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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Housing - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 60 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Cobstone Investments Limited v Maxim [1984] QB 140; [1984] 2 All ER 635; [1984] 3 WLR 606
1985
CA
Dunn LJ, Wood J
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
The court considered the meaning of 'adjoining occupiers' The tenant suggested that the word " adjoining" should be read literally so that the premises must be contiguous in the sense of physically joining, or being co-terminous with the holding of the tenant whose conduct was complained of. It was submitted that adjoining did not mean neighbouring. Held: The submissions failed. Dunn LJ (with whom Wood J agreed) accepted as an accurate statement of the law a passage in the 10th Edition of Megarry on the Rent Acts: "The word ´adjoining' has been construed as meaning ´contiguous' so that the occupants of a second floor flat have been held not to be ´adjoining occupiers' to the ground floor flat beneath them. But this seems too strict a view; for one meaning of the word is ´neighbouring' and all that context seems to require is that the premises of the adjoining occupier should be near enough to be affected by the tenant's conduct on the demised premises" Wood J added that: "In my judgment the meaning of the word ´adjoining' is not restricted to the meaning of ´contiguous'. Each case must depend on the facts as found by the judge trying the action. It is a question of degree. There may be other ways of approaching the issue, but it may be useful to consider it in this way; namely whether the relevant premises are sufficiently close or related, so that the behaviour or conduct of the tenant of the one affects the access to, or occupation or enjoyment of the other by its occupier."
1 Citers


 
ex parte Sangeramano [1985] 17 HLR 94
1985

Hodgson J
Housing
When consideriung whether an applicant for housing was vulnerable, "The vulnerability to be considered is vulnerability loosely in housing terms or in the context of housing."
1 Citers


 
Lewis v Lewis [1985] AC 828
1985
HL

Housing, Family
The House considered the position of a statutory tenant under the 1977 Act, when application was made under the 1967 Act.
Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 Sch2 3(1) - Rent Act 1977
1 Citers


 
Regina v Rent Officer of Nottinghamshire Registration Area, ex parte Allen (1985) 275 EG 251; (1985) 17 HLR 481; [1985] 2 EGLR 153
1985

Farquharson J
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The officer had entered a fair rent for a caravan. The site owner sought the vacation of the entry. The caravan was fully mobile, but was also connected to mains water and electric and sewage. The connections were easily removed, and the caravan was from time to time moved. Held: Whether a caravan counted as a house within the section depended upon the circumstances. The fact that the caravans were sometimes moved, and the impermanence of the connections to the mains utilities took them outside the section. A county court judge can make a declaration as to whether a tenancy is protected under the Act (s 141(1)(a)), but cannot order an alteration in the register. A landlord wanting to challenge a proposed registration should do so quickly, so that the Officer could delay making the entry.
Rent Act 1977 1 141(1)(a)


 
 Birmingham District Council v Kelly; 1985 - (1985) 17 HLR 572
 
Ex parte Allen [1985] EGLR 153
1985


Housing
A caravan cannot be a house.
1 Citers


 
Eastleigh Borough Council v Walsh [1985] 1 WLR 525
1985


Housing
The court considered the nature of a tenancy created by the local authority when satisfying its duty to provide temporary accomodation pending a homelessness assessment. The agreement was described as a tenancy, and held to be one.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Bloomsbury and Marylebone County Court, ex parte Blackburne; CA 1985 - [1985] 2 EGLR 157
 
Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder [1985] AC 461; [1984] UKHL 2; [1984] 3 All ER 83; [1984] 3 WLR 563
1985
HL
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Local Government, Judicial Review, Housing
Rent demands were made by a local authority landlord on one of its tenants. The local authority, using its powers under the Act, resolved to increase rents generally. The tenant refused to pay the increased element of the rent. He argued that the resolutions and notices of increase were ultra vires and void, on the grounds that they were Wednesbury unreasonable, and counterclaiming for a declaration to that effect. The tenant proposed adducing some evidence to support his case of unreasonableness. The local authority sought to strike out the defence and counterclaim as an abuse of process, on the grounds that the tenant should be debarred from challenging the conduct of the local authority other than by application for judicial review under RSC, Ord 53. Held: Mr Winder was entitled as of right to challenge the local authority's decision by way of defence in the proceedings which it had brought against him. The decision was based on "the ordinary rights of private citizens to defend themselves against unfounded claims."
As a matter of construction of the relevant legislation, those rights had not been swept away by the procedural reforms introducing the new RSC Ord 53. Where the issue of a private law right depending on a prior public law decision is raised as a defence to a claim, then the point does not have to be dealt with by judicial review.
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton said: "It would in my opinion be a very strange use of language to describe the respondent's behaviour in relation to this litigation as an abuse or misuse by him of the process of the court. He did not select the procedure to be adopted. He is merely seeking to defend proceedings brought against him by the appellants. In so doing he is seeking only to exercise the ordinary right of any individual to defend an action against him on the ground that he is not liable for the whole sum claimed by the plaintiff. Moreover he puts forward his defence as a matter of right, whereas in an application for judicial review, success would require an exercise of the court's discretion in his favour. Apart from the provisions of Order 53 and section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, he would certainly be entitled to defend the action on the ground that the plaintiff's claim arises from a resolution which (on his view) is invalid: see for example Cannock Chase District Council v. Kelly [1978] 1 WLR 1, which was decided in July 1977, a few months before Order 53 came into force (as it did in December 1977). I find it impossible to accept that the right to challenge the decision of a local authority in course of defending an action for non-payment can have been swept away by Order 53, which was directed to introducing a procedural reform. As my noble and learned friend Lord Scarman said in Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] AC 617, 647G "The new R.S.C., Ord. 53 is a procedural reform of great importance in the field of public law, but it does not - indeed, cannot - either extend or diminish the substantive law. Its function is limited to ensuring 'ubi jus, ibi remedium."' Lord Wilberforce spoke to the same effect at p. 631A. Nor, in my opinion, did section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 which refers only to "an application" for judicial review have the effect of limiting the rights of a defendant sub silentio."
Housing Act 1957
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Harrogate Borough Council v Simpson (1985) 17 HLR 205
1985
CA
Watkins LJ, Ewbank J
Housing
The claimant (defending proceedings for possession by the local authority) had lived with the deceased secure tenant in a lesbian relationship for some years and was so living at the date of her death. She sought to defend her occupation saying she qualified as a spouse of the deceased. Held: The defence failed: "I agree that the expression 'living together as husband and wife' . . is not apt to include a homosexual relationship. The essential characteristic of living together as husband and wife, in my judgment, is that there should be a man and a woman . . " (Ewbank J) The natural English meaning of the words “wife or husband” was gender-specific, and thus, purely as a matter of language, excluded same-sex relationships.
Housing Act 1980 50
1 Citers



 
 Henderson v Law; CA 1985 - (1985) 17 HLR 237

 
 Royal Philanthropic Society v County; CA 1985 - (1985) 276 EG 1068; [1986] 18 HLR 83
 
Bradshaw v Baldwin-Wiseman [1985] 17 HLR 260
1985


Housing
When a landlord seeking possession of property subject to a statutory tenancy had failed to give the required written notice, the court could look to all the circumstances to decide whether that failure was to be forgiven and possession ordered.
1 Cites


 
Regina v East Hertfordshire District Council, Ex parte Hunt (1985) 18 HLR 51
1985

Mann J
Housing
The applicant and her child had been accepted to be in emergency housing need, and had been given temporary bedsit accomodation in a facility they owned and managed. She had a sink, cooker and fridge, and shared bathroom and toilet facilities and a communal sitting room. She had a licence only, and no tenancy. She was given a larger room, but then her behaviour led to complaints, and her licence was terminated and a possession order granted. On re-applying for homeless provision, the authority said that she was intentionally homless by virtue of her behaviour. As a preliminary point it was argued for her that she had not been in secure or settled accomodation so as to lose her original homeless status. Held: The authority could discharge its section 4(5) duties in stages. A homeless applicant would only lose that status on acquisition of 'settled accomodation'. The term settled is a word of convenience rather then ahaving a particular statutory meaning. Whether one has been acquired is a question of fact and degree in the particular circumstances. In these circumstances was in settled accommodation. Upon losing that accomodation she therefore fell to be treated as unintentionally homeless.
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 4(5)
1 Citers



 
 Street v Mountford; HL 6-Mar-1985 - [1985] 1 EGLR 128; [1985] 2 All ER 289; [1985] 2 WLR 877; [1985] AC 809; [1985] UKHL 4
 
Eastleigh Borough Council v Walsh [1985] UKHL 12; [1985] 1 WLR 525; (1985) 17 HLR 392; 83 LGR 525; [1985] 2 All ER 112
28 Mar 1985
HL
Lord Scarman, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brightman, Lord Templeman
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The defendant had been allowed into the property under the homelessness legislation. The authority now sought possession. They said he had a licence only, but he claimed to have a secure tenancy. Held: The authority had made a mistake, and the defedant was a secure tenant. The letter offering him the property, and his receipt for the keys, had said that a tenancy was being granted.
Housing Act 1980 - Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
[ Bailii ]
 
London Borough of Sutton v Swann (1985) 18 HLR 140; Times, 30 November 1985
30 Nov 1985


Housing
The defendant had applied to buy his council property, but lost his secure tenancy before completion of the purchase. Held: He had lost the right to buy the property.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Gravesham Borough Council ex parte Winchester; 1986 - (1986) 18 HLR 207
 
Swanbrae Ltd v Elliott (1986) 19 HLR 86
1986
CA
Swinton Thomas LJ
Housing
The court considered the quality of residence required where a person claimed to be a statutory tenant in succession to her mother, who had been a protected tenant, because she had resided in the premises with her before she died. The appellant had visited frequently and then had moved in on a part-time basis to nurse her sick mother while retaining a home elsewhere. Held: "residing with" meant more than "living at"; a person claiming a statutory tenancy had to show that she had made her home in the premises.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Quick v Taff Ely Borough Council [1986] QB 809; [1985] 3 All ER 321; [1985] EWCA Civ 1; 18 HLR 66; [1985] 3 WLR 981; 276 EG 452; [1985] EGLR 50; 84 LGR 498
1986
CA
Lawton LJ, Dillon LJ, Neill LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Housing
Because of fungus, mould growth and dampness, the tenant's council house was virtually unfit for human habitation in the winter when the condensation was at its worst. Section 32(1) of the 1961 Act implied in the tenancy a covenant by the council to keep in repair the structure and exterior of the dwelling-house. Section 32(3) provided that, in determining the standard of repair required by the lessor's repairing covenant, regard is to be had to the age, character and prospective life of the dwelling-house and the locality in which it is situated. The house was built in accordance with the regulations in force and standards accepted at the time it was built. Held: A landlord of a dwelling-house is obliged by a repairing covenant only to restore the house to its previous good condition. He does not have to make it a better house than it originally was. Dillon LJ said that: "disrepair is related to the physical condition of whatever has to be repaired and not questions of lack of amenity or inefficiency."
Housing Act 1957 6 - Housing Act 1961 32(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Minchburn v Fernandez (No 2) (1986) 19 HLR 29; [1986] 2 EGLR 103; [1986] 280 EG 223
1986
CA

Housing
The issue of the reasonableness of the court making an order for possession had not been fully explored at the trial. Held: The judgment was a nullity. The landlord's reason for wanting possession might be relevant also.

 
Lee-Steere v Jennings [1986] 30 HLR 1
1986


Housing

1 Citers



 
 Stockley v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council; CA 1986 - [1986] 279 EG 677
 
Regina v Canterbury City Council ex parte Gillespie [1986] 19 HLR 7
1986


Housing

1 Citers


 
S v United Kingdom [1986] 47 D&R 274
1986
ECHR

Human Rights, Discrimination, Housing
The applicant was not entitled in domestic law to succeed to a tenancy on the death of her partner. The aim of the legislation is question was to protect the family, a goal similar to the protection of the right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The aim itself is clearly legitimate. The question remains, however, whether it was justified to protect families but not to give similar protection to other stable relationships. The Commission considers that the family (to which the relationship of heterosexual unmarried couples living together as husband and wife can be assimilated) merits special protection in society and it sees no reason why a High Contracting Power should not afford particular assistance to families. The Commission therefore accepted that the difference in treatment between the applicant and somebody in the same position whose partner had been of the opposite sex can be objectively and reasonably justified. And "The Commission notes that the applicant was occu?ying the house, of which her partner had been the tenant, without any legal title whatsoever. Contractual relations were established between the local authority and the deceased partner and that contractual agreement may or may not have permitted long-term visitors. The fact remains, however, that on the death of the partner, under the ordinary law, the applicant was no longer entitled to remain in the house, and the local authority was entitled to possession so that the house could no longer be regarded as 'home' for the applicant within the meaning of Article 8."
European Convention on Human Rights 8
1 Citers


 
Kelly v Monklands District Council 1986 SLT 169
1986


Scotland, Housing, Children, Local Government
A local authority's housing duties may be owed to a child if that child is living independently of its parents.
1 Citers



 
 Peabody Donation Fund v Hay; CA 1986 - [1986] 19 HLR 145

 
 Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council Ex parte Puhlhofer; HL 2-Jan-1986 - [1986] AC 484; [1986] UKHL 1; [1986] 2 WLR 259; [1986] 1 All ER 467
 
Gillow v The United Kingdom 9063/80; (1986) 11 EHRR 335; 13/1984/85/132; [1986] ECHR 14; [1987] ECHR 23; [1987] ECHR 23; [1986] ECHR 14
24 Nov 1986
ECHR

Human Rights, Housing
The housing authority in Guernsey refused to allow the applicants to occupy the house they owned there. Held: The house in question was the applicants' home because, although they had been absent from Guernsey for many years, they had not established any other home elsewhere in the United Kingdom and had retained "sufficient continuing links" with the house for it to be considered their home for the purposes of article 8. "It was . . established that the island of Guernsey should be regarded as a 'territory for the international relations of which the U.K. is responsible' for the purposes of treaty provisions in the terms of Article 4 of this Protocol; and this practice has been followed with regard to treaties concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe including the Convention (Article [56]). It thus clearly results from the text of Article 4 that an express declaration is required for the application of the Protocol to the island of Guernsey". The United Kingdom had not made a declaration extending the Protocol to Guernsey and the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the complaint.
European Convention on Human Rights 8
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Di Palma v United Kingdom; ECHR 1-Dec-1986 - (1986) 10 EHRR 149; 11949/86; [1986] ECHR 19

 
 Paterson v Aggio; CA 1987 - [1987] 2 EGLR 127
 
ex parte Banbury [1987] 19 HLR 76
1987

Russell J
Housing

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Sefton Holdings Ltd v Cairns (1987) 20 HLR 124
1987


Housing
When considering whether a stautory succession was to take place, the question is whether the person was a member of the family, not whether he was living as a member of the family.
Housing Act 1985
1 Citers


 
Chios Property Investment Ltd v Lopez (1987) 20 HLR 120
1987

Sir George Waller
Housing
When asked to consider whether a person cohabiting with a tenant before his death, and seeking a statutory tenancy after his death, the court stressed the importance of a "sufficient state of permanence and stability" having been reached in the relationship so as to constitute a family. Cohabitation for two years still enabled the woman to qualify as a member of the tenant's family. “ It was also argued that the absence of children and the shortness of the relationship should have resulted in a different conclusion. Counsel cited the very much longer periods in the reported cases referred to above. In my judgment, there can be no rule about length. Of course, the longer the relationship, the easier it will be to infer permanence, but there can be no rule about length. For a relationship of only two years to be regarded as permanent must be rare, but the judge for reasons which he gave found this was permanent and I see no reason for disagreeing. The appellants also submitted that there were periods of being apart, e.g. when the deceased was in Egypt and at holiday time, but I do not think that these made any difference. Finally, it was submitted that the fact that she still used her maiden name indicated that they did not constitute a family. This I found the most persuasive of all the appellants' arguments, but at the end of the day the judge had to make a finding of fact bearing in mind the authorities I have quoted. He heard the evidence, he applied the right test and he came to the conclusion that this was a permanent relationship, so recognised by others, and that Miss Lopez was “a member of the tenant's family”. I can see no reason for interfering with this conclusion…”
Rent Act 1977
1 Citers


 
Portman Registrars v Mohammed Latif [1987] 6 CL 217
1987


Housing, Children
A minor can succeed to a statutory tenancy under the Rent Acts. A statutory tenancy is not an interest in land and a minor does have the capacity to contract for necessaries such as lodging.
1 Citers


 
Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council [1987] 1 WLR 1425; (1987) 19 HLR 526
1987
CA
Lord Justice Russell, Sir Denys Buckley
Housing
The wife was the secure tenant of the premises, against whom the local authority landlord obtained a possession order on grounds of arrears of rent, not to be enforced on payment of a weekly sum off the arrears in addition to what the order described as "the current rent". The wife defaulted on the terms and left the premises, leaving the husband in occupation. The landlord obtained a warrant for possession against the wife. The husband applied to be added as a defendant in the possession proceedings, so as to be able in the matrimonial proceedings to apply for the transfer of the tenancy to him. The possession order was suspended in these terms: "judgment for possession shall not be enforced for 28 days in any event, and for so long thereafter as the defendant punctually pays the arrears in addition to the current rent." Held. A tenant holding over under a suspended possession order becomes at best a tolerated trespasser if he then breaches the terms of the suspension. The tenancy terminates automatically and at the moment of breach of the conditions.
Russell LJ said: "It is to be observed that on the face of the order it does not purport to terminate the tenancy. The tenancy, in my judgment, plainly continues and is recognised by the order as continuing. The judgment for possession, however, is suspended so long as the current rent is paid in addition to the arrears. If that were not the true interpretation of the order, then plainly the words "the current rent" to which I have adverted, would not appear." and
"In my judgment, once the defendant in proceedings of this kind where there is a suspended order for possession, ceases to comply with the conditions of the order, namely, 'the punctual payment of the current rent and arrears,' and there is a breach of the terms of the order, the tenancy, whatever it may be, from that moment comes to an end."
He then considered Sherrin's case: "What I think is more important, and indeed crucial, is that Sherrin's case was dealing with an entirely different code of legislation, namely, the Rent Acts, to that with which this case is concerned, namely, the Housing Act 1985. And, in particular, in the instant case, the court has the advantage of the statutory provision, to which I referred earlier, namely section 82(2) which seeks to define the date when a tenancy is to come to an end. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that this court is free to distinguish Sherrin v Brand both on the facts and on the law. Indeed the case is an illustration of how dangerous it can be to rely on judgments delivered where the statutory structure is different from that with which this court is concerned. I repeat section 82(2) provides:
Where the landlord obtains an order for the possession of the dwelling-house, the tenancy ends on the date on which the tenant it to give up possession in pursuance of the order.
I return to the terms of the order, which provide:
judgment for possession shall not be enforced for 28 days in any event, and for so long thereafter as the defendant punctually pays….the arrears…in addition to the current rent.
In my judgment, once the defendant in proceedings of this kind where there is a suspended order for possession, ceases to comply with the conditions of the order, namely, "the punctual payment of the current rent and arrears", and there is a breach of the terms of the order, the tenancy, whatever it may be, from that moment comes to an end."
Housing Act 1985 82(5)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Crawley Borough Council v Sawyer (1987) 20 HLR 98
1987
CA
Parker LJ
Housing
The court considered whether a tenancy had ceased to be secure by reason of the tenant's failure to continue to fulfil the condition set by section 81 of the Act of 1985, namely occupation of the property "as his only or principal home". For about a year the secure tenant had gone to live with his girlfriend and had thereafter returned to the property. During that period he had paid rent and rates, visited the property once a month and at some stage had spent a week back there. His evidence was that he had not abandoned the property and had had every intention of returning to it. The trial judge found that, even during that period of about a year, the property had remained, if not his only home, at least his "principal home" for the purpose of section 81 and so the local authority was not entitled to possession of it. Held: The judge had been entitled to conclude that the tenant had been living with his girlfriend only on a temporary basis and that, indeed, his principal home remained the property during that period.
Parker LJ: "Going through the whole thread of these matters is the common principle that, in order to occupy premises as a home, first, there must be signs of occupation – that is to say, there must be furniture and so forth so that the house can be occupied as a home – and, secondly, there must be an intention, if not physically present, to return to it."
Housing Act 1985 81
1 Citers



 
 Otter v Norman; HL 1988 - [1988] 2 WLR 250; [1989] AC 129; [1988] 1 All ER 531

 
 Whitbread West Pennines Ltd v Reedy; CA 1988 - [1988] 20 HLR 642; [1988] ICR 807; Times, 23 July 1988
 
Dibbs v Campbell (1988) 20 HLR 374
1988


Housing

Housing Act 1988 34(1)(b)
1 Citers



 
 Minchburn v Peck; 1988 - (1988) 20 HLR 393

 
 C Chiodi v De Marney; CA 1988 - [1988] 21 HLR 6

 
 Hilton v Plustitle Ltd; CA 1988 - [1988] 3 All ER 1051; [1989] 1 WLR 149

 
 Webb and Barrett v London Borough of Barnet; CA 1988 - (1988) 21 HLR 228
 
McNerny v London Borough of Lambeth (1988) 21 HLR 188; [1988] EWCA Civ 2; [1989] 1 EGLR 81; [1989] 19 EG 77
1988
CA
Dillon, Taylor LJJ, Sir John Megaw
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The scale of the dampness which had to be endured by a tenant led to constant colds and minor ailments being suffered by the plaintiff and her children who had to live in those unhealthy conditions. Held: The legislature had "conspicuously refrained" from updating the statutory rent limit and it was therefore not for the courts to create liabilities which Parliament had not thought fit to enact. In a field such as housing law, which is very much a matter for the allocation of resources in accordance with democratically determined priorities, the development of the common law should not get out of step with legislative policy. There was no liability under the Act for a design defect in premises causing condensation, as this did was not disrepair and therefore was not covered by the landlords covenant to repair/maintain under section 11.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 11
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Morris v Liverpool City Council [1988] 1 EGLR 47
1988
CA
Slade, Balcombe, Stocker LJJ
Housing
The court was concerned with the implied statutory obligations of repair on the landlord: "It is common ground that the door and frame of the flat were part of the structure and exterior of the flat within the meaning of the implied statutory covenant. It is also common ground that the effect of this implied obligation is to impose on the landlord the obligation to effect any necessary repair within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the want of repair: [Calabar] The plaintiff therefore surmounts the first of the three hurdles which I have mentioned."
Housing Act 1961 32
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Newcastle upon Tyne County Court, ex parte Thompson (1988) 20 HLR 430
1988


Housing

1 Citers


 
Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council, Ex parte Tinn (1988) 20 HLR 205
1988


Housing

1 Citers


 
ex parte Carroll [1988] 20 HLR 142
1988

Webster J
Housing
The applicant for housing was said to have suffered "a major and irreversible handicap" as a result of a childhood injury but who also was in the habit of drinking six or seven pints of beer a day. Held: The court accepted the submission "that the effect of that gloss upon the section is in practice to extend the meaning given to the word "vulnerable" by Waller LJ as if it reads 'less able to fend for oneself when homeless or in finding and keeping accommodation'."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v North Devon District Council ex parte Lewis [1981] 1 WLR 328
1988

Woolf J
Housing
The court was asked what the effect of the conduct of one member of a family might be on the classification of other members as being voluntarily homeless: 'the fact that the Act requires consideration of the family unit as a whole indicates that it would be perfectly proper in the ordinary case for the housing authority to look at the family as a whole and assume, in the absence of material which indicates to the contrary, where the conduct of one member of the family was such that he should be regarded as having become homeless intentionally, that was conduct to which the other members of the family were a party.'
1 Citers



 
 Brickfield Ltd v Hughes; CA 1988 - (1988) 20 HLR 108
 
A G Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers and Bridger [1988] 1 EGLR 36; [1990] 1 AC 417; [1988] 3 WLR 1205; [1988] UKHL 8; [1988] 3 All ER 1058
10 Nov 1988
HL
Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Templeman, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
Housing, Landlord and Tenant, Contract
In Antoniades, the two tenants occupied an attic, living together. Each had at the same time signed identical agreements purporting to create licences. The landlord had reserved to himself the right to occupy the property and to allow others to occupy it so as to create no more than a licence. Held: Behaviour by the parties after a tenancy areement was not relevant in construing the tenancy agreement, but can be used to see whether the document properly reflected what the parties intended. Such surrounding circumstances include 'any relationship between the prospective occupiers, the course of negotiations and the nature and extent of the accommodation and the intended and actual mode of occupation.' The documents were interdependent, and in fact the tenants had enjoyed exclusive occupation. The clause allowing additional occupiers was a sham. The two agreements had to be read together. The parties could not contract out of the Rent Acts, and clause 16 did not reflect the true position and that accordingly clause 16 should be struck out.
In A G Securities, four tenants of a property had signed separate documents at different times. They now claimed to have one joint tenancy rather than licence agreements as claimed by the landlord. Held: The court will look to the substance and reality of the transaction entered into by the parties, not just the apparent form. Nevertheless, in this case the rigts and duties having been created originally as several obligations, could not become joint.
Lord Templeman said: "Where a landlord creates a tenancy of a flat and reserves the right to go into exclusive occupation at any time of the whole or part of the flat with or without notice, that reservation is inconsistent with the provisions of the Rent Acts and cannot be enforced without an order of the court under section 98. Where a landlord creates a tenancy of a flat and reserves the right to go into occupation of the whole or part of the flat with or without notice, jointly with the existing tenants, that reservation also is inconsistent with the provisions of the Acts. Were it otherwise every tenancy agreement would be labelled a licence and would contract out of the Rent Acts by reserving power to the landlord to share possession with the tenant at any time after the commencement of the term.
Clause 16 is a reservation to Mr Antoniades of the right to go into occupation or to nominate others to enjoy occupation of the whole of the flat jointly with Mr Villiers and Miss Bridger. Until that power is exercised Mr Villiers and Miss Bridger are jointly in exclusive occupation of the whole flat making periodical payments and they are therefore tenants. The Rent Acts prevents the exercise of a power which would destroy the tenancy of Mr Villiers and Miss Bridger and would deprive them of the exclusive occupation of the flat which they are now enjoying. Clause 16 is inconsistent with the provisions of the Rent Acts.
There is separate and alternative reason why clause 16 must be ignored. Clause 16 was not a genuine reservation to Mr Antoniades of the power to share the flat and a power to authorise other persons to share the flat. Mr Antoniades did not genuinely intend to exercise the powers save possibly to bring pressure to bear to obtain possession. Clause 16 was only intended to deprive Mr Villiers and Miss Bridger of the protection of the Rent Acts. Mr Villiers and Miss Bridger had no choice in the matter."
Lord Bridge said: "Here the artificiality was in the pretence that two contemporaneous and identical agreements entered into by a man and a woman who were going to live together in a one-bedroom flat and share a double bed created rights and obligations which were several rather than joint. As to the nature of those rights and obligations, the provisions of the joint agreement purporting to retain the right in the respondent to share the occupation of the flat with the young couple himself or to introduce an indefinite number of third parties to do so could be seen, in the relevant circumstances, to be repugnant to the true purpose of the agreement. No one could have supposed that those provisions were ever intended to be acted on. They were introduced into the agreement for no other purpose than as an attempt to disguise the true character of the agreement which it was hoped would deceive the court and prevent the appellants enjoying the protection of the Rent Acts. As your Lordships all agree, the attempt fails."
Rent Act 1977 1
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 ex parte Di Dominico; 1989 - [1989] 20 HLR 153
 
Braschi v Stahl Associates Co (1989) 544 NYS 2d 784
1989


Housing
(New York: Court of Appeals) The issue was as to the meaning of the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations which provided that a landlord might not dispossess "either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased's tenant's family who has been living with the tenant." Held: (by a majority) "The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterised by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence." A same-sex partner of the deceased tenant was, it was held, able to qualify if he could produce the necessary evidence.
1 Citers



 
 Greenwich London Borough Council v Powell; HL 1989 - [1989] 1 AC 995
 
London Borough of Southwark v Ince (1989) 21 HLR 505
1989
QBD
Savile J
Housing, Nuisance
Savile J: "I am not persuaded that because there is now the Control of Pollution Act and there was previously the Noise Abatement Act that therefore lends any support to the construction [that the Public Health Act 1936 did not apply to premises whose standard of noise insulation was such as make the premises prejudicial to health). Under s 92 (l)(a) the question is not whether the noise itself is a statutory nuisance but whether the premises are in such a state as to be prejudicial to health. "
Public Health Act 1936
1 Citers


 
Regina v Nottingham City Council ex parte Costello (1989) 21 HLR 301
1989

Schiemann J
Housing
The court considered the nature of the duty to make inquiries imposed on a local authority faced with a homelessness application: "The duty to make necessary inquiries is not a duty to make all inquiries in fact necessary before the truth can be ascertained. A council which makes numerous inquiries can in my judgment only be attacked for failing to making one more if it failed to make an inquiry which no reasonable council could have failed to regard as necessary."
Housing Act 1985
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council Ex parte Hammell; CA 1989 - [1989] QB 518; [1989] 1 All ER 1202; [1989] 2 WLR 90; [1989] Fam Law 430
 
Regina v London Borough of Hammersmith, ex parte P (1989) 22 HLR 21
1989
QBD
Schiemann J
Housing
The applicants were members of six homeless families who had occupied accommodation in Northern Ireland. The council concluded that members of each household except one had been guilty of criminal and anti-social behaviour, as a result of which the IRA had threatened that they would all be killed unless they left Northern Ireland within 72 hours. The council concluded that all the applicants were homeless intentionally, primarily on the ground that they had ceased to occupy their homes in consequence of deliberate acts, namely their continued misbehaviour after warnings by or on behalf of neighbours. Held: The council's decision was confirmed. The question was one of causation; the section makes no mention of foreseeability but where the immediate cause of the departure (namely the IRA threat) was foreseeable, then it was easier to say that the bad behaviour was the cause of the homelessness and it was less easy to say that the homelessness was caused by a new intervening act. The court rejected the submission that it should, as a matter of public policy, refrain from making the applicants responsible for the acts of vigilantes.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Mellacher And Others v Austria; ECHR 19-Dec-1989 - 10522/83; [1993] ECR I-637; 11011/84; (1989) 12 EHRR 391; [1989] ECHR 25; 11070/84
 
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