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Estoppel - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 31 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Stroughill v Buck [1850] EngR 295; (1850) 14 QB 781; (1850) 117 ER 301
13 Feb 1850

Patteson J
Estoppel
Patteson J said: "When a recital is intended to be a statement which all parties to the deed have mutually agreed to admit as true, it is an estoppel upon all. But, when it is intended to be the statement of one party only, the estoppel is confined to that party, and the intention is to be gathered from construing the instrument."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Horton v The Westminster Improvement Commissioners [1852] EngR 658; (1853) 7 Exch 780; (1852) 155 ER 1165
2 Jun 1852

Baron Martin
Estoppel
The plaintiff was assignee of the defendants' bond to A to pay £10,000. It recited that the defendants had borrowed £5,000 from A for the purposes of carrying out works under the Westminster Improvement Acts 1845 and 1847. The defendants pleaded that they had not borrowed any money from A. The underlying facts, according to the defendants, were that the defendants owed money to B and C, who were induced by A into agreeing that the defendants should issue the bond to A in lieu of payment to themselves. B and C then discovered that they were the victim of a scam and requested the defendants not to pay the bond. In short, the parties to the bond, A and the defendants, both knew when it was issued that the recital about A having lent money to the defendants was false. Held: The defendants were estopped from denying the truth of the facts stated.
Martin B said: "The meaning of estoppel is this - that the parties agreed, for the purpose of a particular transaction, to state certain facts as true; and that, so far as regards that transaction, there shall be no question about them."
The position would be different if the statement had been made for the purpose of concealing an illegal contract, but that was not the case. Nor was it alleged that A had practised a fraud on the defendants. He was alleged to have deceived B and C, when they directed the defendants to give the bond to A, but that did not affect the validity of the bond.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Horton v The Westminster Improvement Commissioners [1852] EngR 729; (1853) 7 Exch 911; (1852) 155 ER 1220
12 Jun 1852


Estoppel, Equity

1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Inhabitants of the Township of Hartington Middle Quarter [1855] 4 ECB 780; [1855] EngR 264; (1855) 4 El & Bl 780; (1855) 119 ER 288
22 Feb 1855

Coleridge J
Estoppel
Coleridge J said: "The question then is, whether the former judgment concludes, not merely as to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide, and which was actually decided, as the groundwork of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue. And we think it does conclude to that extent . . Now, it cannot be said that the facts we are considering were merely collateral to the decision in the former case. The question then was where two unemancipated children were settled: and it was answered by showing that they were the legitimate issue of William and Esther, that is that these two were lawfully married, and the children born after, and that William was settled with the now appellants. Strike either of these facts out, and there is no ground for the decision: these facts therefore were necessarily and directly matter of enquiry. The question now is, where is Esther settled: and this is answered by showing the same two facts, the marriage of Esther and William, and the settlement of William, the two facts already decided. The judgments in the two cases therefore rest on the same foundation; which, having been settled in the first cannot be, as between the same parties, unsettled in the latter."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Cuthbertson v Irving [1859] EngR 767; (1859) 4 H & N 742; (1859) 157 ER 1034; (1859) 4 Hurl & N 742
24 Jun 1859

Martin B
Estoppel, Land
Martin B said: "There are some points in the law relating to estoppels which seem clear. First, when a lessor without any legal estate or title demises to another, the parties themselves are estopped from disputing the validity of the lease on that ground; in other words a tenant cannot deny his landlord's title, nor can the lessor dispute the validity of the lease. Secondly, where a lessor by deed grants a lease without title and subsequently acquires one, the estoppel is said to be fed, and the lease and reversion then take effect in interest and not by estoppel . . ."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Laird v Birkenhead Railway Co; 22-Nov-1859 - (1859) Johns 500; [1859] EngR 1021; (1859) 70 ER 519
 
M'Cance v The London And North Western Railway Company [1861] EngR 967; (1861) 7 H & N 477; (1861) 158 ER 559
19 Nov 1861


Contract, Estoppel
In an action against a railway Company, the first count of the declaration alleged that the plaintiff employed the defendants to provide trucks for the carriage of the plaintiff's horses, for hire to be paid by the plaintiff, in consideration whereof the defendants promised the plaintiff that the trucks should he reasonably fit and proper for the carriage of such horses Breach: that the defendants did not provide fit and proper trucks, whereby the plaritiff's horses were injured. Second count that the defendants having received certain horses of the plaintiff to be carried by railway, in consequence of the defective state of the truck and the negligerice and want of care of the defendants, the plaintiffs horses weie injured. Plea: payment of 25l. into Court Replication damages ultra. At the trial, it appeared that when the plaintiff delivered the horses to the defendants, he signed at their request a declaration that the value of the horses (did not exceed 10l. per horse, and that, on consideration of the rate charged for their conveyance, he thereby agreed that the same were to be carried entirely at the ownet's risk. In the course of the journey the horses were injured in consequence of the defective state of the truck in which they were carried. The horses were worth more than 10l each, and if taken at, their real value the damage sustained by the plaintiff was 65l, but if valued at 10l each the 25l. paid into Court covered the plaintiff's claim. A verdict having been entered for the plantiff for 40l. on motion to enter the verdict for the defendants, the Court being at liberty to draw inferences of fact Held that the plaintiff having made a wilfully false statement as to the value of the horses for the purpose of inducing, and having thereby induced, the defendants to enter into the contract, was not at liberty to shew their real value, in order to obtain compensation above the amount paid into Court -- Semble, that thedeclaration of the value of the horses formed no part of the contract, and that even if it were it did not render the contract a conditional contract --Also, that, the stipulation that the horses should he carried entirely at the owner's risk was not unreasonable and void within the meaning of the 17 & 18 Vict. C 31.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ashpitel (Executor of James Peto) v Bryan [1862] EngR 3 (B); (1862) 3 F & F 183
1862

Mellor J
Contract, Estoppel
Defendant having accepted a bill drawn by procuration in the name of a person deceased, and handed it, indorsed in that name to a third party, held liable to that party ; and held no defence that the consideration was goods, assets of the deceased, in the possession of the endorsee, and that the bill was on an understanding that the indorsee should take out a adminiistration to his estate in the absence of evidence of an express agreement to that effect.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Dillwyn v Llewelyn; ChD 12-Jul-1862 - [1862] EWHC Ch J67; [1862] 45 ER 1284; (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; [1862] EngR 908; (1862) 4 De G F & J 517; (1862) 45 ER 1285
 
Ashpitel, Executor Of James Peto v Bryan [1863] EngR 158; (1863) 3 B & S 474; (1863) 122 ER 179
20 Jan 1863
QBD
Crompton J
Contract, Estoppel
Estoppel. Bill of exchange. Acceptor. Denial of indorsement. - Declaration by the executor of B. upon a bill of exchange purporting to be drawn by A. and accepted by the defendant, and indorsed by A. to B. Plea, that A. did not indorse the bill. It appeared that A., who was possessed of goods, being the stock in trade upon his premises, died intestate indebted to the defendant and other persons ; and it was arranged between B, and the defendant, who were two of his next of kin, that the defendant, should take possession of the goods and accept a bill of exchange for their value, purporting to be drawn and indorsed by A. The goods were accordingly delivered to the defendant, and the bill declared upon was drawn and indorsed to the plaintiff by procuration in the name of A., and accepted by the defendant. Held, that the defendant could not he allowed to set up as a defence to the action that the bill was not indorsed by A.
Cropmton J said: "If it appears . . that, by express agreement between the parties, a bill was drawn and indorsed by procuration in the name of a fictitious or dead person, and the position of one of the parties has been altered, as in the present case, by giving up certain goods to the other, that other is not at liberty afterwards to say that the fact which was assumed as the basis of the contract or arrangement, and upon which the other party acted, and thereby altered his position, was really untrue and that the bill is void."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ashpitel, Executor Of James Peto v Bryan [1864] EngR 575; (1864) 5 B & S 723; (1864) 122 ER 999
14 Jun 1864
CEC
Pollock CB, Williams, Wills JJ, Bramwell and Channell BB
Contract, Estoppel
Bill of exchange. Acceptor. Denial of indorsement. Account stated. - Declaration by the executor of B. upon a bill of exchange purporting to be drawn by A. and accepted by the defendant, and indorsed by A. to B. ; with a count upon accounts stated. It appeared that A., who was possessed of goods, being the stock in trade upon his premises, died intestate, and indebted to the defendant and other persons ; and it was arranged between B. and the defendant, who were two of his next of kin, that the defendant should take possession of the goods and accept a bill of exchange for their value, purporting to be drawn and indorsed by A. The goods were accordingly delivered to the defendant, and the bill declared upon was drawn and indorsed to the plaintiff by procuration in the name of A., and accepted by the defendant. Held: affirming the judgrtlerit of the Queen's Bench ; that the defendant could not be allowed to set up as a defence to the action that the bill was not indorsed by A.-2. Semble. That the bill was evidence of an account stated.
Pollock CB said: "We all agree with the Court below that there may arise an estoppel by agreement, and that such an estoppel arises here. The parties agreed that the transaction should have this character, viz, that the defendant should appear to have bought the goods of John Peto, and that therefore the bill should be drawn and indorsed in the name of John Peto, and it was afterwards accepted by the defendant on the basis of that agreement. The defendant having accepted the bill after it had been drawn and indorsed in that name, and having promised payment of it, now says that it was not drawn and indorsed by John Peto; but he is estopped from doing so."
1 Cites

[ Commonlii ]
 
M'Cance v The London And North Western Railway Company [1864] EngR 595; (1864) 3 H & C 343; (1864) 159 ER 563
20 Jun 1864

Williams J
Contract, Estoppel
The plaintff contracted with the defendant for the transport of horses, understating their value. On their loss, the plaintiff sought their full value. The defendant had succeeded in limiting the award to the value stated. Held: Williams J cited with approval Blackburn's statement in his Treaty on the Contract of Sale that "when parties have agreed to act upon an assumed state of facts their rights between themselves are justly made to depend on the conventional state of facts, and not on the truth."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Ramsden v Dyson; HL 1866 - [1866] LR 1 HL 129; [1866] 12 Jur NS 506
 
Re The Bahia and San Francisco Railway Co Ltd v Trittin and others (1868) LR 3 QB 584
1868
CA
Lord Cockburn CJ, Blackburn J, Lush J, Mellor J
Company, Estoppel
Miss Trittin left her share certificates with a broker. A forged transfer together with the certificates, was lodged with and with registered by the company. The new certificates certified that the named person as registered holder. He then sold them to innocent purchasers who in turn lodged transfers and certificates and obtained certificates in their own names. The company had become obliged to restore Miss Trittin's name to the register but refused to recognise the innocent purchasers as shareholders. A special case was stated for the opinion of the Court between the innocent purchasers as claimants and the company for the purpose of determining the amount of damages (if any) which the company was liable to pay them respectively. Held: The claimant succeeded.
Lord Cockburn CJ: "This power of granting certificates is to give the shareholders the opportunity of more easily dealing with their shares in the market, and to afford facilities to them of selling their shares by at once showing a marketable title, and the effect of this facility is to make the shares of greater value. The power of giving certificates is, therefore, for the benefit of the company in general; and it is a declaration by the company to all the world that the person in whose name the certificate is made out, and to whom it is given, is a shareholder in the company, and it is given by the company with the intention that it shall be so used by the person to whom it is given, and acted upon in the sale and transfer of shares. It is stated in this case that the claimants acted bona fide, and did all that is required of purchasers of shares; they paid the value of the shares in money on having a transfer of the shares executed to them, and on the production of the certificates which were handed to them. It turned out that the transferors had in fact no shares, and that the company ought not to have registered them as shareholders or given them certificates, the transfer to them being a forgery. That brings the case within the principle of the decision in Pickard –v- Sears [6 AD & E 469] as explained by the case of Freeman –v- Cooke [2 Ex 654] that if you make a representation with the intention that it shall be acted upon by another, and he does so, you are estopped from denying the truth of what you represent to be the fact."
Blackburn J referred to the Companies Act and said:- "The statute further provides that the company may give certificates specifying the shares held by the member; and the object of this provision is expressly stated to be that this certificate should be prima facie evidence of the title of the person named to the shares specified; and the company, therefore, by granting the certificate, do make a statement that they have transferred the shares specified to the person to whom it is given, and that he is the holder of the shares. If they have been deceived and the statement is not perfectly true, they may not be guilty of negligence, but the company and no-one else have power to enquire into the matter; and it was the intention of the legislature that these certificates should be documents on which buyers might safely act," and "…. it is quite clear that a statement of a fact was made by the company, on which the company, at the very least, knew that persons wanting to purchase shares might act."
Lush J referred to the certificate given by the company to the fraudsters:- "And the claimants having acted on this statement by the company, there arises an estoppel as against the company, prohibiting them from denying that what it states is true. And the question then is, what does the certificate mean? Does it mean merely, that [the fraudsters' names] are on the register, and the company have done their best to ascertain that they are entitled to the shares, but cannot say whether they are so entitled? Or does it amount to a statement that the company take upon themselves the responsibility of asserting that they are the registered shareholders entitled to the specific shares? I think the certificate must amount to the latter assertion. It is the company who are to keep and look after the register, and they are the only persons who have control over it, and they can refuse to register a person until he shews that he is legally entitled. Having, therefore, put the names of [the fraudsters] upon the register, and granted them a certificate, the company are estopped after that statement has been acted upon and cannot deny that those persons were the legal holders of the particular shares which have been transferred to the claimants. The claimants, therefore, are entitled to recover from the company the value of the shares at the time when they were deprived of them."
1 Citers


 
Brooke v Haynes [1868] 6 LR Eq 25
1868
CA
Lord Romilly MR
Equity, Estoppel
Lord Romilly MR said: "A party to a deed is not estopped in equity from averring against or offering evidence to controvert a recital therein contrary to the fact, which has been introduced into the deed by mistake of fact, and not through fraud or deception on his part."
1 Citers


 
Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139
1870

Blackburn J
Estoppel, International
A judgment in personam of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction cannot be questioned by the parties on the merits when recognition or enforcement of the judgment is sought in England, notwithstanding that it may have been wrong either in fact or law. This derived from the mode of pleading an action on a foreign judgment in debt, and not merely as evidence of the obligation to pay the underlying liability.
1 Citers



 
 Oastler v Henderson; 1877 - [1877] 2 QBD 575

 
 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co; HL 1877 - [1877] 2 App Cas 439; [1877] 46 LJQB 583; [1877] UKHL 1
 
Baxendale v Bennett [1878] 3 QBD 525; 3 CPD 32
1878
CA
Bramwell LJ
Estoppel
"All estoppels are odious" They should not be upheld unless they satisfy precisely the provisions of the law.
1 Citers


 
Simm and Others v Anglo-American Telegraph Co (1879) 5 QBD 188
1879
CA
Brett LJ, Cotton LJ
Estoppel, Company
A firm which had acted through nominees sought to raise an estoppel as to its status on the company registers. Held: The nominees acquired a "title by estoppel" against the company following the issue by the company of a share certificate to the nominees. But that "title" had been lost by the time the action began and was not available to Burge & Co. No representation was made which they had acted upon. Even if there had been a representation, that firm had not altered their position in any material way.
1 Citers



 
 Willmott v Barber; 1880 - (1880) 15 Ch D 96
 
Wilmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96
1880
ChD
Fry J
Estoppel, Land
Fry J set out the test of unconscionability: "A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights. What, then, are the elements or requisites necessary to constitute fraud of that description. In the first place the plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights. Secondly, the plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done some act (not necessarily upon the defendant's land) on the faith of his mistaken belief. Thirdly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff. If he does not know of it he is in the same position as the plaintiff, and the doctrine of acquiescence is founded upon conduct with a knowledge of your legal rights. Fourthly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the plaintiff's mistaken belief of his rights. If he does not, there is nothing which calls upon him to assert his own rights. Lastly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or in the other acts which he has done, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right. Where all these elements exist, there is fraud of such a nature as will entitle the court to restrain the possessor of the legal right from exercising it, but, in my judgment, nothing short of this will do."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Hutchings; 1881 - (1881) 6 QBD 300
 
Scarf v Jardine [1882] 7 AC 345
1882
HL
Lord Blackburn, Lord Selborne LC
Litigation Practice, Estoppel, Contract
If there has been a conclusive election by the plaintiffs to adopt the liability of one of two persons, alternatively liable, they cannot afterwards make the other liable. The two claims are mutually exclusive or impossible in law. To establish an estoppel it must be shown that the person seeking to assert an estoppel has acted on the faith of the representation: "I put rather an emphasis on those last words 'against those who acted upon the faith that the authority continued.'"
An election to avoid a contract is not completed until the decision has been communicated to the other side "in such a way as to lead the opposite party to believe that he has made that choice".
'Novation' is a term derived from the civil law and therefore from Roman law. A novation operates where: "there being a contract in existence, some new contract is substituted for it, either between the same parties (for that might be) or between different parties; the consideration mutually being the discharge of the old contract."
Lord Blackburn said: "The principle, I take it, running through all the cases as to what is an election is this, that where a party in his own mind has thought that he would choose one of two remedies, even though he has written it down on a memorandum or has indicated it in some other way, that alone will not bind him; but so soon as he has not only determined to follow one of his remedies but has communicated it to the other side in such a way as to lead the opposite party to believe that he has made that choice, he has completed his election and can go no further; and whether he intended it or not, if he has done an unequivocal act - I mean an act which would be justifiable if he had elected one way and would not be justifiable if he had elected the other way -the fact of his having done that unequivocal act to the knowledge of the persons concerned is an election."
1 Citers


 
Birmingham and District Land Co v London and North Western Railway (1886) 40 ChD 268
1886
CA
Cotton LJ, Fry LJ, Bowen LJ
Contract, Estoppel
The court considered the creation of an estoppel: Cotton LJ: " … what passed did not make a new agreement, but . . . what took place . . . raised an equity against him."
Bowen LJ said: "The truth is that the proposition is wider than cases of forfeiture. It seems to me to amount to this, that if persons who have contractual rights against others induce by their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe that such rights will either not be enforced or will be kept in suspense or abeyance for some particular time, those persons will not be allowed by a Court of Equity to enforce the rights until such time has elapsed, without at all events placing the parties in the same position as they were before. That is the principle to be applied. I will not say it is not a principle that was recognised by Courts of Law as well as of Equity. It is not necessary to consider how far it was always a principle of common law."
Fry LJ considered that there was an essential difference between a claim for damages for breach of a contract and a claim for an indemnity under an express provision in a contract.
1 Citers


 
Reichel v Magrath [1889] 14 App Cas 665
1889
PC
Lord Halsbury
Litigation Practice, Estoppel
The new vicar of Sparsholt, Dr Magrath, was able to rely on the abuse of process even though he had not been party to earlier proceedings between Reichel and the Bishop of Oxford and the Queen's College and so was not bound by any issue estoppel arising out of those proceedings.
Lord Halsbury said: "I think it will be a scandal to the administration of justice if, the same question having been disposed of by one case, the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to set up the same case again".
1 Citers



 
 Low v Bouverie; CA 1891 - [1891] 3 Ch 82
 
In re Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines Ltd [1893] Ch 618
1893
CA
Bowen LJ
Estoppel, Company
Bowen LJ: (referring to Bahia) "The way in which the Court made the company liable was this: they said that in as much as the certificate had been intended to be acted upon, it became a document the truth of which the company could not deny as against the transferee to whom it was intended to be shewn; and, therefore, it precluded the company, as against the transferee, from denying the truth of what the certificate contained; they could not be in any better position than if the statement were true;"
1 Citers


 
Re de Burgho's Estate [1896] IR 274
1896

Madden J
Litigation Practice, Estoppel
The court considered the necessary elements of issue estoppel: "According to the clear principles of the law of estoppel, it is necessary, in order to estop the objector, to show that he derives title under Dwyer by act or operation of law subsequent to the recovery of the judgment. If this is shown it is reasonable that he should be estopped, because his estate was represented at the time of the recovery of the judgment though not in his person."
1 Citers


 
Van Grutten v Foxwell [1897] AC 658
1897

Lord Macnaghten, Lord Herschell
Estoppel, Health
It would be dangerous to allow a jury, eight years after the event, to decide that a woman executing a deed had been incompetent to do so when at the time she had been certified competent. It is one thing to put the rule in a nutshell and another to keep it there (Lord Macnaghten).
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Bloomenthal v Ford [1897] AC 156
1897
HL
Lord Herschell
Equity, Estoppel
There is no need, and indeed it is wrong, to introduce into the common law notion of estoppel, the equitable doctrine of the bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
1 Citers


 
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