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Extradition - From: 1970 To: 1979
This page lists 7 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.
Athanassiadis v Government of Greece (Note); 1971 - [1971] AC 282
Fernandez v Government of Singapore and Others [1971] UKHL 6; [1971] 2 All ER 691; [1971] 1 WLR 987
25 May 1971
HL
Extradition
Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 8
[ Bailii ]
Regina v Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Cheng [1973] AC 931; [1973] UKHL 8; [1973] 2 WLR 746; [1973] 2 All ER 204; [1973] Crim LR 362
16 Apr 1973
HL
Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Hodson
Extradition
Lord Diplock traced the history of the political offence exception to offences requiring extradition, and emphasised the need for a connection between the impugned conduct and changes to government or government policy: "My Lords, the noun that is qualified by the adjectival phrase "of a political character," is "offence." One must, therefore, consider what are the juristic elements in an offence, particularly one which is an extradition crime, to which the epithet "political" can apply. I would accept that it applies to the mental element: the state of mind of the accused when he did the act which constitutes the physical element in the offence with which he is charged. I would accept, too, that the relevant state of mind is not restricted to the intent necessary to constitute the offence with which he is charged, for in the case of none of the extradition crimes can this properly be described as being political. The relevant mental element must involve some less immediate object which the accused sought to achieve by doing the physical act. It is unnecessary for the purposes of the present appeal, and would, in my view, be unwise, to attempt to define how remote that object might be. If the accused had robbed a bank in order to obtain funds to support a political party, the object would, in my view, clearly be too remote to constitute a political offence. But if the accused had killed a dictator in the hope of changing the government of the country, his object would be sufficiently immediate to justify the epithet "political." For politics are about government. "Political" as descriptive of an object to be achieved must, in my view, be confined to the object of overthrowing or changing the government of a state or inducing it to change its policy or escaping from its territory the better so to do. No doubt any act done with any of these objects would be a "political act," whether or not it was done within the territory of the government against whom it was aimed. But the question is not simply whether it is political qua "act" but whether it is political qua "offence."
Extradition Act 1870 3(1)
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
Regina v Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex parte Narang; Union of India v Narang; HL 1978 - [1978] AC 247
Regina v Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Tarling; QBD 1978 - [1979] 1 WLR 1417
Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779; [1978] 2 All ER 634
1978
HL
Diplock L, Edmund-Davies L, Keith of Kinkel L
Extradition
Kakis' extradition was sought by Cyprus in relation to an EOKA killing in April 1973. Although a warrant for Kakis' arrest had been issued that very night, he had escaped into the mountains and remained hidden for 15 months. Subsequently, he settled in England with the apparent approval of the Cyprus Government and so too did a Mr Alexandrou, Kakis's only alibi witness, who swore that he would not return to give evidence in Cyprus. The House considered all the events that would not have happened had the trial of the accused taken place with ordinary promptitude and the extent to which they would result in prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial. Held: Lord Diplock said: "Unjust' I regard as directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trail itself, 'oppressive' as directed to hardship of the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there if room for overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases where to return him would not be fair. Delay in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings which is brought about by the accused himself by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest cannot, in my view, be relied upon as a ground for holding it to be either unjust or oppressive to return him. Any difficulties that he may encounter in the conduct of this defence in consequence of delay due to such cause are of his own choice and making. Save in the most exceptional circumstances it would be neither unjust nor oppressive that he should be required to accept them".
Lord Edmund-Davies disagreed: "In my respectful judgement, on the contrary, the answer to the question of where responsibility lies for the delay may well have a direct bearing on the issues of injustice and oppression. Thus, the fact that the requesting government is shown to have been inexcusably dilatory in taking steps to bring the fugitive to justice may serve to establish both the injustice and the oppressiveness of making an order for his return, whereas the issue might be left in some doubt if the only known fact related to the extent of the passage of time, and it has been customary in practice to advert to that factor: see, for example, Reg v Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Teja [1971] 2 QB 274, 290, per Lord Parker CJ and the speeches in this House in Reg v Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Narang [1978] AC 247."
Lord Keith of Kinkel said: "the case of Narang 1978 AC 247 also indicates that it may be relevant to consider the extent to which the passage of time has been due to dilatoriness on the part of the requesting authority."
Lord Diplock said: "'Unjust' I regard as directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself, "oppressive" as directed to hardship to the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there is room for overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases where to return him would not be fair. Delay in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings which is brought about by the accused himself by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest cannot, in my view, be relied upon as a ground for holding it to be either unjust or oppressive to return him. Any difficulties that he may encounter in the conduct of his defence in consequence of the delay due to such causes are of his own choice and making. Save in the most exceptional circumstances it would be neither unjust nor oppressive that he should be required to accept them.
As respects delay which is not brought about by the acts of the accused himself, however, the question of where responsibility lies for the delay is not generally relevant. What matters is not so much the cause of such delay as its effect; or, rather, the effects of those events which would not have happened before the trial of the accused if it had taken place with ordinary promptitude. So where the application for discharge under section 8(3) is based upon the "passage of time" under paragraph (b) and not on absence of good faith under paragraph (c), the court is not normally concerned with what could be an invidious task of considering whether mere inaction of the requisitioning government or its prosecuting authorities which resulted in delay was blameworthy or otherwise. Your Lordships have no occasion to do so in the instant case."
Fugitive Offenders' Act 1967 8(3)(b)
1 Citers
Regina v Governor of Pentonville Prison, Ex parte Tarling; HL 1978 - [1978] 70 Cr App R 77 HL
