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Housing - From: 1996 To: 1996

This page lists 76 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Brillouet v Landless [1996] 28 HLR 836
1996
CA
Russell LJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
B occupied a room in a hotel. He sought an injunction to prevent his eviction, arguing first that he was a tenant protected by the Housing Act 1988 and second that he was protected under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. His application was refused. Held: His appeal was also dismissed. To claim under the 1988 Act he had to show that he had a tenancy. The facilities provided by the hotel prevented the appellant from demonstrating that he had exclusive possession. Further, he had taken advantage of hotel services. He was therefore a hotel guest booking accommodation at a daily rate. He was a mere licensee. As to the 1977 Act, he would be able to claim its protection as such, but in these particular circumstances, and even as a licensee his occupation was not occupation of a dwelling for the purposes of section 3 of the 1977 Act.
Housing Act 1998 - Protection from Eviction Act 1977 3

 
Regina v Kerr and the Hackney Borough Council [1996] 28 HLR 747
1996


Housing

1 Citers


 
Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society v Obi [1996] 28 HLR 22
1996


Housing
Once a warrant for possession has been executed, the statutory jurisdiction to re-instate a mortgagor is no longer exercisable. The court's own inherent jurisdiction is exercisable only if either the judgment on which the warrant is based is set aside, or the execution of the warrant amounts to an abuse of process or oppression.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v London Borough of Harrow ex parte Fahia (1996) 29 HLR 94
1996

Roger Toulson QC, DJ
Housing
After deliberately losing her tenancy, the authority had provided the appliant with temporary accomodation in a guest house, but after her housing benefits were halved she lost that accomodation also. Held: The authority had a duty to house her. The change in the level of housing benefits had operated to break the chain of causation, and she was no longer voluntarily homeless.
An example of the causal connection being interrupted, other than by a period in settled accommodation, would be if the applicant's accommodation in the guest house had been burned down; or if, in Dyson's case, the let of the cottage had been brought prematurely to an end by the cottage being destroyed by fire. As the judge observed, Dyson's case had been decided as it was because, when the let came to an end, the fact that Miss Dyson was thereafter homeless was caused by her initial conduct. If, on the other hand, somebody went into a property for a three month period but lost it after 14 days because the premises were burnt down, then in the judge's view, applying the ordinary common sense test of causation, one would say that the cause of the homelessness was the fire. The judge considered Ex p Bassett to be another illustration of the same principle.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Greenwich London Borough Council ex parte Dukic [1996] 29 HLR 87
1996

Toulson J
Housing

1 Citers


 
Scotlife Home Loans v Hedworth (1996) 28 HLR 771
1996
CA
Neill LJ
Housing, Undue Influence
The lender claimed possession as chargee under a legal charge granted by the respondents who filed Defences contending that the claimant had agreed to replace the secured loan and to waive its remedies for default under the charge. The claimant said the defence was misconceived. The District Judge declined to make a possession order, and gave directions. The claimant appealed to the circuit judge. By the time the appeal was heard Mrs Hedworth had amended her Defence to plead that the claimant's charge was unenforceable against her since it had been procured by Mr Hedworth's undue influence, of which the claimant had constructive notice. The judge allowed the claimant's appeal and made a possession order. On appeal Mrs Hedworth sought to adduce additional affidavit evidence to the effect that if the appeal were allowed she would re-amend her Defence to allege that the claimant's advance was applied in discharging existing charges which had themselves been procured by the undue influence of Mr Hedworth, of which the claimant had constructive notice. The claimant conceded that if Mrs Hedworth's Defence were amended to include such allegations it would no longer be appropriate to strike it out. Held: Dismissing her appeal: "I appreciate that counsel for Mrs Hedworth would argue that the fact that a loan by way of mortgage is to be applied for the redemption of prior mortgages does not necessarily establish that the remortgage is to the wife's advantage because .... the mortgages redeemed may themselves have been procured by undue influence. I am not persuaded, however, by this argument. Indeed, it seems to me that it is contrary to the reasoning in Pitt. The court has to find an equilibrium between the proper protection of the rights of a wife who may be the victim of actual or presumed undue influence on the one hand and on the other hand the furtherance of ordinary business transactions involving mortgages of a matrimonial home in the joint ownership of a husband and wife. The decision in Pitt .... demonstrates that a transaction which involves a remortgage with the application of any surplus funds to a purpose which is to the apparent benefit of the husband and wife would not normally arouse suspicion. In the present case I think the correct approach is to consider what would have been the position had Scotlife been alerted to the fact that these monies were to be applied (save for a very small fraction) to the redemption of earlier mortgages. On this basis, I consider that Scotlife would have been entitled to treat the transaction as an ordinary business transaction. .... As I see it, Scotlife had no reason to question the validity of these earlier mortgages."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, ex parte Avdic (1996) 28 HLR 897
1996
QBD
Tucker J
Housing
The applicant challenged a referral of her application for housing as a homeless person by Hammersmith back to Kirklees from where she had moved. She had a cousin in Hammersmith. Held: Her application for judical review failed. Tucker J: "Section 61(1) of the Housing Act provides that a local connection may be established by any of four criteria. One of these at (c) is that because of family associations. But [counsel] does not pursue that suggestion. Instead he relies on (d), that there are in this case other special circumstances. The Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities suggests that this may be particularly relevant in dealing with households returning from abroad, or discharged from HM Forces who do not conform to other criteria. In my opinion family associations do not extend beyond parents, adult children, or brothers and sisters. First cousins once removed (or cousins of any description) cannot provide the necessary connection. And I agree with the decision of the Deputy High Court Judge in R v Slough B C ex p Khan (1995) 27 HLR 492, that if a family association is too weak to create a local connection it can hardly amount to a special circumstance."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Guinan v Enfield London Borough Council (1996) 29 HLR 456
1996
CA

Housing, Local Government
The landlord council and tenant claiming his right to buy disputed the reasonableness of terms proposed by the council for inclusion in the lease. The tenant served a RTB6 notice and the landlord served a RTB7 Counter notice relying on the reasonableness of the terms proposed. The tenant served a RTB8 operative notice of delay contending that the RTB7 Counter notice was invalid because there was action for the landlord to take, that is to agree reasonable terms. Held: Some of the proposed terms were reasonable, but others unreasonable. As to the validity of the Counter notice, the court held that a Counter notice is valid if the landlord in good faith believes that he has in law the right to insist on the terms he is offering, the county court being at hand to settle disputes under section 181.
Housing Act 1985181
1 Citers


 
Bolnore Properties Ltd v Cobb (1996) 29 HLR 202
1996


Housing

Housing Act 1988 34(1)(b)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Lambeth London Borough Council, ex parte Ashley (1996) 29 HLR 385
1996


Housing

1 Citers


 
Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, ex parte Avdic [1996] 30 HLR 1
2 Jan 1996
CA
Lord Justice Simon Brown, Lord Justice Staughton
Housing, Administrative
A refugee from Bosnia moved from Kirklees to London, where she applied for accomodation as being homeless. Hammersmith accepted that she was owed a duty, but referred her back to Kirklees in September. Her solicitors then sent in more material which the LHA considered before, in January, refusing her again. The reconsideration of the case was voluntary.
Lord Justice Simon Brown (obiter): "In my judgment, this council went as far as it possibly could in construing section 61 in a way favourable to this appellant. By no stretch of the imagination could [the cousin's] presence in the neighbouring borough be regarded as a family association such as to give the appellant a local connection with the respondent under section 61(1)(c). Indeed [counsel] does not so submit. . . . To my mind it is far from clear that an appellant's claim to be housed under Part III of the 1985 Act can be improved in this fashion simply because the local authority accede to a request to review the matter, as this local authority has done after the initial decision was taken." Though it was unnecessary to deal definitively with the point the Lord Justice questioned whether the local authority should have acceded to the request for a review.
Simon Brown considered the nature of the authority's residual discretion: "Residual Discretion. That such a discretion exists cannot be doubted. Plainly a local authority are entitled to house an applicant even if he or she has an obvious local connection with some other borough and none at all with their own. To my mind that proposition hardly needs the citation of authority, although I record that it is so stated in R v London Borough of Newham, ex p London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1993) 23 HLR 62 at 71. It should, however, be remembered that this particular legislation is concerned essentially with a local authority's housing function rather than with their social services function. It is not to be thought that a London borough, very hard pressed as doubtless they all are in connection with their public housing stock, will very readily accept on an entirely voluntary basis a housing obligation which, by virtue of section 67, they are perfectly entitled to refer elsewhere and which, indeed some other borough expressly accepts. Nevertheless, I repeat, such a discretion exists. . . . "
Housing Act 1985 65(2) 67(2)(a)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
National and Provincial Building Society v Lloyd Independent, 05 January 1996
5 Jan 1996
CA

Housing
Mortgage repossession may be deferred as long as necessary if sale to be complete.

 
Huwyler v Ruddy [1996] EWCA Civ 1309; (1996) 28 HLR 550; [1996] EGCS 8
18 Jan 1996
CA
Peter Gibson, Schiemann LJJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The parties disputed whether the arrangement between them amounted to a licence to occupy or a tenancy.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v London Borough of Newham ex parte Bibi, Regina v London Borough of Newham ex parte Al-Nashed [1996] EWHC Admin 4
18 Jan 1996
Admn

Administrative, Local Government, Housing

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
National and Provincial Building Society v Lloyd Times, 24 January 1996
24 Jan 1996
CA

Housing
The proper length of suspension of a possession order to allow a sale is a question for each case.
Administration of Justice Act 1970


 
 Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan; CA 31-Jan-1996 - Times, 08 February 1996; (1996) 28 HLR 469; (1996) 72 P & CR 507
 
Marath and Another v MacGillivray Times, 05 February 1996; [1996] 28 HLR 484
5 Feb 1996
CA
Sir Iain Glidewell
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
A landlord's notice to the effect that '3 month's rent due' was a sufficiently precise demand to allow the tenant to know the nature of his default, and the notice was valid. the relevant notice said: "Signed: RM If signed by agent, name and address of agent: Acting Agent RM" with the address. This notice had been served as an exhibit to an affidavit by the agent. Held: A notice served for the purposes of section 20 of the 1988 Act (notwithstanding that it was not a valid notice for the purposes of section 20 itself, because it was served after rather than before the "assured tenancy" was entered into) provided sufficient notice for the purposes of section 48(1).
Sir Iain Glidewell said: "I see the strength in the argument that if it be proved that the landlord, or his solicitors acting on his behalf, had quite deliberately ensured that payment which otherwise would have come from a housing authority was delayed until after the date of the hearing, in order to enable the landlord to prove that more than three months' rent was in fact unpaid, a court would be slow to base a judgment upon more than three months' rent being unpaid. Precisely how it would go about reflecting that unwillingness to give judgment when it is required by statute to do so, I have not considered."
Housing Act 1988 8 20 - Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 48(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Westminster City Council Ex Parte Castelli; Regina v Same Ex Parte Tristan Garcia Independent, 23 February 1996; Gazette, 20 March 1996; Times, 27 February 1996; (1996) 28 HLR 616
23 Feb 1996
CA

Housing, Immigration, European
A Local Authority has a duty to house European Union migrants even without leave to stay as long as they are looking for work. EU nationals who were properly entering the UK were owed the Housing Act duties until they were told that they were overstaying.
Housing Act 1985 63 65
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Waltham Forest London Borough Council Ex Parte Holder and Another Independent, 28 February 1996
28 Feb 1996
QBD

Benefits, Housing
Alternative accommodation offered was suitable even though the housing benefit claimant had no deposit to allow him to take up the accommodation.

 
The Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Ubah Gazette, 03 April 1996; Times, 21 March 1996; [1996] 73 P&CR at 500
21 Mar 1996
CA
Millett LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
The respondent mortgagee had obtained an order for possession against the mortgagor freeholder, referred to in the judgment as "the Chief", who had, prior to the mortgage, granted a tenancy to the appellant. Held: The landlord's retention of a right to use the kitchen made the tenancy a restricted tenancy even though no use was possible by the landlord under the contract in that situation.
CS Millett LJ: "The appellant's evidence was that in 1987, that is before the mortgage was granted to the respondents, the appellant arranged for work to be carried out on the flat. The Chief later agreed with him that he would pay £13,873 towards the cost of those repairs and in the words of the appellant 'the Chief told me to set my rent against what he owed me'. That agreement was effective between the parties, but it did not confirm upon the appellant an interest in land capable of binding successors in title to the Chief whether with or without notice of the arrangements unless the right the right of deduction which was given to the appellant fell within one of the two established rights of deduction which are capable of binding successors in title". And
"As against the Chief in my opinion the appellant may well be entitled to deduct the amount which the Chief owes him from payments of rent which are due to the Chief. But the money judgment below is entirely in respect of rent to due the respondents after the date that they had notified the appellant that they had taken possession. The appellant has no right of set-off capable of binding successors in title such as the respondents. It is, of course, settled law that an interest which is not capable of binding successors in title cannot be an over-riding interest within section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925."
Rent Act 1977 21
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Melville v Bruton; CA 29-Mar-1996 - Times, 03 April 1996; Times, 29 March 1996; [1996] TLR 191; (1996) 29 HLR 319
 
Camden London Borough Council v Goldenberg and Another Times, 01 April 1996; (1996) 28 HLR 727
1 Apr 1996
CA
Thorpe LJ
Housing
The appellant had lived for a number of years with his grandmother; had then married; had thereupon moved with his bride for three months into a house owned by friends who were abroad; had, throughout that time, left the bulk of his belongings at the grandmother's property; at the expiry of the three months had been unable with his wife to find other accommodation for them both; and so had moved alone back to the grandmother's property. He sought a succession to the tenancy. The authority asserted that he had ceased to reside there. Held: The possession orer was set aside. A tenancy succession right was not lost by a temporary and conditional move away.
Housing Act 1985 87 91(3)(c)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Lambeth London Borough Council Ex Parte Njomo Times, 11 April 1996
11 Apr 1996
QBD

Housing
Rent arrears are a proper consideration for a Local Authority in allocating a housing tenancy.
Housing Act 1985 22

 
Regina v Newham London Borough Council Ex Parte Smith Times, 11 April 1996; [1996] 29 HLR 213
11 Apr 1996
QBD
Sir Louis Blom Cooper QC
Housing
The local connection test for rehousing may be applied as at the date of the application for housing: "In my judgment a local authority may properly ask itself whether the applicant had a local connection . . at the date of the application under Part III of the Housing Act, 1985 so long as it is prepared to review its decision in that regard should the delay in its investigations under Section 62 be prolonged in such a way as to call for a reconsideration of its decision on referral."
Housing Act 1985 Part III
1 Citers


 
Regina v Westminster City Council Ex Parte Benniche Times, 15 April 1996
15 Apr 1996
CA

Housing
A desire to attend at a mosque and to be near a Muslim school was insufficient local connection to make the local authority responsible for re-housing the applicant.
Housing Act 1967 61 67

 
Bristol and West Building Society v Ellis and Another Times, 02 May 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 1294
24 Apr 1996
CA

Housing
A mortgage repossession order to be made if there no prospect of a sale within 3-5 years.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Camden London Borough Council Ex Parte Adair Times, 30 April 1996
30 Apr 1996
QBD

Housing
Homelessness enquiry must extend to all appropriate departments within authority.
Housing Act 1985 62

 
Regina v Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council Ex Parte Kihara; Regina v Similar Times, 01 May 1996
1 May 1996
QBD

Housing
The words 'other special reason' for housing need within the section are to be to be read narrowly. The section was to be read as a whole and was not indended to cover impecuniosity through the denial of benefits.
Housing Act 1985 59(1)
1 Citers



 
 Coventry City Council v Finnie and Another; QBD 2-May-1996 - Times, 02 May 1996; (1997) 29 HLR 658

 
 Credit Suisse and Another v Waltham Forest London Borough Council; CA 20-May-1996 - Times, 20 May 1996; [1997] QB 362

 
 Regina v Wandsworth London Borough Council Ex Parte Wingrove; Regina v Same Ex Parte Mansoor; CA 7-Jun-1996 - Times, 07 June 1996; [1997] QB 953
 
Regina v Wolverhampton Metropolitan Borough Council Ex Parte Watters Times, 11 June 1996
11 Jun 1996
QBD

Housing
Local Authority not oblige to place all applicants on housing waiting list - old rent arrears.
Housing Act 1985 22

 
Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council Ex Parte Avdie Times, 11 June 1996
11 Jun 1996
QBD

Housing
Sets limits to the degree of family connection required to establish a connection.
Housing Act 1985 61(1)

 
Regina v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Ex Parte Kihara; Similar Times, 10 July 1996; Independent, 03 July 1996; [1996] 29 HLR 147
25 Jun 1996
CA
Simon Brown, Waite, Neill LJJ
Immigration, Housing
Four asylum seekers had been deprived of benefits, and left destitute. They had sought housing assistance from the authority, claiming that the complete absence of resources left to them was an 'other special reason' leaving them vulnerable within s59. Held: Such destitution was capable of being a reason within the Act, and the appeal against refusal of the assistance was allowed. Deprivation of asylum seekers of benefits made them vulnerable and in housing need. Case law suggested that the ejusdem generis rule should not be applied in construing the section so as to restrict its application.
Housing Act 1988 59(1)(c) - Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous Amendment Regulations 1996 30
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Islington London Borough Council Ex Parte Bibi Times, 10 July 1996
10 Jul 1996
QBD

Housing
An inability to pay rent for the need to feed a family may be a valid reason for leaving house.


 
 Camden London Borough Council v Marshall; QBD 11-Jul-1996 - Times, 11 July 1996
 
Regina v Westminster City Council Ex Parte Obeid Times, 16 July 1996; (1996) 29 HLR 389
16 Jul 1996
QBD

Housing
Loss of a house from ignorance of benefit rules was not deliberate homelessness.
Housing Act 1985 60(3)
1 Citers


 
Susan Patricia Burton v Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Camden [1996] EWCA Civ 522
21 Jul 1996
CA

Housing, Benefits

[ Bailii ]
 
Dickinson v Enfield London Borough Council Times, 09 August 1996
9 Aug 1996
CA

Landlord and Tenant, Housing
A tenat's right to buy property should not effect the assessed fair rent on review.
Housing Act 1985

 
K Pawlowski and Other v Ahmed K M Balabel [1996] EWCA Civ 574
12 Aug 1996
CA

Housing

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Kensington and Chelse Royal London Borough Council Ex Parte Assiter Times, 20 August 1996
20 Aug 1996
QBD

Housing
A Local Authority relying on a bare opinion for its decision should assist the court with an explanation.

 
Honderich v Esme Withers [1996] EWCA Civ 586
20 Aug 1996
CA

Housing

Rent Act 1977
[ Bailii ]
 
Jones v Jones Times, 17 October 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 595
29 Aug 1996
CA

Family, Housing
A transfer of property application in divorce ancillary relief proceedings was properly affected by the Local Authority's housing policies.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 24
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Good [1996] EWHC Admin 69
2 Sep 1996
Admn

Housing

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Mayor and Burgesses of Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex parte Irina Korneva [1996] EWHC Admin 76
23 Sep 1996
Admn

Housing

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Exeter City Council ex parte Michael Medawar [1996] EWHC Admin 78
1 Oct 1996
Admn

Housing

[ Bailii ]
 
LDJ Property and Investment Co Ltd v John Mehta [1996] EWCA Civ 629
2 Oct 1996
CA

Housing

[ Bailii ]

 
 Mainwaring and Yeoman's Row Management Limited v Trustees of Henry Smith's Charity (No 2); CA 3-Oct-1996 - Times, 09 October 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 657
 
Regina v Westminster City Council Ex Parte Bishop Times, 03 October 1996
3 Oct 1996
QBD

Housing
Priority housing need applicant must show some partial dependency of children.
Housing Act 1985 58(1)(b)

 
Regina v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, ex parte M; Regina v Similar Ex Parte P etc Gazette, 13 November 1996; Times, 10 October 1996; [1996] EWHC Admin 90; (1997) 1 CCLR 85; (1997) 30 HLR 10
8 Oct 1996
QBD

Benefits, Housing, Local Government
Destitute asylum seekers who were not entitled to welfare benefits could be in need of care and attention within the meaning of section 21 of the 1948 Act although they were no longer entitled to housing assistance or other social security benefits such as income support. The Act should be read so as to disallow a refusal by local authorities to house destitute asylum seekers. Local Authority has residual duty to support destitute asylum applicants who had been refused benefits.
National Assistance Act 1948 21 22
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
O'Driscoll v Hadjimina [1996] EWCA Civ 677
8 Oct 1996
CA

Housing, Damages

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v City of Westminster ex parte Moklis Ali [1996] EWHC Admin 106
14 Oct 1996
Admn

Housing
Application for judicial review of a decision of the Council given whereby the Council determined that the Applicant and his family were homeless and in priority need, but that they were intentionally homeless.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v London Borough of Lambeth ex parte Kevin Carter [1996] EWCA Civ 729
15 Oct 1996
CA

Housing

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v London Borough of Newham ex parte Larwood [1996] EWHC Admin 123
17 Oct 1996
Admn

Housing

Housing Act 1985 65(2)

 
ex parte London Borough of Hackney v Maureen Mullen [1996] EWCA Civ 767
18 Oct 1996
CA

Housing, Litigation Practice
The authority appealed a fine of £5,000 for a breach of an undertaking to carry out repairs to their tenant's property. They complained that there had been no evidence of previous breaches, and that the judge had been wrong to take account of other breaches. Held: The authority might have applied for an adjournment, anticipating the order to be made. It had not. The judge was exercising a proper discretion, was entitled to take account of other breaches, and also to use his own special knowledge of the respondent's behaviour in other cases. An affidavit from the authority that it had only broken one such order in the previous twelve months was not to the point.
[ Bailii ]
 
The Keepers And Governors Of The Possessions Revenues and Goods Of The Free Grammar School Of John Lyon v Marilyn Edey, Roy Edey [1996] CA Civ 776
21 Oct 1996
CA

Housing
The first respondent occupied premises of the plaintiff as part of her nursing duties. She failed to leave when her employment terminated. She claimed that the dismissal was malicious, and unfair dismissal proceedings were imminent. She sought leave to appeal against an order for possession. She argued that the tenancy was incidental to, not part and parcel of her employment. The finding of the judge could not be criticised. Leave refused.
[ Bailii ]
 
London Borough of Sutton v Morgan Grenfell and Co Ltd Morgan Grenfell and Co Ltd v Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Sutton London Borough of Sutton v Morgan Grenfell and Co Ltd Wellesley Housing Association Ltd Times, 07 November 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 797; (1996) 95 LGR 574
24 Oct 1996
CA
Peter Gibson LJ
Local Government, Housing
The Housing Associations Act 1985 empowered a local authority to give guarantees in relation to registered housing associations. A local authority guaranteed a bank loan for an unregistered housing association. Held: A Local Authority had no power to guarantee a loan to an unregistered housing association. Section 111(1) of the 1972 Act could not be relied on to support the guarantee, which was consequently ultra vires.
Peter Gibson LJ adopted the proposition of counsel that: "Where Parliament has expressly enacted provisions which define the means by which local authorities are to carry out their functions, section 111(1) of the Act of 1972 cannot be relied upon in support of performance of those functions by other means not expressly empowered by the relevant provisions"
Local Government Act 1972 111 - Housing Associations Act 1985
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Darlington Borough Council v Sterling [1996] EWCA Civ 808
25 Oct 1996
CA

Housing

[ Bailii ]
 
Burrows v Brent London Borough Council Gazette, 20 November 1996; Times, 04 November 1996; [1996] 4 All ER 577; [1997] 1 EGLR 32; [1997] 2 FCR 43; [1996] NPC 149; [1997] Fam Law 246; [1996] UKHL 20; (1997) 29 HLR 167; [1997] 11 EG 150; [1997] 1 FLR 178
31 Oct 1996
HL
Browne-Wilkinson L
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority appealed. Held. The agreement had created a new tenancy even after a final possession order had been made, and a A new possession order was required before any warrant could be issued. Had the authority obtained a suspended possession order, no new tenancy might have been created. While a tenant could not sue for breach of a landlord’s covenant while the tenancy was in the state of limbo, if and when the secure tenancy revived, its covenants likewise revived and were to be treated as having been in existence during the limbo period.
An agreement which allowed a tenant to stay on in a house after a possession order had been made, did not itself create a new tenancy, but he might have the status of being a 'tolerated trespasser': "In the absence of special circumstances, an agreement by a landlord not to enforce strictly an order for possession, whether conditional or unconditional does not create a new secure tenancy or licence." However, a tenant who had not been evicted could apply under section 85(2) to postpone the date of possession, and, upon such postponement, the secure tenancy would be revived because "the date on which the tenant is to give up possession" would not have arisen and thus the tenancy would not have ended. Until a possession order was executed, the court could by variation of its order change the date on which possession is to be given and thereby revive a secure tenancy which had already been terminated.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: "What, then, is the correct legal analysis? I start from the proposition that where a former tenant is by agreement allowed to remain in possession of the demised property after the termination of the tenancy, the question in each case is quo animo the parties have so acted: depending upon the circumstances, their conduct may give rise to a new tenancy, a licence or some other arrangement. In the present case, on 5 February 1992 the parties plainly did not intend to create a new tenancy or licence but only to defer the execution of the order so long as Miss Burrows complied with the agreed conditions. It cannot be right to impute to the parties an intention to create a legal relationship such as a secure tenancy or licence unless the legal structures within which they made their agreement force that conclusion.
A secure tenancy protected by Part IV of the Act of 1985 is not like an ordinary tenancy. It can only be terminated by an order of the court ordering possession to be given on a particular date or in a particular event. But even determination by order of the court is not final. Until the possession order is executed, the court can by variation of its order change the date on which possession is to be given and thereby revive a secure tenancy which has already been terminated. During the period between the date specified by the order for the giving of possession and the date on which the order is executed there is a period of limbo: the old tenancy has gone but may yet be revived by a further order of the court varying the date for possession. If the parties reach an agreement as to the continued occupation of the premises by the tenant during that limbo period, what intention is to be imputed to them?
In my judgment little guidance is to be obtained from the cases where a tenant holds over after the termination of an ordinary tenancy where there is no possibility that the expired tenancy can revive. The position in relation to secure tenancies is sui generis. In my judgment, the agreement can and should take effect in the way the parties intend, i.e. it is an agreement by the landlords that, upon the tenant complying with the agreed conditions, the landlords will forbear from executing the order, i.e. from taking the step which would finally put an end to the tenant's right to apply to the court for an order reviving the tenancy. There is no need to impute to the parties an intention to create a new tenancy or licence: the retention of possession and the payment of rent relate to occupation under the old tenancy which is in limbo but which may be revived. In these circumstances I think it is fair to characterise the former tenant as a trespasser whom the landlord has agreed not to evict - a "tolerated trespasser" - pending either the revival of the old tenancy or the breach of the agreed conditions.
Once the effect of section 85 is appreciated, the absurdities which led the Court of Appeal not to accept that Miss Burrows could be a tolerated trespasser disappear. Technically the old secure tenancy is, during the limbo period, no longer in existence and therefore neither the repairing covenants in the tenancy nor the Defective Premises Act 1972 apply. But the tenant can at any time apply to the court for an order varying the date on which possession is to be given and thereby retrospectively revive the old secure tenancy, together with its covenants. If the tenant has complied with the agreed conditions, there can be little doubt that the court would make the required order. Moreover, the tenant will not be a homeless person within section 58(2) of the Act of 1985 because the tenant will be occupying the residence by virtue of any "rule of law giving him the right to remain in occupation:" see section 58(2)(c). If the tenant were in breach of any of the covenants in the old secure tenancy, Brent could apply to vary the order so as retrospectively to revive the old tenancy together with its covenants.
Finally, there is a method (albeit a clumsy one) whereby the order for possession even if an immediate unconditional order, can be discharged or rescinded if so desired under section 85(4). The power in that subsection to discharge or rescind only arises "if the conditions are complied with," a requirement which cannot be satisfied in the case of an unconditional order. But there is no reason why the order cannot be discharged by consent or, if such consent is not forthcoming, by the court varying the original order so as to impose the agreed conditions and then discharging the varied order.
It was submitted that the fact that the tenancy was granted to Miss Burrows jointly with Mr. Allen whereas the agreement of 5 February 1992 was made with Miss Burrows alone, indicated that the agreement must have given rise to a new tenancy with Miss Burrows alone. Therefore there must be a new tenancy. However, since in my view on its proper analysis the arrangement contained in the agreement of 5 February 1992 gave rise to no new tenancy with anyone, that factor is irrelevant. I therefore reach the conclusion that, in the absence of special circumstances, an agreement by a landlord not to enforce strictly an order for possession, whether conditional or unconditional, does not create a new secure tenancy or licence under Part IV of Act of 1985.
As Brent, by making the agreement of 5 February 1992, did not grant a new tenancy or licence to Miss Burrows as from 12 February 1992. It follows that the possession order of 29 January 1992 was properly enforced. I would therefore reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the trial judge and dismiss Miss Burrows's action."
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle said: "whereas an order postponing the date of possession necessarily affects the operation of section 82(2), an order staying or suspending the execution of an order for possession on a stated date has no effect on the operation of that subsection but merely postpones execution so long as the conditions of suspension are complied with."
Housing Act 1985 82 85(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Thompson and Thompson v Williams [1996] EWCA Civ 904
7 Nov 1996
CA

Housing
Possession action - rent arrears.
[ Bailii ]
 
Pourdanay v Barclays Bank Plc Times, 12 November 1996
12 Nov 1996
ChD

Landlord and Tenant, Housing, Land
Statutory tenancy after contractual one binding on mortgagee is also binding.


 
 Highland Council (Formerly Ross and Cromarty District Council) v Patience and Others (Scotland); HL 14-Nov-1996 - Times, 09 January 1997; [1996] UKHL 7
 
Farag v Rosman [1996] EWCA Civ 991
18 Nov 1996
CA

Housing
Claim for return of tenant's deposit.
[ Bailii ]
 
Berryman v Hounslow London Borough Council Times, 18 December 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 1001
20 Nov 1996
CA

Landlord and Tenant, Land, Housing, Personal Injury
No damages were to be awarded for a tenant's injury suffered whilst climbing the stairs when the lift had not been repaired.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v London Borough of Lambeth ex parte Harrington, Howell and Glynn Times, 10 December 1996; [1996] EWHC Admin 261
22 Nov 1996
Admn

Benefits, Housing
Form of reasons for Housing benefits decisions is clear; no need for affidavits.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v London Borough of Hounslow ex parte Malik Javid Khan [1996] EWHC Admin 269
25 Nov 1996
Admn

Housing, Benefits

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Elizabeth Daykin and John Daykin [1996] EWHC Admin 271
26 Nov 1996
Admn

Housing

[ Bailii ]

 
 Enfield London Borough Council v Devonish and Another; CA 27-Nov-1996 - Times, 12 December 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 1048

 
 Ure v United Kingdom; ECHR 27-Nov-1996 - 28027/95
 
Regina v Mayor and Burgesses of Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ex parte Irina Korneva Times, 01 January 1997; [1996] EWCA Civ 1114
5 Dec 1996
CA

Housing
Asylum seeker to be given temporary housing appropriate to the time of application.
Housing Act 1985 Part III
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v London Borough of Newham ex parte Jenner [1996] EWCA Civ 1135
6 Dec 1996
CA

Housing
Renewed application for leave to move for judicial review in a homelessness case.
[ Bailii ]
 
Keepers and Governors of Possessions Revenues and Goods of Free Grammar School of John Lyon v Mayhew Times, 12 February 1997; [1996] EWCA Civ 1192
12 Dec 1996
CA

Landlord and Tenant, Housing
A defect in the Landlord's notice to quit was cured by the Tenant's acceptance of the notice and her and non objection.

 
Regina v Wolverhampton Metropolitan Borough Council, Wolverhampton Justices, ex parte Dunne, and Rafferty Times, 02 January 1997; [1996] EWHC Admin 377
17 Dec 1996
Admn

Housing
A Local authority must investigate the personal circumstances of a tenant before seeking an eviction order.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 77(1)
[ Bailii ]
 
Laura Caroline Ambrose v Joseph Christopher Lawlor [1996] EWCA Civ 1250
18 Dec 1996
CA

Housing, Costs

[ Bailii ]
 
Savino and Another ex parte v City of Bradford Metropolitan Council [1996] EWCA Civ 1270
19 Dec 1996
CA

Housing
Failure to repair.
[ Bailii ]
 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Abdul Azad and Momta Begum [1996] EWCA Civ 1278
20 Dec 1996
CA
Lord Justice Pill, Lord Justice Mummery
Housing
The landlord had a warrant for possession. The tenant said the arrears had been overstated, and sought to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was adjourned to allow the landlord to investigate. The effect of a defect in procedure was not immediately obvious. Nevertheless, it was appropriate to adjourn rather than give leave because the prospects of success remained low
[ Bailii ]
 
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