Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Equity - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 25 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
The Olympic Pride (Etablissements Georges et Paul Levy v Adderley Navigation Co Panama SA [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 67
1980

Mustill J
Equity, Contract
In the case of a bilateral transaction, there must be convincing proof that the concluded instrument does not represent the common intention of the parties to allow rectification. The policy reason for the need for convincing proof is that certainty and ready enforceability of transactions would otherwise be hindered by constant attempts to cloud the issue.
Mustill J said: "The prior transaction may consist either of a concluded agreement or of a continuing common intention. In the latter event, the intention must have been objectively manifested. It is the words and acts of the parties demonstrating their intention, not the inward thoughts of the parties, which matter."
1 Citers


 
A v C (Note) [1981] QB 956; [1980] 2 All ER 347
1980
ChD
Robert Goff J
Litigation Practice, Equity
The plaintiffs said the first defendant had defrauded them of substantial sums, and implicated other defendants. They claimed against five defendants variously for conspiracy to defraud and deceit and for breach of warranty. They also sought to trace the sum of £383,872 paid under a mistake of fact induced by fraud, into an account with a further defendant, a bank. That was the only claim against the bank. They had obtained a Mareva Injunction ex parte, against the fraud defendants, and an injunction restraining them all from disposing of the sum of £383,872 if a lesser sum stood to their credit in accounts with the bank. The court was asked what orders could be made to assist the tracing, including disclosure of bank accounts wherever held. Held: The court may make orders with the purpose of ascertaining the whereabouts of missing trust funds, even though a Mareva order over bank accounts generally could be oppressive. However without that information, the plaintiff may be unable to volunteer the undertakings expected of him. In limited cases where the court decides to make Mareva orders, it may make such disclosure orders as are necessary to ensure that the Mareva jurisdiction is properly and effectively exercised.
An ancillary disclosure order, made in conjunction with an asset preservation order, relies on the same source of jurisdiction as supports the asset preservation order.
Goff J distinguished between Mareva and conventional interlocutory injunctions in aid of a proprietary claim to a fund, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction to restrain the defendants from disposing of the trust fund or what remained of it, quite apart from the Mareva jurisdiction.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393
1980

Buckley LJ, Browne-Wilkinson LJ, Waller LJ
Equity, Company
It had been alleged that there had been a conspiracy involving the company giving unlawful financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares. Held: Dishonesty is not a necessary ingredient of liability in an allegation of a 'knowing receipt'. The court was not swayed by the parties having obtained counsel's advice that the scheme was lawful, apparently on the basis that: "if all the facts which make the transaction unlawful were known to the parties . . ignorance of the law will not excuse them" and "A limited company is of course not a trustee of its own funds: it is their beneficial owner; but in consequence of the fiduciary character of their duties the directors of a limited company are treated as if they were trustees of those funds."
Brown-Wilkinson LJ: ". . . If a transaction falls within the objects, and therefore the capacity, of the company, it is not ultra vires the company and accordingly it is not absolutely void. (5) If a company enters into a transaction which is intra vires (as being within its capacity) but in excess or abuse of its powers, such transaction will be set aside at the instance of the shareholders. (6) A third party who has notice - actual or constructive - that a transaction, although intra vires the company, was entered into in excess or abuse of the powers of the company cannot enforce such transaction against the company and will be accountable as constructive trustee for any money or property of the company received by the third party. (7) The fact that a power is expressly or impliedly limited so as to be exercisable only “for the purposes of the company’s business” (or other words to that effect) does not put a third party on inquiry as to whether the power is being so exercised, i.e. such provision does not give him constructive notice of excess or abuse of such power.”
Buckley LJ: "In my judgment, the alleged conspiracy is established in respect of these three defendants, and they are not exempt from liability on account of counsel's opinion or because they may have believed in good faith that the transaction did not transgress s 54. If all the facts which make the transaction unlawful were known to the parties, as I think they were, ignorance of the law will not excuse them: see Churchill v Walton ([1967] 2 AC 224 at 237). That case was one of criminal conspiracy, but it seems to me that precisely similar principles must apply to a conspiracy for which a civil remedy is sought. Nor, in my opinion, can the fact that their ignorance of, or failure to appreciate, the unlawful nature of the transaction was due to the unfortunate fact that they were, as I think, erroneously advised excuse them (Cooper v Simmons, and see Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions, where the appellant had taken professional legal advice).
If they had sincerely believed in a factual state of affairs which, if true, would have made their actions legal, this would have afforded a defence (Kamara v Director of Public Prosecutions ([1974] AC 104 at 119)); but on my view of the effect of s 54 in the present case, even if £500,000 had been a fair price for the share capital of Maximum and all other benefits under the agreement, this would not have made the agreement legal."
Waller LJ: "A person is a party to a conspiracy if he knows the essential facts to constitute that conspiracy even though he does not know that they constitute an offence (see Churchill v Walton). Since there was a breach of s 54 and the defendants through their directors made all the arrangements and knew all the facts constituting the breach, it would follow that they conspired together to contravene s 54, the object of their conspiracy being Belmont, and if Belmont suffered damage they are liable."
Companies Act 1948 54
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In re Gray's Inn Construction Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 711
1980
CA
Buckley, Goff LJJ and Sir David Cairns
Equity, Insolvency, Banking
After the presentation of a petition for the winding up of the company moneys were paid in and out of the company's bank account which was overdrawn. The liquidator issued a summons for a declaration that the amounts credited and/or debited to the account by the bank during the relevant period constituted dispositions of the company's property which were void under s.227 of the Companies Act 1948. The liquidator further sought an order that the bank pay those moneys to the liquidator as constituting dispositions of the property of the company. Held: In the exercise of the court's discretion whether to make a validation order, the overriding principle is that the court must always do its best to ensure that the interests of the unsecured creditors will not be prejudiced. On an application for a validation order in the period between the presentation of the petition and its hearing, the court will need to be satisfied that it is in the interests of the creditors generally that the transaction should be allowed to proceed.
Buckley LJ said: "When a customer's account with his banker is overdrawn he is a debtor to his banker for the amount of the overdraft. When he pays a sum of money into the account, whether in cash or by payments in of a third party's cheque, he discharges his indebtedness to the bank pro tanto. There is clearly in those circumstances, in my judgment, a disposition by the company to the bank of the amount of the cash or of the cheque."
After stating that in the case before the court the company's account with the bank was overdrawn, he said: "Mr Heslop does not dispute that all payments out of the company's account to third parties, not being payments to agents of the company as such are dispositions of the company's property; . . That all such payments out must be dispositions of the company's property is, I think, indisputable . ."
Companies Act 1948 227
1 Citers



 
 Thomas Bates and Sons Ltd v Wyndham's Lingerie Ltd; CA 21-Nov-1980 - [1981] 1 WLR 505; [1980] EWCA Civ 3; [1981] 1 All ER 1077
 
In re Cleaver dec'd, Cleaver v Insley [1981] 1 WLR 939; [1981] 2 All ER 1018
1981
ChD
Nourse J
Wills and Probate, Equity
Cases of mutual wills are only one example of a wider category of cases, for example secret trusts, in which a court of equity will intervene to impose a constructive trust.
Nourse J said: "The principle of all these cases is that a court of equity will not permit a person to whom property is transferred by way of gift, but on the faith of an agreement or clear understanding that it is to be dealt with in a particular way for the benefit of a third person, to deal with that property inconsistently with that agreement or understanding. An enforceable agreement to dispose of property in pursuance of mutual wills can be established only by clear and satisfactory evidence."
Equity does not protect the beneficiary under mutual wills merely because the wills have been made in identical or almost identical terms. There must be evidence of an agreement to create interests under mutual wills which are intended to be irrevocable after the death of the first person to die. Nourse J said: "It is therefore clear that there must be a definite agreement between the makers of the two wills; that that must be established by evidence; that the fact that there are mutual wills to the same effect is a relevant circumstance to be taken into account, although not enough of itself; and that the whole of the evidence must be looked at."
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd; CA 1981 - [1982] AC 584; [1981] 2 All ER 449; [1981] 2 WLR 893
 
Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich [1981] 1 WLR 1265; [1981] 2 All ER 650
1981
CA
Oliver LJ
Banking, Damages, Equity
A combination of defences based on delay was pleaded in a passing off action objecting to the use of a name which the defendants had been using without objection for many years. A permanent injunction was claimed. Held: Oliver LJ said as to the availability of damages in a case of acquiescence to the breach of a contract: "that the test requires a much broader approach which is directed at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment." The court approved a statement in the court below: "Of course, estoppel by conduct has been a field of the law in which there has been considerable expansion over the years and it appears to me that it is essentially the application of a rule by which justice is done where the circumstances of the conduct and behaviour of the party to an action are such that it would be wholly inequitable that he should be entitled to succeed in the proceeding." The court favoured a broad approach to the problem of inequitable or unconscionable conduct by long delay, rather than one turning on historical distinctions between the assertion of equitable rights and the enforcement rights by equitable means
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd; ChD 1981 - [1982] QB 133; [1981] 2 WLR 576; [1981] 1 All ER 897; [1979] 251 EG 159; [1979] EWHC Ch 1
 
East v Pantiles Plant Hire Ltd [1982] 2 EGLR 111; (1981) 263 EG 61
1981
CA
Brightman, Lawton and Oliver LJJ
Contract, Equity
The court considered the circumstances under which rectification could properly be ordered in respect of a deed. Brightman LJ said: "It is clear on the authorities that a mistake in a written instrument can, in certain limited circumstances, be corrected as a matter of construction without obtaining a decree in an action for rectification. Two conditions must be satisfied: first, there must be a clear mistake on the face of the instrument; secondly, it must be clear what correction ought to be made in order to cure the mistake. If those conditions are satisfied, then the correction is made as a matter of construction. If they are not satisfied then either the claimant must pursue an action for rectification or he must leave it to a court of construction to reach what answer it can on the basis that the uncorrected wording represents the manner in which the parties decided to express their intention. In Snell's Principles of Equity 27th ed p 611 the principle of rectification by construction is said to apply only to obvious clerical blunders or grammatical mistakes. I agree with that approach. Perhaps it might be summarised by saying that the principle applies where a reader with sufficient experience of the sort of document in issue would inevitably say to himself, "Of course X is a mistake for Y"."
1 Citers


 
Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105
1981

Goulding J
Banking, Equity
Goulding J approved the statement in Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: "the receiving of money which consistently with conscience cannot be retained is, in equity, sufficient to raise a trust in favour of the party for whom or on whose account it was received. This is the governing principle in all such cases. And therefore, whenever any controversy arises, the true question is, not whether money has been received by a party of which he could not have compelled the payment, but whether he can now, with a safe conscience, ex aequo et bono, retain it."
1 Citers



 
 Hydro Electric Commission of Nepean v Ontario Hydro; 1982 - (1982) 132 DLR (3d) 193

 
 Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd (in Liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd; CA 1982 - [1982] QB 84; [1981] 1 All ER 923; [1981] 2 WLR 554; [1982] 1 Lloyds Rep 27
 
Dennis v McDonald [1982] Fam 63
1982
CA
Purchas J, Sir John Arnold P
Land, Equity
The plaintiff and defendant had lived together in a house held in their joint names. The woman left the home as a result of the man's violence, and he kept up the mortgage payments. Held: If in order to do equity between the parties an occupation rent should be paid, this would be declared and the appropriate inquiry ordered. Only in cases where the tenants in common not in occupation were in a position to enjoy their right to occupy but chose not to do so voluntarily, and were not excluded by any relevant factor, would the tenant in common in occupation be entitled to do so free of liability to pay an occupation rent. He held that the woman was not a free agent. She was caused to leave the family home as a result of the violence or threatened violence of the defendant. She fell within the category of person excluded from the property "the basic principle that a tenant in common is not liable to pay an occupation rent by virtue merely of his being in sole occupation of the property does not apply in the case where an association similar to a matrimonial association has broken down and one party is, for practical purposes, excluded from the family home."
1 Citers


 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 46 ALR 402
1983

Mason J, Deane J
Commonwealth, Contract, Equity
(Australia) "it is necessary for the plaintiff who seeks relief to establish unconscionable conduct, namely that unconscientious advantage has been taken of his disabling condition or circumstances" Deane J: "Unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of the stronger party in attempting to enforce, or obtain the benefit of, a dealing with a person under a special disability in circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he should do so. The adverse circumstances which may constitute special disability for the purposes of the principles relating to relief against unconscionable conduct may take a wide variety of forms and are not susceptible to being comprehensively catalogued."
1 Citers


 
Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] 2 AC 694; [1983] 2 AC 694; [1983] 2 All ER 763; [1983] 3 WLR 203
1983
HL
Diplock, Keith of Kinkel, Scarman, Roskill and Bridge of Harwick LL
Transport, Damages, Contract, Equity
The House considered giving relief from forfeiture where an owner had justifiably withdrawn his vessel in accordance with the terms of the charter. Held: A withdrawal clause under a time charter, exercised on the ground of the charterer's failure to make punctual payment of an instalment of hire, was not subject to the equitable right to relief against forfeiture, even though it involved the loss of a valuable charter. Such rights of withdrawal are usually exercised where the market rate of hire is substantially above the charter rate. The remedy of relief from forfeiture was unavailable in part because a Court of Equity would not grant specific performance in respect of it.
The House distinguished between merely contractual rights, and contracts concerning the transfer or creation of proprietary or possessory rights. The House warned against the wholesale importation into commercial law of equitable principles inconsistent with the certainty and speed which are essential requirements for the orderly conduct of business affairs.
An injunction restraining the ship owner from exercising his right of withdrawal of the vessel (a contractual right given to him under the charter) was to be equated with an order for specific performance.
Lord Diplock said: "A time charter, unless it is a charter by demise, with which your Lordships are not here concerned, transfers to the charterer no interest in or right to possession of the vessel; it is a contract for services to be rendered to the charterer by the shipowner through the use of the vessel by the shipowner's own servants, the master and the crew, acting in accordance with such directions as to the cargoes to be loaded and the voyages to be undertaken as by the terms of the charterparty the charterer is entitled to give to them. Being a contract for services it is thus the very prototype of a contract of which before the fusion of law and equity a court would never grant specific performance: Clarke v Price (1819) 2 Wils. 157; Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De G.M & G. 604. In the event of failure to render the promised services, the party to whom they were to be rendered would be left to pursue such remedies in damages for breach of contract as he might have at law. But as an unbroken line of uniform authority in this House, from Tankexpress [1949] A.C. 76 to A/S Awilco of Oslo v Fulvia S.p.A. di Navigazione of Cagliari (The Chikuma) [1981] 1 WLR 314, has held, if the withdrawal clause so provides, the shipowner is entitled to withdraw the services of the vessel from the charterer if the latter fails to pay an instalment of hire in precise compliance with the provisions of the charter. So the shipowner commits no breach of contract if he does so; and the charterer has no remedy in damages against him. To grant an injunction restraining the shipowner from exercising his right of withdrawal of the vessel from the service of the charterer, though negative in form, is pregnant with an affirmative order to the shipowner to perform the contract; juristically it is indistinguishable from a decree for specific performance of a contract to render services; and in respect of that category of contracts, even in the event of breach, this is a remedy that English courts have always disclaimed any jurisdiction to grant. This is, in my view, sufficient reason in itself to compel rejection of the suggestion that the equitable principle of relief from forfeiture is juristically capable of extension so as to grant to the court a discretion to prevent a shipowner from exercising his strict contractual rights under a withdrawal clause in a time charter which is not a charter by demise."
Lord Diplock said that his judgment was concerned only with time charters that were not by demise: "the reasoning in my speech has been directed exclusively to time charters that are not by demise. Identical considerations would not be applicable to bareboat charters and it would in my view be unwise for your Lordships to express any views about them."
. . And: "The classic form of penalty clause is one which provides that upon breach of a primary obligation under the contract a secondary obligation shall arise on the part of the party in breach to pay to the other party a sum of money which does not represent a genuine pre-estimate of any loss likely to be sustained by him as the result of the breach of primary obligation but is substantially in excess of that sum. The classic form of relief against such a penalty clause has been to refuse to give effect to it, but to award the common law measure of damages for the breach of primary obligation instead."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Keen v Holland [1984] 1 WLR 251; [1984] 1 All ER 75; (1983) 47 P and CR 639
1984
CA
Oliver LJ
Equity, Estoppel
Oliver LJ rejected a submission that, where parties were shown to have a common view about the legal effect of a contract into which they had entered and it was established that one of them would not, to the other's knowledge, have entered into it if that party had appreciated its true legal effect, they are estopped from asserting that the effect was otherwise than the party originally supposed. He said that that submission could not be right and that he could not see how an erroneous belief as to the effect of the contract could properly be described as a "conventional basis for dealings" so as to give rise to an estoppel, and "the jurisdiction to grant possession is exercisable only subject to the statutory provisions and it is a little difficult to see how the parties can, by estoppel , confer on the court a jurisdiction which they could not confer by express agreement"
1 Citers



 
 Agip SpA v Navigazione Alta Italia SpA, "The Nai Genova"; CA 1984 - [1984] 1 Lloyds Law Reports 353
 
Sport Internationaal Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 776
1984
CA
Oliver LJ
Contract, Equity
There had been a contractual licence to use names and trademarks for sports shoes. An earlier action between the parties had been stayed on the terms scheduled to a Tomlin order, which provided for Inter-Footwear to pay £105,000 in three instalments and to have a licence (partly exclusive and partly non-exclusive) to use the names and marks. If any instalment was not paid on the due date, the whole unpaid balance became due at once and the licensor could determine the licence. There was a delay in payment of the second instalment and the licensor terminated the licence. Held: The court had no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture. Oliver LJ said that taken at its narrowest The Scaptrade case "may be said to establish no more than this: that the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture does not extend to a time charter not being a charter by demise. There is, however, the more general proposition to be derived from it, that, even where the primary object of the insertion of a forfeiture clause may be said to be to secure the payment of money or the performance of some other obligation, the equitable jurisdiction does not extend to contracts which do not involve the transfer or creation of proprietary or possessory rights." There is a need for certainty in commercial contracts and the court doubted whether the licensor's right to terminate the licence in the event of default could be primarily a security for the payment of money: "This is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, but, in fact, there appears to us to be another reason why the equitable jurisdiction to grant relief could not apply to a case such as this. The case is one of contract only and, in so far as there were any rights created or transferred which could be described as "proprietary", they were rights which rested only in contract and to that extent distinguishable from the legal estate created by the grant of a lease or a mortgage. Assuming that relief were capable of being granted, effectively it could be granted only by compelling the plaintiffs to re-grant the permission which had been revoked. An exclusive licence to use a trade mark creates no estate, although it enables the licensee to obtain an injunction if the licensor, in breach of contract, seeks to use the mark in competition with him. Thus, effectively, the licensee applying for relief from forfeiture is in exactly the same position as the charterer in [The Scaptrade]."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Thames Guaranty v Campbell [1984] 3 WLR 109; [1984] 2 All ER 585
1984
CA

Equity, Land
A married couple bought a house in joint names. The husband borrowed from T and agreed to charge the land. When the property had been registered, he ordered the solicitors to deposit the land certificate with T as security. T registered a notice on the register, and later extended their loans to H. When they sought to enforce the charge the wife obtained an order for the delivery up of the land certificate. Held: T's appeal failed. The letter from the husband had been only confirmation that he would deposit the land certificate. At that time the letter was executory only, and since it had been made without his wife's involvement or consent, an equitable charge had not arisen. The husband might be ordered to charge his own interest to T because of the bank's own part performance. The doctrine of part performance would require a balancing of any hardship it might cause to the respective parties, and the wife would suffer far more hardship than the bank. The husband had not had the authority to release the land certificate to the bank and it must be returned.

 
Barclays Bank Ltd v TOSG Trust Fund Ltd [1984] AC 626; [1984] 1 All ER 628; [1984] BCLC 1; [1984] 2 WLR 49
1984
CA
Oliver LJ, Slade LJ
Insolvency, Equity
Oliver LJ acceded to a submission that the rule better be called the rule against double dividends, for its object was to absolve the liquidator from paying out two dividends on what was essentially the same debt. Because overlapping liabilities resulted from separate and independent contracts with the debtor, the basis of the liability by itself was not determinative of whether the rule applied. Oliver LJ said: "The test is in my judgment a much broader one which transcends a close jurisprudential analysis of the persons by and to whom the duties are owed. It is simply whether the two competing claims are, in substance, claims for payment of the same debt twice over . . for the moment I accept [the] broad general proposition that the rule against double proofs in respect of two liabilities of an insolvent debtor is going to apply wherever the existence of one liability is dependant upon and referable only to the liability to the other and where to allow both liabilities to rank independently for dividend would produce injustice to the other unsecured creditors."
Slade LJ said that the payment of more than one dividend in respect of what was in substance the same debt would give the relevant proving creditors a share of the available assets larger than the share properly attributable to the debt in question.
1 Citers



 
 Fraser v Thames Television Ltd; QBD 1984 - [1984] QB 44
 
Sutton v Sutton [1984] Ch 184
1984

John Mowbray QC
Family, Equity
The husband and his wife agreed that in consideration, inter alia, of the wife consenting to the husband divorcing her on the ground of two years' separation and consent, he would transfer the matrimonial home to her, and she would take over responsibility for the mortgage. A decree absolute was made on the husband's petition but he then refused to carry out his part of the bargain. Held: If the agreement was enforceable as a contract, it would leave nothing for the court to do under sections 23 and 24 of the 1973 Act which give the court power to order maintenance and make property adjustments because the agreement pre-judged and foreclosed all financial questions. The wife's consent to the divorce as agreed was an act of part performance, being an act referable to the contract. "her consent to the petition was in itself, in the circumstances, tied to the contract about the house". The husband "stood by and let her perform that part of her bargain irretrievably, and that raised an equity" in her favour.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 1(2)(d) 23 24
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Sport International Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 776; [1984] 2 All ER 321
2 Jan 1984
HL
Lord Templeman
Contract, Intellectual Property, Equity
A contractual licence was granted to use names and trademarks for sports shoes. An earlier action between the parties had been stayed on the terms scheduled to a Tomlin order, which provided for Inter-Footwear to pay a sum in instalments and to have a licence (partly exclusive and partly non-exclusive) to use the names and marks. If any instalment was not paid on the due date, the whole unpaid balance became due at once and the licensor could determine the licence. There was a delay in payment of the second instalment and the licensor terminated the licence. Held: Relief was not available against the forfeiture of a mere contractual licences. As to the discussion of proprietoty or possessory right in Scaptrade: "Mr Wilson submitted that in the present case the licences to use the trade marks and names created proprietary and possessory rights in intellectual property. He admits, however, that so to hold would be to extend the boundaries of the authorities dealing with relief against forfeiture. I do not believe that the present is a suitable case in which to define the boundaries of the equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture. It is sufficient that the appellants cannot bring themselves within the recognised boundaries and cannot establish an arguable case for the intervention of equity. The recognised boundaries do not include mere contractual licences and I can see no reason for the intervention of equity."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Mascall v Mascall [1984] 50 P and CR 119; [1984] EWCA Civ 10
13 Jun 1984
CA
Browne-Wilkinson LJ
Registered Land, Equity
The question was whether a gift of land was completely constituted by delivery of the land certificate Held: Equity will not come to the aid of a volunteer. Therefore, if a donee needs to get an order from a court of equity in order to complete his title, he will not get it. If, on the other hand, the donee has under his control everything necessary to constitute his title completely without any further assistance from the donor, the donee needs no assistance from equity and the gift is complete. It is on that principle, which is laid down in Re Rose, that in equity it is held that a gift is complete as soon as the settlor or donor has done everything that the donor has to do, that is to say, as soon as the donee has within his control all those things necessary to enable him, the donee, to complete his title. Milroy v Lord established that the settlor must have done everything that was necessary for him to do. In that case, however, the transfer had been put under the control of the donee.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.