swarb.co.uk - law index
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Housing - From: 1991 To: 1991
This page lists 11 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.
N and D (London) Ltd v Gadson; 1991 - (1991) 24 HLR 64
Regina v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham ex parte Lusi (1991) 23 HLR 260
1991
Roch J
Housing
The applicants who were Turkish, and had moved from England to Turkey in order to undertake a business activity there, but it had not proved successful and they then returned to England, and sought to be treated as homeless. Held: The court accepted that ignorance as to the availability of accommodation on their return was capable of being a relevant fact when considering whether they were intentionally homeless.
1 Citers
Haringey London Borough Council v Stewart and Stewart [1991] 2 EGLR 252; (1991) 23 HLR 557
1991
Waite J
Housing
A tenant with a bad payment record may still be subject to an order for possession though he clears the arrears by the time of the hearing. When considering reasonableness, it is the duty of the judge to take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the hearing in a "broad, common-sense way as a man of the world . . giving . . weight as he thinks fit to the various factors in the situation."
1 Citers
Regina v London Borough of Brent, ex parte Blatt (1991) 24 HLR 319
1991
QBD
Leggatt LJ, Owen J
Housing, Local Government
The applicant was the respondent's secure tenant. The respondent decided to change its tenancy agreement, by including a list of items of repair for which it would be responsible and a procedure by which it could vary the terms of the agreement. In a further clause the respondent agreed that no variation might be made to the agreement which either reduced the respondent's repair obligations or made them more difficult to enforce or which reduced the tenant's security of tenure under the agreement. The respondent later decided to remove the list of its repair obligations from the agreement, to remove the contractual security of tenure provisions and to replace them with the grounds provided by the Act and to remove the variation clause, including clause 8(b). The tenant sought judicial review. Held: Section 102 of the Act gave power to the respondent to vary the terms of a secure tenancy; clause 8(b) was itself a term of the tenancy and so could itself be varied by deletion pursuant to statutory procedure. It was a matter of construction of the statute.
Leggatt LJ: "Mr. Watkinson argues that it was open to the Council to agree not to exercise the power given by section 103. He says that that is what the council did in 1981 as a result of negotiations with the tenants' associations. He submits that the effect of including clause 8(b) in the old Agreement was to preclude the Council thereafter from varying the standard form by reducing the security of tenure of tenants under the Agreement. The respondents, therefore, cannot now reduce the quality of the security, as they have purported to do in the fashion complained of under the applicant's first argument. Attractive though the argument is, especially since that is what the average tenant might expect the position to be, it cannot, in my judgment, prevail over the language of the statute. Section 102 gives power to the Council to vary the terms of a secure tenancy by Agreement with the tenants, or alternatively, in accordance with section 103 by giving notice of variation of a periodic tenancy following compliance with the statutory arrangements for a preliminary notice. In that way the respondents can in effect vary the terms of the tenancy unilaterally. Clause 8(b) is itself a term of the tenancy, so it can be varied by deletion. It does not, after all, contain or constitute a promise that it will not itself be revoked. In truth, however, as I have earlier indicated, this represents no substantial diminution in the tenants' rights. Their basic protection is afforded by the statute, and such embellishments of that protection as were brought about by contract, would, if enforceable, only have been of value in the event that the statutory protection was itself reduced in future . . ."
Owen J: ". . . I would only add that whilst not finding that it is possible I am far from convinced that it would be impossible for a local authority to contract out the powers given by sections 102 and 103 of the Housing Act 1985. However, if such a contracting out is possible, then it would need to be both clear and explicit. I am satisfied there was no such contracting out here. Once that conclusion is accepted, then the changes intended to be made by the proposed Tenancy Agreement do not provide a sufficient Basis for the application made here. . ."
1 Citers
Leicester City Council v Aldwinckle [1991] 24 HLR 40
1991
CA
Leggatt, Neill and Stocker LJJ
Housing
A tenant was evicted while absent from the premises for some months through illness and who, following her breach of the suspended possession order, received no notice whatever either of the council's application for a warrant, or of the issue of the warrant and the date of its proposed execution. Held: Leggatt LJ said: "In my judgment, even though Miss Aldwinckle was not expecting execution to be levied against her possessions, the use of available process does not of itself constitute abuse nor amount to oppression; and the court would be interfering unjustifiably with the existing policy of Parliament were it to introduce its own requirements as to additional conditions that have to be satisfied before execution may issue." and
"after a warrant for possession has been executed in this class of case it can only be suspended or set aside if either (1) the order on which it is issued is itself set aside; (2) the warrant has been obtained by fraud; or (3) there has been an abuse of process or oppression in its execution."
1 Cites
1 Citers
Regina v London Borough of Tower Hamlets, ex parte Nadia Saber (1991) 24 HLR 611
1991
QBD
McCullough J
Housing
It is not uncommon, after a decision has been reached that an applicant for housing under Part III of the Act became intentionally homeless, for a request to be made to reconsider the decision in the light of additional material or argument. Such a request is not the equivalent of a reapplication and does not cast on the housing authority the duties imposed when an application under Part III is made. It is otherwise if there has meanwhile been a material change of circumstances. The housing authority has, however, a discretion to accede to the request. A decision not to reconsider the original decision is clearly reviewable on ordinary Wednesbury principles. No more stringent criteria can apply. It may well therefore be that a challenge to a decision not to reconsider will infrequently succeed. Each case will of course fall to be considered on its own facts.
Housing Act 1986
1 Citers
Regina v Shropshire County Council, ex parte Bungay [1991] 23 HLR
1991
Admn
Otton J
Housing, Planning
The court upheld a planning decision that a gypsy family had retained their nomadic way of life notwithstanding that they had not travelled for many years. Fifteen years after the gypsy family had stopped travelling because of the father's age and ill-health, the court held that they were still of a nomadic habit of life because they had not abandoned their nomadic lifestyle but held it in abeyance to care for the father.
1 Citers
Irvine v Moran [1991] 1 EGLR 261
1991
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant took a lease for under 7 years, accepting repairing and other obligations. The question was how those obligations fitted the landlord's implied obligations under section 32, and the effect of the section on decorating covenants. The landlord argued that the decoration was not repair, that the statutory implied obligations were to be subtracted from the lease, and that the remaining express covenants had effect. Held: The phrase 'structure and exterior of the dwelling-house' did not mean the entire dwelling-house, or the building as constructed. The structure is that part of a building giving it its shape, stability and basic appearance, rather than to those elements which made it habitable. A separate garage and gates were not part of the structure, and nor were the internal plastering and door furniture. The windows, and the several parts of them did fall within section 32. The tenant's obligations to decorate the exterior of any part of the structure were covered by s32 because this involved a protection against the elements. Most elements of decoration would involve some element of maintenance.
Housing Act 1961 32
1 Cites
1 Citers
Tagro v Cafane and Another [1991] 1 EGLR 279; [1991] 2 All ER 235; [1991] EWCA Civ 1; (1991) 23 HLR 250; [1991] EGCS 5; [1991] 1 WLR 378
23 Jan 1991
CA
Lord Donaldson MR, Russell and Nolan LJJ
Housing, Damages
The private landlord held premises under a lease from a local authority which prohibited sub-letting and assignment. He sub-let to the plaintiff and then unlawfully evicted her. He appealed against an award to her of statutory damages, submitting that the prohibition of sub-letting and assignment in the lease meant that the market value of the landlord's interest in the property under s.28 was virtually nil. Held: The argument was rejected.
Lord Donaldson MR said: "I do not understand that section to contemplate, as Mr Carnwath's argument contemplates, that the premises will be treated as virtually inalienable and having no value in consequence. Subsection (3) clearly contemplates that there shall be no increase in the damages because the effect of the tenant being dispossessed is that it enables some very valuable development to take place. But the whole concept of the landlord in default selling his interest on the open market to a willing buyer assumes that he can sell it on the open market to a willing buyer, and that involves the subsidiary proposition on the facts of this case that the willing buyer would take a lease from the Lambeth London Borough Council on a monthly basis subject to the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 with a covenant against subletting or assignment in exactly the same way as Mr Cafane had done. In my judgment, there is nothing in that point."
Housing Act 1988 28
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Norris (t/a J Davis and Son) v Checksfield; CA 17-Apr-1991 - [1991] 1 WLR 1241; Times, 23 April 1991; [1991] 4 All ER 327; [1991] 23 HLR 423
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk; HL 5-Dec-1991 - Gazette, 22 January 1992; [1992] 1 AC 478; [1991] 3 WLR 1144; [1991] UKHL 6; [1992] 1 All ER 1