Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Equity - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Lowe v Lombank Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 196
1960
CA
Diplock J
Equity, Estoppel
A false statement made about a matter of past fact could not operate either as an estoppel by representation or (where the fact is expressed as an agreement) a contractual estoppel. The court set out three criteria for an evidential estoppel: it must be shown that:
(a) The clause (acknowledgement) was clear and unambiguous;
(b) that the representee had intended the representor to act on the statements in the clause; and
(c) that the representor must have entered into the contract in the belief that they were true.
1 Citers


 
Ghana Commercial Bank v Chandiram [1960] AC 732
1960
PC
Lord Jenkins
Land, Equity
The bank made an advance to the owner of property in Accra which was used to pay off his indebtedness to Barclays (DC & O) Ltd, secured by an equitable mortgage. The owner executed a legal mortgage in favour of the Ghana Bank, but this was invalidated by a previous attachment of the property by a creditor. Held: The Ghana Bank was entitled to be subrogated to the equitable mortgage which had been paid off. "It is not open to doubt that where a third party pays off a mortgage he is presumed, unless the contrary appears, to intend that the mortgage shall be kept alive for his own benefit."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Campbell Discount Company Ltd v Bridge; CA 1961 - [1961] 1 QB 445
 
A Roberts and Co Ltd v Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555; [1961] 2 All ER 545
1961
ChD
Pennycuick J
Equity, Contract
The court considered the circumstances required for rectification of a contract after a unilateral mistake. Pennycuick J said: "a party is entitled to rectification of a contract upon proof that he believed a particular term to be included in the contract, and that the other party concluded the contract with the omission or a variation of that term in the knowledge that the first party believed the term to be included. . . The principle is stated in Snell on Equity, 25th edition (1960), p 569 as follows: 'By what appears to be a species of equitable estoppel, if one party to a transaction knows that the instrument contains a mistake in his favour but does nothing to correct it, he (and those claiming under him) will be precluded from resisting rectification on the ground that the mistake is unilateral and not common.'"
1 Citers


 
in Re Pilkington's Will Trusts; Pilkington v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1961] Ch 488
2 Jan 1961
CA
Upjohn LJ
Trusts, Equity

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Jones v Lipman and Another; ChD 1962 - [1962] 1 WLR 832; [1962] 1 All ER 442
 
In Re Pilkington's Will Trusts; Pilkington v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1964] AC 612; [1962] 3 All ER 622; [1962] 3 WLR 1051; 106 Sol Jo 834; 40 Tax Cas 433; [1962] UKHL TC - 40 - 416
8 Oct 1962
HL
Viscount Radcliffe
Equity, Trusts
The trustees proposed establishing a new trust in respect of the share of an estate to which an infant beneficiary had a contingent entitlement. A portion of the trust fund would be allocated to the new trust. Held: This was a lawful exercise of the statutory power of advancement. The new trusts must be read as if they had been created by the settlor of the existing settlement, at the time of the existing settlement, and, when tested against the rule against perpetuities in that situation, they failed. In the context of a power of advancement, it is no bar to an exercise of the power that the primary object neither requested nor consented to it, and the power was not limited to the conferring of benefit "personal to the person concerned in the sense of being related to his or her own real or personal needs". Nevertheless, trusts created in remainder after the life interest of the settlor's son were void for perpetuity. The phrase "advancement or benefit" in setion 32 of the 1925 Act covered: "any use of the money which will improve the material situation of the beneficiary."
A power of advancement was a special power and accordingly trusts called into existence by its exercise must be written into the instrument creating the power far the purposes of applying the perpetuity rule.
Viscount Radcliffe said: "I ought to note for the record (1) that the transaction envisaged does not actually involve the raising of money, since the trustees propose to appropriate a block of shares in the family’s private limited company as the trust investment, and (2) there will not be any actual transfer, since the trustees of the proposed settlement and the will trustees are the same persons. As I have already said, I do not attach any importance to these factors . . To transfer or appropriate outright is only to do by shortcut what could be done in a more roundabout way by selling the shares to a consenting party, paying the money over to the new settlement with appropriate instructions and arranging for it to be used in buying back the shares as the trust investment. It cannot make any difference to follow the course taken in In Re Collard’s Will Trusts and deal with the property direct. On the other point, so long as there are separate trusts, the property effectually passes out of the old settlement into the new one, and it is of no relevance that, at any rate for the time being, the persons administering the new trust are the same individuals."
TC Trusts - Will settlement - Infant beneficiary with contingent interest - Statutory power of advancement - Whether exercisable by resettlement on new trusts - Rule against perpetuities - Whether new trusts to be treated as if contained in original settlement - Trustee Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 19), Section 32.
Trustee Act 1925 32
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Lovelock v Margo [1963] 2 All ER 13; [1963] 2 QB 786
1963

Pullin J, Lord Denning MR, Slade LJ, Cumming-Bruce LJ
Landlord and Tenant, Equity
The tenant wished to assign the lease. The lease contained the "usual covenant" not to assign without consent, that consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The landlord had refused a request from the tenant to assign the lease because she was "not satisfied with the area proposed to be used". Held: The tenant succeeded. Where the covenant states that the landlord must not unreasonably refuse that consent, the court has to have regard to the landlord's actual state of mind at the relevant time.
Lord Denning MR said: "it is not right to say that this is an objective question, as counsel said. This matter cannot be considered without regard to the state of mind of the landlord herself as to her reasons for refusing consent. How otherwise can a lessee hope to see whether he can assign unless he knows the landlord's reasons for objection"
County Courts Act 1959 191(3)
1 Citers



 
 Re Hewitt's Contract; 1963 - [1963] 1 WLR 1298

 
 Re Pauling's Settlement Trusts (No.1); CA 29-May-1963 - [1963] EWCA Civ 5; [1964] Ch 303; [1963] 3 All ER 1; [1963] 3 WLR 742
 
Phipps v Boardman [1964] 1 WLR 993
1964
ChD
Wilberforce J
Equity, Agency
Agents of certain trustees had purchased shares, in circumstances where they only had that opportunity because they were agents. Held: The shares were held beneficially for the trust.
1 Citers


 
Inwards v Baker [1965] QB 29; [1965] 1 All ER 446; [1965] 2 WLR 212; [1965] EWCA Civ 465
13 Jan 1965
CA
Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts and Salmon LJJ
Equity, Estoppel
An indulgent father had encouraged his son to build a bungalow on his, the father's, land. The son had done so in the expectation, encouraged by the father, that he would be permitted to remain in occupation. Held: The court formulated the principle of equitable estoppel on the footing that where a person has expended money on the land of another with the expectation, induced or encouraged by the owner of the land, that he would be allowed to remain in occupation, an equity is created such that the court would protect his occupation of the land; and that the court has power to determine in what way the equity so arising would be satisfied. The court therefore refused the plaintiff an order for possession of the bungalow which his son had built on the land, and held that the son was entitled to stay there as long as he wanted. It need not be not fatal to a claim under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel that the property in which the right is claimed has not been precisely identified.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Senanayake v Cheng [1966] AC 63; [1965] 3 All ER 296
1966
PC

Equity
A representee, to whom a fraudulent misrepresentation had been made was "entitled to make all inquiries and to endeavour to learn all the facts."
In a claim for rescission in equity for innocent misrepresentation, the questions are "whether restitutio in integrum is substantially possible and whether rescission is timely and just and fair".
1 Citers


 
Phipps v Boardman [1966] 3 All ER 721; [1967] 2 AC 46; [1966] UKHL 2
3 Nov 1966
HL
Lord Upjohn, Lord Hodson
Equity, Trusts, Information
A trustee has a duty to exploit any available opportunity for the trust. "Rules of equity have to be applied to such a great diversity of circumstances that they can be stated only in the most general terms and applied with particular attention to the exact circumstances of each case. The relevant rule for the decision of this case is the fundamental rule of equity that a person in a fiduciary capacity must not make a profit out of his trust, which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict."
"The whole of the law is laid down in the fundamental principle exemplified in Lord Cranworth's statement [in Aberdeen Railway Co v. Blaikie]. But it is applicable, like so many equitable principles which may affect a conscience, however innocent, to such a diversity of different cases that the observations of judges and even in your Lordships' House in cases where this great principle is being applied must be regarded as applicable only to the particular facts of the particular case in question and not regarded as a new and slightly different formulation of the legal principle so well settled." and "The phrase 'possibly may conflict' requires consideration. In my view it means that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conflict; not that you could imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result in conflict."
The court considered the circumstances under which information has been acquired which impose a duty of confidence: "The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such cases such confidential information is often and for many years has been described as the property of the donor, the books of authority are full of such references: knowledge of secret processes, 'know-how', confidential information as to the prospects of a company or of someone's intention or the expected results of some horse race based on stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal sense but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship."
Lord Upjohn said: "In general, information is not property at all. It is normally open to all who have eyes to read and ears to hear. The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another, then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such cases such confidential information is often and for many years has been described as the property of the donor, the books of authority are full of such references; knowledge of secret processes, 'know-how', confidential information as to the prospects of a company or of someone's intention or the expected results of some horse race based on stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship".
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1966] UKHL 3; [1967] 2 AC 291; [1966] UKHL TC - 43 - 519
24 Nov 1966
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Pearce, Lord Upjohn, Lord Donovan, Lord Wilberforce
Equity, Income Tax
The taxpayer made a gift of shares to a trust set up to fund a medical professorship. The shares were in a private company, and an option was given for their repurchase once a certain level of dividends had been attributed to them. He was assessed to substantial surcharges on them on the basis that the arrangement was a settlement under which he retained an interest and of which he had not divested himself absolutely.
Lord Upjohn said: "If A intends to give away all his beneficial interest in a piece of property and thinks he has done so but, by some mistake or accident or failure to comply with the requirements of the law, he has failed to do so, either wholly or partially, there will, by operation of law, be a resulting trust for him of the beneficial interest of which he had failed effectually to dispose. If the beneficial interest was in A and he fails to give it away effectively to another or others or on charitable trusts it must remain in him"
Income Tax Act 1952 411 415 - Law of Property Act 1925 53
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
R W Pathirana v A Pathirana [1967] 1 AC 233
1967
PC

Company, Equity
Section 29 requires a partner to account to the partnership for any private benefit which he derives at the expense of the partnership, and this duty subsists after the dissolution of the partnership until the winding up is completed. An inalienable asset had been acquired by one partner in his own name but in account of the firm.
Partnership Act 18980 29
1 Citers



 
 Seager v Copydex Ltd; CA 1967 - [1967] 1 WLR 923; [1967] RPC 349
 
Wakeham v Mackenzie [1968] 1 WLR 1175
1968


Equity, Landlord and Tenant
The plaintiff sought performance of an oral agreement to grant a tenancy having given up her own home to move into her employer's home. Held: There had been sufficient part performance.


 
 Thatcher v CH Pearce and Sons (Contractors) Ltd; 1968 - [1968] 1 WLR 748
 
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith No.2 [1969] 2 WLR 427
1969
CA
Edmund Davies LJ
Equity, Trusts
The court approved the statement in Snell's Principles of Equity that: "A constructive trust is a trust which is imposed by equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and good conscience without reference to any express or presumed intentions of the parties."
1 Citers


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.