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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Health - From: 1800 To: 1849

This page lists 9 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Jones, Ex Parte [1806] EngR 375; (1806) 13 Ves Jun 237; (1806) 33 ER 283 (B)
23 Dec 1806


Health

[ Commonlii ]
 
Whyte and Mandatory v Clark and Others [1817] ScotJCR 1_Murray_233; (1817) 1 Murray 233
20 Mar 1817
SJC

Scotland, Health
Impartial and intelligent witnesses having sworn that they considered a person capable of managing his own affairs, and having supported their opinion by particular facts; found that he was not to be considered an "idiot" or "fatuous and incapable of understanding business," though other witnesses swore that they considered him so.
[ Bailii ]
 
Ball v Mallin (1829) 3 Bligh NS 1
1829
HL

Contract, Health
A person must have the necessary mental capacity if he is to execute a voluntary deed. The House upheld a direction to the jury that what was required was that a person "should be capable of understanding what he did by executing the deed in question when its general import was fully explained to him."
1 Citers


 
In The Goods Of Elizabeth Brand [1831] EngR 118; (1831) 3 Hag Ecc 754; (1831) 162 ER 1333
1831


Wills and Probate, Health
A testatrix executed a wiil, and thereupon destroyed a former will, and subsequently executed two other wills. The last mill was propounded, but abandoned. A decree then issued calling on all parties interested to shew cause why probate of the instructions for the first will should not be granted; and the Court, on proof per testes that the instructions were of the same effect is the first will, that that will was executed wheri the deceased was sane, but destroyed and the other wills executed when insane, pronounced for the instructions, and refused coats out of the estate to persons in distribution who by interrogatories set up insanity when the first will waa executed.
[ Commonlii ]
 
The King v The Inhabitants Of Stockton [1833] EngR 821; (1833) 5 B & Ad 546; (1833) 110 ER 892
9 Nov 1833


Health, Family
Two justices ordered F. C., the wife of It. C., a Scotchman, having no settlement in England, and a lunatic, to be removed from parish A., where she had become chargeable, to parish B., whioh was adjudged to be her lawful settlement. The order did not state where the husband was when it was made: Held, that the order was not void on the ground that it would effect the separation of husband and wife, because it was not to be presumed that when it was made, the husband was residing in parish A., or was not residing in parish B.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Barry v Butlin (1838) 2 Moores PCC 480; [1838] EngR 1051; (1838) 1 Curt 637; (1838) 163 ER 223; [1838] EngR 1056; (1838) 2 Moo PC 480; (1838) 12 ER 1089; [1836] EngR 855; (1836) 1 Moo PC 98; (1836) 12 ER 749; [1838] UKPC 22
8 Dec 1838
PC
Baron Parke
Wills and Probate, Health
The testator, who had one son, bequeathed legacies to Percy, his attorney, one Butlin, to whom he also bequeathed the residue of his estate, and Whitehead, his butler. The will was upheld by the judge in the Prerogative Court and the son appealed. Held: The case law establishes that the proposition that the propounder of a will: "must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator." The Board rejected a suggestion that the onus of proof could only be discharged by evidence of prior instructions for or subsequent reading over of the will before execution by the testator, saying: "Nor can it be necessary, that in all such cases, even if the testator's capacity is doubtful, the precise species of evidence of the deceased's knowledge of the will is to be in the shape of instructions for, or reading over the instrument. They form, no doubt, the most satisfactory, but they are not the only satisfactory description of proof, by which the cognizance of the contents of the will may be brought home to the deceased. The court would naturally look for such evidence; in some cases it might be impossible to establish a will without it, but it has no right in every case to require it."
The rules for admitting a will to probate are two. Baron Parke said: "the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding a will, and he must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator. The second is, that if a party wrote or prepares a will under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to excite the suspicion of the court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and jealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true will of the deceased." The conscience of the court must be satisfied by the evidence."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ] - [ Commonlii ] - [ Commonlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Charles Harwood v Maria Baker (1840) 3 Moores PCC 282; [1840] EngR 1087; (1840) 3 Moo PC 282; (1840) 13 ER 117
1840
PC
Erskine J
Wills and Probate, Health
The Board emphasised the importance that the Court of Probate should be satisfied that a testatrix had the necessary capacity when she executed the will if the evidence showed that she had lost capacity shortly afterwards. The infirmity of the testator may strengthen certain presumptions which arise against the will in a case where the will is contrary to the previously expressed intentions of the testator as to his testamentary dispositions.
"in order to constitute a sound disposing mind, a Testator must not only be able to understand that he is by his will giving the whole of his property to one object of his regard; but that he must also have capacity to comprehend the extent of his property, and the nature of the claims of others, whom by his will he is excluding from all participation in that property." and
"Now if their Lordships had found from the other evidence that Mr Baker had, while in a state of health, compared and weighed the claims of his relations, and had formed the deliberate purpose of rejecting them all in favour of his wife, but had omitted to carry that purpose into effect before the attack of illness under which he dies; and that during that illness he had acted upon that previous intention, and executed a Will in question, - less evidence of the capacity to weigh those claims during his illness might have been sufficient to show that the Will propounded really did contain the expression of the mind and will of the deceased."
Erskine J said: "Their Lordships are of opinion that, in order to constitute a sound disposing mind, a testator must not only be able to understand that he is by his will giving the whole of his property to one object of his regard, but he must also have capacity to comprehend the extent of his property, and the nature of the claims of others, whom by his will he is excluding from all participation in that property; and that the protection of the law is in no cases more needed than it is in those where the mind has been too much enfeebled to comprehend more objects than one; and more especially, when that one object may be so forced upon the attention of the invalid as to shut out all others that might require consideration. And, therefore, the question which their Lordships propose to decide in this case is, not whether Mr Baker knew, when he executed this will, that he was giving all his property to his wife, and excluding all his other relations from any share in it, but whether he was at that time capable of recollecting who those relations were, of understanding their respective claims upon his regard and bounty, and of deliberately forming an intelligent purpose of excluding them from any share of his property. If he had not the capacity required, the propriety of the disposition made by the will is a matter of no importance. If he had it, the injustice of the exclusion would not affect the validity of the disposition, though the justice or injustice of the disposition might cast down some light upon the question as to his capacity."
and "that in all cases the party propounding the Will is bound to prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the paper in question does contain the last will and testament of the deceased, and that this obligation is more especially cast upon him when the evidence in the case shows that the mind of the testator was generally, about the time of its execution, incompetent to the exertion required for such a purpose."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Daniel M'Naghten's Case; HL 1843 - (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200; [1843] 8 ER 718; [1843] UKHL J16; [1843] EngR 875
 
Dyce Sombre, A Lunatic [1844] EngR 507; (1844) 1 Ph 436; (1844) 41 ER 697
3 May 1844


Health

[ Commonlii ]
 
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