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swarb.co.uk - law indexThese cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases. Â |
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Family - From: 1900 To: 1929This page lists 91 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018. ÂForbes-Smith v Forbes-Smith and Chadwick [1901] P 258; [1901] LJP 61; [1901] LT 789; [1901] 50 WR 6; [1901] 17 TLR 587; [1901] 45 Sol Jo 595 1901 CA Costs, Family W petitioned for judicial separation. H cross-petitioned for divorce, citing C as co-respondent. The actions were consolidated, W's petition withdrawn, and a decree absolute of divorce granted to H. A costs order was made against C. On taxation, H asked for his costs of defending W's original suit. Held: The consolidation of the suits was not properly so called, and H was not entitled against C to his costs of defending W's original suit to which C was not a party. The court had no jurisdiction to make such an order, since he had not been a 'party to the proceedings' as required under the 1857 Act. Judicature Act 1890 5 - Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 34 1 Citers  Rex v Earl Russell [1901] AC 446; 17 TLR 685 1901 HL Crime, Family Earl Russell was charged with an offence under section 57, namely "Whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place in England or Ireland or elsewhere, shall be guilty of felony." He was alleged to have married for a second time in Nevada in the United States of America, when his first wife was alive. It was argued on his behalf that s57 should be construed as if it prohibited only bigamous marriages occurring within the King's dominions, upon the footing that prima facie an English statute should not be taken to apply to acts committed beyond the King's dominions unless expressly saying so. Held: The defence failed. A marriage in Nevada may constitute statutory bigamy punishable in England. The jurisdiction of the Imperial Parliament in the eye of a British Court extends to all persons on British territory whether foreigners or not, and to all British subjects whoever they may be; and in a British Court the meaning of an Imperial Act will be understood accordingly. That he honestly believed his divorce valid and that he was free to remarry, was not a defence and merely went in mitigation of punishment. Offences Against the Person Act 1861 57 1 Citers   Re Shephard, George v Thyer; 1904 - [1904] 1 Ch 456  Winans v Attorney-General [1904] AC 287 1904 HL Lord MacNaghten Family A domicile of origin can only be replaced by clear cogent and compelling evidence that the relevant person intended to settle permanently and indefinitely in the alleged domicile of choice. A domicile of origin is tenacious; the character of domicile of origin "is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off" than domicile of choice because a change in domicile may involve "far reaching consequences in regard to succession and distribution and other things which depend on domicile." The question was whether it had "with perfect clearness and satisfaction" been shown that the testator had "a fixed and settled purpose" or "a determination" or "a fixed and deliberate intention" to abandon his American domicile and settle in England. 1 Cites 1 Citers  H v H (1904) P 258 1904 Karminski J Family W sought a decree of agility for her marriage saying she had not consented. Held: Karminski J said: "It was argued by the Attorney-General that the facts of the present ease cannot be said to prove that the ceremony of marriage was performed under fear or duress, and he rightly emphasized, and I accept, that the principles are strict and should not be rashly extended." and "If the present ease was devoid of the element of fear I should be compelled to find that the parties to the present suit intended that the petitioner should become the wife of the respondent." 1 Citers  A (A Child), Re [2009] EWCC 4 (Fam) 1 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A Mother v A Father [2009] EWCC 5 (Fam) 1 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X and Y (Minors), Re [2009] EWCC 2 (Fam) 1 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  B (Minors), Re [2010] EWCC 10 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 49 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A and B (Children) [2010] EWCC 43 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A B and C (Children), Re [2010] EWCC 30 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A Local Authority v P Mother and Another [2010] EWCC 18 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A, B and C (Minors), Re [2010] EWCC 37 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Ab (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 54 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  As (A Minor) [2010] EWCC 23 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  In re (A Child) [2010] EWCC 31 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family (County Court) Contested application for care order. [ Bailii ]  B and T (Children), Re [2010] EWCC 45 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X Local Authority v A Mother and Another [2010] EWCC 9 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  B and B (Children), Re [2010] EWCC 48 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  B (A Child), Re [2010] EWMC 28 (FPC) 2 Jul 1905 MagC Magistrates, Family [ Bailii ]  B (A Child), Re [2010] EWMC 12 (FPC) 2 Jul 1905 MagC Magistrates, Family [ Bailii ]  C (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 12 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X Local Authority v M (A Mother) [2010] EWCC 2 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 33 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X (Local Authority) v L (A Child) [2010] EWCC 3 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X (Local Authority) v A Mother and Father [2010] EWCC 4 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Sl (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 7 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  K (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 5 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  C (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 7 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  A Mother v A Mother and Another [2010] EWCC 1 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X Local Authority v M (A Mother) [2010] EWCC 8 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  S (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 51 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X Local Authority v A Mother and Others [2010] EWCC 20 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X Local Authority v A Mother and Another [2010] EWCC 17 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 28 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  X and Y (Children), Re [2010] EWCC 13 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  W (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 14 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  C (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 35 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  S (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 32 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  O (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 53 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  M and C (Children), Re [2010] EWCC 36 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Local Authority X v M and F (Parents) [2010] EWCC 46 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Local Authority X v M and F (Parents) [2010] EWCC 44 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Local Authority X v A Mother and Others [2010] EWCC 38 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Local Authority X v A Mother and Another [2010] EWCC 39 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Lg and Dg (Children), Re [2010] EWCC 26 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  C (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 56 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  W (A Child), Re, [2010] EWCC 15 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  C (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 50 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  C (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 57 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  C (Minor), Re [2010] EWCC 11 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Dh (A Minor), Re [2010] EWCC 22 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  E and H (Minors), Re [2010] EWCC 27 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  G (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 16 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  G (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 59 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  J (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 40 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  K (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 41 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  L and K (Children) [2010] EWCC 42 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  J (A Child), Re [2010] EWCC 58 (Fam) 2 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Ab (A Child), Re [2011] EWCC 3 (Fam) 3 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  O (A Minor), Re [2011] EWCC 4 (Fam) 3 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  J (A Child), Re [2011] EWCC 5 (Fam) 3 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  N (Minors), Re [2011] EWCC 1 (Fam) 3 Jul 1905 CCF Family [ Bailii ]  Dodd v Dodd [1906] P 189 1906 Sir Gorell Barnes P Constitutional, Family Sir Gorell Barnes P set out the task of a judge saying that it is our task is jus dicere non jus dare - to state the law, not to make the law, but decried the state of family law: "That the present state of the English law of divorce and separation is not satisfactory can hardly be doubted. The law is full of inconsistencies, anomalies, and inequalities amounting almost to absurdities; and it does not produce desirable results in certain important respects." "The order does not state upon its face the finding of fact upon which the order was made - in other words, it does not state on the face of it that the respondent had been guilty of wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for the petitioner and her child, and that by such neglect he had caused her to leave and live separately and apart from him. It might be said that I could therefore ignore the order and treat it as if it had never been applied for and made, on the general principle that a Magistrate's order ought to state the finding of fact essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction: see the observations in the case of Brown v. Brown (1898, 62 JP 711); but it is necessary to observe, first, that this point is highly technical, and, on an appeal to this Division, the defect could have been corrected, that the petitioner acted upon the order and endeavoured to enforce it, and that it was undoubtedly treated by both parties as being an effective order, and further, that in the case of Brown v. Brown the effect of the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts and of the forms which are provided for use under those Acts was not fully considered. According to s. 8 of the Act of 1895 all applications under it are to be made in accordance with the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, and, without going through the details of those Acts as they at present stand, it is sufficient to observe that the Summary Jurisdiction Rules J 886, r. 31, provided that the forms in the schedule thereto, or forms to the like effect, might be used with such variations as circumstances might require; and the forms of orders in that schedule omit to state whether the complaint is found and adjudged to be true: so that although in strictness the order ought to state the findings of fact essential to jurisdiction, having regard to the provisions of the Act and Rules to which I have just referred, I am not prepared to hold, without further argument, that this order ought to be treated as bad on the face of it. I might point out, however, that it is desirable that the practice adopted, I believe, by the Magistrates in London of stating that the cause of complaint is found to be true is desirable in order to avoid any such difficulty as arises in the present case upon this point . . " 1 Citers   Crowden v Crowden (The King's Proctor showing cause); 1906 - (1906) 23 TLR 143   Bater v Bater; CA 1906 - [1906] P 209   Brownlee's Executrix v Brownlee; 1908 - 1908 SC 232  In Re Pope ex parte Dicksee [1908] 2 KB 169 1908 Sir Herbert Cozens-Hardy MR Insolvency, Family, Land In a post-nuptial settlement, the wife had given up all her rights in return for a transfer to her of property from her husband who was later made bankrupt. Held: Sir Herbert Cozens-Hardy MR said: "I am unable to adopt the view that there must be either money or physical property given by the purchaser in order to bring the case within the exception. In my opinion, the release of a right or the compromise of a claim, not being a merely colourable right or claim, may suffice to constitute a person a "purchaser" within the meaning of section 47". Buckley LJ disagreed: "The purchaser for valuable consideration within this section must be, I think, a person who gives such a valuable consideration as justifies his being described as a purchaser or buyer. That is only satisfied when the valuable consideration is money or property or something capable of being measured by money. It does not, I think, extend to the surrender of such a right as the right to relief for matrimonial offences." Bankruptcy Act 1883 47 1 Citers  Spiers v Hunt [1908] 1 KB 720 1908 Family, Contract The marriage tie and the married state was held to be so fundamental that it was morally wrong and against public policy to become engaged whilst still married. 1 Citers  Re Green, Noyes v Pitkin (1909) 25 TLR 222 1909 Family There had been a foreign marriage ceremony. The court applied the presumption of marriage from long cohabitation without ceremony. 1 Citers  Dunbar (otherwise White) v Dunbar [1909] P 90-91 1909 Sir Gorell Barnes P Family In a case alleging non-consummation of a marriage, the court discussed the purpose of the 1907 Act: "The object of that Act, so far as nullity suits are concerned, was to remedy a defect that previously existed. In some cases of nullity, for instance, a husband or wife of one of the parties turned up after a number of years, and there was no power, in the absence of a settlement, to do anything for the woman who had believed herself a wife, and perhaps had children, and who might be left destitute. There may, however, be a great distinction between one case and another." The court has a wide discretion: "Each case must depend on its own merits, and the court must be guided by the facts of the particular case before it." Matrimonial Causes Act 1907 1 Citers   Leslie v Leslie; 1911 - [1911] P 203  Pretty v Pretty (The King's Proctor Shewing Cause) [1911] P 83 1911 Bargrave Deane J Family Bargrave Deane J said that: "the woman is the weaker vessel: that her habits of thought and feminine weaknesses are different from those of the man."   Ramsey v Ramsey (otherwise Beer); 1913 - (1913) 108 LT 382  Maconochie v Maconochie [1916] P 326 1916 Shearman J Family If there was a general rule that the death of a party in a divorce case leads to the abatement of the action, then it cannot be supported. 1 Citers  Hulton v Hulton [1917] 1 KB 813 1917 CA Scrutton LJ Contract, Family A wife sought to rescind a separation deed for fraudulent misrepresentation. As part of the terms of the deed the litigation documents had been destroyed. Held: This was not a bar to rescission, because: "it was the defendant who was anxious that those letters should be destroyed. I cannot in those circumstances treat the letters as so important to him that there can be no rescission because they cannot be brought back into existence." 1 Citers   Gascoigne v Gascoigne; 1918 - [1918] 1 KB 223   Balfour v Balfour; CA 1919 - [1919] 2 KB 571; [1918-19] All ER Rep 860; (1919) 88 LJKB 1054; (1919) 121 LT 346; (1919) 35 TLR 609  Board v Board and The Attorney General for The Province of Alberta [1919] UKPC 59; [1919] AC 956 3 Jul 1919 PC Family (Alberta) [ Bailii ]  Walker v Walker and The Attorney General for The Province of Manitoba [1919] UKPC 58 3 Jul 1919 PC Family (Manitoba) [ Bailii ]  Jones v Newtown and Llanidloes Guardians [1920] 3 KB 381 1920 Family A wife's agency of necessity of her husband is suspended whilst she is in desertion. 1 Citers  In re Gardner [1920] 2 Ch 523 1920 Wills and Probate, Family A common intention of husband and wife and taking of benefit are sufficient to establish mutual wills. 1 Citers  Gardiner (otherwise Phillips) v Gardiner (1920) 36 TLR 294 1920 Sir Henry Duke P Family A petition for nullity of a marriage was based upon an allegation of incapacity: "Every case of this kind must be decided on its own facts, and an appeal for permanent maintenance after a decree of nullity is not an appeal to a set of fixed principles, but one to the sense of propriety and moral justice of the court." 1 Citers  Russell v Russell [1924] UKHL 1 30 May 1924 HL Family, Children The House was asked whether or not by the law of England evidence of non-access may, in proceedings for divorce, be tendered by a spouse and received by a Court with the object, or possible result, of bastardising a child of the marriage. Held: It was not receivable. [ Bailii ]  Earl v Earland Kyle; Earl v Earl (1926) 96 LJP 23; [1926] 136 LT 383 1926 Family, Costs There had been cross-petitions between H and W, and they had been consolidated by court order. Held: The court had no jurisdiction to order the co-respondent to pay the costs of the wife's suit since she was not a party to that petition despite the consolidation. Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 50 1 Cites  In re Stollery [1926] Ch 284 1926 Family A birth certificate is prima facie evidence of all matters required by statute to be entered in the certificate. 1 Citers  Neuman v Neuman Times, 15 October 1926 1926 Family The court considered the validity of a marriage created by a ceremony according to the Jewish faith. 1 Citers   Von Lorang v Administrator of Austrian Property; 1927 - [1927] AC 641  Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601 1929 Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Atkin Family The husband had left the wife for another woman. Adultery by the husband was not a ground for divorce absent aggravating circumstances, such as incest. The parties had entered into a deed of separation under which the husband had paid two lump sums and agreed to make weekly payments of £20 for the life of the wife. The deed included a covenant by the wife that she would not institute any proceedings to make him pay more than this. The House was asked whether the wife was precluded from petitioning the court for permanent maintenance. Held: An agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the court to grant ancillary relief is void as being against the public interest. Lord Hailsham LC said: "It is sufficient for the decision of the present case to hold, as I do, that the power of the Court to make provision for a wife on the dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public, and the wife cannot by her own covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the court or preclude the court from the exercise of that jurisdiction." Lord Atkin said: "In my view no agreement between the spouses can prevent the Court from considering the question whether in the circumstances of the particular case it shall think fit to order the husband to make some reasonable payment to the wife, 'having regard to her fortune, if any, to the ability of her husband and to the conduct of the parties.' The wife's right to future maintenance is a matter of public concern, which she cannot barter away." and "Full effect has therefore to be given in all Courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial Courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance, and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreements, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy." Lord Atkin also said: "We have to deal with a separation deed, a class of document which has had a chequered career at law. Not recognized by the Ecclesiastical Courts, such contracts were enforced by the common law. Equity at first frowned. Lord Eldon doubted but enforced them: cf. St. John v St. John ((1803-1805) 11 Ves Jr 526, 529 and Bateman v. Countess of Ross (1813) 1 Dow 235; and see the arguments of Sir Fitzroy Kelly and Mr Turner and of Mr Bethell in Wilson v. Wilson (1848) 1 H. L. C. 538, 550-553, 564, 565. Finally they were fully recognized in equity by Lord Westbury's leading judgment in Hunt v. Hunt (1861) 4 D. F. & J. 221, in which he followed Lord Cottenham's decision in Wilson v. Wilson (1846-1848) 1 HLCas 538, 550-553, 564, 565, where his argument for the respondent had prevailed. Full effect has therefore to be given in all courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreement, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy." 1 Citers  Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601; [1929] All ER 245; [1929] P 1 1929 HL Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Atkin Jurisdiction, Family The husband had left the wife for another woman. The parties had entered into a deed of separation under which the husband had paid two lump sums and agreed to make weekly payments of 20 pounds for the life of the wife. The deed included a covenant by the wife that she would not institute any proceedings to make him pay more than this. Held: The parties cannot lawfully covenant or make an agreement either not to invoke the jurisdiction or to control the powers of the court where jurisdiction in invoked. In partiicular, a wife cannot contract out of her matrimonial maintenance entitlements in a deed of separation. Lord Atkin gave a short history of such contracts and commented on their effect: "We have to deal with a separation deed, a class of document which has had a chequered career at law. Not recognized by the Ecclesiastical Courts, such contracts were enforced by the common law. Equity at first frowned. Lord Eldon doubted but enforced them: cf. St. John v. St. John (1803) Ves. 525, 529 and Bateman v. Countess of Ross (1813) 1 Dow 235; and see the arguments of Sir Fitzroy Kelly and Mr Turner and of Mr Bethell in Wilson v. Wilson (1848) 1 H. L. C. 538, 550-553, 564, 565. Finally they were fully recognized in equity by Lord Westbury's leading judgment in Hunt v. Hunt (1861) 4 D. F. and J. 221, in which he followed Lord Cottenham's decision in Wilson v. Wilson (1846-1848) 1 HLCas 538, 550-553, 564, 565, where his argument for the respondent had prevailed. Full effect has therefore to be given in all courts to these contracts as to all other contracts. It seems not out of place to make this obvious reflection, for a perusal of some of the cases in the matrimonial courts seems to suggest that at times they are still looked at askance and enforced grudgingly. But there is no caste in contracts. Agreements for separation are formed, construed and dissolved and to be enforced on precisely the same principles as any respectable commercial agreement, of whose nature indeed they sometimes partake. As in other contracts stipulations will not be enforced which are illegal either as being opposed to positive law or public policy. But this is a common attribute of all contracts, though we may recognize that the subject-matter of separation agreements may bring them more than others into relation with questions of public policy." and "the court's statutory powers to order a divorced husband to maintain his former wife were granted 'partly in the public interest to provide a substitute for this husband's duty of maintenance and to prevent the wife from being thrown upon the public for support'" Lord Hailsham LC said: "However, this may be, it is sufficient for the decision of the present case to hold, as I do, that the power of the court to make provision for a wife on the dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public, and that the wife cannot by her own convenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the court or preclude the court from the exercise of that jurisdiction." The existence of the covenant did not preclude the wife from making an application to the court: "this by no means implies that, when this application is made, the existence of the Deed or its terms are not the most relevant factors for consideration by the court in reaching a decision." 1 Citers  |
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