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Employment - From: 1990 To: 1990

This page lists 30 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Williams v Watsons Coaches Limited [1990] ICR 536
1990
EAT
President Sir John Wood
Employment
"A number of principles relevant to the application of the doctrine to contracts of employment can be derived from these decisions which, in any event, are rare occurrences in the realm of employment law.
First, that the court must guard against too easy an application of the doctrine, more especially when redundancy occurs and also when the true situation may be a dismissal by reason of disability. Secondly, that although it is not necessary to decide that frustration occurred on a particular date, nevertheless an attempt to decide the relevant date is far from a useless exercise as it may help to determine in the mind of the court whether it really is a true frustration situation. Thirdly, that there are a number of factors which may help to decide the issue as they may each point in one or other direction. " (reference to Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Ltd . . . To these we would add the terms of the contract as to the provisions for sickness pay, if any, and also, a consideration of the prospects of recovery. Fourthly - see F C Shepherd & Co Ltd v. Jerrom [1986] I.C.R. 802 - the party alleging frustration should not be allowed to rely upon the frustrating event if that event was caused by that party - at least where it was caused by its fault."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Baker v Cornwall County Council [1990] IRLR 194
1990


Employment
The court asked when it could infer race discrimination: "In these circumstances, the Tribunal has no choice but to draw an inference adverse to the respondents and find that the applicant has been discriminated against by the respondents within the meaning of section 1(1), because no satisfactory explanation justifying the treatment accorded to the applicant has been accepted by them."
1 Citers


 
British Telecommunications Plc v Sheridan [1990] IRLR 27; [1989] EWCA Civ 14; FA 6
1990
CA
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR, Ralph Gibson, McCowan LJJ
Employment
The appellant employers challenged the decision of the EAT to reverse the tribunal's finding that the claimant had been fairly dismissed. Held: Even in cases where the Appeal Tribunal has 'grave doubts' about the decision of the Employment Tribunal, it must proceed with 'great care' before finding perversity in its decision. In this case, the decision of the Industrial Tribunal was in fact perverse.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Secretary of State for Health, Ex parte Guirguis [1990] IRLR 30
1990
CA

Employment, Health Professions
The secretary of state did not have jurisdiction to intervene in disciplinary proceedings to say whether a doctor had properly been dismissed where the allegation was of personal rather than professional misconduct.
1 Citers



 
 Harber v North London Polytechnic; CA 1990 - [1990] IRLR 198

 
 Regina v Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police, Ex parte Cotton; CA 1990 - [1990] IRLR 344

 
 Micklefield v SAC Technology Ltd; 1990 - [1990] IRLR 218
 
Slaughter v Brewer and Sons Ltd [1990] IRLR 426
1990


Employment
Procedural fairness
1 Citers



 
 Bracebridge Engineering Limited v Darby; EAT 1990 - [1990] IRLR 3
 
Regina v Chief Constable of Thames Valley ex parte Cotton [1990] IRLR 344
1990

Simon Brown J, Bingham LJ
Employment, Administrative
In order:- "to make good a natural justice challenge an applicant must establish where there is a real, as opposed to purely minimal possibility that the outcome would have been different" (Simon Brown J) Bingham LJ: "While cases may no doubt arise in which it can properly be held that denying the subject of a decision an adequate opportunity to put his case is not in all the circumstances unfair, I would expect these cases to be of great rarity. There are a number of reasons for this:- 1. Unless the subject of the decision has had the opportunity to put his case it may not be easy to knew what case he could or would have put if he had the chance. 2. As memorably pointed out by Megarry J in John v. Rees [1970] Ch 345 at page 402, experience shows that what is confidently expected is by no means always that which happens. 3. It is generally desirable that decision-makers should be reasonably receptive to argument, and it would therefore be unfortunate if a complainant's position became weaker as the decision-maker's mind became more closed. 4. In considering whether the complainant's representations would have made any difference to the outcome the court may unconsciously stray from its proper province of reviewing the propriety of the decision-making process into the forbidden territory of evaluating the substantial merits of a decision. 5. This is a field in which appearances are generally thought to matter. 6. Where the decision-maker is under a duty to act fairly the subject of the decision may properly be said to have a right to be heard, and rights are not to be lightly denied".
1 Citers


 
Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd and Another [1990] FSR 385
1990
ChD
Falconer J
Employment, Company
The claimant, a manufacturer of filter tubes, employed the defendant as a director. He gave notice to leave, but during his notice period, he was contacted by a customer who informed him of a meeting between that customer and the company at which the company had informed them of an impending price increase and that supplies would be discontinued. The defendant told the customer that he was leaving, and said he would be able to supply them himself. He began to prepare his business, buying in stock and taking on former and current employees of the claimant. The claimant now alleged breach of his fiduciary duties as director, of acting in conflict of interest, and of his duties of faithfulness as an employee. Held: The mere intention to set up a competing business whilst employed as a director was not a breach of fiduciary duty, and nor did he have a duty to disclose that intention. Though general preparation were not a breach of his duty of fidelity as an employee, the taking of an order from a customer, and the taking on of an employee did each amount to such a breach.
There was no misues of confidential information. Although the new business used similar fibre mixes, the defendant's own skill could account for his preparation of them without misuse of the claimant's confidential information.
Falconer J said: "In my judgment an intention by a director of a company to set up business in competition with the company after his directorship has ceased is not to be regarded as a conflicting interest within the context of the principle, having regard to the rules of public policy as to restraint of trade, nor is the taking of preliminary steps to investigate or forward that intention so long as there is no actual competitive activity, such as, for instance, competitive tendering or actual trading, while he remains a director."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Post Office v Union of Communication Workers [1990] ICR 258
1990
CA
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR
Employment
De minimis principle inindustrial relations ballots.
1 Citers


 
Briggs v Oates [1990] ICR 473
1990

Scott J
Employment
A former assistant solicitor, whose contract had been brought to an end by the dissolution of the partnership which had employed him, was held to be bound by a restrictive provision expressed to operate once the agreement "shall have determined for whatever reason." Held: The clause was not binding.
Scott J said: "I am unable to accept this submission. First the obligation to which the defendant subjected himself under clause 8 cannot in my opinion be wholly separated from the other provisions of the agreement. The bargain between the plaintiff and Mr. Rees on the one hand and the defendant on the other hand was, in broad terms, that in return for a five-year employment on clause 6 remuneration terms, the defendant would, during the five-year term, discharge the duties imposed on him and after the termination of his employment observe the clause 8 restraint. The plaintiff and Mr Rees were together responsible for withholding from the defendant the benefit of employment for the last year of the five-year term. One year out of five is certainly not de minimis. The defendant was deprived, by a breach of contract for which the plaintiff and Mr Rees were together responsible, of the full consideration in exchange for which he accepted the clause 8 restriction. In such a case, in my opinion, he is not bound by the restriction. Secondly, and this is another way of putting the same point, the breach of contract for which, as I have held, the plaintiff and Mr Rees were jointly responsible, was accepted by the defendant as putting an end to the contract. In such a case outstanding contractual obligations of the injured party are in law discharged together with the contract. This result does not, in my judgment, depend on the construction of the contract.
But the point goes further. Suppose I am wrong. Suppose Mr Johnson is right in submitting that under the true construction of the contract clause 8 binds the defendant regardless of whether the 1979 agreement is brought to an end by the decision of the plaintiff and Mr Rees to discontinue their partnership, or by some other wrongful dismissal of the defendant. The termination of the defendant's employment under the 1979 agreement could, on that footing, have taken place at any time after 3 September 1979, but the defendant would still have been bound by the five-year restraint clause. It is well settled that the reasonableness of a restraint clause is to be tested by reference to the position as at the date of the contract of which it forms part. If Mr Johnson's submissions are right I would regard the clause 8 restraint as unreasonable as between the parties. A contract under which an employee could be immediately and wrongfully dismissed but would nevertheless remain subject to an anti-competitive restraint seems to me to be grossly unreasonable. I would not be prepared to enforce the restraint in such a contract."
1 Citers


 
Attorney General v Barker [1990] 3 All ER 257
1990
CA
Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR
Intellectual Property, Employment
A claim was made for an injunction to enforce an express covenant in a contract of employment by a member of the Royal Household by which he undertook (amongst other things) not to publish any information concerning a member of the family which came to his knowledge during his employment. Held: Lord Donaldson MR said: "It is, in my judgment, very important to notice that this is not a case such as Spycatcher (see eg A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) . . [1990] 1 AC 109), where the Attorney General is relying on a duty of confidentiality. His claim is based on a breach of contract, the consideration for the covenant by Mr Barker (that he would not publish matter true or false concerning his experiences in the royal household) being the agreement by those concerned to take him on the staff of the royal household and to pay him wages or a salary. It is not in principle in any way different from the case of someone who enters into a contract with a newspaper whereby the person concerned undertakes, in consideration of a money payment, not to give their story to anyone else for publication. The newspaper in those circumstances would be likely to publish, but they would not be obliged to publish. That is an exact analogy here: the royal household would be entitled to authorise publication if they wished but equally are fully entitled under the contract to refuse to allow it. . . Exactly the same considerations would apply if the employer had been an ordinary citizen. It is a simple case of someone who has entered into a negative covenant for a consideration where the covenant is not limited territorially and is not limited in time. As Nourse LJ pointed out in argument, in such circumstances the courts habitually enforce the covenant provided only that the covenant itself cannot be attacked for obscurity, illegality or on public policy grounds such as that it is in restraint of trade."
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1 Citers


 
Adams and Raynor v West Sussex County Council [1990] ICR 546
1990

Wood J P
Employment
The EAT does not have a general power of review of interlocutory orders made by Industrial Tribunals or a Chairman. An appellant must convince the appeal tribunal that the Industrial Tribunal had erred in legal principle in the exercise of the discretion or had failed to take into account relevant considerations or had taken irrelevant factors into account, or that no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself could have refused the amendment. Wood P said that three questions should be answered: "(a) Is the order made one within the powers given to the tribunal? (b) Has the discretion been exercised within guiding legal principles)? … (c) Can the exercise of the discretion be attacked on the principles in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation?"
1 Citers


 
Casella London Ltd v Banai [1990] ICR 21
1990


Employment
A strike out order was not a decision capable of review.
1 Citers


 
Louies v Coventry Hood and Seating Co [1990] ICR 54
1990
EAT
Wood J
Employment
An employer's dismissal procedure need not be prima facie unfair if the employee was not permitted to know the contents of statements on which the employer would rely in taking a decision to dismiss or confirm a previous dismissal. Wood J said: "It does seem to me that it must be a very rare case indeed for the procedures to be fair where statements which have been given in writing by witnesses and upon which in essence the employer is going to rely almost entirely - and that is this case - that an employee should not have a sight of them or that he should not be told very clearly exactly what is in them or possibly have them read to him. One understands that there may be delicate situations. We have dealt with the case of informers in Linfood Cash & Carry v Thomson [1989] ICR 518. It may be that one does not want to exacerbate the relationship between employees or possibly groups of employees at work. However, where the essence of the case, the main substance of the, case is contained in two statements which this employee asks to see and which he is refused without reason and upon which substantial reliance is placed, then prima facie to me it seems to be unfair. It may be the reaction of a lawyer; I trust it is the reaction of anyone."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Wishart v National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux Ltd [1990] ICR 794
1990
CA
Mustill LJ
Employment, Contract
Mustill LJ said: "Undeniably, it is possible for an employer to make an offer conditional on something to be objectively determined (for example, the passing of a medical examination)."
1 Citers


 
Hogg v Dover College [1990] ICR 39
1990
EAT
Garland J
Employment
The claimant asserted unfair dismissal after his contract was changed to provide that his post as head of the history department would be part time. He had been ill, and the head teacher reduced his teaching periods. He accepted the change in writing under protest in order to mitigate his loss. He said that the change in his contract terms was fundamental. Held: The change in contract terms was sufficiently fundamental to amount to a repudiation of the contract and amounted to a dismissal. The definition of dismissal in section 55 referred to the termination of a contract of employment, not of the relationship of employer and employee.
If an employee makes it clear that he is accepting a repudiation of his original contract, the fact that he agrees to be re-employed under the new contract may not prevent him saying that he had been unfairly constructively dismissed under the old one. A court might legitimately treat as dismissal and re-engagement a situation where the employer ostensibly is merely seeking to vary the contract without effecting any dismissal as such at all.
Garland J said: "The trite law is that of course employment results from a contract. It is the contract at which one has to look, not the relationship of the employer and employee.
Up to 31 July, the applicant, who was well and sympathetically treated by the employers, was head of history; he was employed to teach full-time at a full salary plus such allowances to which he was entitled. On 31 July, he was told that he was no longer head of history; that he would not be employed full-time and he would come down to eight periods a week plus general studies and religious education; that the salary he would receive would be exactly half the new scale which superseded the Burnham scale.
It seems to us, both as a matter of law and common sense, that he was being told that his former contract was from that moment gone. There was no question of any continued performance of it. It is suggested, on behalf of the employers, that there was a variation, but again, it seems to us quite elementary, that you can vary by consent terms of a contract, but you simply cannot hold a pistol to somebody's head and say: "henceforth you are to be employed on wholly different terms which are in fact less than 50 per cent of your previous contract. We come unhesitatingly to the conclusion that there was a dismissal on 31 July."
Employment Rights Act 1978 55(2)
1 Citers


 
Spink v Express Foods Limited [1990] IRLR 320
1990
EAT
Wood J P
Employment
Wood J said: "It is a fundamental part of a fair disciplinary procedure that an employee know the case against him. Fairness requires that someone accused should know the case to be met; should hear or be told the important parts of the evidence in support of that case; should have an opportunity to criticise or dispute that evidence and to adduce his own evidence and argue his case."
1 Citers


 
Makanjuola v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1992] 3 All ER 617; (1990) 2 Admin LR 214
1990

Henry J
Vicarious Liability, Employment, Police
A plain clothed off duty police officer gained entry to premises by production of his warrant card. He enquired as to the immigration status of the two residents. He told them they were in breach of the immigration regulations, and demanded sexual favours, which the female resident acceded to, in return for his refraining from reporting the irregularities. Held: The Commissioner was not liable for the actions of the officer under Section 48(1) of the 1964 Act. The phrase "police functions" referred to" the ordinary police functions of investigating, preventing, discovering and reporting crime, including the power of arrest". The first defendant contended that the same approach should be applied in this case. "Purported", here meant "in the professed performance of his functions" or "pretending to be acting in the course of his employment". Obtaining entry to the premises by identifying himself as a police officer and going on to make enquires was in purported performance of his police functions, and a statement by the officer that he intended to arrest, report, warn or take no further action would also be in purported performance of his police functions. However, the claim was not concerned with something which a police officer might in certain circumstances be entitled to do, but something which the resident could never have believed was or could have been done in the performance of his duty, it being clear to her as it would have been to anyone else, that the demand for sexual favours was one which no one could make as a police officer.
Police Act 1964 48(1)
1 Citers


 
James Cook and Co (Wivenhoe) Ltd v Tipper [1990] ICR 716; [1990] IRLR 386
1990
CA
Neill LJ, Farquharson LJ, Sir Roger Ormrod
Employment, Damages
A number of shipyard workers were dismissed by their employers but believed credibly that there was a realistic prospect that they might be re-employed. Only later did it come to their knowledge that the shipyard at which they worked was to close down. The employer appealed a decision allowing the claims to go ahead out of time. Only then did they present their complaints to an Industrial Tribunal. Held: It had not been reasonably practicable for the claimants to complain of unfair dismissal until the closure of the business (which occurred after the three-month time limit has passed) but it was reasonable for the claims to have been brought within 2 weeks of the date of closure. The fact that the company closed shortly after making redundancies may properly allow the capping of the compensatory award for unfair dismissal for redundancy on that first round.
Neill LJ said: "As has been emphasised in the authorities, the expression "reasonably practicable" must be looked at in a common sense way."
1 Citers


 
Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurdwara [1990] ICR 209
1990
CA

Employment, Ecclesiastical
A Granthi, a priest, at a Sikh temple was not employed under a contract of service.
1 Citers



 
 Ashmore v British Coal Corporation; CA 1990 - [1990] 2 QB 338
 
Hilton International Hotels v Protopapa [1990] IRLR 316
1990
EAT
Knox J
Employment, Torts - Other
The claimant asserted constructive dismissal. Held: The trbunal rejected a submission that the absence of any provision for vicarious liability in the 1978 Act indicated that the general rule that an employer is vicariously liable for his employee's acts done in the course of his employment did not apply. Knox J: "We do not regard this argument as compelling because the context of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is quite different from the context of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is dealing with a very wide multiplicity of different situations besides the master and servant employer-employee relationship. In relation to many of those relationships where there is no necessary contractual nexus, it was necessary in our view to define in general terms the circumstances in which employers were liable for their employees' actions. Accordingly there being a different context which justifies the inclusion of the specific provisions in s. 41(1) we do not think it right to draw conclusions from the absence of such a provision in the different context of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978."
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978


 
 Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung; PC 8-Mar-1990 - [1990] ICR 409; [1990] 2 AC 374; [1990] UKPC 1; [1990] UKPC 9; [1990] IRLR 236
 
Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group (1990) ICR 616; C-262/88; [1990] ECR I-1889; [1991] 1 QB 344; R-262/88; [1990] EUECJ R-262/88
17 May 1990
ECJ

European, Employment, Discrimination
Europa The benefits paid by an employer to a worker on the latter's redundancy constitute a form of pay to which the worker is entitled in respect of his employment, which is paid to him upon termination of the employment relationship, which facilitates his adjustment to the new circumstances resulting from the loss of his employment and which provides him with a source of income during the period in which he is seeking new employment. Such benefits paid in connection with a compulsory redundancy consequently fall within the scope of the second paragraph of Article 119 of the Treaty, whether they are paid under a contract of employment, by virtue of legislative provisions or on a voluntary basis. Unlike the benefits awarded by national statutory social security schemes, retirement pensions paid under private occupational schemes, which are characterized by the fact of being established either by an agreement between workers and employers or by a unilateral decision taken by the employer - whether financed by the employer alone or by both the employer and the workers - which may by law with the employee' s agreement operate in part as a substitute for the statutory scheme and which apply only to workers employed by certain undertakings, constitute consideration paid by the employer to the worker in respect of his employment and consequently fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty. The fact that a private occupational scheme has been set up in the form of a trust and is administered by trustees who are technically independent of the employer does not affect that interpretation of Article 119 since that provision also applies to consideration received indirectly from the employer. 3. Article 119 of the Treaty prohibits any discrimination with regard to pay as between men and women, whatever the system which gives rise to such inequality. Accordingly, it is contrary to that provision to impose an age condition which differs according to sex for the purposes of entitlement to a pension under a private occupational scheme which operates in part as a substitute for the statutory scheme, even if the difference between the pensionable age for men and that for women is based on the one provided for by the national statutory scheme. 4. With regard to equal pay for men and women, genuine transparency, permitting an effective review by the national court, is assured only if the principle of equal pay must be observed in respect of each of the elements of remuneration granted to men and women, and not on a comprehensive basis in respect of all the consideration granted to men and women. 5. Article 119 of the Treaty applies directly to all forms of discrimination which may be identified solely with the aid of the criteria of equal work and equal pay referred to by that provision, without national or Community measures being required to define them with greater precision. The national court before which that provision is relied upon must safeguard the rights which it confers on individuals, in particular where a private occupational pension scheme which operates in part as a substitute for the statutory scheme refuses to pay to a man on redundancy an immediate pension such as would be granted in a similar case to a woman. 6. Since the Member States and the circles concerned may, in the light of Directives 79/7 and 86/378, have misunderstood the precise extent of their obligations with regard to the implementation of the principle of equality between men and women for the purposes of the grant of certain retirement benefits, overriding considerations of legal certainty preclude the direct effect of Article 119 of the Treaty from being relied upon in order to claim, under a private occupational pension scheme which operates as a substitute for the statutory scheme, entitlement to a pension with effect from a date prior to that of the judgment upholding, in proceedings for a preliminary ruling, the applicability of that article to pensions of that type, except in the case of workers or those claiming under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Hampson v Department of Education and Science [1990] ICR 511; [1991] 1 AC 171; [1990] 3 WLR 42; [1990] UKHL 15; [1990] 2 All ER 513; [1990] IRLR 302
7 Jun 1990
HL
Lord Lowry
Employment, Discrimination
A teacher of Hong Kong national origin was refused qualified teacher status in this country because the Secretary of State had not exercised a power conferred on him by the relevant regulations to treat her Hong Kong qualifications as equivalent to the necessary UK qualifications. The refusal was alleged to constitute indirect racial discrimination. The Secretary of State argued, and the majority in the Court of Appeal had held, that the Secretary of State was entitled to rely on s. 41 (1) (b) because the decision complained of was taken under powers conferred by a statutory instrument. Held: A discriminatory act is only saved by the subsection if it is mandated by the statutory provision, or by the arrangements in question.
Race Relations Act 1976 41(1)
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[ Bailii ]
 
Foster and others v British Gas plc [1991] 2 WLR 258; [1990] 2 CMLR 833; 2 CMLR 833 ECJ; C-188/89; [1990] ECR I-3313; [1990] EUECJ C-188/89; [1990] IRLR 353; [1990] 3 All ER 897; [1991] 1 QB 405; [1991] ICR 84
12 Jul 1990
ECJ
Sir Gordon Slynn, P
European, Utilities, Employment, Company
The defendants (BGC) were nationalised suppliers of gas. BGC was by statute a body with a legal persona operating under the supervision of the authorities. Its members were appointed by the Secretary of State, who also determined their remuneration. The statutory objective set was the development and maintenance of an efficient, co-ordinated and economical supply of gas for Great Britain. In conjunction with the Secretary of State it was to settle a research programme into matters which affected the supply of gas. Additionally, the Secretary of State had power to require BGC to report to him and comply with any directions he might give. The court asked whether British Gas was part of the State before it was privatised? Held:
  • [A Directive] may be relied upon in a claim for damages against a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relation to individuals
  • ECJ has jurisdiction in proceedings for a preliminary ruling to determine the categories of person against whom the provisions of a directive may be relied on. It is for the national courts . . to decide whether a party to proceedings before them falls within one of the categories so defined.
  • must provide a public service pursuant to a measure adopted by the State
  • must be a public service under the control of the State
  • must have for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relation to individuals All criteria were satisfied in this case. All criteria were important.
    The HL had held the British Gas Corporation (before privatisation) met the criteria of the ECJ for defining an emanation of state and that British Gas was bound by vertical direct effect.
    It had been held in a series of cases that provisions of a European directive could be relied on against organisations and bodies which were subject to the authority or control of the State or had special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals. Reference was made to a number of its decisions to illustrate this point. Held: "It follows from the foregoing that a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals is included in any event among the bodies against which the provisions of a directive capable of having direct effect may be relied upon."
    ECJ 1. Unconditional and sufficiently precise provisions of a directive may be relied upon against organizations or bodies which are subject to the authority or control of the State or have special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals. They may in any event be relied upon against a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals.
    2. Article 5(1 ) of Directive 76/207 on equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment and working conditions is a provision which is unconditional and sufficiently precise to be relied on by an individual and to be applied by the national courts.
    Directive 1976 EEC/76/207 5(1)
    1 Citers

    [ Bailii ]
     
    Kent Management Services Ltd v Butterfield [1990] UKEAT 407_90_1112
    11 Dec 1990
    EAT
    Wood J
    Employment
    The company had terminated the claimant's employment, but refused to award him his commission and bonus, saying these were discretionary. They were within the PAYE scheme, and paid after cancellation of other contractual benefits, but set up as an ex gratia scheme. The claimant alleged an unlawful deduction from his wages. Held. The Act required payment of sums due including non-contractual sums. The sums were in connection with the employment, and therefore the employer's appeal failed.
    Wages Act 1986 1(1) 7
    [ Bailii ]
     
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