it is not an income tax case. It is an immigration case. In these statutes 'ordinarily resident' means lawfully ordinarily resident here. The word 'lawfully' is often read into a statute: see, for instance, Adlam v Law Society [1968] 1 WLR 6. It should be read into these statutes."
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Bhagwan (1970) 3 All ER 97; [1972] AC 60
1972
HL
Lord Diplock
Constitutional, Immigration
Lord Diplock said: "Under our system of Parliamentary government what Parliament enacts are not policies but means for giving effect to policies. Those means often involve imposing on private citizens fresh obligations or restrictions on their liberties to which they were not previously subject at common law. The constitutional function of the courts in relation to enacted law is limited to interpreting and applying it. It is the duty of the judge to ascertain what are the means which Parliament has enacted by the Act. In construing the enacting words he may take account of what the Act discloses as the purpose that those means were intended to achieve and, in the case of ambiguity alone, he may interpret them in the sense in which they are more likely to promote than hinder its achievement. But it is no function of a judge to add to the means which Parliament has enacted in derogation of rights which citizens previously enjoyed at common law, because he thinks that the particular case in which he has to apply the Act demonstrates that those means are not adequate to achieve what he conceives to be the policy of the Act.
To do so is not to carry out the intention of Parliament but to usurp its functions. The choice of means is itself part of the Parliamentary choice of policy. It represents the price, by way of deprivation of freedom to do or not to do as they wish, which Parliament is prepared to exact from individual citizens, to promote those objects to which the Act is directed. To raise the price is to change the policy—not to give effect to it. If the policy is to be changed it is for Parliament not the courts to change it—as Parliament has in fact changed the policy of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, by the amending Act of 1968 which makes it an offence for Commonwealth citizens to do what the respondent did in 1967. This is what Parliament has also done in numerous Finance Acts which have followed on decisions of your Lordships’ House in cases which have brought to light inadequacies in the enacted means of raising public revenue. In each of those cases the method adopted by the taxpayer of avoiding the incidence of taxation involved concerted action with at least one other person, and the decisions of your Lordships’ House in them are irreconcilable with the proposition for which the prosecution contends in the instant appeal."
Lord Diplock spoke of "the common law rights of British subjects . . to enter the United Kingdom when and where they please and on arrival to go wherever they like within the realm."
1 Citers



 
 Zaman (Dependent Parent) (Pakistan); IAT 21-Mar-1973 - [1973] UKIAT 00001

 
 Hasan and others (Dependent Parent) (India); IAT 12-May-1975 - [1976] Imm AR 28; [1975] UKIAT 00001
 
In re Sital Singh Unreported, 8 July 1975
8 Jul 1975
QBD
Milmo J
Immigration
Mtr Singh was suspected to be an illegal immigrant. The Secretary of State had authorized his removal on 24 April 1975. The matter came before the court on 8 July 1975. The applicant had been in custody since 17 March, three and a half months prior to the decision of the court. The court had been informed by counsel that a communication had been received from the Indian High Commission saying that a reply to the application for a travel document relating to the applicant would be received within the next ten days. Held: Milmo J said: "The Court is satisfied that everything that can be reasonably done by the Secretary of State for Home Affairs to urge the Indian High Commission to produce a travel document has been done and is being done." In those circumstances the court said: "It may be that a case will arise when the detention awaiting deportation is excessive, and when that case does arise it will be considered. But in the judgment of this Court the present case falls far short of that mark."
1 Citers



 
 Regina -v- Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Ex parte Salamat Bibi; CA 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 979; [1976] 3 All ER 843

 
 Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte R P Mehta (No 1); CA 1976 - [1976] Imm AR 38

 
 Suthendran -v- Immigration Appeal Tribunal; HL 1977 - [1977] AC 359; [1977] Imm AR 44; [1976] 3 All ER 611
 
In re Saidur Rahman [1977] Imm App Rep 24
1977
QBD
Collins J
Immigration

1 Citers



 
 Regina -v- Home Secretary, ex parte Hosenball; CA 1977 - [1977] 1 WLR 766; [1977] 3 All ER 452
 
Taj Bibi -v- Entry Clearance Officer, Islamabad [1977] Imm AR 25
1977


Immigration

1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Immigration Appeal Adjudicator, ex parte Bhanji [1977] Imm AR 89
4 Apr 1977
CA
Lord Denning MR, Lane, Cumming-Bruce LJJ
Immigration
The appellant had been issued with a form stating when his leave to stay would expire. Held: The "time to pack up" leave given by form APP101 could not be taken as a leave de novo but only as a permission to remain as an indulgence, and not a leave (Lord Denning MR).
1 Citers



 
 Regina -v- Pierre Bouchereau; ECJ 27-Oct-1977 - C-30/77; [1977] ECR 1999; R-30/77; [1977] EUECJ R-30/77; [1987] QB 732
 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Sultan Mahmood [1981] QB 59
1978
CA
Roskill LJ, Stephenson LJ, Geoffrey Lane LJ
Immigration
The applicant appealed refusal of his writ of habeas corpus. He had been arrested pending removal to Pakistan. He said that he had been registered a British Citizen under the 1948 Act. Whilst in Pakistan he had substituted his own photograph for that of his deceased relative, and entered the UK under the assumed name, and later obtained registration as a UK citizen. He said that he remained a UK citizen until his citizenship was revoked under section 20. Held: The appeal failed. Stephenson LJ said that the "registration was a nullity".
Roskill LJ: "before the provisions of section 20 can be prayed in aid, in my judgment the appellant must show that he can bring himself within subsection (1) of that section. He seeks to do so by reliance upon the fact of registration as evidenced by the certificate. If it were clear that the appellant was the Javed Iqbal originally named and identified in the Pakistani passport and in the other relevant documents and that the Secretary of State had intended to grant registration to that person, this argument would clearly have great force because it would be to that person so named and identified that that grant would have been directed. But the evidence is that that person was dead. The Secretary of State's intention cannot have been to grant registration to the appellant for he did not know who the appellant was. He wrongly believed the appellant to be Javed Iqbal, which he was not, nor could have been, for that individual was dead.
There are, I think, only three possible effects of the purported registration. First, it was a grant to Javed Iqbal. Secondly, it was a grant to the appellant. Thirdly, it was a grant to nobody but was a nullity. I have given my reasons already for rejecting the first two possibilities. There remains the third, that the purported grant was a nullity. I accept that in some cases it may be difficult to draw a dividing line in these cases between a registration which is a nullity and therefore void, as I think is the case with the present registration, in which case the alleged citizen by registration cannot bring himself within section 20(1) at all, and a registration which is only voidable, in which case the machinery of section 20 … has to be invoked … [Counsel for the Secretary of State] accepted that it was not easy to formulate a dividing line between the two classes of case. I agree, but wherever that line is drawn, I am clearly of the view that the instant case is one in which the alleged British registration was a nullity."
Geoffrey Lane LJ: "It seems to me that the only question to be decided is whether the appellant ever was a citizen of the United Kingdom by registration. I find it difficult to see how he could be. He chose to assume the identity of a dead man, he took the oath of allegiance and filled in the necessary forms in the dead man's name. I find it impossible to say that in those circumstances Sultan Mahmood became a citizen of the United Kingdom any more than did Javed Iqbal. The proceedings were ineffective and section 20 never applied."
1 Citers


 
Regina -v- IAT ex parte Nathwani [1979-80] Imm AR 9
1979
QBD

Immigration
The most natural reading of a ministerial statement as to immigration rules is that (in the absence of any statement to the contrary) they will apply to the decisions made until different rules are promulgates, after which decisions will be made according to the new rules.
1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Zamir [1979] QB 688; [1979] 2 All ER 849
14 Mar 1979
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ, Cumming-Bruce LJ and Neill J
Immigration
The applicant sought a writ of habeas corpus having been detained pending his removal after failing to disclose his subsquent marriage on entry under an entry certificate. Held. The request failed on the basis that entry had been obtained by a deception.
Immigration Act 1971
1 Citers


 
Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Zamir [1980] QB 378; [1980] 1 All ER 1041
21 Dec 1979
CA
Stephenson, Eveleigh and Brandon, LJJ
Immigration
The claimant appealed refusal of his request for a writ of habeas corpus. He had been detained for return to Pakistand. He had obtained an entry certificate, but then married, but did not disclose that on entry. Held. The failure amounted to a deception and the detention and intended removal were correct.
Immigration Act 1971
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
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