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Housing - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 46 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Watson v Lucas [1980] 1 WLR 1493
1980
CA
Oliver LJ
Housing
A woman who had lived with a man, although he remained married to his wife, was a member of his family for the purpose of Schedule 1 to the Act of 1977 because of the lasting relationship between them.
Rent Act 1977
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Siddiqui v Rashid; CA 1980 - [1980] 1 All ER 184; [1980] 1 WLR 1018; [1980] 124 Sol Jo 464; [1980] 40 P&CR 504
 
Dyson v Kerrier District Council [1980] 1 WLR 1205; [1980] 3 All ER 313
1980
CA
Brightman LJ
Housing
Miss Dyson gave up her flat in Huntingdon and went to live in Cornwall. But the only accommodation which she had arranged for herself was a three month winter let of a cottage in Helston. She knew that the tenancy was not protected and that she would have to leave. When she was finally evicted, she applied to the local council for accommodation on the ground that she was now homeless. The council said that she was intentionally homeless because she had given up the Huntingdon flat knowing that after the expiry of the winter let she would have nowhere to live. She argued that was concerned only with the accommodation one had been occupying at the time when one became homeless. This was the cottage in Cornwall and it was not reasonable to expect her to continue to occupy that accommodation because the court had ordered her to leave it. Held: Such a construction would enable people to jump the housing queues by making themselves intentionally homeless at one remove. They would only have to move into temporary accommodation and wait until evicted. The Court therefore held that one was not confined to asking whether it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy the cottage in Cornwall. If it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy the flat in Huntingdon and there was a causal link between deliberately leaving that flat and her subsequent homelessness in Cornwall, then she was intentionally homeless.
1 Citers


 
Poland and Another v Cadogan [1980] 3 All ER 544
1980
CA
Waller LJ, Megaw LJ, Eveleigh LJ
Housing
The court was called upon to construe the Act. when the question was whether a tenant could bring himself within the Act had to be more strict than the construction of the Rent Acts because the Leasehold Reform Act enabled a tenant to acquire compulsorily a greater interest in the house against the will of the landlord. In order to qualify under Section 1 of the Act, the tenant of a leasehold house had to occupy the house as his residence and at the time of giving notice in accordance with the Act of his desire to have the freehold or an extended lease, he had to have been the tenant of the house under a long tenancy at a low rate and have occupied it as his residence for the last five years or for periods amounting to five years in the last 10 years. In that case the applicants, Commander Poland and his wife, had gone abroad leaving the keys of the property in the hands of the mortgagees of the property believing or at least hoping that the house would be sub-let and had been sub-let, so that the rent thus obtained could be used to discharge the mortgage payments. Commander and Mrs Poland had left their furniture in the house during their absence abroad. All three members of the Court of Appeal concluded that the applicants were not during the period of their absence abroad resident in the house nor had they occupied it as their residence for the last five years. Waller LJ: "Once it becomes clear that the tenant is not physically in occupation the onus is firmly on him to show that the steps which he has taken to maintain occupation are clear. Going away for a short holiday is simple but the longer the period the more difficult it becomes to infer continued occupation. If the family, wife or children, are still in physical occupation, then the position is clear, but to infer occupation because furniture is left in the house or because there is a caretaker requires closer examination. If the period is short the inference of continued occupation may be easy, but where many months are concerned very much more doubtful. The tenant does not lose the benefit of his periods of genuine occupation because of the provisions allowing aggregation." Eveleigh LJ When it came to the question of sub-letting: "I am of the opinion that a person may occupy premises as his residence, even though he is absent for a very long period. It may well be, however, that a long absence will necessitate the acquisition of another residence which will prevent the tenant from claiming the premises were his only or main residence, which is the requirement of section 1(2) of the Act. It seems to me that, if a person takes the tenancy of a house and furnishes it and keeps it ready for his own habitation “whenever he pleases to go into it”, he is . . . an occupier though he may not reside in it one day in a year, and I would further say that he occupies it as a residence. Moreover, I would say that he occupies it as his residence provided that it is understood that the expression “his residence” is not used in a context which implies his main residence. It means he keeps it for himself to live in. If, however, he sub-lets the property, he ceases to occupy it as his residence because .... the occupation is in the sub-tenant. It may not be inaccurate, however, still to refer to the premises as his residence. That in isolation would be a permissible description of the property, but it does not mean that he is in occupation." Megaw LJ: "It seems to me that, as regard the former statutory provision, a tenant cannot be said to be occupying a house as his residence during a period of time in respect of which he has no intention of occupying it or residing in it because of his belief, or expectation, whether it is accurate or not, that he has given up his legal right to occupy or reside in the house. He has in respect of that period of time to use the expression used in the judgement of the court in Brown -v- Brash .. no “animus possidendi” ; no intention of asserting or exercising an immediate right of possession. That is an essential element."
Leasehold Reform Act 1967 1(1)(b)
1 Citers


 
Patel v Mehtab [1980] 5 HLR 78
1980
QBD
Donaldson LJ, Hodgson J
Housing
The question was whether the premises in question were in such a state as to be prejudicial to health, being injurious, or likely to cause injury, to health. The defects included dampness. Evidence was given by a self-employed public health advisor, who had previously been a senior public health inspector. He had inspected the premises and concluded that the premises were injurious to health. A serving environmental health officer for the local authority was also called. He stated that in his view the premises were close to being uninhabitable. He agreed that they were likely to be injurious to health. It was argued that medical evidence must be given only by somebody with medical qualifications. Held: Environmental health officers had appropriate qualifications and experience to give this sort of evidence. This was not a field in which magistrates were free to use their own experience to substitute evidence of such eperts.
Public Health Act 1936
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hillingdon London Borough Council ex parte Streeting [1980] 1 WLR 1425
1980
CA
Dunn LJ, Lord Denning MR
Housing, Immigration
The court duscussed the extent of the housing duty of an authority toward a person "not lawfully here". Held: Outstayers should not be qualified for assistance.
1 Citers



 
 Delahaye v Oswestry Borough Council; 29-Jul-1980 - Times, 29 July 1980

 
 Regina v Thanet District Council, ex parte Reeve; QBD 1981 - (1981) 6 HLR 31; Times, 25 November 1981
 
London Borough of Hackney v Ezedinma [1981] 3 All ER 439
1981
QBD
May J
Family, Housing
The house had rooms let for students in the basement and on the ground, first and second floors, with kitchens on the top three floors to serve the rooms. Five rooms had been let when the authority issued a notice under section 19(1) to restrict the number of households to three. The agent let a further three rooms, and the authority prosecuted him, saying that there weer no eight households in breach of the notice. The authority appealed dismissal of the summons. Held. The authority's appeal failed. The respondent was the occupier within 19(2). What amounts to a household is a question of fact in the circumstances, but one room could constitute a household.
Housing Act 1961 19(2) 19(10) - Housing Act 1964 67(5)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Brikom Investments Ltd v Seaford; 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 863

 
 Morrow v Nadeem; 1981 - [1986] 1 WLR 1381

 
 Harrison v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council; CA 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 650

 
 Regina v Thurrock Borough Council ex parte Williams; QBD 1981 - (1981) 1 HLR 128
 
Din v Wandsworth London Borough Council Unreported, 23-Jun-1981
23 Jun 1981
CA
Ackner LJ
Housing

Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
1 Citers



 
 Cocks v Thanet District Council; HL 25-Nov-1981 - [1983] 2 AC 286; [1982] 3 WLR 1121; [1982] 3 All ER 1135; [1981] UKHL 10

 
 Din (Taj) v Wandsworth London Borough Council; HL 26-Nov-1981 - [1983] 1 AC 657; [1981] UKHL 14; [1981] 3 WLR 918; [1982] 1 All ER 1022; (1981-82) 1 HLR 73; [1981] 3 All ER 881
 
Regalian Securities Ltd v Scheuer (1982) 5 HLR 48
1982
CA
Cumming-Bruce LJ, Eveleigh LJ, May LJ
Housing
The court considered the right of a protected tenant to become a statutory tenant on the termination of his protected tenancy under section 2(1)(a) of the 1977 Act, requiring him to occupy the dwelling house "as his residence". The tenant occupied the flat as a temporary expedient for part of the time when the house, which his wife had purchased and in which they and their children lived, was let to others during the winter. Held: His residence in the flat did not have the quality needed to attract the protections of the Rent Acts.
Cumming-Bruce LJ asked whether the second residence was used as a home rather than a place of convenient resort.home. Cumming-Bruce LJ set out two principles that were relevant in that context: "First, the court enquires what is the extent and what are the characteristics of the user of the residence? When that is ascertained the court also enquires: Is the nature of the residence during the period that it persisted the kind of residence that is within the contemplation of the Rent Act? Is this the kind of residence that Parliament intended should clothe the tenant with the right to claim statutory protection?"
May LJ took a similar approach, asking whether there was occupation as a home.
Rent Act 1977 2(1)(a)
1 Citers



 
 Fernandes v Pavardin; CA 1982 - [1982] 5 HLR 33

 
 Wycombe Health Authority v Barnett; CA 1982 - (1982) 264 EG 619; (1982) 5 HLR 84

 
 Trustees of Henry Smiths Charity v Hemmings; 1982 - (1982) P and CR 377

 
 Regina v City of Westminster, Ex parte Chambers; 1982 - [1982] 6 HLR 24

 
 Robinson v Torbay Borough Council; QBD 1982 - [1982] 1 All ER 726
 
Regina v London Borough of Ealing Ex parte Sidhu (1982) 2 HLR 48
2 Jan 1982

Hodgson J
Housing
The applicant, in flight from domestic violence, had gone with her two young children, to stay in a women's refuge. The local authority argued that she was not homeless because she had accommodation available to her in the refuge. Held: The application for judicial review succeeded. The court approved the conclusion of a county court judge in another case that "women living in refuges were still homeless" under the terms of the 1977 Act. Hodgson J did not regard a crisis refuge as accommodation within the meaning of the 1977 Act. It was essential that women who had gone to refuges were still seen as homeless. Otherwise the refuges would have to give them 28 days notice when they came in so that they would be under threat of homelessness (under s 1(3) of the 1977 Act).
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Din and Another v London Borough of Wandsworth; HL 25-Mar-1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 418
 
Regina v Waveney City Council, ex parte Bowers [1983] QB 238; Times, 25 May 1982; [1982] 3 WLR 661; [1982] 3 All ER 727
25 May 1982
CA
Waller LJ
Housing
The applicant was an alcoholic and had in 1980 been hit by a motor vehicle and suffered a severe head injury. He sought judicial review of the respondent's failure to house him. Held: The appeal was allowed: "The question we have to consider is whether or not the applicant is vulnerable and secondly whether the vulnerability is as a result of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical or other special reason. Dealing first with the meaning of "vulnerable", vulnerable literally means "may be wounded" or "susceptible of injury". (See the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 6th edition (1976), p.1305.) In our opinion, however, vulnerable in the context of this legislation means less able to fend for oneself so that injury or detriment will result when a less vulnerable man will be able to cope without harmful effects." and "There can be no question here but that the applicant is vulnerable. The Judge accepted that there was a degree of vulnerability. Furthermore it is reasonably clear that the degree of vulnerability increased as a result of serious accident with severe brain injury in the early summer of 1980. Before that, although he had a drink problem, the applicant was able to cope, living in lodgings. Since the accident nobody will give him lodgings and all those who have considered his case take the view that he needs either "support" or "help" or "a degree of shelter" or "sheltered accommodation . . . The first question which has to be considered is whether or not there is vulnerability. If there is vulnerability, then does it arise from those matters which are set out within section 2(1)(c)? It may not arise from any single one but it may arise from a combination of those causes."
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 2(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Waveney District Council ex parte Bowers Times, 25 May 1982
25 May 1982

Stephen Brown J
Housing
The applicant sought judicial review of a decision that he was not homeless under section 1 of the Act. For 15 months he had been using a night shelter in Lowestoft. It was an unheated dormitory in a derelict building. It was empty and closed between 8:00am and 8:00pm each day. If on any evening he presented himself at the shelter at or after 8:00pm, he was offered a bed, unless it was already full, in which case he was turned away. Held: The housing authority's decision that he had accommodation at the shelter was irrational.
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
1 Citers



 
 Brown v Hamilton District Council; HL 25-Nov-1982 - [1982] UKHL 13; (1983) 133 NLJ 63; 1983 SLT 397; 1983 SC (HL) 1
 
Calabar Properties Ltd v Stitcher [1984] 1 WLR 287; [1983] 3 All ER 759
1983
CA
Stephenson LJ
Housing, Damages
The landlord had failed in his duty to repair. One tenant's health suffered because of the damp, and they had to rent other premises. Held: The landlord has only a reasonable time to effect repairs once he has been given notice of the need for them. Damages for breach of a covenant to repair are to compensate the tenant for inconvenience and discomfort of occupying premises in disrepair, not for diminution in rental value.
1 Citers


 
Devenport v Salford City Council (1983) 8 HLR 54
1983
CA
Fox LJ and Waller LJ
Housing
A possession order was made because of the misconduct of the tenants and their children. The council made a finding of intentional homelessness, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Held: For the purposes of the homelessness legislation, "deliberately" governs only the act or omission and not the homelessness.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Sopwith v Stuchbury; 1983 - (1983) 17 HLR 50
 
Noble v South Herefordshire District Council (1983) 17 HLR 80
1983
CA
Waller LJ, May LJ
Housing
The argument (that the word 'emergency' was used in a wider sense than emergencies confined to emergencies arising from disaster) had no force in this case because in the phrase 'any emergency such as flood, fire or any other disaster' the words 'or any other disaster' clearly indicate 'any other disaster' similar to a flood or a fire.
Housing Act 1977 2(1)(b)
1 Citers



 
 Battlespring Ltd v Gates; CA 1983 - [1983] EGLR 103; [1983] EG 355; (1984) 11 HLR 6

 
 Greater London Council v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council; 1983 - (1983) 15 HLR 57
 
Regina v Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council, Ex parte Bassett (1983) 10 HLR 125
1983

Taylor J
Housing
The housing applicant had given up the tenancy of a house in Basingstoke when she and her husband decided to emigrate to Canada. They moved to Canada, but their application to stay permanently was refused, and they had to return to England, where they lived in temporary accommodation in Bramley. The marriage then broke down as a result of the husband's behaviour, and the applicant left the Bramley accommodation and applied for accommodation as a homeless person. Held: Taylor J, relying on Lord Fraser's acceptance in Din of the need for a continuing causal connection, held that the applicant had not become homeless intentionally. Her homelessness was not due to her having given up the secure accommodation in Basingstoke and moved into unsettled accommodation: it was due to the break-up of her marriage.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Eastleigh Borough Council, Ex parte Betts; In re Betts; CA 1983 - [1983] 1 WLR 774

 
 Regina v Westminster City Council, ex parte Ali; 1983 - [1983] 11 HLR 83
 
Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd v Attorney-General [1983] Ch 159; [1983] 1 All ER 288
1983

Peter Gibson J
Charity, Housing
Housing associations wished to build self-contained dwellings for sale to the elderly. The court was asked whether such activity would be charitable in nature. Held: The proposed schemes were charitable. They were for the relief of the aged, and remained charitable even though individuals would benefit.
Peter Gibson J discussed the compatibility of gifts benefitting individuals with the trust being charitable: "The third objection was that the schemes were for the benefit of private individuals and not for a charitable class. I cannot accept that. The schemes are for the benefit of a charitable class, that is to say the aged having certain needs requiring relief therefrom. The fact that, once the association and the trust have selected individuals to benefit from the housing, those individuals are identified private individuals does not seem to me to make the purpose in providing the housing a non-charitable one any more than a trust for the relief of poverty ceases to be a charitable purpose when individual poor recipients of bounty are selected."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Southwark London Borough Council ex parte Hughes; 1983 - [1983] 30 HLR 1082
 
Regina v Eastleigh Borough Council, Ex parte Betts; In re Betts [1983] 2 AC 613; [1983] UKHL 9; [1983] 3 WLR 397; [1984] Fam Law 25; [1983] 2 All ER 111
27 Jul 1983
HL
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Roskill, Lord Brightman
Housing, Local Government
Mr Betts applied to Eastleigh for accommodation under the 1977 Act. They said that he had no local connection and referred his application to Blaby where the applicant and his family had formerly been living. Blaby accepted the referral and offered accommodation, but he refused it and made a further application to Eastleigh. In relation to that application Eastleigh took the view that, in referring the earlier application under section 5 of the 1977 Act, they had discharged their duty to the applicant. The applicant sought judicial review of that decision on the grounds that Eastleigh (in that context, the notifying authority) had been wrong to decide that the applicant had no local connection with their own district. The basis for that decision was that the applicant's connection with Eastleigh did not fall within the working definition of 'normal residence' set out in the Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless. Held: The authority's appeal succeeded. The question was whether the respondents had a "local connection" with the appellants' area within section 18(1)(a) for the purposes of section 5(1). Held: "local connection" was not a defined expression, the effect of which was to allow a reader to construe it by substituting "is or was normally resident in," or "is employed in," or "has family associations with" for the words "has a local connection with". The section was intended to specify those factors alone upon which a local connection could be founded. The fundamental question was the existence of a local connection: "In construing section 5 it is only to be expected that the emphasis falls on 'local connection', and not on past or present residence or current employment, etc. The Act is one which enables a homeless person in certain circumstances to jump over the heads of all other persons on a housing authority's waiting list, to jump the queue. One would not expect any just legislation to permit this to be done unless the applicant has in a real sense a local connection with the area in question. I accept that 'residence' may be changed in a day, and that in appropriate circumstances a singe day's residence may be enough to enable a person to say that he was normally resident in the area in which he arrived only yesterday. But 'local connection' means far more than that. It must be built up and established; by a period of residence; or by a period of employment; or by family associations which have endured in the area; or by other special circumstances which spell out a local connection in real terms."
Lord Brightman spoke of the national 'Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless': "it is obvious that time consuming and expensive disputes might arise between housing authorities as to the existence of a 'local connection'. Such disputes are not in the interest either of housing authorities or of homeless persons. The purposes of the Act demand speedy solutions to questions of doubt. To avoid such disputes, and to settle them quickly and cheaply if they arise, certain steps have been taken on behalf of housing authorities. First, in order to facilitate agreements between notifying authorities and notified authorities as required by section 5(7) a national 'Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless' was negotiated between the Association of District Councils, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the London Boroughs Association at the time when the Bill was being considered by Parliament. This agreement has been adhered to by the majority of housing authorities. Secondly, by the Housing (Homeless Persons) (Appropriate Arrangements) Order 1978 (SI 1978 No 69), the Secretary of State for the Environment, in exercise of his powers under section 5(8) has established the 'Appropriate Arrangements' set out in the schedule to the order for the purpose of settling unresolved disputes between housing authorities. These arrangements are in a form which was agreed by the three associations who negotiated the Agreement on Procedures. They provide for any disputed question under section 5 to be determined speedily either by a person agreed upon by the authorities concerned or by a person chosen from a panel. These arrangements came into operation on January 21, 1978, that is to say a few weeks after the Act of 1977 came into force. There is evidence that he Agreement on Procedures has worked well, and that as a result there have only been about 50 references under the order since the Act came into force.
The Agreement on Procedures does not purport to impose a legally binding code on housing authorities who adhere to it. It is merely a policy document."
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 5(1) 18(1)(a)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
McGriel v Wake [1984] 13 HLR 134
1984
CA

Housing, Damages

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Sturolson v Weniz [1984] 272 EG 326
1984
CA

Housing
The plaintiffs took occupation under an agreement which purported to grant a non exclusive right of possession of the flat, and to be personal. Occupation could only be shared with persons approved in advance by L. L's agent had said the agreement was intended to get around the Rent Acts. L purported to terminate the agreement, and the occupiers claimed a tenancy. Held: The right reserved to the owner to require them to share with others was contrary to the provisions of the Rent Acts and was in any event a pretence intended only to get round the Rent Acts. However the parties knew of the pretence, and the agreement created a licence.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
McCoy and Co v Clark (1984) 13 HLR 87
1984
CA

Housing

1 Citers


 
Enfield London Borough Council v French (1984) 17 HLR 211
1984
CA
Stephenson LJ
Housing
In considering a request for a possession order for which it was a requirement that an odder of suitable alternative accomodation, the question of whether the accommodation was suitable should be decided before the question whether it was reasonable to make an order for possession.
1 Citers


 
O'Neill v Williams [1984] HLR 1
1984


Family, Housing

Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 1(2)
1 Citers


 
Warner v Lambeth London Borough Council Times, 26 March 1984
26 Mar 1984
QBD

Housing, Environment
A complaint of statutory nuisance laid before the magistrates must contain even if in summary form, similar details as would appear in an abatement notice, including the capacity in which the defendant is served and the steps required to be taken to abate the nuisance complained of. The defence available under section 99 was available to the land owner.
Public Health Act 1936 99
1 Citers


 
Harrogate Borough Council v Simpson [1986] 2 FLR 91; [1984] EWCA Civ 3
11 Dec 1984
CA
Watkins LJ, Ewbank J
Housing
Appeal against order for possession of dwellinghouse.
[ Bailii ]
 
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