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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Defamation - From: 2002 To: 2002

This page lists 41 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Pedder v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 2442 (QB); [2004] EMLR 19
2002
QBD
Gray J
Defamation
The court expressed concern at the costs being incurred in defamation cases after the introduction of conditional fee agreements. Additional elements in an abuse of process case may include the ability of the claimant to pursue a claim at no risk in costs, the exposure of the defendant win or lose to a costs burden and the consequent "chilling effect" upon the defendant's freedom of expression. Held: The three circumstances combined to give rise to a real unfairness to the defendants if the action were to proceed.
1 Citers


 
Comarek v Ramco Energy [2002] All ER (D) 314; [2002] EWHC 2501 (QB)
2002
QBD
Eady J
Defamation
A company in business in Prague had sent a document defamatory of the claimants with whom they were in a business relationship to the British Ambassador in Prague and asked for his assistance. Held: On the relevance of 'common interest ' to the defence of qualified privilege "Counsel for the defendants drew an analogy with the recent case of Kearns v General Counsel of the Bar … That too was primarily a common interest case, but it turned upon the well-established relationship between the Bar Council and members of the Bar … The issue was not fact sensitive therefore, in the sense that it would become necessary to investigate the particular circumstances surrounding each individual publication. Here, by contrast, the common and corresponding interest contended for is not, so to speak, "off the peg" and is being tailored to the individual circumstances and people involved. There is more room, therefore, for factual inquiry at trial before it can be finally determined that the common interest alleged would be classified as ‘legitimate’ by the law of defamation."
1 Citers


 
Komarek v Ramco Energy plc [2002] EWHC 2501 (QB)
2002
QBD

Defamation

1 Citers



 
 Bennett v News Group Newspapers; 2002 - [2002] EMLR 39
 
Abu v MGN Ltd (Practice Note) [2002] EWHC 2345 (QB); [2003] 1 WLR 2201
2002
QBD
Eady J
Defamation
Eady J explained the background and legislative purpose of the 1996 Act provisions for offers of amends.
Defamation Act 1996 2
1 Citers


 
A v United Kingdom (2002) 36 EHRR 917
2002
ECHR

Human Rights, Defamation
"Statements made by MPs outside the Houses of Parliament are subject to the ordinary laws of defamation and breach of confidence, save where they are protected by qualified privilege." and "Furthermore, the immunity afforded to MPs in the United Kingdom appears to the Court to be in several respects narrower than that afforded to members of national legislatures in certain other signatory States and those afforded to Representative to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and Members of the European Parliament. In particular, the immunity attaches only to statements made in the course of parliamentary debates on the floor of the House of Commons or House of Lords. No immunity attaches to statements made outside Parliament, even if they amount to a repetition of statements made during the course of Parliamentary debates on matters of public interest. Nor does any immunity attach to an MP's press statements published prior to parliamentary debates, even if their contents are repeated subsequently in the debate itself."
European Convention on Human Rights
1 Citers


 
Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2002] EWHC 829 (QB)
2002
QBD
Eady J
Defamation
The claimant asserted that the defendant had defamed her in a leaflet. The defendant asked the court to determine that the pamphlet did not carry a defamatory meaning. Held: Eady J formulated the principles applicable when determining meaning: "The proper role for the judge when adjudicating a question of this kind is to evaluate the words complained of and to delimit the range of meanings of which the words are reasonably capable, exercising his or her own judgment in the light of the principles laid down in the authorities and without any of the former Order 18 Rule 19 overtones. If the judge decides that any pleaded meaning falls outside the permissible range, then it will be his duty to rule accordingly. In deciding whether words are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, the court should reject those meanings which can only emerge as the produce of some strained or forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation. The purpose of the new rule is to enable the court to fix in advance the ground rules and permissible meanings, which are of cardinal importance in defamation actions, not only for the purpose of assessing the degree of injury to the claimant's reputation but also for the purpose of evaluating any defences raised, in particular, justification and fair comment.
The court should give the article the natural and ordinary meaning which it would have conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader reading the article once. Hypothetical reasonable readers should not be treated as either naive or unduly suspicious. They should be treated as being capable of reading between the lines and engaging in some loose thinking, but not as being avid for scandal. The court should avoid an over-elaborate analysis of the article, because an ordinary reader would not analyse the article as a lawyer or accountant would analyse documents or accounts. Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. The court should certainly not take a too literal approach to its task."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Mawdsley v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 1780 (QB)
2002
QBD
Morland J
Defamation, Damages
The court asked whether the summary judgment procedure under sections 8 to 10 of the 1996 Act, with its ceiling of £10,000, was appropriate in a case in which a jury after a trial might award £30,000. He decided that it was appropriate. A claimant in defamation has the same duty as any other victim of a tort to mitigate his losses. An admission by the defendant might attract a substantial discount in the damages to be awarded.
Defamation At 1996 8
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Kiam v MGN Ltd Gazette, 15 March 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 43; [2002] 1 WLR 2810; [2003] QB 281
28 Jan 2002
CA
Lords Justice Simon Brown, Waller and Sedley
Damages, Defamation
Where a court regards a jury award in a defamation case as excessive, a "proper" award can be substituted for it is not whatever sum court thinks appropriate, wholly uninfluenced by jury's view, but the highest award which a jury could reasonably have thought necessary. "In a great many cases proof of a cold-blooded cost-benefit calculation that it was worth publishing a known libel is not there, and the ineffectiveness of a moderate award in deterring future libels is painfully apparent . . judges, juries and the public face the conundrum that compensation proportioned to personal injury damages is insufficient to deter, and that deterrent awards make a mockery of the principle of compensation."
Awards in an adequate amount may also be necessary to deter the media from riding roughshod over the rights of other citizens. "[I]n a great many cases proof of a cold-blooded cost benefit calculation that it was worth publishing a known libel is not there, and the ineffectiveness of a moderate award in deterring future libels is painfully apparent … Judges, juries and the public face the conundrum that compensation proportioned to personal injury damages is insufficient to deter, and that deterrent awards make a mockery of the principle of compensation."
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 8
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
English and Another v Hastie Publishing Ltd [2002] All ER (D) 11
31 Jan 2002

Gray J
Defamation
The court should be reluctant to attach qualified privilege to 'reportage' in circumstances where Parliament, in enacting section 15 and Schedules 1 and 2 of the Defamation Act 1996, had not chosen to do so.
Defamation Act 1996
1 Citers


 
Kufaan Publishing Ltd v Al-Warrak Publishing Ltd Unreported, 1 March 2002
1 Mar 2002
CA
Potter LJ
Defamation, Litigation Practice

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Wallis v Valentine and others [2002] EWCA Civ 345; [2003] EMLR 8
5 Mar 2002
CA
Sir Murray Stuart-Smith
Defamation
The court dismissed an appeal by the claimant against the striking out of his claim as an abuse of process. That was an extreme case where the judge had found that even if the claimant succeeded his damages would be very modest, perhaps nominal, and not such as could justify the costs of an action which was estimated to last 14 days in circumstances where the claimant had no assets. Furthermore the claimant was not motivated by a desire for vindication, but was pursuing a vendetta.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Orford v Rasmi Electronics [2002] EWCA Civ 725
22 Apr 2002
CA
Potter LJ
Defamation

[ Bailii ]
 
Mcvicar v The United Kingdom 46311/99; [2002] ECHR 431; (2002) 35 EHRR 22; [2002] ECHR 436
7 May 2002
ECHR

Human Rights, Defamation, Costs
It was not inconsistent with article 6 to expect both claimants and defendants in defamation proceedings to act in person.
European Convention on Human Rights 6
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Hamilton v Al Fayed and Others (No 2); CA 17-May-2002 - Times, 17 June 2002; Gazette, 20 June 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 665; [2003] QB 1175
 
Spencer v Sillitoe and Another [2002] EWCA Civ 820
20 May 2002
CA
Simon Brown LJ
Defamation
Application for leave to appeal - summary dismissal of claim of defamation - alleged remarks by co-worker to senior employee. Leave given
A litigant should not be deprived of a hearing merely because the case seems to a judge implausible on paper.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 1101 (QB); [2003] EMLR 11
29 May 2002
QBD
Eady J
Defamation
A libel defence of justification which was based on "reasonable grounds for suspicion" must focus on conduct of claimant that gives rise to suspicion. It was not permissible to rely upon hearsay. Defendant may not plead as "grounds" material which had become available only after publication. A Lucas-Box meaning might fall into one of three categories: "The sting of a libel may be capable of meaning that a claimant has in fact committed some serious act, such as murder. Alternatively it may be suggested that the words mean that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that he/she has committed such an act. A third possibility is that they may mean that there are grounds for investigating whether he/she has been responsible for such an act."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Rosalyn Jane Mark v Associated Newspapers Limited [2002] EWCA Civ 772; [2002] EMLR 839; [2002] EMLR 38
29 May 2002
CA
Lord Justice Mummery
Defamation
The claimant sought damages in defamation saying that the defendant had said she had authorised publication of extracts from her book about her time working as housekeeper for the prime minister's family before she had obtained proper authority for publication. Held: The court restated the application of the 'bane and antidote principle' of defamation law. A publication which advances and then purports to dispel a defamatory allegation can be acquitted of any possible defamatory meaning only in the very clearest of cases, because 'mud sticks'.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Bonnick v Morris, The Gleaner Company Ltd and Allen [2002] UKPC 31; [2003] 1 AC 300; [2002] 3 WLR 820; 12 BHRC 558; [2002] EMLR 37; [2002] 2 Lloyds Rep 403; (2002) 12 BHRC 558; [2002] All ER (D) 92; (2003) 4 CHRLD 35
17 Jun 2002
PC
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote and Mr Justice Tipping
Defamation, Commonwealth, Media
(Jamaica) The appellant sought damages from the respondent journalists in defamation. They had claimed qualified privilege. The words alleged to be defamatory were ambiguous. Held: The publishers were protected by Reynolds privilege. The court should give the article the natural and ordinary meaning which would be attributed by an intelligent reader seeing it once. He could read between the lines but may not be unduly suspicious.
An appellate court should not disturb the judge's finding without real justification. That did not apply here.
As to privilege, qualified privilege need not be lost because of unanticipated ambiguity. The defamatory imputation was a matter of implication, about which different views could apply. Responsible journalism was the point at which a fair balance was held between freedom of expression on matters of public concern and the reputations of individuals. Nevertheless ambiguity can be a screen behind which a journalist could be "willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike". It is a matter for the words in each case. In this case the ambiguity was not so patent. There was, or perhaps should be, a deterrent element in the amount of damages in defamation cases.
Lord Nicholls discussed the single meaning rule in defamation: "The 'single meaning' rule adopted in the law of defamation is in one sense highly artificial, given the range of meanings the impugned words sometimes bear: see the familiar exposition by Diplock LJ in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157, 171-172. The law attributes to the words only one meaning, although different readers are likely to read the words in different senses. In that respect the rule is artificial. Nevertheless, given the ambiguity of language, the rule does represent a fair and workable method for deciding whether the words under consideration should be treated as defamatory. To determine liability by reference to the meaning an ordinary reasonable reader would give the words is unexceptionable."
For the purposes of determining whether, in the context of a defamation action, a journalist had acted responsibly, it was permissible to take account of the meaning which a journalist thought an article had even though that is different from the meaning which the article had to the ordinary reasonable reader. "A journalist should not be penalised for making a wrong decision on a question of meaning on which different people might reasonably take different views." In that case "the defamatory meaning of the words used was not so glaringly obvious that any responsible journalist would be bound to realise this was how the words would be understood by ordinary, reasonable readers."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]
 
X v Berkoff [2002] EWCA Civ 1042
25 Jun 2002
CA
Auld LJ
Torts - Other, Defamation

[ Bailii ]
 
Firth v State of New York (2002) NY int 88
2 Jul 2002


International, Defamation, Limitation
(New York Court of Appeals) A report published at a press conference on 16 December 1996 was placed on the internet the same day. A claim was filed over a year later. Held. The limitation period started when the report was first uploaded onto the website and did not begin anew each time the website version of the report was accessed by a user: "The policies impelling the original adoption of the single publication rule support its application to the posting of . . the report . . on the website . . These policies are even more cogent when considered in connection with the exponential growth of the instantaneous, worldwide ability to communicate through the Internet . . Thus a multiple publication rule would implicate an even greater potential for endless retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants. Inevitably, there would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet which is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise."
1 Citers

[ Cornell ]
 
McManus and others v Beckham Times, 11 July 2002; Gazette, 12 September 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 939; [2002] 1 WLR 2982; [2002] 4 All ER 497
4 Jul 2002
CA
Lord Justice Waller, Lord Justice Clarke and Lord Justice Laws
Defamation, Media, Damages
The claimant sought damages from the defendant who was a pop star, and had vociferously, publicly, and wrongly accused the claimant of selling pictures with fake autographs of her husband. The defendant obtained an order striking out the claim on the ground that the defendant was not responsible for repetitions of the slander by others. Held: It was not possible to dispose of the republication issue at the interlocutory stage. Much would depend on the findings of the jury, in the light of appropriate directions. Whether the defendant was so responsible was a matter eventually for a jury to decide. She might be found liable if her own fame was such that she expected or should reasonably expect anything extraordinary which she said in public, to be reported. The striking out was set aside. It would be a question of fact for each case. "The reality is that the court has to decide whether, on the facts before it, it is just to hold [the defendant] responsible for the loss in question".
Waller LJ said: "What the law is trying to achieve in this area is a just and reasonable result by reference to the position of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant. If a defendant is actually aware (1) that what she says or does is likely to be reported, and (2) that if she slanders someone that slander is likely to be repeated in whole or in part, there is no injustice in her being held responsible for the damage that the slander causes via that publication. I would suggest further that if a jury were to conclude that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should have appreciated that there was a significant risk that what she said would be repeated in whole or in part in the press and that that would increase the damage caused by the slander, it is not unjust that the defendant should be liable for it. Thus I would suggest a direction along the above lines rather than by reference to 'foreseeability'."
Laws LJ said: "It will not however in my judgment be enough to show that D's slander is a cause of X's further publication: for such a cause might exist although D could have no reason to know of it; and then to hold D responsible would not be just. This is why the old formulae, "natural and probable cause," is inapt even as a figurative description of the relationship that needs to be shown between D's slander and the further publication D is to be held liable for the latter. It must rather be demonstrated that D foresaw that further publication would probably take place, or that D (or a reasonable person in D's position) should have so foreseen and that in consequence increased damage to C 'would ensue'.
Such an approach, I hope, may go some modest distance to demythologise the law of defamation. I make it clear that I intend what I had said to be in conformity with Waller LJ's suggestion at the end of his judgment as to how a jury might be directed, though with difference to him I think that any avoidance of the term "foreseeability" is commended by the need for clarity rather than adherence to principle, for in principle the approach he proposes, and for what its worth my own reasoning, require that the damage in question flowing from X's act be foreseen or foreseeable by D or the reasonable person in D's position"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Gregson v Channel Four Television Corporation [2002] EWCA Civ 941
4 Jul 2002
CA

Defamation
Whether trial before jury appropriate
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Wallis v Valentine and Others Times, 09 August 2002; Gazette, 26 September 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 1034; [2003] EMLR 175
18 Jul 2002
CA
Lord Justice Peter Gibson, Lord Justice Potter and Sir Murray Stuart-Smith
Defamation, Civil Procedure Rules
The claimant in a defamation case appealed a decision to strike out his claim on the basis that it was an abuse of process, being intended to act as an harassment of the defendant, or to cause commercial embarrassment or undue cost. Held: Applying Broxton, the case was properly struck out. The test of abuse was properly applied to the circumstances surrounding the issue of the claim, as well as its conduct after, and was objective. The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules was relevant. The judge had looked at the claimant's case from its highest point, and being careful not to usurp a jury had correctly applied the test in Broxton.
Civil Procedure Rules
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Macintyre v Chief Constable of Kent and others [2002] EWCA Civ 1087
24 Jul 2002
CA
Brooke, Dyson LJJ, Wall J
Defamation
The defendants appealed against case management directions made in this defamation action.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Lillie and Reed v Newcastle City Council, Barker, Jones, Saradjian, Wardell; QBD 30-Jul-2002 - [2002] EWHC 1600 (QB)
 
B v N and Another [2002] EWHC 1692 (QB)
31 Jul 2002
QBD
Eady J
Defamation
There was as allegation of defamation by one doctor against another. Held: Eady J said: "There are various acts that can give rise to legal responsibility, for example, encouraging the primary author, supplying him with information intending or knowing that it will be re-published, or, if one is in a position to do so, instructing or authorising him to publish it."
Eady J considered the role of a jury not only in coming to conclusions of primary fact but also in drawing any appropriate inferences, saying: ""First, it seems that I should address the primary facts relied upon by the claimant for establishing the defendant's responsibility for the publication of the 12th January letter. The burden is upon the claimant to establish those facts at trial. At this stage, I should make all assumptions in favour of the claimant so far as pleaded facts are concerned.
Again, in so far as evidence has been introduced for the purpose of the present application, I should assume that those facts will be established, save in so far as it can be demonstrated on written evidence that any particular factual allegation is indisputably false.
The next question is whether, on the facts assumed, a properly directed jury could draw the inference for which the claimant contends. In this case, of course, the inference is that the second defendant was, in some sense, a participant in the publication of the letter. I should only rule out the case against the second defendant if I am satisfied that a jury would be perverse to draw that inference . .
If the defendant's case is so clear that it cannot be disputed, there would be nothing left for a jury to determine. If, however, there is room for legitimate argument, either on any of the primary facts or as to the feasibility of the inference being drawn, then a judge should not prevent the claimant having the issue or issues resolved by a jury. I should not conduct a mini-trial or attempt to decide the factual dispute of first appearances when there is the possibility that cross-examination might undermine the case that the defendant is putting forward."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd and Another v Campbell; CA 31-Jul-2002 - [2002] EWCA Civ 1143
 
Pepin v Taylor [2002] EWCA Civ 1245
16 Aug 2002
CA

Litigation Practice, Defamation
Application for permission to appeal against order made on case management hearing. The case related to defamation alleged to have taken place in an Internet Usenet group. The judge had made findings which the claimant, and this court found were not justified on the facts before it, and a substantial point of law may be at stake. Leave granted.
[ Bailii ]
 
Pepin v Taylor [2002] EWCA Civ 1522
10 Oct 2002
CA
Tuckey, Longmore LJJ
Defamation
The claimant and defendant claimed defamation of each other in cross claims as to postings made on internet newsgroups messages. Mr P said that the defendant had not been identified in the defamation alleged against Mr P. The defendant had been identified by his email address. The claimant appealed against the judgment given dismissing his own claim, and for the defendant. Held: The judge's finding stood. The claimant should not be prejudiced, since the same argument might run against him to say that only a few people would make the identification, and that the damages were therefore very limited.
"This case cried out for case management. The rules allow a judge to do what Gray J did. If the judge thinks there is no real prospect of a claim succeeding, he ought, when exercising his case management powers, to dismiss it summarily: see CPR Part 1.4(2)(c) and paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of the Practice Direction to CPR Part 26. In the course of his discussion with Mr Pepin the judge made it clear what it was that he was intending to do and yet Mr Pepin, who is an experienced litigant in person, did not ask for an adjournment or indicate that he found himself in any difficulty in dealing with the points which the judge put to him."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Heard v Kemp [2002] EWCA Civ 1506
15 Oct 2002
CA
Sedley LJ
Defamation

[ Bailii ]
 
Spencer v Sillitoe and Another [2002] EWCA Civ 1579; [2003] EMLR 207; [2003] EMLR 10
22 Oct 2002
CA
Simon Brown VP CA, Buxton, Carnwath LJJ
Civil Procedure Rules, Defamation
Appeal from a decision of Morland J, who granted the defendants summary judgment under Civil Procedure Rule 24(2)(a)(2), finding that the claimant, Mr Spencer, had no real prospect of succeeding on his claim. Held: Buxton LJ said: "Bearing in mind the emphasis placed on the right to jury trial in section 69 [of the Senior Court Act 1981] and the analogy drawn by this court in Alexander with the criminal practice in Galbraith, the question in a case such as the present comes down to whether there is an issue of fact on which, on the evidence so far available, the jury could properly, without being perverse, come to a conclusion in favour of the claimant.
That question has to be answered against the background of the great respect that is paid to a jury's assessment of witnesses after seeing and hearing them, and hearing them cross-examined. It is unlikely that a judge will be able to find that a witness will necessarily be disbelieved by a jury; or that for a jury to believe him would be perverse; when he has not actually heard that witness give evidence and be cross-examined: unless, of course, there is counter evidence that plainly demonstrates the falsity of the witness's evidence, as opposed, in this case, to rendering it, in the judge's view, implausible."
Civil Procedure Rules 24(2)(a)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Another; HL 24-Oct-2002 - Times, 25 October 2002; [2002] UKHL 40; [2002] 1 WLR 3024; [2002] 4 All ER 732; [2003] EMLR 1
 
Orford v Rasmi Electronics and Another [2002] EWCA Civ 1672; [2002] All ER (D) 397 (Oct)
25 Oct 2002
CA
Brooke L, Bodey J
Torts - Other, Defamation, Litigation Practice

[ Bailii ]

 
 Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd (No 2); CA 28-Nov-2002 - Times, 06 December 2002; Gazette, 23 January 2003; [2003] 1 Costs LR 111; [2002] EWCA Civ 1739; [2002] All ER (D) 442
 
Milne v Express Newspapers Ltd Times, 09 December 2002
29 Nov 2002
QBD
Eady J
Defamation
The defendant newspaper had made a full apology and offer of amends under the section, and relied upon it as a defence. The claimant sought to impugn that apology, saying that the article had been malicious. He sought disclosure to support the claim. Held: The request was a fishing expedition. To undermine the defence, the claimant had to show bad faith, not just negligence, and actual rather than constructive knowledge of the falsity.
Defamation Act 1996 2 4(2)


 
 Chase v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd; CA 3-Dec-2002 - Times, 31 December 2002; [2002] EWCA Civ 1772; [2003] EMLR 218; [2003] EMLR 11
 
Baron v Housmans Bookshop Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1877
4 Dec 2002
CA

Defamation

[ Bailii ]
 
Roberts v Bass [2002] HCA 57; [2002] 212 CLR 1; [2002] 77 ALJR 292; [2002] 194 ALR 161
12 Dec 2002

Gleeson CJ
Defamation, Constitutional
Austlii (High Court of Australia) Defamation - Defences - Qualified privilege - State election - Publication of electoral material - Reciprocity of interest - Proof of malice - Improper motive - Whether intention to cause political damage constitutes an improper motive - Relevance of honest belief in truth of statement - Relevance of reckless indifference to truth or falsity of published material - Relevance of knowledge of falsity of published material - Relationship of common law qualified privilege to extended qualified privilege as identified in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520.
Constitutional law (Cth) - Implied limitation upon laws restricting freedom of expression concerning governmental and political matters - Whether constitutional question arises having regard to issues before the State trial and appellate courts - Whether constitutional implication may be disregarded - Whether general common law relating to the occasion of qualified privilege is compatible with the Constitution - Whether general common law relating to malice is compatible with the Constitution - Whether common law needs to be developed to ensure compatibility - Ingredients of malice in the circumstances of the case - Whether malice established in communications published in a State electoral campaign. Words and phrases - "malice".
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd and others [2002] EWHC 2726 (QB); [2002] QB 321
12 Dec 2002
QBD

Defamation
The court considered the possible affront to jurors in a defamation action when asked to decide some elements of an action, but not others.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
A v The United Kingdom Times, 28 December 2002; 35373/97; [2002] ECHR 805; (2002) 36 EHRR 917; [2002] ECHR 811
17 Dec 2002
ECHR

Human Rights, Defamation, Legal Aid, Constitutional
The applicant complained that the absence of legal aid to allow a challenge what had been said about her in Parliament by way of defamation, violated her right of access to court. Held: The right to absolute parliamentary privilege was within the margin of freedom enjoyed by a nation state. The applicant was not left entirely without remedy, and the freedom of parliament was properly to be protected. As to the availability of legal aid, limited legal advice was available, and a conditional fee arrangement might also have been available. "However, the right of access to court is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations. These are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State. In this respect, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention's requirements rests with the Court. It must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved."
European Convention on Human Rights 6 8.1
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
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