swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Housing - From: 1992 To: 1992
This page lists 15 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.
Haniff v Robinson [1992] 3 WLR 875
1992
Housing
The only way that a landlord may properly secure possession of property subject to a statutory tenancy against the wishes of the tenant is by first obtaining a possession order and then by executing a warrant for possession.
London Borough of Hackney v Lambourne (1992) 25 HLR 172
1992
Ralph Gibson LJ
Housing
Ralph Gibson LJ said: "The defendants . . have no private law right to remain in occupation of the temporary premises let to them. Their private law right is to the accommodation which the council has, in the exercise of its discretion, judged to be suitable accommodation."
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London Borough of Brent v Sharma and Vyas (1992) 25 HLR 257
1992
CA
Lord Justice Scott
Housing
A tenancy of a flat was granted to Miss Vyas. She occupied it with Mr Sharma. They later married. She moved out and was given the tenancy of a council house elsewhere. She then wrote to Brent, the landlords, to say she was no longer sharing with Mr Sharma, that she had moved out and had no objection to the transfer of the flat into his name. Brent stopped charging rent to Miss Vyas, posting a notice to quit through the letter box of the flat requiring her to give up possession on 16 January 1989. The judge held that the notice was invalid as never having been properly served on Miss Vyas. She continued to live in Milton Keynes until September 1989. Mr Sharma continued to occupy the flat. Brent never transferred the tenancy to him and never treated him as a tenant. Brent took proceedings for possession against both Miss Vyas and Mr Sharma on 14 September 1989. The judge made an order for possession, taking the view that Miss Vyas' notice of November 1988 was an unequivocal act by her and evincing an intention to surrender the tenancy, which he held had been accepted by Brent. The judge relied on the fact that Brent's internal records showed that they no longer debited any rent to Miss Vyas. He therefore made the possession order. The defendants appealed, arguing that there was no evidence of any unequivocal act by Brent showing that it had accepted that there was no longer a continuing tenancy and that Brent's service of the notice to quit in December 1988 showed that it regarded the tenancy as then still continuing. Held: The appeal was dismissed. Miss Vyas' conduct in leaving the flat, moving to Milton Keynes and living there with her two children and sending her November 1988 notice to Brent amounted to unequivocal representations that she was treating her tenancy of the flat as at an end. Lord Justice Scott: "Of course, unilateral conduct by one of the parties to a tenancy cannot by itself bring to an end the tenancy. Surrender by operation of law requires unequivocal conduct by both landlord and tenant. The landlord council, it seems, was not entirely clear as to the legal effect of the conduct of Miss Vyas. So the council did three things. On December 19, 1988, it ceased to charge rent as from December 12, 1988; thereafter no rent was charged to Miss Vyas in respect of the tenancy at 33, Donovan Court. Second, the council served a document, purporting to be a notice to quit, terminating the tenancy as at the end of January 1989; and, third, by any number of internal memoranda, the council showed that it regarded Miss Vyas's tenancy of 33, Donovan Court as having come to an end. I refer, in particular, to the comments describing the occupation of Mr Sharma, who had been living with Miss Vyas at 33, Donovan Court, as in 'unlawful occupation'.
The council's conduct in December 1988 may, correctly viewed, have been equivocal. But, in my judgment, by February 1989 at the latest the council's conduct had become entirely unequivocal. If both tenant and landlord are unequivocally treating a tenancy as at an end, the law has no business to insist on its continuance."
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Regina v London Borough of Ealing, Ex parte Lewis (1992) 24 HLR 484
1992
CA
Lloyd LJ, Woolf LJ
Housing, Local Government
The court was asked as to the issue of a local housing authority's power under the 1989 Act, to expend money on "the repair, maintenance, supervision and management of houses and other property". Held: The phrase should be given "a wide construction" (Lloyd LJ) and Woolf LJ: it should receive "a generous interpretation".
Local Government and Housing Act 1989
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Wilson v Nithsdale District Council [1992] SLT 1131
1992
Lord Prosser
Housing, Scotland
An eighteen year old girl had been sexually assaulted, was unable to return home, had been expelled from a hostel for suspected theft and was said to be at risk of further sexual assault if not provided with suitable accommodation. She sought housing as a vulnerable person. Held: The court pointed out the dangers of a comparative approach in extablishing vulnerability: "The 'comparative' approach to vulnerability adopted in these cases cannot in my view be pushed to its logical limit; the intention cannot be that every homeless person will be held vulnerable for special reason merely because one other such homeless person might by comparison seem less vulnerable. The comparison must in my view be with some assumed average or normal run-of-the-mill homeless person. But if there is a lesser ability to fend for oneself, against that comparison, in a housing context, so that injury or detriment would result when such an ordinary homeless person would be able to cope without harmful effects, then in my opinion vulnerability for special reason is established for the purpose of the Act, and nothing more special (far less anything odd or exceptional) is required."
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Hughes and Hughes v Greenwich London Borough Council [1992] 65 P & CR 12; [1992] 24 HLR 805 CA
1992
CA
Housing
The applicant was headmaster of a boarding school. The contract of employment did not require him to occupy the house, but a new house was built for the headmaster and he moved into it. It was not necessary for him to occupy the house for his duties, but it was advantageous. He sought the right to buy the house. Held: The authority appealed a finding that he was a secure tenant. A term can only be implied that he should occupy a particular house wher this was essential. It could not be implied where occupation would be for the better performance of his duties..
Housing Act 1985 79
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Swansea City Council v Glass [1992] 1 QB 844; [1992] CLY 2828; [1992] 2 All ER 680; [1992] 3 WLR 123
1992
CA
Taylor LJ
Limitation, Housing, Local Government
The defendant had failed himself to reapir his property, and the Local Authority carried out the work itself under the 1957 Act. It sought to recover the associated costs from the defendant, but he said that their claim was time barred, being more than six years after the work had been concluded. The authority argued that it was not more than six years from when it had served the notices demanding payment. Held: The notices were not the cause of action, but only a condition precedent to bringing an action. Accordingly time ran from the conclusion of the works, and the claim was out of time.
Taylor LJ said: "Section 10(4) provides expressly that where the local authority opts to take summary proceedings to recover their expenses, the limitation period runs from the date of service of the demand or, if there is an appeal, the date when the demand becomes operative. Again, by implication, since no such provision is applied to proceedings in the High Court or County Court, time in those proceedings does not run from the date when the demand is served or becomes operative. It will run from the accrual of the cause of action which, ex hypothesi, is a different time.
The rationale of the distinction between summary and other proceedings probably lies in the respective limitation periods. In summary proceedings the period is six months. If time were to run from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the expenses were incurred, summary proceedings might often be statute-barred before they could be brought, especially where there was an appeal against the demand. In other proceedings, however, the limitation period of six years gives, or should give, the local authority ample time to sue even after an appeal against their demand. In my judgment, the expression, special to section 10(4), that time runs from service of the demand or when it becomes operative, is intended to distinguish summary proceedings from other proceedings. Inclusio unius, exclusio alterius. In other proceedings, time runs from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e. when the four elements identified above are complete. Thus, I conclude that the requirement to serve a demand is a procedural condition precedent to bringing proceedings. It is not part of the cause of action.
I am fortified in this view by consideration of what could result if the local authority were right. Upon their argument, the local authority could delay service of a demand indefinitely. Then, having served their demand long after the works were complete, they would have a further six years in which to take proceedings in the High Court or the county court."
Taylor LJ also nted that: ""Although not on all fours with the present case, these decisions show that a cause of action may well accrue before, for procedural reasons, the plaintiff can bring proceedings. Where the cause of action arises from statute, the question as to what is merely procedural and what is an "inherent element" in the cause of action is one of construction." It is a question of construction of the relevant instrument, whether statute, regulations, rules or contract, in each case as to whether there is such a difference.
Housing Act 1957 10(4) - Limitation Act 1980
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Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v Miah Gazette, 29 January 1992
29 Jan 1992
CA
Housing
A homeless person given a licence to occupy temporarily a house themselves leased by the Local Authority in order to provide temporary accommodation for the homeless, had not been given a tenancy of that property. The section covered situations where the local authority had less than a full freehold interest.
Housing Act 1985 Sch 1 para 6
Westminster City Council v Clarke; HL 29-Apr-1992 - Gazette, 29 April 1992; [1992] AC 288; [1992] 24 HLR 360; [1992] UKHL 11; [1992] 1 All ER 695
Mohram Ali v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council Gazette, 27 May 1992; [1993] QB 407; (1992) 24 HLR 474
27 May 1992
CA
Nolan LJ
Housing
A challenge to the exercise of homelessness duties by a local authority must be by way of Judicial Review. Nolan LJ: "It follows that in my judgment the public law duties of the council were not discharged until they had completed the process of deciding on the suitable accommodation which they were obliged to secure for the plaintiff. If this process was properly carried out as a matter of public law, then the consequential private law right of the plaintiff was simply a right to the accommodation which the council had decided to be suitable."
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Waltham Forest London Borough Council v Thomas Gazette, 22 July 1992
22 Jul 1992
HL
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
A person claiming a tenancy by succession by virtue of their occupation of the property with a deceased tenant for a period of 12 months, did not need that 12 months to have immediately preceded the death.
Housing Act 1985 79
Omar Parks Ltd v Elkington Gazette, 09 September 1992
9 Sep 1992
CA
Housing
The test as to the occupation of a mobile home site is at the date of the trial not when the proceedings were issued.
Mobile Homes Act 1983 Sched 1 part 5
Regina v Lewisham London Borough Council ex parte Dolan Gazette, 28 October 1992
28 Oct 1992
QBD
Housing
Reasons for housing need to include medical and social factors.
Regina v Harrow London Borough Council Ex Parte Carter; QBD 25-Nov-1992 - Gazette, 25 November 1992; (1992) 26 HLR 32
South Hams District Council v Shough and Others Gazette, 20 January 1993; Times, 08 December 1992
2 Dec 1992
CA
Nourse LJ, Staughton LJ
Local Government, Housing
There was a possible duty on a council not to evict trespassers claiming to be gypsies. If the authority had a duty to house the applicants, but failed to provide accommodation in accordance with that duty, it could be wrong to make an order supporting an attempt to evict them. The duty to house was a higher duty than the duty to recover possession of land.
Caravan Sites Act 1968 6(1) 7(1) - Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 24
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