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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Estoppel - From: 1800 To: 1849

This page lists 9 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Outram v Morewood (1803) 3 East 346; [1803] 102 ER 630; [1803] EngR 498
1803

Lord Ellenborough
Estoppel
Where a fact or title had been put at issue between the parties in an action for trespass, the ensuing verdict creates an estoppel preventing the same parties relitigating that fact or title. Of a finding of trespass, in relation to some coal lying close under the land of the plaintiff, the court said: "A finding upon title in trespass not only operates as a bar to the future recovery of damages for a trespass founded on the same injury, but also operates by way of estoppel to any action for an injury through the same supposed right of possession."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Taylor v Neeham [1810] 2 Taunt 278
1810

Mansfield CJ
Estoppel, Land
“It would be a very odd in the law of any country, if A could take by any form of conveyance, a greater or better right than he had who conveys it to him; it would be contrary to all principle. But it does not rest merely on the general principle; if you look into all the books upon estoppel, you find it laid down, that parties and privies are not estopped, and he who takes an estate under a deed, is privy in estate, and therefore never can be in a better situation than he from whom he takes it.”
1 Citers


 
Gregory v Mighell (1811) 18 Ves 328
1811


Estoppel

1 Citers


 
Dunn v Murray [1829] EngR 602; (1829) 9 B & C 780; (1829) 109 ER 290
8 Jul 1829


Contract, Estoppel
Declaration stated, that in consideration that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, would enter into the employ of the defendant in a certain capacity for a year, at the rate of five guineas per week throughout the year, defendant undertook to employ him for a year, and alleged as a breach that the defendant dismissed the plaintiff from his employ before the end of the year without any reasonable or probable cause.
The declaration contained counts for wages, and for work and labour, &c. The cause, which was commenced before the expiration of the year, was referred to an arbitrator, who awarded to the plaintiff a sum of money equivalent in amount to the wages he would have been entitled to receive from the defendant on the day when the action was commenced. No claim was made before the arbitrator for any compensation in damages for the dismissal, except so far as the special count in the declaration, and the evidence of the employment and the dismissal might amount to such a claim. The plaintiff having afterwards brought an action to recover compensation in damages in consequence of the dismissal from the deferidant’s employ before the end of the year; it was held, that the award of the arbitrator was a bar to such action.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Carpenter v Buller [1840] EngR 840; (1840) 2 M & Rob 298; (1840) 174 ER 295 (A)
29 Jul 1840


Estoppel

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Carpenter v Buller [1841] EngR 552; (1841) 8 M & W 209; (1841) 151 ER 1013
28 Apr 1841

Parke B
Estoppel
The defence to an action of trespass was that the defendant was seised of the land in question. He produced a deed, made between himself, the plaintiff and a third party, in which this was stated to be the case Held: The plaintiff was not estopped from denying the defendant's seisin because the action was not brought on the deed which did not directly concern the land. The doctrine of estoppel as it applies to recitals extends also to instruments not by deed.
Parke B said: "If a distinct statement of a particular fact is made in the recital of a bond, or other instrument under seal, and a contract is made with reference to that recital, it is unquestionably true, that, as between the parties to that instrument, and in an action upon it, it is not competent for the party bound to deny the recital, notwithstanding what Lord Coke says on the matter of recital in Coke Littleton, 352; and a recital in instruments not under seal may be such as to be conclusive to the same extent . . By his contract in the instrument itself, a party is assuredly bound, and must fulfil it. But there is no authority to show that a party to the instrument would be estopped, in an action by the other party, not founded on the deed, and wholly collateral to it, to dispute the facts so admitted, though the recitals would certainly be evidence."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Cottingham v Earl of Shrewsbury (1843) 3 Hare 627
1843

Sir James Wigram V-C
Estoppel
"If a plaintiff can not get at his right without trying and deciding a case between Co-defendants the Court will try and decide that case, and the Co-defendants will be bound. But, if the relief given to the Plaintiff does not require or involve a decision of any case between Co-defendants, the Co-defendants will not be bound as between each other by any proceeding which may be necessary only to the decree the Plaintiff obtains"
1 Citers


 
Lyon v Reed (1844) 13 M&W 285; [1843-60] All ER Rep 178
1844

Baron Parke
Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel
The court examined the principle of the surrender of a lease by operation of law: “. . . all the old cases will be found to depend on the principle to which we have adverted, namely, an act done by or to the owner of a particular estate, the validity of which he is estopped from disputing, and which could not have been done if the particular estate continued to exist. The law there says, that the act itself amounts to a surrender. In such case it will be observed there can be no question of intention. The surrender is not the result of intention. It takes place independently, and even in spite of intention. Thus, in the cases which we have adverted to of a lessee taking a second lease from the lessor, or a tenant for life accepting a feoffment from the party in remainder, or a lessee accepting a rent-charge from his lessor, it would not at all alter the case to show that there was no intention to surrender the particular estate, or even that there was an express intention to keep it unsurrendered. In all these cases the surrender would be the act of the law, and would prevail in spite of the intention of the parties.”
Baron Parke: "In order to ascertain how far ... cases can be relied on as authorities, we must consider what is meant by a surrender by operation of law. This term is applied to cases where the owner of a particular estate has been a party to some act, the validity of which he is by law afterwards estopped from disputing, and which would not be valid if his particular estate had continued to exist. There the law treats the doing of such act as amounting to a surrender. Thus, if a lessee for years accept a new lease for his lessor, he is estopped from saying that his lessor had not power to make the new lease; and, as the lessor could not do this until the prior lease had been surrendered, the law says that the acceptance of such new lease is of itself a surrender..." and "If we apply these principles to the case now before us, it will be seen that they do not at all warrant the conclusion, that there was a surrender of the lease of the 7th of April, 1812, by act and operation of law. Even adopting, as we do, the argument of the plaintiff, that the delivery up by Ord and Planta of the lease in question affords cogent evidence of their having consented to the making of the new lease, still there is no estoppel in such a case. It is an act which, like any other ordinary act in pais, is capable of being explained, and its effect must therefore depend, not on any legal consequence necessarily attaching on and arising out of the act itself, but on the intention of the parties." and "The acts in pais which bind parties by way of estoppel are but few, and are pointed out by Lord Coke, Co Litt, 352a. They are all acts which anciently really were, and in contemplation of law have always continued to be, acts of notoriety, not less formal and solemn than the execution of a deed, such as livery, entry, acceptance of an estate, and the like. Whether a party had or had not concurred in an act of this sort, was deemed a matter which there could be no difficulty in ascertaining, and then the legal consequences followed. But in what uncertainty and peril will titles be placed, if they are liable to be affected by such accidents as those alluded to by Mr Justice Bayley."
1 Citers


 
Freeman And Another, Assignees of William Broadbent v Cooke (1848) 2 Exch 554; 6 Dow & L 187; [1843-60] All ER Rep 185; [1848] EngR 687; (1848) 154 ER 652
1 Jul 1848


Contract, Estoppel
Where a party creates a belief in another's mind, and causes the other to act upon that belief, he will not in subsequent court proceedings be heard to deny that belief: "a party who negigently of culpably stands by and allows another to contract on the faith of a fact which he can contradict, cannot afterwards dispoute that fact in an action against the party who he has himself assisted in deceiving."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
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