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Estoppel - From: 1996 To: 1996
This page lists 6 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.
ÂPorter v Secretary of State for Transport [1996] 3 All ER 693
1996
CA
Stuart Smith LJ
Land, Damages, Estoppel
Land had been compulsorily acquired for a road. The plaintiff was granted on appeal under section 18 of the 1961 Act a certificate of appropriate alternative development in respect of the land acquired, namely that the land acquired would have been suitable for residential development. Held. On a valuation on a compulsory purchase of land, the value is not dependent on findings on probabilities or even that "it could reasonably have been expected that planning permission would be granted".
Stuart Smith LJ set out the four elements for an issue estoppel: "It is common ground that four matters have to be established if there is to be an issue estoppel. "(1) The issue in question must have been decided by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
(2) The issue must be one which arises between parties who are parties to the decision. This also is accepted.
(3) The issue must have been decided finally and must be of a type to which an issue estoppel can apply.
(4) The issue in respect of which the estoppel is said to operate must be the same as that previously decided." and “Where a court or tribunal has to decide what would have happened in a hypothetical situation which does not exist, it usually has to approach the matter on the basis of assessing what were the chances or prospect of it happening. The chance may be almost a certainty at one end to a mere speculative hope at the other. The value will depend on how good this chance is. Where, however, the court or tribunal has to decide what in fact has happened as an historical fact, it does so on balance of probability; and once it decides that it is more probable than not, then the fact is found and is established as a certainty. This distinction is well illustrated by Davies v Taylor [1972] 3 All ER 836, [1974] AC 207 and Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons (a firm) [1995] 4 All ER 907, [1995] 1 WLR 1602.,br />It would be unnecessary for the Secretary of State to evaluate the chance of the eastern route being the preferred alternative route in the event that the actual route was not chosen, provided it was more than 50%; but the Lands Tribunal would be concerned in assessing value to evaluate the chances of this happening more precisely.”
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965
1 Cites
1 Citers
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 Barber v Staffordshire County Council; CA 29-Jan-1996 - Gazette, 14 February 1996; Independent, 02 February 1996; Times, 29 January 1996; [1996] ICR 379; [1996] IRLR 229
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Desert Sun Loan Corporation v Hill Gazette, 20 March 1996; Times, 21 February 1996; [1996] 2 All ER 847
21 Feb 1996
CA
Evans LJ
Estoppel, Litigation Practice
A defence of Issue Estoppel was not available where the issue which was claimed to have been decided had been made under an unclear foreign procedure. It was also essential that the issue in respect of which an estoppel was now asserted had been a finding necessary to the judgment to be relied upon: "The principle is that an issue of fact or law which necessarily was concluded in favour of one party in the foreign proceedings cannot be reopened in foreign proceedings between the same parties here."
1 Citers
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Gale v Superdrug Stores Plc Gazette, 22 May 1996; Times, 02 May 1996; [1996] EWCA Civ 1300; [1996] 1 WLR 1089; [1996] 3 All ER 46
25 Apr 1996
CA
Estoppel, Litigation Practice
The right to resile from an admission made in pleadings is lost only if there can be found proof of prejudice to the other party. It is a matter for the judge's discretion.
The court set out the principles on which it should act when it is asked to give leave to amend.
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
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Pridean Limited v Forest Taverns Limited; John Hipwell and David Marshall [1996] EWCA Civ 1060; (1996) 75 P & CR 447
28 Nov 1996
CA
Aldous LJ, Stuart-Smith LJ
Estoppel
The claimant owned a public house. It set out with the defendant to to acquire the premises or to take a lease of them. The defendant went into occupation, and carried out works. Negotiations continued, but broke down over the form of protection to be given to the claimant's rights as a minority shareholder in the joint venture company. When the claimant demanded possession, the defendant raised the defence of proprietary estoppel. Held: "Mr Fetherstonhaugh did not dispute that in appropriate circumstances proprietary estoppel could arise. He submitted that, on the evidence and the findings of fact made by the judge, it did not arise in this case. I believe he is right. It is accepted that the appellants expended money and time on the premises. Thus the pertinent question to ask is – what was the expectation that the appellants were allowed or encouraged by the respondent to assume? The appellants' answer to that question was an expectation that they would be able to occupy and trade from the premises. The Respondent says that it was an expectation that the negotiations would lead to the joint venture company occupying and trading from the premises or it would be purchased if the parties could agree terms. That in fact was the conclusion of the judge. He held that the respondents did not lead the appellants to believe that they would be granted a lease. They did however allow the appellants to expend money and time in the expectation that agreement would soon be reached on the precise terms of the joint venture or after November the premises would be purchased on terms to be agreed. There was no expectation that the appellants could remain if the negotiations for a joint venture failed.
I believe you can test that conclusion by asking – what were the terms upon which the appellants believed that they were entitled to remain and manage the premises? There was no agreement. That was decided by the judge who rejected the appellants' evidence. The answer, I believe must be "terms to be agreed". Those terms were never agreed.
The case for proprietary estoppel failed when the judge rejected the appellants' case that there was an agreement between the parties. If there was no agreement then the only expectation that could arise was an expectation that negotiations would be concluded as anticipated. That being so, there could not have been an expectation, which arose due to any action or inaction of the respondent, that the appellants could remain if the negotiations were not satisfactorily concluded."
1 Citers
[ Bailii ]
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In Re B (Nibors) Gazette, 04 December 1996
4 Dec 1996
FD
Estoppel
Issue estoppel is to be applied only very carefully in children proceedings.
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