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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Family - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 74 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Gurasz v Gurasz [1970] P 11
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR
Family
Lord Denning MR described "the husband's duty to provide his wife with a roof over her head" as "elemental in our society"
1 Citers


 
Merritt v Merritt [1970] 2 All ER 760; [1970] 1 WLR 1211
1970
CA
Stamp J
Family, Contract
H and W owned their house jointly. When H left for another woman, he signed an agreement to pay Mrs Merritt a monthly sum, and eventually to transfer the house to her if Mrs M kept up the monthly mortgage payments. When the mortgage was paid off Mr Merritt refused to transfer the house. Mrs Merritt asked the court to enforce the agreement. Held: H's appeal failed, and specific performance granted. The usual presumption against an agreement within a marriage being legally enforceable did not apply in this case since the parties were separated. This was more than a domestic arrangement.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Gould v Gould [1970] 1 QB 275
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Edmund Davies LJ, Megaw LJ
Family
H told W he would pay her £15 a week as long as he had it. She issued a writ claiming payment of arrears of maintenance due. Held: The agreement was unenforceable, since it was not sufficiently certain.
Lord Denning MR (dissenting) said: "I hold, therefore, that an oral separation agreement by which the husband agrees to pay the wife so much a week is legally enforceable. There is ample consideration for such agreement."
Edmund Davies LJ thought the agreement was too vague to be enforced but: "There can be no doubt that husband and wife can enter into a contract which binds them in law. Peters (Executors) v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1941] 2 All E.R. 620 and the recent decision of Stamp J. in Merritt v. Merritt, "The Times," May 15th, 1969, afford examples of this. But it is upon the spouse asserting that such a contract has been entered into to prove the assertion: see the observations of Atkin L.J. in Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 580 … In the general run of cases the inclination would be against inferring that spouses intended to create a legal relationship: see Lord Hodson in Pettitt v. Pettitt [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966, 983. The evidence establishing such an intention needs, in my judgment, to be clear and convincing."
Megaw LJ agreed with Edmund Davies LJ.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Registrar General, Ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Winn and Buckley LJJ
Family, Administrative, Ecclesiastical
The Church of Scientology chapel at East Grinstead, Sussex was not a "place of meeting for religious worship" within the meaning of section 2 of the 1855 Act since that would require reverence to a deity. The Church of Scientology's services did not meet that test, and a valid ceremony of marriage could not be conducted there. The question of whether the services performed in the chapel are properly to be regarded as a form of religious worship is inevitably conditioned by whether Scientology is to be regarded as a religion.
Lord Denning asked whether the chapel was a place of meeting for religious worship within the meaning of the Act, saying: "We have had much discussion on the meaning of the word "religion" and of the word "worship", taken separately, but I think we should take the combined phrase, "place of meeting for religious worship" as used in the statute of 1855. It connotes to my mind a place of which the principal use is as a place where people come together as a congregation or assembly to do reverence to God. It need not be the God which the Christians worship. It may be another God, or an unknown God, but it must be reverence to a deity. There may be exceptions. For instance, Buddhist temples are properly described as places of meeting for religious worship. But, apart from exceptional cases of that kind, it seems to me the governing idea behind the words "place of meeting for religious worship" is that it should be a place for the worship of God. I am sure that would be the meaning attached by those who framed this legislation of 1855."
As to how that might apply to the Church of Scientology: "Turning to the creed of the Church of Scientology, I must say that it seems to me to be more a philosophy of the existence of man or of life, rather than a religion. Religious worship means reverence or veneration of God or of a Supreme Being. I do not find any such reverence or veneration in the creed of this church . . When I look through the ceremonies and the affidavits, I am left with the feeling that there is nothing in it of reverence for God or a deity, but simply instruction in a philosophy. There may be belief in a spirit of man, but there is no belief in a spirit of God."
Winn LJ said that he did not feel well qualified to discuss whether Scientology could properly be called a religion, but the evidence did not show to his mind that its adherents observed any form of worship. He explained what he meant by worship: "by no "worship", if I am bound to define my terms, I mean to indicate that they do not humble themselves in reverence and recognition of the dominant power and control of any entity or being outside their own body and life."
Buckley LJ said: "Worship I take to be something which must have some at least of the following characteristics: submission to the object worshipped, veneration of that object, praise, thanksgiving, prayer or intercession."
Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 2
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Wright v Wright [1970] 1 WLR 1219
1970

Sir Gordon Willmer
Family
In the course of a settlement of divorce proceedings, a wife agreed to withdraw her claim for maintenance. She sought to re-open it. Held: the principle of Hyman v. Hyman applied, notwithstanding that the agreement between the parties had been approved by the court, under section 5 of the 1963 Act.
Sir Gordon Willmer said: "There is no doubt that no agreement made inter parties can ever deprive the court of its right to review the question of maintenance for a wife, as was decided by the House of Lords in Hyman v. Hyman (1929) AC 601. I do not think that anything contained in the new provisions of the Act of 1965, giving the court the power to approve reasonable arrangements between the parties, is such as to cast any doubt at all upon the continuance in force of the doctrine enunciated by the House of Lords in Hyman v. Hyman (1929) AC 601. There is, therefore, scope for two diametrically opposite views. On the one hand, it may be said that the court has an absolute right to go behind any agreement between the parties so far as the question of maintenance for a wife is concerned. On the other hand, there is the judge's approach to the problem, that is, that where there is an agreement between the parties approved by the court, effect must be given to it. Under the one view, the right to award maintenance would be completely uninhibited, whereas under the other it would be strictly curtailed by the arrangement made between the parties and approved by the court at the time of the trial.
Mr. Dean, as I understand his argument, contended for an intermediate position between those two extremes. As I followed him, he said that the fact of this arrangement having been made and having been approved by the court is merely one factor amongst the numerous factors that have to be taken into consideration when the court is called upon to award maintenance to a wife following a divorce case. I suppose the reait of this argument would be to limit or inhibit to some extent the generosity of the registrar or judge in making an award of maintenance; that is to say, supposing he would, without any such arrangement having been made, have been disposed to award X a week, he must now in deference to the arrangement made between the parties, to which some effect must be given, award only X minus Y. The difference between that and the judge's view is that the judge held that it would not be right in the absence of proof of any unforeseen circumstances of the kind envisaged by the arrangement to make any award of maintenance at all.
On behalf of the husband, the judge's conclusion was vigorously defended by Mr. Anns who said, and said very forcibly, that this was a perfectly valid agreement between two parties, both sui juris, arrived at with the assistance they had from their legal advisors and approved by the court. It was, therefore, something to which effect ought to be given unless compelling reasons to the contrary were shown. He added (I think with a good deal of force)ithat the fact that the court had given its approval to the proposed arrangement had put the stamp of reasonableness on the arrangement which was then being made, viz, that there should be no maintenance."
and "I think . . that the existence of this agreement, having regard to the circumstances in which it was arrived at, at least makes it necessary for the wife, if she wants to justify an award of maintenance, to offer prima facie proof that there have been unforeseen circumstances in the true sense, which make it impossible for her to work or otherwise maintain herself. If that be right, I think it is quite plain that the wife here did not give such prima facie proof".
Matrimonial Causes Act 1963 5
1 Citers


 
Tinker v Tinker [1970] P 136; [1970] 1 All ER 540
1970
CA
Nicholas LJ, Lord Denning MR, Cross LJ
Family, Trusts
The husband bought a business in Cornwall and a house for his family. At first he intended to buy the house in his own name, but was advised that if the venture failed, the house could be taken by his creditors as part of his business assets. It was put in his wife’s name and all was explained to his wife by the solicitors. The marriage broke down. The husband applied for a declaration that the wife held the house on trust for him. The registrar found that the husband was an honest businessman, intending and able to honour his financial commitments and held that he had rebutted the presumption of advancement and made the declaration sought. Held: The wife's appeal succeeded. The husband, being an honest man, must have genuinely intended that the house should belong to his wife because that was the only honest intention he could have. The Court must weigh, or balance, the adverse consequences of granting relief against the adverse consequences of refusing relief. The ultimate decision calls for a value judgment.
Salmon LJ: “The husband is in an inescapable dilemma. Either he is honest, in which case the house belongs to his wife; or he is dishonest. The registrar has found that he is honest.” and "The burden of displacing the presumption of advancement is therefore on the husband. This burden can in many cases be displaced without much effort. It seems to me, however, that in this case the husband's evidence, far from displacing the presumption, has done much to reinforce it."
"The burden of displacing the presumption of advancement is therefore on the husband. This burden can in many cases be displaced without much effort. It seems to me, however, that in this case the husband's evidence, far from displacing the presumption, has done much to reinforce it." Having referred to the husband's evidence as to the advice given by the solicitor and having pointed out that there would have been nothing wrong in the husband's putting the property into his wife's name in order to protect it from his creditors, Salmon LJ continued: "It seems to me to follow from the registrar's finding that he was an honest man that the husband must have intended that the house should belong to his wife. That is why I say that his evidence strengthens the presumption of advancement. As far as I can see, the only possible alternative to what I have just described would be the husband dishonestly putting the house in his wife's name with the intention of himself having the beneficial interest in it, and also with the intention, when he failed in business, to go to his creditors and say quite untruthfully and dishonestly: ´I have no interest in this house. You can look at the documents, and they are plain enough to show that I have none.' The registrar negatived that dishonest frame of mind, and certainly this court would not interfere with that finding."
Lord Denning MR: “So it is plain that the husband had the house put into his wife’s name so as to avoid any risk of it being taken by his creditors in case his business was not a success. What is the result in law? In Gascoigne v Gascoigne [1918] 1 K.B. 223, it was held that when a husband put a house in his wife’s name so as to avoid it being taken by his creditors, the house belonged to the wife. The husband could not be heard to say that it belonged to him because he could not be allowed to take advantage of his own dishonesty. That case was applied In re: Emery’s Investment Trusts [1959] Ch. 410; and also McEvoy v Belfast Banking Co. Ltd. [1934] N.I. 67. We were invited by Mr Wheatley to overrule those decisions but in my opinion they are good law.” He considered the attempts of counsel to distinguish the facts of that case from the authorities that he had quoted and concluded: “But whether the solicitor gave that advice or not, I am quite clear that the husband cannot have it both ways. So he is on the horns of a dilemma. He cannot say that the house is his own and, at one and the same time, say that it is his wife’s. As against his wife, he wants to say that it belongs to him. As against his creditors that it belongs to her. That simply will not do. Either it was conveyed to her for her own use absolutely: or it was conveyed to her as trustee for her husband. It must be one or the other. The presumption is that it was conveyed to her for her own use: and he does not rebut that presumption by saying that he only did it to defeat his creditors. It belongs to her.”
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Falconer v Falconer [1970] 3 All ER 449
1970
CA

Trusts, Family

1 Citers


 
Tumath v Tumath [1970] 1 All ER 111
1970
CA
Salmon LJ
Family
Salmon LJ discussed cases where there was an irretrievable breakdon of a marriage: "this court has recently pointed out that a spouse does not now prejudice his or her chances in future custody or maintenance proceedings by not pursuing a prayer at the hearing of a divorce case".

 
Turczak v Turczak [1970] P 198
1970


Family, International
Following a Polish divorce, there was no power to order maintenance under the 1965 Act because the parties were no longer husband and wife.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1965
1 Citers


 
Roberts v Roberts [1970] P 1
1970
PDAD
Rees J, Sir Jocelyn Simon P
Family
W appealed against an order of the justices that, out of a net income of £22 per week, H should pay only £2.50 per week for the maintenance of herself and their son. The reasoning of the justices was that H needed to apply the balance of his income to support himself and his cohabitant and two of her children. Held. The court:
(a) decided to survey the relevance not only of a husband's moral obligation to support a cohabitant but also of an ex-husband's legal obligation to support a second wife (on the basis that the claim of the former could not rank higher than that of the latter);
(b) held that not only an ex-husband's legal obligation to a second wife but also a moral obligation of a husband or ex-husband to a cohabitant had to be brought into account in assessing the level of his obligation to maintain a first wife; but
(c) held that "on general principle, a spouse must on marriage be presumed . . to take the other subject to all existing encumbrances, whether known or not – for example . . an obligation to support the wife or child of a dissolved marriage"; but
(d) considered that English law did not, as did some Commonwealth courts, take the principle to its logical conclusion by affording "primacy" or "priority" to the claims of the first wife; yet nevertheless
(e) concluded, at 5D and 10D, that a decision, such as that of the justices, to give such "priority" to the claims of the cohabitant (or second wife) as virtually to ignore the claims of the first wife was plainly wrong.
Rees J considered the ambit of the phrase "the circumstances of the case", and rejected a submission that the court should confine itself to a husband's 'legal' obligations enforceable at law, and said: "Therefore no hard and fast line can be drawn between 'legal' and 'moral' obligations. Such obligations frequently involve the support and maintenance of children, and in this context (i.e. the husband's moral obligations to support his illegitimate children) nice distinctions between whether or not they are enforceable at law . . are often impracticable of application and in any event undesirable. Merely by way of example we cite the following: (relevant instances of enforceable moral obligations) an obligation to support an illegitimate child under an affiliation order; and obligation to support an illegitimate child in respect of whom an affiliation order might be obtained, but is obviated by actual support of the child."
1 Citers


 
Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1971] P 83
1 Feb 1970
FD
Ormrod J
Administrative, Family
There had been a purported marriage in 1963 between a man and a male to female trans-sexual. Held: Because marriage is essentially a union between a man and a woman, the relationship depended on sex, and not on gender. The law should adopt the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests. If all three are congruent, that should determine a person's sex for the purpose of marriage. Any operative intervention should be ignored. The biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth, at the latest, and cannot be changed either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex or by medical or surgical means. The marriage was void ab initio.
As to the difference between a declaration under RSC Ord.15, and a decree of nullity, Ormrod J observed: "The importance of this distinction is, of course, that on a decree of nullity, the court has the power to entertain an application for ancillary relief whereas if a declaration order is made, there is not such power." Since ecclesiastical courts did in fact grant declaratory sentences in cases of meretricious marriages, there was no discretion to withhold any decree of nullity. "[o]n the facts as I have found them to be, a matrimonial relationship between the petitioner and the respondent was a legal impossibility at all times and in all circumstances, whereas a marriage which is void on the grounds of bigamy, non-age or failure of third party consents, might, in other circumstances, have been a valid marriage." Sex is an essential determinant of marriage, because: "it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and woman."
Ormrod J: "It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The respondent's operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex. The only cases where the term "change of sex" is appropriate are those in which a mistake as to sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical investigation."
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Merritt v Merritt [1970] EWCA Civ 6; [1970] 2 All ER 760; [1970] 1 WLR 1211
27 Apr 1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Widgery, Karminski LJJ
Contract, Land, Family
The parties had setted an arramngement for the house on splitting up. Following the agreement, she repaid the mortgage over time, and then requested the conveyance of the house under the agreement. She now appealed from an order refusing the transfer into her name. Held: The appeal failed. Agreements between husband and wide are not generally intended to have legal effect, but "It is altogether different when the parties are not living in amity but are separated, or about to separate. They then bargain keenly. They do not rely on honourable understandings. They want everything cut and dried. It may safely be presumed that they intend to create legal relations."
[ Bailii ]

 
 Gissing v Gissing; HL 7-Jul-1970 - [1970] 3 WLR 255; [1971] AC 886; [1970] 2 All ER 780; [1970] UKHL 3
 
Szechter (orse Karsov) v Szechter [1971] P 286; [1971] 1 WLR 171
1971

Sir Jocelyn Simon P, Karminski J
Family, Administrative
The parties, who had been given leave to stay in the United Kingdom for only a limited period, had acquired a domicile of choice in England by residing here with the intention of making this country their permanent home. It was immaterial that their intentions were liable to be frustrated by the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department as to permission for their continued residence here.
As to the necessary element of consent to a marriage. Sir Jocelyn Simon P said: "It is, in my view, insufficient to invalidate an otherwise good marraige that a party has entered into it in order to escape from a disagreeable situation, such as penury or social degradation. In order for the impediment of duress to vitiate an otherwise valid marriage, it must, in my judgment, be proved that the will of one of the parties thereto has been overborne by genuine and reasonably held fear caused by threat of immediate danger (for which the party is not himself responsible), to life, limb or liberty, so that the constraint destroys the reality of consent to ordinary wedlock. I think that in the instant ease that test is satisfied."
Karminski J said: "In order for the impediment of duress to vitiate an otherwise valid marriage, it must, in my judgment, be proved that the will of one of the parties thereto has been overborne by genuine and reasonably held fear caused by threat of immediate danger (for which the party is not himself responsible), to life, limb or liberty, so that the constraint destroys the reality of consent to ordinary wedlock."
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Singh v Singh [1971] EWCA Civ 10; [1971] 2 All ER 82; [1971] 2 WLR 963; [1971] P 226
1 Feb 1971
CA
Davies LJ, Karminski LJ, Megaw LJ
Family
The wife appealed against refusal of her petition for agility and for the absence of consent. It had been an arranged marriage, and she met H at the altar. She found him repugnant, and refused to consummate the marriage. Held: Her appeal failed. The situation did not amount to lack of consent, and she had shown no condition making intercourse not possible.
W appealed against rejection of her petition for agility based first on the absence of consent and second for non-consummation. It had been an arranged marriage, and she did not meet H until the day of the marriage. She found him repugnant and refused to consummate the marriage.
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[ Bailii ]
 
Kaur v Singh [1971] EWCA Civ 2; [1972] 1 All ER 292; [1972] 1 WLR 105
20 Oct 1971
CA

Family

[ Bailii ]
 
Mason v Mason [1972] Fam 302
1972


Family, Health
The court considered the mental capacity required of somebody to give their consent to a decree of divorce.
1 Citers


 
Jablonowski v Jablonowski (1972) 28 DLR (3d) 440
1972

Lerner J
Commonwealth, Family
(Ontario High Court) The petitioner had met both the residence and animus requirements despite having entered Canada illegally.
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Smallman v Smallman [1972] Fam 25
1972
CA
Lord Denning MR
Family, Contract
An order was sought under the 1882 Act to decide the shares in which the family home was to be held. An overall agreement had been negotiated in correspondence between solicitors that W should have a half share in the proceeds of sale of the property and that H would pay the children's school fees and maintenance but this was conditional upon W providing evidence on which H could divorce her and on "the approval of the court." W gave the confession but H then sought to resile from the agreement claiming that it was not binding until it had been approved by the court. W proceeded under section 17 and the Registrar held there was a binding agreement but that before the proceeds could be distributed the court must approve it. Held: Lord Denning MR said: "In my opinion, if the parties have reached an agreement on all essential matters, then the clause "subject to the approval of the court" does not mean there is no agreement at all. There is an agreement, but the operation of it is suspended until the court approves it. It is the duty of one party or the other to bring the agreement before the court for approval. If the court approves, it is binding on the parties. If the court does not approve, it is not binding. But, pending the application to the court, it remains a binding agreement which neither party can disavow. Orr L.J. has drawn my attention to a useful analogy. Many contracts for the sale of goods are made subject to an export or import licence being obtained. Such a condition does not mean that there is no contract at all. It is the duty of the seller, or the buyer, as the case may be, to take reasonable steps to obtain a licence. If he applies for a licence and gets it, the contract operates. If he takes all reasonable steps to obtain it, and it is refused, he is released from his obligations. If he fails to apply for it or to do what is reasonable to obtain it, he is in breach and liable to damages."
Married Women's Property Act 1882 17
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 Hazell v Hazell; CA 1972 - [1972] 1 All ER 923; [1972] 1 WLR 301

 
 Ash v Ash; FD 2-Feb-1972 - [1972] Fam 135

 
 Santos v Santos; CA 16-Feb-1972 - [1972] Fam 247; [1972] EWCA Civ 9; [1972] 2 All ER 246; [1972] 2 All ER 246; [1972] 2 WLR 889
 
Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72
3 Oct 1972
FD
Ormrod J
Family
Mr. Justice Ormrod ordered the husband to pay to his wife (i) a lump sum of pounds 10,000, or half the value of the former matrimonial home in Norwood, South London, whichever be the less: (ii) a periodical payment of pounds 1,500 per annum, less tax: and (iii) a further payment of pounds 500 per annum, less tax, in respect of the eleven-year-old daughter.
Ormrod J said that conduct was to affect the division of property only when it was n ''both obvious and gross''.
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970
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Trippas v Trippas [1973] Fam 134
1973
CA
Scarman LJ
Family
The court emphasised the flexibility of the statutes providing for ancillary relief.
1 Citers


 
D'Este v D'Este; D(J) v D(S) [1973] Fam 55; [1973] 1 All ER 349
1973
FD
Ormrod J
Family
The husband had obtained a decree absolute of divorce against his wife. The matrimonial home had been conveyed to them jointly. He remarried and applied to the court for variation of the post-nuptial settlement. He died before the application was heard, and his second wife sought to carry on the application in her capacity as his personal representative. Held: The court had no jurisdiction to deal with the application. Under section 4 of the 1970 Act an application for variation could only be made and proceeded with by one spouse against another while both remained alive. So far as material, section 4 gave power to the court to vary "for the benefit of the parties to the marriage . . any ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlement . . made on the parties to the marriage"
Ormrod J said: "In my judgment, the real answer to this application is this, that the whole of the matrimonial causes legislation, right back to 1857, is essentially a personal jurisdiction arising between parties to the marriage or the children of the marriage. The death of one or other of the parties to the litigation has nothing whatever to do with the old common law rule which was abrogated by the Act of 1934. The fact that these applications abate by death derives, in my judgment, from the legislation which created the rights, if they are rightly called "rights" and from no other source. If that is correct, then it is not necessary to examine very closely whether or not the administratrix in this case has something which could be called, by any stretch of imagination, a cause of action."
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1970 4
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 Harris v Harris; CA 1973 - [1973] 1 Lloyd's Rep 445
 
Jackson v Jackson [1973] Fam 99
1973


Family
Provided an application for ancillary relief has been made prior to the decree absolute dissolving the marriage (for example, by a Petitioner in the petition for divorce) the jurisdiction to entertain an application for ancillary relief application remains open.
1 Citers


 
Tarr v Tarr [1973] AC 254
1973
HL
Lord Pearson
Family
By section 1 of the 1967 Act, the County Court had been given power to regulate the occupation of the property by either spouse. The man challenged an order made at the instance of the woman with whom he had been living as if she was his wife from the occupation of a house which he had a legal right to occupy or compelling him to allow her to enter into and remain in the house which he had and she had not a legal right to occupy. The House was asked whether that power included the power to grant an injunction excluding the husband from the property. Held: A power to regulate an activity does not of itself imply a power to prohibit the activity.
Lord Pearson said: "There is authority in several different connections for the proposition that a power to regulate does not (unless the context so requires) include a power to prohibit." and . . "Thus, the word `regulating' in itself is not apt to include a power to prohibit. There is no evident reason why the draftsman should not have added the words `or prohibiting' if he meant to include a power to prohibit. If a temporary prohibition were required, the duration could have been limited under subsection (4). Alternatively the words `or suspending' might have been added."
Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 1
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Torok v Torok [1973] 1 WLR 1066
1973

Ormrod J
Family, International
Ormrod J agreed to an application to accelerate the decree absolute of divorce to preserve the court's jurisdiction to hear a claim for ancillary relief. If a divorce were obtained in Hungary on the basis of the husband's Hungarian nationality, it would have to be recognised, and the English court would have no jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 to deal with the house in England where the wife and children were living, even though the Hungarian court was unlikely to award maintenance.
1 Citers



 
 Mesher v Mesher and Hall; CA 1973 - [1980] 1 All ER 126

 
 Lombardi v Lombardi; CA 1973 - [1973] 3 All ER 325
 
Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72; [1973] EWCA Civ 10; [1973] Fam 72; [1973] 2 WLR 366
8 Feb 1973
CA
Lord Denning MR, Phillimore, Roskill LJJ
Family
The court described the 1969 and 1970 Acts as "a reforming statute designed to facilitate the granting of ancillary relief in cases where marriages have been dissolved . . We regard the provisions of sections 2,3, 4 and 5 of the Act of 1970 as designed to accord to the courts the widest possible powers in readjusting the financial position of the parties and to afford the courts the necessary machinery to that end . ." Relevant misconduct so as to affect an ancillary relief order should be confined to those cases where the conduct was 'obvious and gross'.
Lord Denning MR said that the phrase 'family assets': " refers to those things which are acquired by one or other or both of the parties, with the intention that there should be continuing provision for them and their children during their joint lives, and used for the benefit of the family as a whole."
The phraase
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 - Divorce Reform Act 1969
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1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ FLW ]

 
 Livingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard; FD 1974 - [1974] 2 All ER 766; [1974] Fam 47
 
Richards v Dove [1974] 1 All ER 888
1974
ChD

Family, Trusts

1 Citers


 
Tee v Tee [1974] 1 WLR 213
1974
CA

Family

1 Citers



 
 H v H (Family Provision: Remarriage); CA 1975 - [1975] Fam 19

 
 O'Neill v O'Neill; CA 1975 - [1975] 3 All ER 289

 
 Calderbank v Calderbank; CA 1975 - [1976] Fam 93
 
O'Neill v O'Neill [1975] EWCA Civ 1; [1975] 3 All ER 289; [1975] 1 WLR 1118
12 Mar 1975
CA
Cairns, Roskill, Browne LJJ
Family
W appealed from rejection of her petition for divorce. The Judge held that the behaviour proved was no more than a wife could reasonably be expected to put up with, and he dismissed the petition.
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 1(2)(b)
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[ Bailii ]
 
Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox [1976] QB 503; [1975] EWCA Civ 8
17 Oct 1975
CA
Lord Denning MR, James LJ, Bridge LJ
Family, Housing
The defendant had lived with the tenant for 21 years until his death. They were unmarried and had no children. Reversing the County Court judge, the Court of Appeal ruled that she was a member of his family. It was absurd to distinguish between two couples on the basis that one had children and the other did not. (Lord Denning) and "The popular meaning given to the word 'family' is not fixed once and for all time. I have no doubt that with the passage of years it has changed. The cases reveal that it is not restricted to blood relationships and those created by the marriage ceremony. It can include de facto as well as de jure relationships. The popular meaning of 'family' in 1975 would, according to the answer of the ordinary man, include the defendant as a member of Mr. Wright's family. This is not to say that every mistress should be so regarded. Relationships of a casual or intermittent character and those bearing indications of impermanence would not come within the popular concept of a family unit." per James LJ, and "Now, it is, I think, not putting it too high to say that between 1950 and 1975 there has been a complete revolution in society's attitude to unmarried partnerships of the kind under consideration. Such unions are far commoner than they used to be. The social stigma that once attached to them has almost, if not entirely, disappeared. The inaccurate but expressive phrases "common law wife" and "common law husband" have come into general use to describe them. The ordinary man in 1975 would, in my opinion, certainly say that the parties to such a union, provided it had the appropriate degree of apparent permanence and stability, were members of a single family whether they had children or not." (Bridge LJ)
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1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Brockwell v Brockwell [1975] CAT 75/468; Unreported, 5 November 1975
5 Nov 1975
CA
Ormrod LJ, Stamp LJ
Family
Ormrod LJ said: "But it must be a matter entirely for the judge to look at all the facts and the financial situation of each party and taking into account the fact that they made this agreement which to my mind is a very important piece of conduct under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 because what the court is required to arrive at eventually is such an order as will be just and practicable having regard, among other things, to the conduct of the parties, and clearly when people make an agreement like this it is a very important factor in considering what is the just outcome of the proceedings . . what they themselves felt to be fair at the time when they made the agreement and that is as good a guide to justice perhaps as anything." and "To decide what weight should be given, in order to reach a just result, to a prior agreement not to claim a lump sum, regard must be had to the conduct of both parties, leading up to the prior agreement, and to their subsequent conduct, in consequence of it. It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms, such as misrepresentation or estoppel; all the circumstances as they affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex relationship of marriage. So, the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement are relevant. Undue pressure by one side, exploitation of a dominant position to secure an unreasonable advantage, inadequate knowledge, possibly bad legal advice, an important change of circumstances, unforeseen or overlooked at the time of making the agreement, are all relevant to the question of justice between the parties. Important too is the general proposition that formal agreements, properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice, should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice will be done by holding the parties to the terms of their agreement. There may well be other considerations which affect the justice of this case; the above list is not intended to be an exclusive catalogue."
Stamp LJ, after citing Wright v Wright, said: "Nevertheless, the wife ought, in my judgment, to have the opportunity of showing that in all the circumstances, and notwithstanding the agreement, the court should exercise in her favour this discretion to award her some lump sum payment."
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25
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1 Citers


 
O'D v O'D [1976] Fam 83
1976
CA
Ormrod LJ
Family
When considering an application for ancillary relief by a wife, the court should consider the wife's position, 'not from the narrow point of "need", but to ascertain her reasonable requirements.'
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
1 Citers


 
S v S [1976] FLR 640; [1977] Fam 127
1976


Family
Ancillary relief in marriage of short duration.
1 Citers


 
Smith v Smith [1976] Fam 18
1976
FD
Latey J
Family
The husband sought to re-open settled ancillary relief arrangements after his former wife remarried. Held: He had to take the chance of her remarriage. Latey J gave guidance on this question and said: "If the wife had remarried or was going to remarry her financial position on remarriage had to be considered. If it was guesswork whether she would or would not remarry, prospective remarriage should be ignored."
1 Citers


 
Doherty v Doherty [1976] Fam 71
1976
CA
Ormrod LJ
Family
The court avoided technicality when considering the distinction between lump sum and property adjustment orders: "Whether it is right, or not, to accept counsel for the husband’s submission that a clear distinction should be drawn between notices of application for financial provision under s 23 and notices of application for property adjustment orders under s 24, may be doubted. These two sections are, in effect, a statement by Parliament of the code to be adopted by the court in dealing with ancillary relief after divorce generally. The fact that they are two separate sections seems to me to be much more a matter of convenience and drafting than anything else. There is no reason that I can see why any distinction should be drawn between those two classes of relief which the court is now empowered to grant. In my view, these two sections should be, as far as possible, regarded as part and parcel of a single code. It may be very important in many cases when the matter comes to be investigated by the court that the court should be free to make either a property adjustment order or a lump sum order, whichever turns out to be the more convenient in the circumstances. It would be unfortunate, I think, if that degree of elasticity were lost for some technical reason. It is quite plain that the same principles apply in the assessment of claims under each of these two sections. That appears from s 25, and it is equally plain from the judgments in Trippas v Trippas of Lord Denning MR and Scarman LJ. Lump sum orders are alternatives to property adjustment orders, and in many cases one order may prove more convenient than another. I do not think there is any greater difference than that. So, in my judgment, the court should keep technical points of the kind with which we are dealing in this case to an absolute minimum."
1 Citers


 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Bullock [1976] 1 WLR 1178
1976
CA
Buckley LJ
Income Tax, Family
The court had to establish a domicile of choice for a taxpayer by reference to his intentions: "I do not think that it is necessary to show that the intention to make a home in the new country is irrevocable or that the person whose intention is under consideration believes that for reasons of health or otherwise he will have no opportunity to change his mind. In my judgment, the true test is whether he intends to make his home in the new country until the end of his days unless and until something happens to make him change his mind."
1 Citers


 
Harte v Harte Times, 02 December 1976
2 Dec 1976


Family
Ordinary contractual considerations apply to the interpretation of a settlement of an ancillary relief application.
1 Citers



 
 Haldane v Haldane; PC 1977 - [1977] AC 673
 
McDonnell v McDonnell [1977] 1 WLR 34
1977
CA
Ormrod LJ
Family, Costs
In family proceedings, a costs letter had been written in the form suggested in Calderbank. Held: The court accepted and endorsed the practice suggested by Cairns LJ. Ormrod LJ said: "The important factor which distinguishes this case is the fact that the appellant husband's solicitors took advantage of a recent decision of this court in Calderbank v. Calderbank. On December 16, 1975, shortly after serving the notice of appeal, they wrote a letter to the wife's solicitors offering to withdraw the appeal altogether if the wife would agree to a modification of Mrs. Justice Lane's order in respect of the house. In accordance with the procedure suggested in Calderbank, they headed the letter 'Without Prejudice' but reserved the right to bring it to the attention of the court after judgment on the question of costs."
and "Clearly this is a very important consideration in exercising the court's discretion with regard to costs.It would be wrong, in my judgment, to equate an offer of compromise in proceedings such as these [ancillary proceedings following a divorce] precisely to a payment into court. I see no advantage in the court surrendering its discretion in these matters as it has to all intents and purposes done where a payment into court has been made. A Calderbank offer should influence but not govern the exercise of the discretion. The question to my mind is whether, on the basis of the facts known to the wife and her advisers and without the advantage of hindsight, she ought reasonably to have accepted the proposals in the letter of December 16, bearing always in mind the difficulty of making accurate forecasts in cases such as this. On the other hand, parties who are exposed to the full impact of costs need some protection against those who can continue to litigate with impunity under a civil aid certificate."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Morgan v Morgan; 1977 - [1977] Fam 122
 
Fielding v Fielding [1977] 1 WLR 1146
1977
CA
Ormrod LJ
Family, Trusts
The wife, following divorce, applied for a lump sum order to be made against the husband but then she added a claim under s.17 of the Act of 1882 for a declaration that she had an interest, for which the husband should account to her, in the assets of two public houses which together they had managed. Held. The registrar and, on first appeal, the circuit judge had been wrong to concentrate – at great length – on the claim under the Act of 1882 referable to strict property rights. Ormrod LJ said that it was "of very little value to proceed under the [Act of] 1882 after divorce" and the 1973 Act "provides an elastic method of deciding what is a fair order".
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 - Married Women's Property Act 1882 18
1 Citers


 
West v West [1978] Fam 1
1977


Family

1 Citers


 
Masich v Masich (1977) Family Law 245
1977
CA
Ormrod L, Stamp LJ
Family
A husband was served at 3.30 pm with an ex parte order requiring him to vacate the matrimonial home at 6 pm the same day. Held: There was nothing to justify turning the husband out of his home without hearing his side: "Such a course should be taken only in exceptional circumstances. Applications by a spouse requiring the other spouse to leave the matrimonial home must be made on notice to the other side, and should never be ex parte. It was desirable that both parties should be present at the hearing." Such applications were an abuse of the process of the court, and solicitors who sought such applications in the future might find themselves liable for the costs.
1 Citers


 
Wales v Wadham [1977] 1 WLR 199
1977
FD
Tudor Evans J
Family
H and W agreed a consent order following a divorce under which H was to pay W £13,000 from his half-share of the matrimonial home in settlement of W's claims for financial provision for herself. Both consulted solicitors and the agreement was reached without affidavits having been filed. The agreement was embodied in a court order under sections 23 and 25 of the Act of 1973. Both had failed to disclose relevant matters: W her intention to remarry, and H as to his resources, and that he was cohabiting. W re-married shortly after decree absolute, and H husband brought an action in the QBD to rescind the agreement and order on four grounds: that W had fraudulently misrepresented to him that she did not intend to; the doctrine of uberrima fides applied to the agreement; that the established practice of the Family Division imposed a duty to make a full and frank disclosure of all material facts before an order was made; and that H had made the agreement under a unilateral mistake in that he believed that the wife did not intend to remarry. It was transferred to the Family Division and tried there by Tudor Evans J. Held: The order stood. As to the grounds. On fraudulent misrepresentation, the case failed on the facts. The uberrima fides doctine at common law did not apply. Since no affidavits had been filed, and the parties were bargaining at arm's length with the help of their respective solicitors, the usual Family Division requirement for disclosure did not apply. As to unilateral mistake, H had had in mind the possibility that W might remarry when he made the offer to pay £13,000 in settlement of all her claims, and he was not affected by a fundamental mistake of fact entitling him to rescind the agreement.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 23 25
1 Citers


 
Suttill v Graham [1977] 1 WLR 819
1977
CA
Stamp, Ormerod LJJ
Equity, Family
The husband remained in the home after the divorce and paid all mortgage instalments. Held: An occupation rent was payable.
Stamp LJ said: "a beneficiary entitled to an equal share in equity of property of which he is a trustee, and which he himself occupies, is to be charged with at least an occupation rent so that if as here he seeks to charge his co-beneficiary trustee with half the outgoings he should be charged with half the occupation rent . . That will normally produce a fair result and save costs and where, as here, the husband in possession does not submit to be charged with an occupation rent, it must be wrong that he should seek to charge the wife with half the mortgage interest which he has paid while living in the property rent free and resisting a sale of the property."
Ormrod LJ said: "So far as my recollection goes, it has been the normal practice in this class of case to allow the occupying spouse to take credit for repayments of capital but not of interest, because he or she has had the benefit of the use of the house. It was certainly so where the husband was in occupation, although it may not always have been the case where the wife, and particularly the children, were in occupation."
Married Women's Property Act 1882 17
1 Citers


 
Ansah v Ansah [1977] Fam 138
1977
CA
Ormrod LJ, Stamp LJ and Sir John Pennycuick
Family, Litigation Practice
Ormrod LJ: "Orders made ex parte are anomalies in our system of justice which generally demands service or notice of the proposed proceedings on the opposite party: see Craig v Karssen [1943] KB 256, 262. Nevertheless, the power of the court to intervene immediately and without notice in proper cases is essential to the administration of justice. But this power must be used with great caution and only in circumstances in which it is really necessary to act immediately." Such circumstances tend to occur more frequently in family disputes than in other types of litigation: "but even in such cases the court should only act ex parte in an emergency when the interests of justice or the protection of the applicant or a child clearly demands immediate intervention by the court. Such cases should be extremely rare, since any urgent application can be heard inter partes on two days' notice to the other side… Circumstances, of course, may arise when prior notice cannot be given to the side; for example, cases where … a spouse, usually the wife, is so frightened of the other spouse that some protection must be provided against a violent response to service of proceedings, but the court must be fairly satisfied that such protection is necessary."
1 Citers


 
Martin v Martin [1978] Fam 12; [1977] EWCA Civ 7
10 Mar 1977
CA
Ormrod LJ, Stamp LJ, Sir John Pennycuick
Family
The court urged caution in a judge using his own experience of the property market by way of judicial notice: "[W]herever it is to be argued that the wife could find alternative accommodation for herself out of her share of the equity, whatever that may be . . there should be evidence put before the court to that effect. The unsupported assertions and speculations which are made in the course of argument in these cases are not satisfactory. It means the court has to use its own imprecise knowledge of the property market and may well make mistakes. So if it is going to be said that the wife could get alternative accommodation, let there be some evidence to that effect. Otherwise it will have to be assumed that it is not possible." The court upheld the right of a wife to remain indefinitely in a very modest matrimonial home against the claim of her former husband that it should be sold and the proceeds equally divided: "I appreciate the point he (Mr Aglionby, counsel for the husband) has made, namely that it is difficult for practitioners to advise clients in these cases because the rules are not very firm. That is inevitable when the courts are working out the exercise of the wide powers given by a statute like the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It is the essence of such a discretionary situation that the court should preserve, so far as it can, the utmost elasticity to deal with each case on its own facts. Therefore, it is a matter of trial and error and imagination on the part of those advising clients. It equally means that decisions of this court can never be better than guidelines. They are not precedents in the strict sense of the word. There is bound to be an element of uncertainty in the use of the wide discretionary powers given to the court under the 1973 Act, and no doubt there always will be, because as social circumstances change so the court will have to adapt the ways in which it exercises discretion. If property suddenly became available all over the country many of the rationes decidendi of the past would be quite inappropriate"
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25
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[ Bailii ]
 
Welfare v Welfare Times, 12 October 1977
12 Oct 1977
FD
Bush J
Family
Bush J heard a defended divorce petion sand said: "Conduct of a respondent could not be looked at in isolation but had to be viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the degree of provocation." He continued to adopt the words from Rayden on Divorce: "In all these cases the totality of the evidence of the matrimonial history must be considered, and the conclusion will depend on whether the cumulative conduct was sufficiently serious to say that from a reasonable person's point of view, after a consideration of any excuse or explanation which this respondent might have in the circumstances, the conduct is such that this petitioner ought not to be called upon to endure it.""
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B v B (Matrimonial Proceedings: Discovery) [1978] Fam 181; [1978] 3 WLR 624
1978
CA
Dunn LJ
Family, Litigation Practice
The wife applied for ancillary relief, and sought disclosure from a third party. Held: Whilst a party must disclose all documents in his possession, custody or power the court has a discretion whether to order inspection. "Custody" in RSC Ord 24 was held "to refer to documents which are in the physical holding of a party but not in his personal capacity, rather qua company director/agent or similarly".
Dunn LJ said: "It is another feature of such proceedings that one party, usually the wife, is in a situation quite different from that of ordinary litigants. In general terms, she may know more than anyone else about the husband's financial position . . She may . . know, from conversations with the husband in the privacy of the matrimonial home, the general sources of his wealth and how he is able to maintain the standard of living that he does. But she is unlikely to know the details of such sources or precise figures, and it is for this reason that discovery now plays such an important part in financial proceedings in the Family Division.
Applications for such discovery cannot be described as "fishing" for information, as they might be in other divisions. The wife is entitled to go "fishing" in the Family Division within the limits of the law and practice."
1 Citers


 
Practice Note (Matrimonial Cause: Injunction) [1978] 1 WLR 92
1978
FD

Family
"The President is greatly concerned by the increasing number of applications being made ex parte in the Royal Courts of Justice for injunctions, which could and should have been made (if at all) on two clear days' notice to the other side, as required by the rules. An ex parte application should not be made, or granted, unless there is real immediate danger of serious injury or irreparable damage."
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Davis v Johnson [1978] 1 All ER 841
1978
CA
Lord Denning MR, Cumming-Bruce LJ
Family, Constitutional
The court had to consider whether the Act protected cohabitees as well as wives. In doing so the court looked at whether it could look to parliamentary debates. Held: Lord Denning MR said: "Some may say, and indeed have said, that judges should not pay any attention to what is said in Parliament. They should grope about in the dark for the meaning of an Act without switching on the light. I do not accede to this view . . It is obvious that there is nothing to prevent a judge looking at these debates himself privately and getting some guidance from them. Although it may shock the purists, I may as well confess that I have sometimes done it. I have done it in this very case. It has thrown a flood of light on the position. The statements made in committee disposed completely of counsel for the respondent's argument before us." but (Cumming-Bruce LJ) "I am not alarmed by the criticism that I am a purist who prefers to shut his eyes to the guiding light shining in the reports of parliamentary debates in Hansard."
Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976
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Dean v Dean [1978] Fam 161
1978
FD
Bush J
Family
The wife said that she had not got a good bargain in an agreement settling ancillary relief applications. Held: The court must have regard to s.25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, but also to: "Conduct of the parties in all the circumstances . . (which) must include the fact of and the nature of an agreement voluntarily arrived at by the parties."Bush J said: "What is or is not a good bargain does not depend entirely on the financial aspects, other considerations may apply." The court sanctioned use of the abbreviated 'notice to show cause' procedure.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 25
1 Citers



 
 Davis v Johnson; HL 2-Jan-1978 - [1979] AC 264; [1978] 1 All ER 1132; [1978] UKHL 1; [1978] 2 WLR 553

 
 Minton v Minton; HL 1979 - [1979] AC 593; [1978] FLR Rep 461

 
 Quazi v Quazi; HL 1979 - [1979] 3 All ER 897 HL(E); [1979] 3 WLR 833; [1980] AC 744
 
Hamer v United Kingdom (1979) 24 DR 5; (1979) 4 EHRR 139
1979
ECHR

Human Rights, Family
(Commission) The Commission considered the right of a prisoner in prison to get married. Held: A rule against such marriages was incompatible with article 12. The Commission explained the power of national laws in relation to article 12: "Such laws may thus lay down formal rules concerning matters such as notice, publicity and the formalities whereby marriage is solemnised. They may also lay down rules of substance based on generally recognised considerations of public interest. Examples of rules concerning capacity, consent, prohibited degrees of consanguinity or the prevention of bigamy. However, in the Commission's opinion national law may not otherwise deprive a person or category of persons of full legal capacity of the right to marry. Nor may it substantially interfere with their exercise of the right". And "[States] may also lay down rules of substance based on recognised considerations of public interest"
Europen Convention on Human Rights 812
1 Citers


 
Lord Lilford v Glyn [1979] 1 WLR 78
1979
CA
Orr LJ
Family, Child Support
The judge had ordered the father to make money settlements on his daughters which had no relation to accommodation or their need during minority. Held: The judge had gone quite ouside the jurisdiction of the Act, and the appeal succeeded. Children are entitled to a suitable home, to an upbringing, and to an education which is appropriate to their family's circumstances and standard of living. But they are not entitled to long term provision into adulthood unless they have some special need.
Orr LJ said: "There is not . . one rule for millionaires and another for less wealthy fathers."
Matrimonial Causes Act 19735
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Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1979] Ch 496
1979
FD
Oliver J
Family, Torts - Other
Oliver J said: "The common law has in relation to the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden been a trifle selective in its application of the biblical doctrine that "even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence"."
1 Citers


 
Joyce v Joyce and O'Hare [1979] Fam 93
1979
FD
Lane J
Family, International
The Wife asked the court not to recognise a foreign decree of divorce, saying that it would deprive her of substantial fairness in ancillary relief. Held: Lane J said: "If the courts of this country were empowered to grant ancillary relief on recognition of a foreign decree, the position would be somewhat different" and “The jurisdiction of this court to grant the relief sought by the petitioner depends upon whether or not this court will recognize a decree of divorce pronounced and made absolute in a court of competent jurisdiction in . . Canada. If recognition is given to the Canadian decree, this court cannot adjudicate because there would then be no subsisting marriage to be dissolved.”
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 8(2)
1 Citers


 
Stevens v Stevens [1979] 1 WLR 885
1979
FD
Sheldon J
Family
Sheldon J considered whether the divrce petitioner had established that she should not be expected to continue to live with her husband. Held: Sheldon J said: "the wife would be entitled to a decree in the present suit if she could establish (a) that their marriage remained irretrievably broken down . . and (b) that since March 16, 1976, he has behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him. In my judgment, moreover, it is not necessary for her to establish . . that the husband's behaviour, of which she now complains, was in any way responsible for the breakdown of the marriage.
On the other hand, of course, the facts that the marriage had clearly broken down and, a fortiori, that the breakdown was due to the fault of the wife are or may be matters in determining whether the husband's behaviour since has been unreasonable in this context. The court must have regard to the whole history of the matrimonial relationship.
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 Chambers v Chambers; 1979 - [1979] 1 FLR 10
 
Jacques de Cavel v Louise de Cavel C-143/78
27 Mar 1979
ECJ

European, Family
The term 'rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship' within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 1 of the Convention, includes not only property arrangements specifically and exclusively envisaged by certain national legal systems in the case of marriage but also any proprietary relationships resulting directly from the matrimonial relationship or the dissolution thereof. Judicial decisions authorizing provisional protective measures - such as the placing under seal or the freezing of the assets of the spouses - in the course of proceedings for divorce do not fall within the scope of the convention as defined in article 1 thereof if those measures concern or are closely connected with either questions of the status of the persons involved in the divorce proceedings or proprietary legal relations resulting directly from the matrimonial relationship or the dissolution thereof. In relation to the matters covered by the convention, no legal basis is to be found therein for drawing a distinction between provisional and definitive measures.
Convention Of 27 September 1968 On Jurisdiction And The Enforcement Of Judgments
1 Citers



 
 de Lasala v de Lasala; PC 4-Apr-1979 - [1980] AC 546; [1979] UKPC 10; [1979] 2 All ER 1146; [1980] FSR 443; [1979] 3 WLR 390

 
 Airey v Ireland; ECHR 9-Oct-1979 - 6289/73; Series A no 32; (1979) 2 EHRR 305; [1979] ECHR 3
 
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