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Health and Safety - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 42 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Coltness Iron Co v Sharp [1938] AC 90
1938
HL
Lord Atkin, Lord Macmillan
Health and Safety
The court considered the extent of the duty of care owed by an employer to its employees under the Act: (Atkin) "In the facts of this case where the dangerous machinery was exposed for only a few minutes as the only means of effecting necessary repairs in a part of the mine where it was unlikely that any workman would be exposed to risk of contact with the machine other than the engineer engaged in the work of repair, I am unable to take the view that it was reasonably practicable by any means to avoid or prevent the breach" and (Lord Macmillan) "It was not only not reasonably practicable to keep the gearing securely fenced when it had to be observed on the test run, but it would have been impossible to have observed its working if it had been protected by the guard . . (and) if you prevent anyone going near a machine then of course you prevent the possibility of anyone being injured by it. But employees must have access to mend them. "
1 Citers



 
 Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English; HL 1938 - [1938] AC 57; [1937] UKHL 2

 
 Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries; HL 1940 - [1940] AC 152
 
Noble v Southern Railway Co [1940] UKHL 1; [1940] 2 All ER 383
18 Apr 1940
HL

Health and Safety, Personal Injury
The deceased was killed by an electric train. He was employed as a as a fireman and attached to the locomotive depot at Norwood Junction, having piloting duties, so that when a driver did not know the railroad, he had to travel in the engine cab and show it to him. Having reported one night at the engine shed and was then told to go to East Croyden, travelling as a passenger from Norwood Junction Station by a train due to leave shortly. To catch that train he had to walk to the Junction Station. There was a recognized route had been specified as the right way since the locomotive depot was opened. The distance along this route, which was adequately lighted at night and perfectly safe, was 1,002 yards. There was, however, a short cut along the lines of the railway, the total distance of which was 841 yards. This route was dangerous because of live rails, various obstructions and electric trains. It was not lit at night and its use by employees of the respondents was strictly prohibited. The deceased took this route and was killed by an electric train coming up behind him. He had departed from the recognized and safe- route and was walking along the highly dangerous route in close proximity to the rails used by electric trains. His widow claimed workers compensation. Held: The claim succeeded. Proceeding to the railway station was to report duty and was during the course of his employment.
Lord Wright said: 'I have often reflected with sadness that the Act was to be administered with as little technicality as possible. Yet thousands of reported cases have accumulated round it and fresh ones are likely to go on accumulating so long as the Act remains in its present form. . . The fundamental and initial question in every claim under the Act must be whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. That is a question of fact which can only be decided by the County Court Judge by applying his common sense and his knowledge of industrial conditions to the evidence ' However: "our duty is to follow the law as we believe it to have been laid down in the previous decision of the House of Lords."
Viscount Maugham said that three questions had to be answered: "First, looking at the facts proved as a whole, including any regulations or orders affecting the workman, was the accident one which arose out of, and in the course of, his employment?
Secondly, if the first question is answered in the negative, is the negative answer due to the fact that when the accident happened the workman was acting in contravention of some regulation or order?
[ Bailii ]
 
Speed v Swift [1943] KB 557
1943
CA
Lord Greene MR
Health and Safety
Lord Greene MR considered what was meant by system when considering an employer's duty to provide a safe system of working: "I do not venture to suggest a definition of what is meant by system, but it includes, in my opinion, or may include the physical lay-out of the job - the setting of the stage, so to speak - the sequence in which the work is to be carried out, the provision in proper cases of warnings and notices, and the issue of special instructions. A system may be adequate for the whole course of the job or it may have to be modified or improved to meet circumstances which arise. Such modifications or improvements appear to me equally to fall under the head of system."

 
Lyon v Don Brothers, Buist and Co 1944 JC 1
1944

Lord Justice General Normand
Health and Safety, Scotland
Lord Justice General Normand said that the circumstances which can reasonably be expected by an employer in the context of health and safety "include a great deal more than the staid, prudent, well-regulated conduct of men diligently attentive to their work".
1 Citers



 
 Mitchell v North British Rubber Co Ltd; 1945 - 1945 JC 69
 
London and North Eastern Railway Company v Berriman [1946] AC 278; [1946] 1 All ER 255; 115 LJKB 124
1946
HL
Lord Simonds, Lord Porter, Lord MacMillan
Health and Safety, Personal Injury
A railway worker's widow sought compensation after her husband was killed by a train. Held: He had been involved in routine maintenance and oiling at the time of the accident and was not 'relaying or repairing' tracks. She was not entitled to compensation.
Lord Porter said that the word 'repair' contains 'some suggestion of putting right that which is wrong'.
Lord MacMillan said: "I recognise that when Parliament employs technical terms without definition in a statute dealing with a particular art or industry, courts of law are entitled to have the assistance of skilled persons in the interpretation of such terms. Indeed the present statute and rules contain numerous technical terms as to whose meaning in railway parlance evidence would be almost indispensable."
Lord Simonds said that a person is "not to be put in peril upon an ambiguity, however much the purpose of the Act appeals to the predilection of the court."
and "It is only by reference to the industry that the meaning can be ascertained . . It remains a question of evidence what the words mean in the industry. They are a term of art and it is by those skilled in the art that I must be instructed."
1 Citers



 
 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd; HL 1946 - [1946] 2 All ER 345; [1947] AC 1; [1946] UKHL 1
 
Vyner v Waldenberg Brothers Ltd [1946] KB 50
1946
CA
Scott LJ
Health and Safety, Personal Injury
Scott LJ said: 'If there is a definite breach of a safety provision imposed on the occupier of a factory, and a workman is injured in a way which could result from the breach, the onus of proof shifts on to the employer to show that the breach was not the cause. We think that that principle lies at the very basis of statutory rules of absolute duty.'
1 Citers


 
Edwards v National Coal Board [1949] 1 KB 704
1949
CA
Asquith LJ
Personal Injury, Health and Safety
A regulation encompassed a requirement to take specified action, so far as it is reasonably practicable, in order to prevent danger. Asquith LJ discussed the term: ""Reasonably practicable" . . seems to me to imply that a computation must be made by the owner, in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other; and that if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them – the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice – the defendants discharge the onus on them."
1 Citers


 
Millar v Galashiels Gas Co Ltd; Galashiels Gas Company Ltd v O'Donnell [1949] AC 275; [1949] SC (HL) 31; [1949] UKHL 2; 47 LGR 213; 1949 SLT 223; 65 TLR 76; [1949] LJR 540; [1949] AC 275; [1949] 1 All ER 319
20 Jan 1949
HL
Lord Morton of Henryton
Health and Safety, Scotland, Personal Injury
A hoist mechanism failed, the employee was injured, and he sought damages from his employer under the Act. Held: The section imposes an absolute obligation to maintain work equipment in an efficient state or in efficient working order. The duty imposed was an absolute and continuing obligation, so that proof of any failure in the mechanism of a hoist or lift established a breach of statutory duty, even though it was impossible to anticipate such failure before the event or to explain it afterwards, and even though all reasonable steps had been taken to provide a suitable hoist or lift and to maintain it properly.
Factories Act 1937 22(1)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Harrison v National Coal Board; HL 1951 - [1951] AC 639; [1951] 1 TLR 1079; [1951] 95 Sol Jo 413; [1951] 1 All ER 1102
 
Dorman Long and Co Ltd v Hillier [1951] 1 All ER 357
1951

Lord Goddard CJ
Personal Injury, Health and Safety
A worker had to remove four corrugated iron sheets from a roof. He was injured and claimed under the 1937 Act. Held: A place can be a means of access at one time and a place of work at a different time but it cannot be both at the same time. A step on to one of the sheets while the worker was passing down another after its removal was a step not upon a means of access but upon a part of the place where the work was being done. Lord Goddard CJ said that it would be "too artificial to say that there were different branches of work according to which sheet he was removing at any particular moment."
Factories Act 1937 26(1)
1 Citers


 
McCarthy v Coldair Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 1226
1951
CA
Denning LJ, Hodson LJ
Personal Injury, Health and Safety

1 Citers


 
Clifford v Charles H Challen and Son Ltd [1951] 1 KB 495
1951
CA
Denning LJ
Health and Safety

1 Citers



 
 Dooley v Cammell Laird and Co Ltd; 1951 - [1951] 1 Lloyd's Rep 271
 
Davies v de Havilland Aircraft Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 50
1951


Personal Injury, Health and Safety

1 Citers


 
Ebbs v James Whitson and Co Ltd [1952] 2 QB 877
1952
CA
Hodson LJ
Health and Safety

1 Citers


 
Sheppey v Matthew T Shaw and Co Ltd [1952] 1 TLR 1272
1952


Health and Safety

1 Citers



 
 Day v Harland and Wolff Ltd; 1953 - [1953] I WLR 906; [1953] 2 All ER 387; [1953] 97 Sol Jo 473
 
Levesley v Thomas Firth and John Brown Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1206; [1953] 2 All ER 866
1953
CA

Health and Safety
In the course of some loading operations a block of iron was left temporarily protruding three inches out into a gangway, used as a means of access.
1 Citers


 
General Cleaning Contractors Ltd v Christmas [1952] 1 KB 141; [1953] AC 180; [1952] 2 All ER 1110
1953
HL
Lord Oaksey, Lord Read
Health and Safety
It is the duty of the employer to consider the situation, devise a suitable system and instruct his employees what they must do and to provide appropriate equipment. In leaving it to individual workmen to take precautions against an obvious danger, the employers had failed to discharge their duty to provide a reasonably safe system of work.
Lord Oaksey said: "In my opinion, it is the duty of an employer to give such general safety instructions as a reasonably careful employer who has considered the problem presented by the work would give to his workmen. It is, I think, well known to employers, and there is evidence in this case that it was well known to the appellants, that their workpeople are very frequently, if not habitually, careless about the risks which their work may involve. It is, in my opinion, for that very reason that the common law demands that employers should take reasonable care to lay down a reasonably safe system of work. Employers are not exempted from this duty by the fact that their men are experienced and might, if they were in the position of an employer, be able to lay down a reasonably safe system of work themselves. Workmen are not in the position of employers. Their duties are not performed in the calm atmosphere of a board room with the advice of experts. They have to make their decisions on narrow window sills and other places of danger and in circumstances in which the dangers are obscured by repetition.
The risk that sashes may unexpectedly close, as the sashes in this case appear to have done, may not happen very often, but when it does, if the workman is steadying himself by a handhold, his fall is almost certain. If the possibility is faced the risk is obvious. If both sashes are closed there is no longer the handhold by which the workman steadies himself. If either sash is kept open the handhold is available and, on the evidence in this case, is, in my opinion, reasonably safe. But the problem is one for the employer to solve and should not, in my opinion, be left to the workman. It can be solved by general orders and the provision of appropriate appliances."
Lord Reid said: "The question then is whether it is the duty of the appellants to instruct their servants what precautions they ought to take and to take reasonable steps to see that those instructions are carried out. On that matter the appellants say that their men are skilled men who are well aware of the dangers involved and as well able as the appellants to devise and take any necessary precautions. That may be so but, in my opinion, it is not a sufficient answer. Where the problem varies from job to job it may be reasonable to leave a great deal to the man in charge, but the danger in this case is one which is constantly found, and it calls for a system to meet it. Where a practice of ignoring an obvious danger has grown up I do not think that it is reasonable to expect an individual workman to take the initiative in devising and using precautions. It is the duty of the employer to consider the situation, to devise a suitable system, to instruct his men what they must do and to supply any implements that may be required."
1 Citers


 
Latimer v AEC Limited [1953] 2 All ER 449; [1953] AC 643; [1953] UKHL 3
25 Jun 1953
HL
Lord Oaksey, Lord Porter
Health and Safety, Personal Injury
The Appellant had recovered damages for injuries which he alleged had been the result of a failure on the part of the Respondents in their statutory duty to maintain one of the gang ways in their works in an efficient state. He slipped on a factory floor which had become flooded in an unusually heavy rain storm causing a mixture of water and oily coolant, normally confined to a channel, to coat the floor. Held: The employer was not negligent because it had done all that could reasonably be expected of it having regard to the degree of risk.
Lord Oaksey said: "On the question of the construction of section 25(1) of the Factories Act, 1937, I am of the opinion that by virtue of that section and the interpretation section 152, the respondents were bound to maintain the floors and passages in an efficient state, but I do not consider that it was proved that they were not in an efficient state. A floor does not, in my opinion, cease to be in an efficient state because a piece of orange peel or a small pool of some slippery material is on it. Whilst I do not agree that the maintenance of the floors is confined to their construction, I think the obligation to maintain them in an efficient state introduces into what is an absolute duty a question of degree as to what is efficient . . The question then is whether section 25(1) applies to things which are not part of the floor but whose presence on it is a source of danger. If section 25 stood alone I would say that it did not. No doubt the section is one dealing with safety, but, even so, keeping the surface of a floor free from dangerous material does not appear to me to come within the scope of maintaining the floor."
Lord Tucker said: "The learned judge seems to have accepted the reasoning of counsel for the plaintiff to the effect that the floor was slippery, that slipperiness is a potential danger, that the defendants must be taken to have been aware of this, that in the circumstances nothing could have been done to remedy the slipperiness, that the defendants allowed work to proceed, that an accident due to slipperiness occurred, and that the defendants are therefore liable.
This is not the correct approach. The problem is perfectly simple. The only question was: has it been proved that the floor was so slippery that, remedial steps not being possible, a reasonably prudent employer would have closed down the factory rather than allow his employees to run the risks involved in continuing work? The learned judge does not seem to me to have posed this question to himself, nor was there sufficient evidence before him to have justified an affirmative answer.
The absence of any evidence that anyone in the factory during the afternoon or night shift, other than the plaintiff, slipped or experienced any difficulty or that any complaint was made by or on behalf of the workers all points to the conclusion that the danger was in fact not such as to impose upon a reasonable employer the obligation placed upon the respondents by the trial judge."
Factories Act 1937 25(1)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Hartley v Mayoh and Co; 1954 - [1954] 1 QB 383
 
Norris v W Moss and Sons Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 346
1954
CA

Health and Safety
The employer had erected scaffolding in a way which infringed the Regulations. Held: He was not to be held liable to his employee who had noticed the defect and set about remedying it negligently and was injured as a result. The breach of the Regulations was not the cause of the accident.
Building (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations 1948
1 Citers


 
Creed v McGeoch and Sons Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 1005; [1955] 3 All ER 123
1955

Ashworth J
Negligence, Health and Safety
The question of who is an occupier will depend on the particular facts of each case and especially upon the nature and extent of the occupation or control in fact enjoyed or exercised by the defendant over the premises. The defendant contractor was held to be the occupier only of the length of the road under construction but not the land flanking the road.
1 Citers


 
John Summers and Sons Ltd v Frost [1955] AC 740; [1955] 1 All ER 870
1955
HL
Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid
Health and Safety, Negligence
The normal rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed has not been allowed to stand in the way of the protection given to the workman by the statutory language. The House considered the requirement under section 14(1) of the 1937 Act that "Every dangerous part of any machinery … shall be securely fenced unless it is in such a position or of such construction as to be as safe to every person employed or working on the premises as it would be if securely fenced", and had applied to the concept of dangerousness an approach dating back to Hindle v Birtwhistle [1897] 1 QB 192, namely that a machine or part is dangerous "if in the ordinary course of human affairs danger may reasonably be anticipated from the use of them without protection", and that it was "impossible to say that because an accident had happened once therefore the machine was dangerous". Lords Reid and Keith at pp 765-766 and 774 expressly endorsed the relevance of determining whether the degree of danger was such that there was "a reasonably foreseeable cause of injury".
Lord Reid aid that an employer considering the use of dangerous equipment must allow for possible lapses by a workman.
Viscount Simonds said that it was elementary that it is necessary to consider not only the risk run by a skilled and careful man who never relaxes his vigilance.
Factories Act 1937 14(1)
1 Citers



 
 Richards v Highway Ironfounders (West Bromwich) Ltd; CA 1955 - [1955] 1 WLR 1049

 
 Gregson v Hick Hargreaves and Co Ltd; CA 1955 - [1955] 1 WLR 1252
 
Prince v Carrier Engineering Co Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep 401
1955


Health and Safety, Personal Injury

1 Citers



 
 Brophy v J C Bradfield and Co Ltd; CA 1955 - [1955] 1 WLR 1148

 
 Banks v Woodhall Duckham and Others; CA 30-Nov-1955 - Unreported 30 November 1955

 
 Grant v National Coal Board; HL 1956 - [1956] AC 649

 
 Staveley Iron and Chemical Co Ltd v Jones; HL 1956 - [1956] AC 627

 
 Massey-Harris-Ferguson (Manufacturing) Ltd v Piper; QBD 1956 - [1956] 2 QB 396

 
 Trott v WE Smith (Erectors) Ltd; CA 1957 - [1957] 1 WLR 1154; [1957] 3 All ER 500

 
 Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd v Bryers; HL 1957 - [1958] AC 485; [1957] 3 All Er 572
 
Miller v South of Scotland Electricity Board 1958 SC(HL) 20
1958
HL
Lord Keith of Avonholm
Scotland, Health and Safety
An employer should recognise that it is not possible to predict all the ways in which dangers may arise, especially where the risk is created by carelessness. The employer is liable even if he did not foresee the precise accident that happened. In claims of damages for alleged negligence it could only be in rare and exceptional cases that an action could be disposed of on relevancy, because the facets and detail of a case on which an assessment of the law must depend could not be conveyed to the mind by mere averments of the bare bones of the case.
1 Citers


 
Wilson v Tyneside Window Cleaning Co [1958] EWCA Civ 2; [1958] 2 WLR 900; [1958] 2 QB 110; [1958] 2 All ER 265
24 Apr 1958
CA
Jenkins, Pearce, Parker LJJ
Health and Safety, Negligence
Pearce LJ said that if an employer sends an employee to work, "for instance in a respectable private house", he could not be held negligent for not visiting the house himself "to see if the carpet in the hall created a trap".
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd; HL 1959 - [1959] AC 604; [1959] 1 All ER 346; [1959] 2 WLR 331; [1959] 2 Lloyds Rep 587
 
Baker v TE Hopkins and Son Ltd [1959] EWCA Civ 4; [1959] 1 WLR 966; [1959] 3 All ER 225
24 Jul 1959
CA
Morris, Ormerod, Willmer LJJ
Health and Safety, Negligence, Personal Injury
The defendant had employed to clean a well. In error a petrol pump was sued, which discharged carbon monoxide into the well. On two workers getting into difficulties, a doctor sought to rescue them. All three died in the well. The employer denied negligence as regards the death of the Doctor. Held: " Bearing in mind that danger invites rescue, the court should not be astute to accept criticism of the rescuer's conduct from the wrongdoer who created the danger. Moreover, I think it should be remembered that it is fatally easy to be wise after the event. It is not enough that, when all the evidence has been sifted and all the facts ascertained in the calm and deliberate atmosphere of a court of law, the rescuer's conduct can be shown ex post facto to have been misguided or foolhardy. He is entitled to be judged in the light of the situation as it appeared to him at the time, i.e., in a context of immediate and pressing emergency. Here Dr. Baker was faced with a situation in which two men were in danger of speedy death at the bottom of the well, unless something were done very quickly. He was a doctor, and he had been specially summoned to help. Any man of courage in his position would have felt impelled to act, even at the risk of his own safety. Time was pressing; immediate action was necessary if the men in danger were to be helped; there was virtually no opportunity for reflection, or for estimating the risks involved in an act of rescue. If Dr. Baker in such circumstances had instinctively gone straight down the well, without stopping to take any precautions at all, it would, I think, have been difficult enough to criticise him. But in point of fact he did take the very wise precaution of securing himself with a rope, whereby those on the surface could pull him up if he himself were overcome. The immediate cause of his death was the sheer mischance of the rope becoming caught on some obstruction, so as to make it impossible for those on the surface to pull him to safety. I do not think that, having regard to the emergency in which he was acting, he is to be blamed for not foreseeing and guarding against the possibility of such a mischance. On the contrary, I entirely agree with the view expressed by the judge that the defendants, whose negligence brought about the danger, must accept the risk of mischances of this kind. In all the circumstances, I find it impossible to accept the contention that Dr. Baker was guilty of any negligence either causing or contributing to his death."
[ Bailii ]
 
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