Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Estoppel - From: 2001 To: 2001

This page lists 18 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Wake v Page and Another Times, 09 February 2001; [2001] RTR 291
9 Feb 2001
CA
Kennedy LJ
Insurance, Estoppel, Litigation Practice, Road Traffic
Insurers were quite entitled to insist upon service of the statutory seven day notice of an intention to sue. In the absence of a notice very were not liable even though they were fully aware of the possibility of action. However regrettable it was there was no representation from the Insurers that they would waive their right for formal notice, and no equitable estoppel arose. A prudent solicitor would be well advised to ensure that the insurance company received written notice within seven days after the commencement of proceedings.
1 Citers


 
Baird Textile Holdings Limited v Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274
28 Feb 2001
CA
Lord Justice Mance
Contract, Estoppel
The court considered the requirements to establish a proprietary estoppel: "It is on authority an established feature of both promissory and conventional estoppel that the parties should have had the objective intention to make, affect or confirm the legal relationship." The court also considered the requirements to be established for the creation of a contract: "For a contract to come into existence, there must be both (a) an agreement on essentials with sufficient certainty to be enforceable and (b) an intention to create legal relations.
Both requirements are normally judged objectively. Absence of the former may involve or be explained by the latter. But this is not always so. A sufficiently certain agreement may be reached, but there may be either expressly (i.e. by express agreement) or impliedly (e.g. in some family situations) no intention to create legal relations.
An intention to create legal relations is normally presumed in the case of an express or apparent agreement satisfying the first requirement: see Chitty on Contracts (28th edition) vol 1, para 2 - 146. It is otherwise, when the case is that an implied contract falls to be inferred from a party's conduct: Chitty, para 2 - 147. It is then for the party asserting such a contract to show the necessity for implying it. As Morison J said in his paragraph 12(1), if the parties would or might have acted as they did without any such contract, there is no necessity to imply any contract. It is merely putting the same point another way to say that no intention to make any such contract will then be inferred."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Shah v Shah and others [2001] EWCA Civ 493
7 Mar 2001
CA

Contract, Estoppel, Land
Renewed application for permission to appeal - whether deed validly signed.
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Derby v Scottish Equitable Plc [2001] EWCA Civ 369; [2001] 3 All ER 818; [2001] OPLR 181; [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 274; [2001] Pens LR 163
16 Mar 2001
CA
Simon Brown, Robert Walker, Keene LJJ
Equity, Estoppel
The court was asked questions of some general interest and importance as to claims for money paid under a mistake and the defences of change of position and estoppel.
[ Bailii ]
 
Shah v Shah Times, 15 May 2001; [2002] QB 35; [2001] EWCA Civ 527; [2001] 3 WLR 31; [2001] 4 All ER 138
10 Apr 2001
CA
Pill LJ, Tuckey LJ and Sir Christopher Slade
Land, Estoppel
The court was asked as to the enforceability of a document under the terms of which the defendants were to make a payment of pounds 1.5 million to the claimant. The document was described as a deed and provided for each defendant to sign in the presence of a witness. In the event, although the "witness" signed shortly after the defendants, he did so without having been present when they signed. When, therefore, the claimant brought proceedings against them, the defendants disputed the claim on the basis that the "deed" had not been validly executed. Held: The defendants were estopped from denying that they had signed the document in the witness's presence. Public policy could not be used to disallow a party from asserting that a deed was valid despite the fact that the signature had not been properly witnessed, even though it was in the nature of the deed that such witnessing was required by law. Here the witness signature had not been present when he added his signature. The circumstances which might give rise to such a claim would often be solely with the party seeking to avoid liability under a deed, and being permitted to deny his deed would lead to uncertainty and fraud. The party had presented it as his own and properly attested deed and could be estopped from denying it.
Pill LJ said: "I bear in mind the clarity of the language of section 1(2) and (3) and also that the requirement for attestation is integral to the requirement for signature in that the validity of the signature is stipulated to depend on the presence of the attesting witness. I also accept that attestation has a purpose in that it limits the scope for disputes as to whether the document was signed and the circumstances in which it was signed. The beneficial effect of the requirement for attestation of the signature in the manner specified in the statute is not in question. It gives some, but not complete, protection to other parties to the deed who can have more confidence in the genuineness of the signature by reason of the attestation. It gives some, but not complete, protection to a potential signatory who may be under a disability, either permanent or temporary. A person may aver in opposition to his own deed that he was induced to execute it by fraud, misrepresentation or, as was unsuccessfully alleged in the present case, duress and the attestation requirement is a safeguard.
I have, however, come to the conclusion that there was no statutory intention to exclude the operation of an estoppel in all circumstances or in circumstances such as the present. The perceived need for formality in the case of a deed requires a signature and a document cannot be a deed in the absence of a signature. I can detect no social policy which requires the person attesting the signature to be present when the document is signed. The attestation is at one stage removed from the imperative out of which the need for formality arises. It is not fundamental to the public interest, which is in the requirement for a signature. Failure to comply with the additional formality of attestation should not in itself prevent a party into whose possession an apparently valid deed has come from alleging that the signatory should not be permitted to rely on the absence of attestation in his presence. It should not permit a person to escape the consequences of an apparently valid deed he has signed, representing that he has done so in the presence of an attesting witness, merely by claiming that in fact the attesting witness was not present at the time of signature. The fact that the requirements are partly for the protection of the signatory makes it less likely that Parliament intended that the need for them could in all circumstances be used to defeat the claim of another party.
Having regard to the purposes for which deeds are used and indeed in some cases required, and the long-term obligations which deeds will often create, there are policy reasons for not permitting a party to escape his obligations under the deed by reason of a defect, however minor, in the way his signature was attested. The possible adverse consequences if a signatory could, months or years later, disclaim liability upon a purported deed, which he had signed and delivered, on the mere ground that his signature had not been attested in his presence, are obvious. The lack of proper attestation will be peculiarly within the knowledge of the signatory and, as Sir Christopher Slade observed in the course of argument, will often not be within the knowledge of the other parties.
In this case the document was described as a deed and was signed. A witness, to whom the third and fourth defendants were well known, provided a form of attestation shortly afterwards and the only failure was that he did so without being in the presence of the third and fourth defendants when they signed."
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 1
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Parry v Edwards Geldard (A Firm) [2001] EWHC Ch 427
1 May 2001
ChD

Agriculture, Damages, Estoppel
The court had to decide the measure of damages. The claimant had lost the opportunity to acquire without charge a milk quota. The claimant asserted an estoppel by convention. This failed. Also the judge had not properly allowed for the marriage value of changes in the value of a second plot becoming used in conjunction with nearby land.
Dairy Produce Quotas Regulations 1994
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Specialist Group International Ltd v Deakin and Another [2001] EWCA Civ 777
23 May 2001
CA
Lord Justice Aldous And Lord Justice May
Estoppel
Law upon res judicata - action estoppel and issue estoppel and the underlying policy interest whereby there is finality in litigation and litigants are not vexed twice on the same matter.
(May LJ) "the authorities taken as a whole tend to encourage elaborate technical submissions which many percipient non-lawyers would scarcely understand. Cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel are not readily understandable phrases to a non-lawyer. It should not be necessary to have to pick for hours over the precise text of a dozen or so law reports to find out what in the end is reasonably straightforward and understandable law capable of being simply expressed. I would try to express it simply as follows.
If a claim has been explicitly determined in previous concluded proceedings between the same parties, that claim cannot be raised again, other than on an appeal, unless there is fraud or collusion. If a necessary element of a claim has been explicitly determined in previous concluded proceedings between the same parties, that issue cannot be raised again, if, as is likely but not inevitable, it would be an abuse to raise that issue again. This may also extend to an implicitly necessary element of the previous determination. The previous determination may include a settlement. If a claim or issue has not been determined in previous concluded proceedings between the same parties, there may nevertheless be circumstances in which, as a matter of public and private interest on a broad merits-based procedural judgment, it would be an abuse for a party to raise that claim or issue. Such circumstances may depending on the facts, exist where the litigant could and should have raised the matter in question in earlier concluded proceedings. There may in particular cases be other elements of abuse, including oppression of another party: but abuse of process is a concept which defies precise definition in the abstract. The court will only stop a claim as an abuse after most careful consideration."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
F and I Services Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2001] EWCA Civ 762
23 May 2001
CA
Lord Justice Robert Walker, Lord Justice Sedley And Mr Justice Lightman
VAT, Administrative, Estoppel
VAT implications of tripartite voucher schemes
[ Bailii ]
 
Campbell v Griffin and others [2001] EWCA Civ 990; [2001] NPC 102; (2001) 82 P & CR DG23; [2001] WTLR 981
27 Jun 2001
CA
The President, Lord Justice Thorpe, Lord Justice Robert Walker
Estoppel, Land

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies Inc [2001] 2 SCR 460; 2001 SCC 44
12 Jul 2001

Binney J
Commonwealth, Estoppel
Canlii (Supreme Court of Canada) Administrative law – Issue estoppel – Employee filing complaint against employer under Employment Standards Act seeking unpaid wages and commissions – Employee subsequently commencing court action against employer for wrongful dismissal and unpaid wages and commissions – Employment standards officer dismissing employee’s complaint – Employer arguing that employee’s claim for unpaid wages and commissions before court barred by issue estoppel – Whether officer’s failure to observe procedural fairness in deciding employee’s complaint preventing application of issue estoppel – Whether preconditions to application of issue estoppel satisfied – If so, whether this Court should exercise its discretion and refuse to apply issue estoppel.
Binney J said: "a decision which is made without jurisdiction from the outset cannot form the basis of an estoppel"
1 Citers

[ Canlii ]

 
 South Buckinghamshire District Council v Flanagan and Another; QBD 16-Jul-2001 - Gazette, 26 July 2001
 
Actionstrength Limited v International Glass Engineering, In Gl En S P A , Saint-Gobain Glass UK Limited [2001] EWCA Civ 1477; [2002] 1 WLR 566
10 Oct 2001
CA
Lord Justice Simon Brown, Lord Justice Peter Gibson and Lord Justice Tucke
Contract, Construction, Estoppel
The claimant sought payment for works undertaken. They had been given a promise that in return for not withdrawing their workforce from the site, the second defendants would redirect payments due to the first defendant to the claimant. When it came to it, they asserted that that agreement was void under the Act since it was not evidenced in writing. At this stage the issue was whether the agreement was a guarantee or an agreement accepting a primary obligation. They answered that since the liability was contingent upon non-payment it was not a primary obligation. Held In these cases the court must look to the substance more than the form. The agreement fell within the act, and no estoppel arose.
Statute of Frauds 1677 4
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Lloyd and others v Dugdale and Another Gazette, 06 December 2001; [2001] EWCA Civ 1754; [2002] 2 P&CR 13; [2001] 48 EGCS 129; [2001] NPC 168; [2002] WTLR 863
21 Nov 2001
CA
Lord Justice Kennedy, Lord Justice Mummery, And, Sir Christopher Slade
Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel, Land, Contract, Trusts
The claimants asserted a right to possession of land, and the defendant resisted, claiming a proprietary estoppel. A predecessor had intended to grant a sub-lease to the defendant, who had arranged for his company JAD Ltd to execute major works on the strength of that promise. JAD was given permission to store items there, but JAD Ltd took up possession. The sub-lease was never signed. The head-lease was assigned to the claimants, subject to any rights of the defendants. Held: No notice was effective. Whatever estoppel arose, was in favour of JAD, not his company, and it was in possession, not him. The assignment defeated the claim of JAD Ltd by section 20. No constructive trust arose, because the claimant's conscience was not deemed to be affected.
The court set out the principles applying: "(1) Even in a case where, on a sale of land, the vendor has stipulated that the sale shall be subject to stated possible incumbrances or prior interests, there is no general rule that the court will impose a constructive trust on the purchaser to give effect to them.
(2) The court will not impose a constructive trust in such circumstances unless it is satisfied that the conscience of the estate owner is affected so that it would be inequitable to allow him to deny the claimant an interest in the property.
(3) In deciding whether or not the conscience of the new estate owner is affected in such circumstances, the crucially important question is whether he has undertaken a new obligation, not otherwise existing, to give effect to the relevant encumbrance or prior interest. If, but only if, he has undertaken such a new obligation will a constructive trust be imposed.
(4) Notwithstanding some previous authority suggesting the contrary, a contractual licence is not to be treated as creating a proprietary interest in land so as to bind third parties who acquire the land with notice of it, on this account alone: see Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold . .
(5) Proof that the purchase price by a transferee has been reduced upon the footing that he would give effect to the relevant encumbrance or prior interest may provide some indication that the transferee has undertaken a new obligation to give effect to it: see Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold . . However, since in matters relating to the title to land certainty is of prime importance, it is not desirable that constructive trusts of land should be imposed in reliance on inferences from "slender materials"."
Law of Property Act 1925 20(1) 70(1)(g)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
J S Bloor (Measham) Ltd v Eric Myles Calcott Times, 12 December 2001; Gazette, 24 January 2002; [2001] EWHC Ch 467; CH1997 J No: 5742
23 Nov 2001
ChD
Mr Justice Hart
Agriculture, Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel, Damages
The tenant had claimed a tenancy under the Act. The landlord sought to assert a proprietary estoppel against them. There was nothing in the 1986 Act to stop the claimants relying on a proprietary estoppel and asserting their claims to occupation. The defendant's tenancy was unenforceable against them.
Agricultural Holdings Act 1986
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Leslie Cook, Winifred Cook v Norlands Limited Appeal No 51 of 2000
27 Nov 2001
PC

Land, Limitation, Employment, Estoppel
(Isle of Man) The claimants had been employed for 27 years managing an amusement centre. They had a lower salary, reflecting a promise that the tied accommodation was to be 'theirs' after 7 years. After dismissal, the company sought possession, and the claimants sought transfer of the freehold, and asserted a proprietary estoppel. However there was no evidence as to the details of any calculations made, and the claimants had continued to accept low wages long after the house might have been paid for. The claim of a contract was void for uncertainty, and past performance issues did not arise.
Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1956 (Isle of Man)
[ PC ] - [ PC ]
 
re Queen's Moat House Plc Unreported, 5 December 2001
5 Dec 2001
ChD
Mr Justice Pumfrey
Company, Estoppel
The interests of justice are unlikely to require a second investigation of facts, which have already been the subject matter of an exhaustive examination.
1 Citers


 
Hazel v Akhtar and Another Times, 07 January 2002; [2001] EWCA Civ 1883; [2002] 07 EG 124
12 Dec 2001
CA
Lord Justice Henry and Sir Anthony Evans
Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel
A landlord who had consistently accepted late payment of rent from his tenant could become estopped from refusing renewal of a business tenancy on the grounds of late payment of rent. That tenant's conduct as regards payment of rent involving repeated minor breaches of his obligations under the lease had been acceptable to the landlords was significant. They were estopped in law and equity from insisting that the tenant comply strictly with the lease until such time as the tenant received clear notice that strict compliance was required.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(b)
[ Bailii ]
 
Gribbon v Lutton and Another Times, 04 December 2001; [2001] EWCA Civ 1956; [2002] 2 EGCS 100; [2002] NPC 2; [2002] QB 902; [2002] PNLR 19; [2002] 2 WLR 842; [2002] Lloyd's Rep PN 272
19 Dec 2001
CA
Lord Justice Pill, Lord Justice Robert Walker and Mr Justice Laddie
Professional Negligence, Litigation Practice, Estoppel
The defendant solicitors acted in obtaining and holding a deposit on the sale of land. They issued interpleader proceedings which decided that the deposit was payable to the purchaser. The vendor then sued the solicitors in negligence. The solicitors were faced with two courts making different and contradictory decisions on the same facts as to the destination of the deposit, and claimed that the decision of the first court was incorrect. Held: The solicitor had initiated the interpleader proceedings, and could not be heard to complain about it. The application was an abuse of process. The claim in negligence succeeded because the defendants had failed to secure for their client an enforceable bipartite agreement under which the deposit would be forfeit if the prospective purchaser did not proceed. No issue estoppel arose in their favour because they were not parties in any real sense to the original proceedings.
Laddie J, sitting as a judge of the Court of Appeal, said (as to Chillingworth): "All the judge was saying was that if that [the 10 July document] had been a binding contract, suitable wording could have been inserted into it to make the deposit non-refundable."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.