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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Housing - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 11 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Hall v The Manchester Corporation [1915] Law Journal Chancery 732
1915

Lord Parker
Nuisance, Housing
Lord Parker set out the test which to be applied when considering whether a property was fit for human habitation: "I desire to add that if the corporation are minded to make a new order under section 41 dealing with the houses in question, they would do well to consider the following points. In deciding whether a house is unfit for human habitation, reference must necessarily be made to some standard of fitness or unfitness. The fact that the corporation have a certain standard of fitness which they desire to impose on the area subject to their jurisdiction, and that the building in question falls short of that standard will not, in my opinion, necessarily render the house unfit within the meaning of the section. Thus the absence of such air spaces at the front and back as are prescribed by the by-laws in respect of new houses would not, in my opinion, be alone sufficient to justify the corporation in making an order under the section. The standard to be applied seem to be that of the ordinary reasonable man. This test may seem vague, but it will be found quite sufficient except in cases on the borderline, and in such cases the corporation will proceed at their own risk and must expect litigation."
1 Citers



 
 Remmington v Larchin; CA 1921 - [1921] 3 KB 404
 
Read v Goater [1921] 1 KB 611
1921

McCardie J
Housing
As to the Rent Acts, it was essential "that, wherever possible, [they] should be construed in a broad, practical, common-sense manner so as to effect the intention of the Legislature"
1 Citers


 
Remon v City of London Real Property Co Ltd [1921] 1 KB 49
1921
CA
Scrutton LJ, Bankes LJ, Atkin LJ
Housing
The court was asked whether the plaintiff, a tenant of rooms to which (once enacted) the Act of 1920 applied and who had been excluded from possession by the landlord's re-entry on the day that the Act came into force following service of a notice to quit, was entitled to an injunction restraining the landlord from interfering with his quiet enjoyment of the premises. Re-entry had been obtained forcibly, by the landlord breaking the locks. Held: Although the contractual tenancy had come to an end with expiry of the notice to quit, nevertheless, at the time of the re-entry, the plaintiff was to be treated as a tenant who by virtue of the provisions of the Act had retained possession for the purposes of section 15(1); and so was a person entitled to the benefit of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment under that subsection. As a residential tenant even though only having a tenancy at will, may have the protection of the Rent Acts, including protection against rent increases.
Scrutton LJ said: "The question is whether, his tenancy by agreement having expired at a time when no Rent Restriction Act gave him any right to stay on, and the landlords having got into the premises without any assistance from the Court, he can claim any right to stay on or to ask the Court to restrain landlords from interfering with his possession." and "The object of the various Rent Restrictions Acts is clear. It was intended to prevent the tenant from having his rent raised against him, or from being turned out, though his tenancy by agreement had expired, so long as he was willing to pay the rent authorised by statute. He was originally presented by Parliament with a statutory tenancy at the will of the tenant for so long as he liked and no longer. But Parliament did not in terms say that though his tenancy by agreement has expired, he had a statutory right to stay in on specified terms; it provided that no order for recovery of possession should be made, and omitted expressly to provide what sort of legal interest the person who stayed in by permission of Parliament and against the will of the landlord should have, nor did Parliament expressly provide for the case where the landlord by his own action and without obtaining the order of the Court, got into possession of his own premises." and "Yet I think it is clear Parliament had intended to confirm these people in a statutory tenancy and speak of their position as "a letting". Mr Romer [counsel for the landlords] argued very forcibly to us that though the policy were clear yet the courts ought not to give effect to it unless they could find words apt in their ordinary meaning to justify them in so doing, and that the case of landlord getting into possession of premises which under the agreement of tenancy he had a right to enter had not been dealt with by Parliament. I do think it has expressly; and I feel I am straining language in speaking of a person whose tenancy has expired and who stays in against the active protest of the landlord as "tenant", and of the landlords' relation to him as "letting"; but such a person appears to be within the clear intention of the legislature, and where the statute has forbidden any process of court to be used to eject him, I think it must have intended and be taken to forbid ejection by the private action of the landlords without the aid of the Court. "
Bankes LJ accepted that in no ordinary sense of the word was the respondent a tenant of the premises on the coming into force of the Act. But: “It is however clear that in all the Rent Restrictions Acts the expression “tenant” has been used in a special, a peculiar sense, and as including a person who might be described as an ex-tenant, someone whose occupation had commenced as a tenant and who had continued in occupation without any legal right to do so except possibly such as the Acts themselves conferred upon him. The respondent therefore on the coming into operation of the new Act was a tenant within the meaning of that expression in the Act . . .” Lord Justice Bankes held that the plaintiff had the protection of section 15: “Section 15 is intended to supply something that was wanting in the previous Acts, namely, an indication as to the legal position of a person who continued in occupation of premises merely by reason of the protection afforded by those Acts. The opening words of section 15 are words of description of the person to whom the conditions of the statutory tenancy apply. He is described as a tenant who by virtue of the provisions of the Act retains possession of a dwelling house to which the Act applies. As pointed out by Mr Romer in his argument the Legislature in section 5 was apparently only contemplating eviction by legal process. A person therefore who is protected by the Act from eviction by legal process from his dwelling house may not inaccurately be described as a person who by virtue of the Act retains possession of his dwelling house. The respondent being obviously a person protected by section 5 from eviction by legal process, comes in my opinion within the description contained in section 15, and is therefore entitled to the benefit of the Act, assuming that his premises come within the Act.”
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 5
1 Citers


 
Wilkes v Goodwin [1923] 2 KB 86
1923
CA
Bankes LJ
Housing
The supply of a cup of tea to a tenant each morning is not sufficient to constitute 'board' so as to take the tenancy out of statutory protection.
1 Citers



 
 Williamson v Pallant; KBD 1924 - [1924] 2 KB 173; [1924] All ER Rep 623; [1924] 93 LJKB 726
 
Martin Estates Ltd v Watt and Hunter [1925] NI 79
1925
CANI
Moore, Andrews LJJ
Northern Ireland, Housing
Barracks were leased for police purposes to a receiver for the Royal Ulster Constabulary. On expiry the landlord moved for possession. The tenant resisted, citing legislation enacted to protect tenants of houses from disturbance in their occupation. He claimed to enjoy possession or occupation of the barracks. Held: Occupation means actual physical enjoyment. The defence was rejected. Housing let for the public service and occupied by public servants was not a dwelling for the purposes of the Rent Acts and that policemen in police barracks, patients in hospital and inmates in a gaol could not claim security of tenure.
1 Citers



 
 Schneiders and Sons Ltd v Abrahams; 1925 - [1925] 1 KB 301

 
 Salter v Lask; 1925 - [1925] 1 KB 584
 
Hicks v Snook (1928) 27 LGR 175
1928
CA
Scrutton, Greer and Sankey LJJ
Housing, Landlord and Tenant
The property had been let for twenty five years with a shop on the ground floor with living accomodation above. There had been no formal tenancy agreement, and no explicit user stipulation. The tenant claimed the protection of the 1920 Act. Held: The effect of section 12(2)(ii) appeared "to affirm in statutory form what the Court of Appeal had decided [in the Epsom Grandstand case]." The commercial use of part of the premises did not "stop the premises in which he lives from being a dwelling house".
Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 1(1) 12(2)
1 Citers


 
Roe v Russell [1928] 2 KB 117
1928
CA
Sargant LJ
Housing
Sargant LJ said that the Rent Acts had "not been framed with any scientific accuracy of language."
1 Citers


 
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