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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Evidence - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 12 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Bearmans Ltd v Metropolitan Police District Receiver [1961] 1 WLR 634; [1961] 1 All ER 384
1961
CA
Sellers LJ, Devlin LJ
Police, Damages, Evidence
Sellers LJ said: "The second plaintiffs had paid some £5,000 for that theft; and for their respective losses these plaintiffs sought to recover damages under the Riot (Damages) Act, 1886"
The court considered that a liberal approach was appropriate for the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings.
Riot (Damages) Act 1886
1 Citers


 
Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR
1961

Cairns J
Evidence
The court stated the common law position of the cross examination of a defendant on his antecedents. Cairns J said: "The range of permissible cross-examination as to credit is, however, a very wide one. It has never, I think, been doubted that a conviction for any offence could be put to a witness by way of cross-examination as to credit, even though the offence was not one of dishonesty."
1 Citers



 
 Greenwood v Fitt; 1961 - [1961] 29 DLR 1
 
Regina v Redpath [1962] 47 Crim App R 319
1962
CCA

Evidence
Evidence as to the distress of a complainant may not carry probative weight if it is only part and parcel of the making of a complaint. However, it may properly be afforded weight if the complainant is unaware of being observed, and if the distress is exhibited at the time of, or shortly after, the offence itself, in circumstances which appear to implicate the accused.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857; [1963] 1 All ER 832; (1963) 47 Cr App R 79; [1963] 2 WLR 585
1963
CCA
Winn J
Criminal Practice, Evidence
The court considered the status in evidence of a used air ticket. Held: Where the prosecution have available evidence to establish an essential part of the case for the prosecution, that evidence should be called as part of the case for the prosecution, and the prosecution should not, as a matter of proper practice, seek to supplement and complete the case for the prosecution by cross examination of the accused.
The court accepted into evidence an airline ticket displaying the name of the accused on the basis that its relevance and legal admissibility stemmed from the likelihood that a ticket with a name or names on it had been used on a flight by a person of that name or names on the ticket. The ticket could be used to infer that the accused had taken the flight to which the ticket applied. The court distinguished the relevance and probative significance of the ticket itself as opposed to its content.
A trial judge's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the case law and in such a way and subject to such safeguards as seem to the judge best suited to achieve justice between the Crown and the defendant.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Somers [1963] 3 All ER 808
1963


Evidence
An expert is permitted to give second hand information.
1 Citers


 
In re Dellow's Will Trusts; Lloyd's Bank v Institute of Cancer Research [1964] 1 WLR 451; [1964] 1 All ER 771
1964
ChD
Ungoed-Thomas J
Wills and Probate, Trusts, Evidence
Ungoed-Thomas J said: "The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome the unliklihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it."
1 Citers



 
 In re Dellow's Will Trusts; Lloyd's Bank v Institute of Cancer Research; ChD 1964 - [1964] 1 WLR 451
 
Regina v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688; [1965] 2 All ER 464
1965

Marshall J
Evidence
The court was asked whether tape recordings of speech were, in the law of evidence, documents. Held: They were. Marshall J commented that: “For many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched. The prints as seen represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting, and recording, conversations. We can see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. There can be no question of laying down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence should be judged.”


 
 Blyth v Blyth; HL 1966 - [1966] AC 643
 
Chapman v Copeland (1966) 110 SJ 569
1966


Evidence

1 Citers


 
Sapporo Maru (Owners) v Statue of Liberty (Owners); The Statue of Liberty [1968] 1 WLR 739; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep 277; [1968] 2 All ER 195
1968
HL
Lord Reid, Sir Jocelyn Simon P
Evidence
There had been a collision between two ships. The plaintiff sought to have admitted in evidence a film of radar echoes recorded by a shore radio station. The defendants argued that evidence produced mechanically and without human intervention was inadmissible hearsay. Held: The court considered the admission of 'real evidence' in the form of plots of a ships course. Every plot involves a margin of error.
Sir Jocelyn Simon P said: "If tape recordings are admissible, it seems that a photograph of radar reception is equally admissible – or indeed, any other type of photograph. It would be an absurd distinction that a photograph should be admissible if the camera were operated manually by a photographer but not if it were operated by a trip or clock mechanism. Similarly if evidence of weather conditions were relevant, the law would affront common sense if it were to say that those could be proved by a person who looked at a barometer from time to time, but not by producing a barograph record. So too with other types of dial recordings. Again, cards from clocking-in-and-out machines are frequently admitted in accident cases."
and ""It is said that the echoes of the two ships involved in this collision appear on the film and that a succession of photographs from the film will throw light on where and how the collision occurred and the responsibility of each ship. Normally this radar and screen are monitored by human agency, but on this occasion - for reasons I was not told, nor needed to be - it was not monitored. The film strip, however, is available. The defendants resist the admissibility of this strip of film on the broad ground that it is a piece of evidence produced purely mechanically without human intervention and as such offends against the hearsay rule. Counsel for the defendants relies on Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions (1964) 2 All ER 881; (1965) AC 1001. He has argued robustly that it makes all the difference that no human agency is available to verify or explain what the machine records. The Evidence Act, 1938, does not render this sort of evidence admissible, in his submission.
I am clearly of the opinion that the evidence is admissible, and could, indeed, be a valuable piece of evidence in the elucidation of the facts in dispute. In a case concerned with mechanical recordings by tape recorder, R v Maqsud Ali, R v Ashiq Hussain (1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688, the Court of Criminal Appeal, in ruling that the tape recordings were admissible, stated (1965) 2 All ER at p469; (1966) 1 QB at p 701 that it could see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. See also R v Senat, R v Sin (Mar 16, 1968), The Times; 112 Sol Jo 252. Moreover, R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688 makes it plain that we are not here concerned with evidence admissible under the Evidence Act, 1938, because that Act is not applicable to criminal proceedings. Counsel for the defendants seeks to distinguish R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688 from the present case on the ground that in the former case the police officer set up a recording machine to overhear part of a recorded conversation and claimed to be able to identify the voices recorded. I should be sorry to think that that was a ground for distinction; for in R v Maqsud Ali (1965) 2 All ER 464; (1966) 1 QB 688, the language was a dialect of Punjabi, not understandable by Urdu experts, let alone by English police officers. In my view the evidence in question in the present case has nothing to do with the hearsay rule and does not depend on the Evidence Act, 1938."
Evidence Act 1938
1 Citers


 
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