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Employment - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 35 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Beetham v Trinidad Cement Ltd; 1960 - [1960] AC 132
 
Lee v Lee's Air Farming Limited [1960] 3 All ER 420; [1960] UKPC 33; [1960] 3 WLR 758; [1961] AC 12
11 Oct 1960
PC
Viscount Simons, Lord Rei, Lord Tucker, Lord Denning, Lord Morris
Company, Employment, Commonwealth
Mr Lee had formed a company, Lee's Air Farming Limited and held nearly all its shares. He was the managing director, but by profession a pilot. The company was formed to conduct an aerial top-dressing business. He appointed himself the chief pilot for the company. In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, North J said: "These powers were moreover delegated to him for life and there remained with the company no power of management whatsoever. One of his first acts was to appoint himself the only pilot of the company, for, although article 33 foreshadowed this appointment, yet a contract could only spring into existence after the company had been incorporated. Therefore, he became in effect both employer and worker. True, the contract of employment was between himself and the company: see Booth v Helliwell, but on him lay the duty both of giving orders and obeying them. In our view, the two offices are clearly incompatible. There could exist no power of control and therefore the relationship of master-servant was not created." Held: Appeal allowed. "one person may function in dual capacities. " and "Ex facie there was a contract of service. . . . the real issue is whether the position of the deceased as sole governing director made it impossible for him to be the servant of the company in the capacity of chief pilot of the company. . . there was no such impossibility. There appears to be no greater difficulty in holding that a man acting in one capacity can give orders to himself in another capacity than there is in holding that a man acting in one capacity can make a contract with himself in another capacity. The company and the deceased were separate legal entities. The company had the right to decide what contracts for aerial top-dressing it would enter into. The deceased was the agent of the company in making the necessary decisions."
[ Bailii ]

 
 Annamunthodo v Oilfields Workers' Trade Union; PC 1961 - [1961] AC 945
 
Parsons v BNM Laboratories Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 658; [1964] 1 QB 95; [1963] 2 WLR 1273
1963
CA
Sellers LJ, Harman LJ, Pearson LJ
Damages, Employment
Unemployment benefit was deductible from damages for wrongful dismissal. The benefit was not "purely personal", the employer had made a contribution, and the plaintif had a duty to mitigate his loss (Sellers LJ). The benefit was not "truly analogous" to insurance moneys" (Harman LJ). It was not too remote a consequence of the wrongdoing and was payable as a matter of general right rather than by virtue of a private insurance policy (Pearson LJ).
1 Citers


 
Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1963] 1 WLR 441
1963
QBD
Megaw J
Employment
The plaintiff claimed benefits after an injury to a member while riding his motor cycle in the course of the performance of his duties as a "sick steward" of the union. The applicant, who was an employee of a public corporation, had become a sick steward by nomination under the rules of the union. He could have been fined had he refused to act. Neglect of duties would have led to fining and, eventually, to dismissal. The rules laid down the duties of the sick steward, which were, primarily, to visit sick members once a week, make payments to him, account for monies and such like. The issue for the court was whether, at the time of the accident, the applicant was "in insurable employment" as defined statutorily and, in particular, whether the particular arrangement whereby a member of the union was appointed a sick steward and paid for performing the duties of a sick steward (one shilling for each visit and travelling expenses) came within the meaning of "contract of service" in the relevant statutory provision. Held. Construing the statutory provision, there had to be a contract which provided for employment of one person by another person and, if so, the provisions as to employment were contract of service provisions, as opposed to contract for services provisions.
1 Citers


 
Alvis v Council EEC C-32/62; [1963] EUECJ C-32/62
4 Jul 1963
ECJ

Employment
(Judgment)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Ridge v Baldwin (No 1); HL 1964 - [1964] AC 40; [1963] UKHL 2

 
 Faramus v Film Artistes' Association; HL 1964 - [1964] AC 925; [1964] 1 All ER 25

 
 Commercial Plastics Ltd v Vincent; CA 1964 - [1964] 3 WLR 820; [1964] 3 All ER 546; [1965] 1 QB 623
 
Printers and Finishers Limited v Holloway [1965] RPC 239; [1965] 1 WLR 1
1965

Cross J
Intellectual Property, Employment
The court considered the questions arising from the use of information acquired by an employee during his employment after that employment had ended, and noted that information the future use of which will not be restrained is information not readily separable in the mind of the employee from other information which he is free to use, and the actual or threatened misuse of information which has been deliberately memorised for the purpose of its being carried away and used elsewhere will be restrained.
The question was whether the knowledge was "a separate part of the employee's stock of knowledge which a man of ordinary honesty and intelligence would recognise to be the property of his old employer." The law would defeat its own object if it sought to enforce standards which would be rejected by the ordinary person.
Cross J said: "The employee might well not realise that the feature or expedient in question was in fact peculiar to his late employer's process and factory; but even if he did, such knowledge is not readily separable from his general knowledge of the flock printing process and his acquired skill in manipulating a flock printing plant, and I do not think that any man of average intelligence and honesty would think that there was anything improper in his putting his memory of particular features of his late employer's plant at the disposal of his new employer." and
"Although the law will not enforce a covenant directed against competition by an ex-employee, it will enforce a covenant reasonably necessary to protect trade secrets. If the managing director is right in thinking that there are features in the plaintiffs process which can fairly be regarded as trade secrets and which their employees will inevitably carry away with them in their heads, then the proper way for the plaintiffs to protect themselves would be by exacting covenants from their employees restricting their field of activity after they have left their employment, not by asking the court to extend the general equitable doctrine to prevent breaking confidence beyond all reasonable bounds."
1 Citers


 
Gledhow Autoparts Ltd v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366
1965
CA
Diplock LJ
Employment
When considering the reasonableness of an employee's restrictive covenant, the court must test it at the time when it was entered into. If a covenant was unreasonable it will be wholly unenforceable - not partly unenforceable to the extent of what the outcome turned out to be: "The defendant was in fact employed for over six years by the plaintiffs and no doubt became a valuable servant . . It is natural in those circumstances to look at what in fact happened under the agreement. But the question of the validity of a covenant in restraint of trade has to be determined at the date at which the agreement was entered into and has to be determined in the light of what may happen under the agreement, although what may happen may cover many possibilities which in the result did not happen. A covenant of this kind is invalid ab initio or valid ab initio. There cannot come a moment at which it passes from the class of invalid into that of valid covenants."
1 Citers



 
 J T Stratford and Son Ltd v Lindley; HL 1965 - [1965] AC 269; [1966] 1 All ER 1013; [1966] 1 WLR 691
 
Morren v Swinton and Pendlebury Borough Council [1965] 1 WLR 576
1965


Employment
The court was asked whether the plaintiff had been an employee. Held: 'once the primary facts are found, then it is a pure question of law as to what is the reasonable inference based on the legal interpretation of the contract.'
1 Citers


 
Veness v Dyson Bell and Co Times, 25 May 1965
25 May 1965

Widgery J
Employment
The claimant sought damages against her employer saying they had failed to meet their duty of care to prevent bullying. Held: The court refused to strike out the claim that "[the plaintiff] was so bullied and belittled by her colleagues that she came to the verge of a nervous breakdown and had to resign".
1 Citers


 
Morton Sundour Fabrics v Shaw (1966) KIR 1; [1967] ITR 84
1966
QBD
Widgery J
Employment
The court considered whether the employee had been given a notice falling within the Act so as to give rise to a redundancy. Held: Widgery J said: "there are certain formalities about the type of notice necessary to determine a contract of employment. The notice may be a peremptory notice, sometimes referred to as a dismissal without notice, but if it is to operate on a future day, the notice must specify that date, or at least contain facts from which that date is ascertainable."
Redundancy Payments Act 1965 3
1 Citers


 
O'Reilly v National Rail and Tramway Appliances [1966] 1 All ER 499
1966


Employment


 
Loudon v Crimpy Crisps Ltd (1966) 1 ITR 307
1966


Employment
In order to test whether there has been a redundancy the statute asks as to the requirements of the business for employees to do work of a particular kind. The personal attributes of the employee are not relevant except in so far as they reflect upon his ability to perform the relevant tasks.
1 Citers


 
Lavarack v Woods of Colchester Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 683; [1967] 1 QB 278; 1 KIR 312; [1966] 3 WLR 706; [1966] EWCA Civ 4
19 Jul 1966
CA
Lord Denning MR, Diplock LJ, Russell LJ
Employment, Contract, Damages
The plaintiff had been wrongly dismissed. He came to be employed by Martindale at a lower salary, and bought shares in Martindale and Ventilation which increased in value. Held: The new salary and the increase in the value of the Martindale shares were brought to account, but not the increase in the value of the Ventilation shares, on the ground that that benefit was not a direct result of the dismissal but was an "entirely collateral benefit".
When looking at the damages to be awarded on a breach of contract by an employer, "the first task is to estimate . . what the Plaintiff would have gained . . if the defendant had fulfilled his legal obligation and had done no more."
The employment relationship does not give rise to any promise that an employee will receive any salary increases or even be considered for salary increases.
Diplock LJ qualified the principle that where the defendant in breach has the option of performing a contract in alternative ways, damages for breach by him must be assessed on the assumption that he will perform in the way most beneficial to himself and not in that most beneficial to the plaintiff, by stating that one "must not assume that [the defendant] will cut off his nose to spite his face and to control events so as to reduce his legal obligations to the plaintiff by incurring greater loss in other respects".
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Cesare Alfieri v Parliament [1966] EUECJ C-3/66
14 Dec 1966
ECJ

Employment
ECJ (Judgment) 1. Officials - retirement by institution - procedure - plurality of connected steps - application against the measure retiring an official - possibility of contesting the legality of earlier steps (staff regulations of officials of the ECSC, article 91; staff regulations of officials of the EEC and EAEC, article 53) 2. Officials - retirement by institution - written form obligatory (staff regulations of officials of the EEC and EAEC, article 53) 3. Officials - retirement by institution - obligation of the person concerned to co-operate - powers of the administration if the person concerned fails to act (staff regulations of officials of the ECSC, article 91; staff regulations of officials of the EEC and EAEC, article 53, annex ii, article 7) 1. Since the various steps comprising the procedure for retiring an official form a single entity, it must be accepted that in an action contesting the retirement decision, the applicant may contest the legality of earlier steps which are closely linked to it. A submission of inadmissibility on the ground that an appeal against these steps was out of time is therefore inadmissible. Cf. Para. 1, summary, joined cases 12 and 29/64, (1965) ECR 144. 2. A decision to retire an official must be made in writing. 3. The guarantees conferred by the staff regulations with regard to retiring an official must not be interpreted as meaning that it is possible for the person concerned to object to the formation of an invalidity committee, particularly by refusing to appoint a doctor of his own choice. It follows from the fundamental duty of loyalty and co-operation which all officials owe to the authority to which they belong that the power to appoint a doctor at the same time constitutes a duty. The administration has the power, if necessary, to remedy the failure of the person concerned to appoint a doctor in order to ensure the setting up and functioning of an invalidity committee, provided that any element of an arbitrary nature is avoided and that the official's interests are not unnecessarily harmed.
[ Bailii ]
 
Sinclair v Neighbour [1967] 2 QB 279
1967
CA
Sellers LJ, Davies LJ, Sachs LJ
Contract, Employment
The manager of a betting shop took £15 from the shop till for the purpose of gambling; he knew that he would not have been given permission to do so if he had asked. He put an IOU in the till and repaid the money next day. He was summarily dismissed. The employer now appealed against his successful claim in the County Court his action having been found improper and reprehensible but not dishonest. Held: The appeal suceeded. Although the employer had pleaded dishonesty, it did not matter whether the conduct was labelled as dishonest or not; it was seriously inconsistent and incompatible with the employee's duty. Sellers LJ said: "The whole question is whether that conduct was of such a type that it was inconsistent, in a grave way – incompatible – with the employment in which he had been engaged as a manager."
Davies LJ said: "With the greatest respect to the judge, I think that he fell into error in attaching too much weight to the label and not enough to the facts. The facts were established. The fact that the manager took the money from his employer's till behind his back knowing that the employer would not consent was established; and it seems to me that it does not really matter very much whether that justifies the label "dishonest" or not The judge ought to have gone on to consider whether even if falling short of dishonesty the manager's conduct was nevertheless conduct of such a grave and weighty character as to amount to a breach of the confidential relationship between master and servant, such as would render the servant unfit for continuance in the master's employment and give the master the right to discharge him immediately."
Sachs LJ referred to the "well established law that a servant can be instantly dismissed when his conduct is such that it not only amounts to a wrongful act inconsistent with his duty towards his master but is also inconsistent with the continuance of confidence between them."
1 Citers


 
X v Netherlands (1976) 7 DR 161
1967
ECHR

Human Rights, Employment
The applicant, a specialist worker in the building industry, claimed unemployment benefit and was required as a condition of payment to accept work which he considered to be unsuitable for a person with his qualifications and socially demeaning. He refused the offer and brought a complaint of a violation of article 4. The Commission declared the complaint inadmissible, observing that it was open to the claimant to refuse the work and that its acceptance was only a condition for the grant of unemployment benefit. There could therefore be no question of forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of article 4.
European Convention on Human Rights 4
1 Citers



 
 Lavarack v Woods of Colchester Ltd; CA 1967 - [1967] 1 QB 278; [1966] EWCA Civ 4; [1966] 3 All ER 683; [1966] 1 KIR 312; [1966] 3 WLR 706

 
 Sanders v Parry; 1967 - [1967] 1 WLR 753

 
 Morgan v Fry; QBD 1967 - [1967] 2 All ER 386

 
 W. Gimber and Sons Ltd v Spurrett; QBD 7-Mar-1967 - [1966] ITR 391; [1967] EWHC QB 2

 
 Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinland-Pfalz v Joseph Welchner; ECJ 5-Dec-1967 - C-14/67; R-14/67; [1967] EUECJ R-14/67
 
Ready Mixed Concrete Southeast Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497; [1968] 1 All ER 433; [1968] 2 WLR 775; [1967] EWHC QB 3
8 Dec 1967
QBD
MacKenna J
Employment
In three cases appeals were heard against a finding as to whether a worker was entitled to have his employer pay National Insurance contributions on his behalf which would apply if he were an employee. He worked as an 'owner-driver' Held: The court asked what was the test of whether a worker was self-employed or an employee. It looked to whether the employer exercised 'control' over the worker.
MacKenna J said: "A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled. (i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master. (ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master. (iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service."
As to (i): "There must be a wage or other remuneration. Otherwise there will be no consideration, and without consideration no contract of any kind. The servant must be obliged to provide his own work and skill. Freedom to do a job either by one's own hands or by another's is inconsistent with a contract of service, though a limited or occasional power of delegation may not be . . As to (ii). Control includes the power of deciding the thing to be done, the way in which it shall be done, the means to be employed in doing it, the time when and the place where it shall be done. All these aspects of control must be considered in deciding whether the right exists in a sufficient degree to make one party the master and the other his servant. The right need not be unrestricted." and
"'To find where the right resides one must look first to the express terms of the contract, and if they deal fully with the matter one may look no further. If the contract does not expressly provide which party shall have the right, the question must be answered in the ordinary way by implication.
The third and negative condition is for my purpose the important one, and I shall try with the help of five examples to explain what I mean by provisions inconsistent with the nature of a contract of service.
(i) A contract obliges one party to build for the other, providing at his own expense the necessary plant and materials. This is not a contract of service, even though the builder may be obliged to use his own labour only and to accept a high degree of control: it is a building contract. It is not a contract to serve another for a wage, but a contract to produce a thing (or a result) for a price.
(ii) A contract obliges one party to carry another's goods, providing at his own expense everything needed for performance. This is not a contract of service, even though the carrier may be obliged to drive the vehicle himself and to accept the other's control over his performance: it is a contract of carriage.
(iii) A contract obliges a labourer to work for a builder, providing some simple tools, and to accept the builder's control. Notwithstanding the obligation to provide the tools, the contract is one of service. That obligation is not inconsistent with the nature of a contract of service. It is not a sufficiently important matter to affect the substance of the contract.
(iv) A contract obliges one party to work for the other, accepting his control, and to provide his own transport. This is still a contract of service. The obligation to provide his own transport does not affect the substance. Transport in this example is incidental to the main purpose of the contract. Transport in the second example was the essential part of the performance.
(v) The same instrument provides that one party shall work for the other subject to the other's control, and also that he shall sell him his land. The first part of the instrument is no less a contract of service because the second part imposes obligations of a different kind: Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1963] 1 WLR 441, 451, 452.
I can put the point which I am making in other words. An obligation to do work subject to the other party's control is a necessary, though not always a sufficient, condition of a contract of service. If the provisions of the contract as a whole are inconsistent with its being a contract of service, it will be some other kind of contract, and the person doing the work will not be a servant. The judge's task is to classify the contract (a task like that of distinguishing a contract of sale from one of work and labour). He may, in performing it, take into account other matters besides control.'
National Insurance Act 1965
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Morgan v Fry [1968] All ER 3 452
1968
CA

Employment, Torts - Other

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Vaux and Associated Breweries Ltd v Ward [1968] 3 ITR 385
1968


Employment
Definition of the phrase "work of a particular kind".
1 Citers


 
Watts v Monmouthshire County Council and Another [1968] 66 LGR 171
1968

Browne J
Education, Employment
The Plaintiff, a teacher had had a number of accidents at school and applied for and was granted a short service gratuity from the Ministry of Education being agreed to be permanently incapable of serving efficiently as a teacher of the appropriate kind. The employer did not give him any notice of dismissal. Held: Under the regulations he had been entitled to three months' notice. The teacher sued for damages, including damages in that he had not been given pay for the period of notice that would have been applicable had notice of dismissal been given. "Having regard to the correspondence, I now come to the question of whether there was frustration of this contract. It is quite clear, in my view, that the mere inability of the Plaintiff to perform his duties by reason of illness or accident does not in itself amount to frustration of the contract. The regulations regarding tenure clearly contemplate that, even if the teacher does become ill or suffers an accident, the contract shall continue in existence in spite of that. But as a matter of common sense it seems to me that an application for and acceptance by the plaintiff of a gratuity on the basis that he had become permanently incapable of serving efficiently as a teacher is wholly inconsistent with the continued existence of a contract by the County Council to employ him as a teacher and by him to serve the County Council as a teacher." After drawing attention to the Act, "I consider that it is plain that the whole basis of this gratuity is that the teacher has become permanently incapable of serving efficiently as a teacher. In my judgment, it is impossible for the plaintiff at the same time to accept a gratuity on the basis that he is permanently incapable of serving as a teacher and also to continue to serve as such. Having accepted this gratuity, the plaintiff was not, in my view, eligible to return to the service of the County Council. In my view the foundation of the contract was destroyed when the plaintiff accepted the gratuity and the contract then came to an end by frustration. If there is frustration, there is no need for either party to give any notice terminating the date of it. The determination is automatic."
Teachers' (Superannuation) Act 1925
1 Citers


 
Dutton v C H Bailey Ltd (1968) 3 ITR 355
1968
QBD
Lord Parker CJ
Employment
Dutton had been employed for nearly twenty years as a boiler maker. In 1967 the employers considered that there were too many restrictive practices and tried to get the employees' society to agree to do away with them. The employees' society refused. The employers told the men that, if they wished to continue to work, they would have to agree to new working rules and conditions. Dutton refused to agree. So did all the other boiler makers. In consequence, the employers told him that his labour was not required. The industrial tribunal had held that he was not dismissed by reason of redundancy: "We find that the reason for the employers' termination of the old contract is that they wished - wisely or unwisely - to impose or attempt to impose new terms upon their work force. It was not because of any existing or expected reduction in the need for boiler makers". The employer appealed. Held: The appeal suceeded. Lord Parker, CJ said: "the proper approach is to say what in all the circumstances would have happened if these men had been retained on the old terms".


 
 Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security; 1969 - [1969] 2 QB 173; [1969] 2 WLR 1; [1968] 3 All ER 732

 
 John v Rees and Others; Martin and Another v Davis and Others; ChD 1969 - [1970] 1 Ch 345; [1969] 2 All ER 275
 
Lloyd v Brassey [1969] 2 WLR 310; [1969] 1 All ER 382; [1969] 2 QB 98
1969
CA
Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ
Employment
A farm was sold as a going concern with land and all stock-in-trade. Held. This was a "transfer of a trade, business, or undertaking." It was the same business being carried on both before and after the transfer. The same staff were employed. Lord Denning MR considerd the nature of a redundancy payment: "As I read the Act, a worker of long standing is now recognised as having an accrued right in his job ; and his right gains in value with the years. So much so that if the job is shut down, he is entitled to compensation for loss of the job - just as a Director gets compensation for loss of office. The director gets a golden handshake. The worker gets a redundancy payment. It is not unemployment pay. I repeat 'not'. Even if he gets another job straightaway, he nevertheless is entitled to full redundancy payment. It is, in a real sense, compensation for long service."
Salmon LJ said: "Of the many factors to be taken into account in considering whether or not a change in the ownership of a business has occurred, none by itself nor a combination of any of them together is necessarily conclusive. Everything depends on a broad view of all the circumstances of each particular case. In this case, having come to the conclusion that there was ample evidence to support the tribunal's finding, I would allow the appeal."
1 Citers



 
 Fitzgerald v Hall Russell and Co Ltd; HL 21-Oct-1969 - [1969] UKHL 7; [1970] AC 984; [1969] 3 WLR 868; [1969] 3 All ER 1140
 
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