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Estoppel - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 16 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Peyman v Lanjani [1985] 1 Ch 457; [1985] CL 457
1985
CA
Stephenson LJ, May LJ
Estoppel, Landlord and Tenant
Application was made for consent to assign a lease. The court was asked whether or not the purchaser of a leasehold interest in a property, who had elected to affirm the contract despite a repudiatory breach by the vendor, could be held to his election if, when he made it, he was aware of facts which entitled him to rescind the contract, but had no knowledge that those facts gave him the right in law to rescind. Held: For the purposes of the common law doctrine of election, where a person has an unrestricted choice between two mutually inconsistent courses of action which affect his rights, knowledge of the right to elect is a pre-condition of making an effective election, and there can be no effective election unless the person making it knows his legal rights as well as the facts giving rise to those rights. An estoppel must be based upon an informed choice, but: "When a party has legal advice, he will be more easily presumed to know the law and evidence or special circumstances may be required to rebut the presumption."
May LJ said: ""The next feature of the doctrine of election in these cases which in my opinion is important is that when the person entitled to make the choice does so one way or the other, and this has been communicated to the other party to the contract, then the choice becomes irrevocable even though, if and when the first person seeks to change his mind, the second cannot show that he has altered his position in any way.
This being so, I do not think that a party to a contract can realistically or sensibly be held to have made this irrevocable choice between rescission and affirmation unless he has actual knowledge not only of the facts of the serious breach of the contract by the other party which is the pre-condition of his right to choose, but also of the fact that in the circumstances which exist he does have that right to make that choice which the law gives him."
Stephenson LJ said: "I therefore feel free to follow the decision of this court in Leathley v John Fowler & Co Ltd [1946] KB 579 and to hold that knowledge of the facts which give rise to the right to rescind is not enough to prevent the plaintiff from exercising that right, but he must also know that the law gives him that right yet choose with that knowledge not to exercise it."
1 Cites

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 Allied Marine Ltd v Vale do Rio Doce SA (The Leonidas D); CA 1985 - [1985] 1 WLR 925; [1985] 2 Lloyds Rep 18; [1985] 2 All ER 796
 
The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490
1985
HL
Lord Brandon
Litigation Practice, Estoppel
The Henderson v Henderson principle should only be applied where it is clear (i) that the decision or determination relied on was made by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction and (ii) the decision upon the issue later sought to be raised is a final and binding decision on the merits.
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The August Leonhardt [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 28
1985
CA
Kerr LJ
Estoppel
For an estoppel by convention, a common understanding must actually be communicated by one party to the other: "All estoppels must involve some statement or conduct by the party alleged [to be estoppel on which the alleged representee was entitled] to rely and did rely. In this sense all estoppels may be regarded as requiring some manifest representation which crosses the line between representor and representee, either by statement or conduct."
1 Citers


 
Willis and Son v Willis [1986] 1 EGLR 62
1986
CA
Parker LJ, Sir John Donaldson MR
Estoppel, Trusts
The appellants had resisted giving a flat, claiming a promissory estoppel based on the respondents having more than once said that the appellants could live in the premises rent free for as long as they needed. The appellants said that some £1339.90 had been spent relying upon that promise. The appellants produced a letter given to their solicitor to support the particulars. The writer said he had carried out the works. He no longer had details, but could confirm the details from his ledgers. The letter was found to be a complete fiction. He had done no work, had no ledgers and had not been paid. Both appellants knew that it was wholly false. Held: If the falsity of the Robins' letter had not been discovered it would have been relied upon throughout the proceedings. "I find it difficult to see how there could be any more serious conduct than that. When a party comes to the Court and seeks to obtain from it equitable relief, it is accepted, as I have said, that he must come with clean hands. I accept also, as was submitted on behalf of the appellants, that not every item of misconduct can possibly be sufficient to deprive a party who seeks equity from being granted the relief he seeks. Some misconduct may be trivial. But when a party acts as these parties have done – and Joanna Willis must be regarded as having been concerned in this, albeit indirectly, in as much as the document was put forward on behalf of both the appellants – it seems to be impossible for this Court to do other than to take the most serious view of it and to decline to grant equitable relief even if, to which I say nothing because it does not arise on the view I take of this case, they would otherwise have been so entitled." (Sir John Donaldson MR) "The conduct of the appellants which has been disclosed in this case was such that no Court could, in my judgment, possibly grant equitable relief." and "When a person seeks the aid of the Court to obtain the Court's assistance, via the principles of equity, to override somebody's strict legal rights, it is clearly a case for the application of the maxim, as indeed is accepted by the appellants, "that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands"."
1 Citers


 
The Indian Endurance [1987] AC 878
1986
HL
Lord Steyn
Estoppel
The House considerd how an estoppel by convention arose: "It is settled that an estoppel by convention may arise where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared by them both or made by one and acquiesced in by the other. The effect of an estoppel by convention is to preclude a party from denying the assumed facts or law if it would be unjust to allow him to go back on the assumption: K. Lokumal & Sons (London) Ltd. v. Lotte Shipping Co. Pte. Ltd. [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 28; Norwegian American Cruises A/S v. Paul Mundy Ltd. [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 343; Treitel, The Law of Contract, 9th ed. (1995), pp. 112-113. It is not enough that each of the two parties acts on an assumption not communicated to the other. But it was rightly accepted by counsel for both parties that a concluded agreement is not a requirement for an estoppel by convention."
1 Citers


 
Watson v Goldsbrough [1986] 1 EGLR 265
1986


Estoppel
Licensees of land owned by the wife's parents agreed that an angling club could have fishing rights if they improved the ponds. Held: The estoppel was fed when the licensees acquired the legal estate.
1 Citers


 
In re Basham dec'd; Basham v Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498; [1987] 1 All ER 405
1986

Edward Nugee QC
Wills and Probate, Estoppel
The claimant and her husband had helped her mother and her stepfather throughout the claimant's adult life. She received no remuneration but understood that she would inherit her stepfather's property when he died. After her mother's death and until her stepfather's death she and her husband lived near the cottage to which her stepfather had moved (but never lived in the cottage). The claimant was told by her stepfather that 'she would lose nothing' by her help and (a few days before his death) that she was to have the cottage. The deputy judge held that she was entitled, by proprietary estoppel, to the whole of the estate of her stepfather (who died intestate). He rejected the submission that the principle could not extend beyond cases where the claimant already had enjoyment of an identified item of property.
Edward Nugee QC said: "In the present case it is in my judgment clearly established by the evidence, first, that the plaintiff had a belief at all material times that she was going to receive both Rosslyn and the remainder of the deceased's property on his death, and secondly, that this belief was encouraged by the deceased . . I am satisfied that the deceased encouraged the plaintiff in the belief that all the property he possessed at the date of his death would pass to her." and
"The plaintiff relies on proprietary estoppel, the principle of which, in its broadest form, may be stated as follows: where one person, A, has acted to his detriment on the faith of a belief, which was known to and encouraged by another person, B, that he either has or is going to be given a right in or over B's property, B cannot insist on his strict legal rights if to do so would be inconsistent with A's belief." and "But in my judgment, at all events where the belief is that A is going to be given a right in the future, it is properly to be regarded as giving rise to a species of constructive trust, which is the concept employed by a court of equity to prevent a person from relying on his legal rights where it would be unconscionable for him to do so."
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 Watson v Goldsborough; CA 1986 - [1986] 1 EGLR 265
 
Attorney General of Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queen's Gardens) Ltd [1987] 1 AC 114
1987
PC
Lord Templeman
Land, Commonwealth, Estoppel
An agreement in principle was marked "subject to contract". The Government would acquire some flats owned the plaintiff Group of companies in return for the Government granting, inter alia, a lease to the Group of some Crown lands. The Government was allowed to and did take possession of the flats and spent money upon them and moved some civil servants into them, the Crown accordingly disposing of the premises where those civil servants had previously resided. On the other side of the bargain, the Government allowed the Group to enter the Crown land and to demolish buildings upon it. However, the requisite forms of documents were never executed Held: Lord Templeman said: "The government acted in the hope that a voluntary agreement in principle expressly made 'subject to contract' and therefore not binding, would eventually be followed by the achievement of legal relationships in the form of grants and transfers of property. It is possible but unlikely that in circumstances at present unforeseeable a party to negotiations set out in a document expressed to be 'subject to contract' would be able to satisfy the court that the parties had subsequently agreed to convert the document into a contract or that some form of estoppel had arisen to prevent both parties from refusing to proceed with the transactions envisaged by the document."
1 Cites

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Norwegian American Cruises A/S (formerly Norwegian American Lines A/S) v Paul Munday Ltd (The "Vistafjord") [1988] 2 Lloyds Rep 343
1988


Contract, Estoppel
A party may be precluded by an estoppel by convention from raising a contention contrary to a common assumption of fact or law (which could include the validity of a notice) upon which they have acted.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Re State of Norway's Application (No 2) [1988] 3 WLR 603
1988
CA
May LJ, Balcombe LJ
Estoppel
The basic requirement for an issue estoppel to arise was that "the earlier determination relied on as raising an issue estoppel shall have been fundamental to the decision first arrived at". The Board did not accept that an issue estoppel is impossible if the first decision could not be appealed.
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975
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The Vistafjord [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 343
1988
CA
Bingham LJ
Estoppel
A common assumption which was known to be so by both parties and upon which both acted, was enough to create an estoppel: Bingham LJ "Each [of the parties] was fully privy to the thinking of the other. Moreover we have very clear conduct crossing the line . . . This is not a case of inaction, but of action on both sides of which the other party was full cognizant"
1 Citers


 
Walton Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher [1988] 164 CLR 387
1988


Estoppel, Commonwealth
(High Court of Australia) It would be unconscionable for a party to stand by in silence when it must have known that the other party was proceeding on an assumption that they had a binding agreement.
1 Citers


 
Re State of Norway's Application (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 723
1989
HL
Lord Goff of Chieveley
Estoppel, International, Evidence
The government of Norway sought evidence here to support a claim for tax in Norway. Held: The State of Norway’s application requesting the oral examination of two witnesses residing in England did not fall foul of the Revenue rule. A claim will not be enforced here, where the claimant is asserting a sovereign right or where the central interest of the claimant is governmental in nature, however, Lord Goff said: "It is of importance to observe that that rule is limited to cases of direct or indirect enforcement in this country of the revenue laws of a foreign state. It is plain that the present case is not concerned with the direct enforcement of the revenue laws of the State of Norway. Is it concerned with their indirect enforcement? I do not think so. It is stated in Dicey & Morris, at p. 103, that indirect enforcement occurs (1) where the foreign state (or its nominee) in form seeks a remedy which in substance is designed to give the foreign law extraterritorial effect, or (2) where a private party raises a defence based on the foreign law in order to vindicate or assert the right of the foreign state. I have been unable to discover any case of indirect enforcement which goes beyond these two propositions. Even so, since there is no authority directly in point to guide me, I have to consider whether a case such as the present should nevertheless be held to fall foul of the rule. For my part, I cannot see that it should. I cannot see any extraterritorial exercise of sovereign authority in seeking the assistance of the courts of this country in obtaining evidence which will be used for the enforcement of the revenue laws of Norway in Norway itself."
Lord Goff discussed the phrase 'civil or commercial matters', and said of itsuse in the 1856 Act: "Here we find the first mention in an Act of Parliament, at least in this context, of the expression "civil or commercial matter." It is plain that here the word "matter" is used as referring to the relevant proceedings; because in section 1 the "matter" is required (consistently with the long title and section 2 of the Act) to be pending before the foreign court or tribunal. This reinforces the natural inference that, in section 1 of the Act, the expression "civil matter" is being given no restricted meaning, and would be understood in this country as referring to civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings. It is true that this gives no weight to the words "or commercial" so far as the law of this country is concerned: but it is not surprising to find these words added in relation to a jurisdiction which will be invoked by courts or tribunals in foreign countries, many of which differentiate between civil and commercial matters."
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 - Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856
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 Shelley v United Artists Corporation Limited; CA 1989 - (1989) 60 P&CR 241; [1990] EGLR 103
 
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