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Defamation - From: 1997 To: 1997

This page lists 37 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Zeran v America Online [1997] 129 F3d 327
1997

Wilkinson CJ
International, Defamation
(United States of America) Wilkinson CJ discussed the statutory protection given to Internet Service providers in the US: "Section 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, Section 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service providers liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions -- such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content -- are barred" and "None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would escape accountability. While Congress acted to keep government regulation of the Internet to a minimum, it also found it to be the policy of the United States "to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer". Congress made a policy choice, however, not to deter harmful on-line speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages"
1 Citers


 
Vodafone Group Plc v Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd [1997] FSR 34; [1997] EMLR 84
1997
ChD
Jacob J
Intellectual Property, Media, Defamation
The court examined the development of the law in relation to comparative advertising. Jacob J said: "Prior to the coming into force of the Trade Marks Act 1994 comparative advertising using a registered trade mark of a competitor was, subject to minor exceptions involving the use of a company name, forbidden by section 4(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1938. But in an increasingly pro-competitive environment there was virtually a moratorium on enforcement of section 4(1) rights in a number of trades - for instance comparative advertising in the field of motor cars was very common for a number of years before the 1938 Act was repealed. The 1994 Act now positively permits fair competitive advertising by section 10(6). This provides:
"Nothing in the preceding provisions of this section shall be construed as preventing the use of a registered trade mark by any person for the purpose of identifying goods or services as those of the proprietor or a licensee.
But any such use otherwise than in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters shall be treated as infringing the registered trade mark if the use without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the trade mark."
In this case it is common ground that there is no infringement unless the use of Vodaphone in the comparison falls within the qualification of section 10(6). This qualification was considered by Laddie J in Barclays Bank Plc v. Advanta [1996] RPC 307. He held that it is for the plaintiff to show that the use falls within the qualification and that the test of honesty is objective (ie. would a reasonable reader be likely to say, upon being given the full facts, that the advertisement is not honest?). Laddie J gave as an example the case where the advertisement is "significantly misleading". In trade marks, as [Counsel] rightly submitted, there is no "one meaning rule". If a comparison is significantly misleading on an objective basis to a substantial proportion of the reasonable audience, it is not an "honest practice" within the section."
"The meaning of the words concerned is the first matter to be considered, for their truth or falsity is to be tested against that meaning. The meaning is for the court to determine when a judge sits without a jury. Evidence of the meaning to others is inadmissible. The question: ‘is not one of construction in the legal sense. The ordinary man does not live in an ivory tower and he is not inhibited by the rules of construction. So he can and does read between the lines in the light of his general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs . . What the ordinary man would infer without special knowledge has generally been called the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. But that expression is rather misleading in that it conceals the fact that there are two elements in it. Sometimes it is not necessary to go beyond the words themselves, as where the plaintiff has been called a thief or a murderer. But more often the sting is not so much in the words themselves as in what the ordinary man will infer from them, and that is also regarded as part of their natural and ordinary meaning’, per Lord Reid in Lewis v The Daily Telegraph"
Jacob J discussed obiter the application of the 'one meaning rule' in malicious falsehood cases: "As a comparative stranger to this branch of the law I find the "one meaning rule" strange, particularly for malicious falsehood. Without authority, I should have thought it would be enough to satisfy the criterion of falsity for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant made a statement which was false to a substantial number of people. That, for instance, is the position in passing off (a tort also concerned with false representations): for that tort it is enough to show that the representation fools some of the people, even if not most of them.
The reason for the libel rule in part relates to the entitlement of jury trial for libel (as Diplock L.J. explained in Slim). Save in exceptional circumstances the right to jury trial remains for libel and slander (see section 69(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981) but there is no such right in relation to malicious falsehood. So it by no means follows that that historical reason for the rule in libel should apply to malicious falsehood. Another reason for the rule relates to the function of a jury in awarding damages for defamation: unless one has settled on a particular meaning one cannot judge the extent of the defamation. But in malicious falsehood damages are rather different: they are essentially compensatory for pecuniary loss as for most other torts. So again it does not seem necessarily to follow that the libel rule should apply to the tort. However, as I say, the parties were agreed that I should proceed on the basis that I am a notional jury identifying the single meaning of the words complained of. That is what I will do, and, as will be seen, in this case the point is academic."
Jacob J looked at the question of meaning in marketing cases: "This is a case about advertising. The public are used to the ways of advertisers and expect a certain amount of hyperbole. In particular the public are used to advertisers claiming the good points of a product and ignoring others, . . and the public are reasonably used to comparisons— "knocking copy" as it is called in the advertising world. This is important in considering what the ordinary meaning may be. The test is whether a reasonable man would take the claim being made as one made seriously, the more precise the claim the more it is likely to be so taken— the more general or fuzzy the less so."
Trade Marks Act 1994 10(6) - Supreme Court Act 1981 69(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Barker v Statesman and Nation Publishing Co Ltd and Others Times, 08 January 1997
8 Jan 1997
CA

Defamation
A malicious falsehood claim may be struck out without evidence, but only rarely.

 
Bennett and others v Guardian Newspapers Limited Times, 27 February 1997; [1997] EWCA Civ 815
22 Jan 1997
CA

Defamation, Media
The existence of other rumours as to a plaintiff's character do not reduce the damages to be awarded for the distress caused by the libel in a libel action.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Albert Anthony Keith Miller v Terence George Osborne [1997] EWCA Civ 855
28 Jan 1997
CA

Defamation, Litigation Practice
Application for leave to appeal out of time.
[ Bailii ]
 
Sugar v Venerables and Another (1) [1997] EWCA Civ 923
5 Feb 1997
CA

Defamation

[ Bailii ]
 
Daniels v Griffiths [1997] EWCA Civ 1105
27 Feb 1997
CA
Brook LJ
Defamation
Application for leave to appeal.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Mapp v News Group Newspapers Limited; Gillan v News Group Newspapers Limited and similar; CA 27-Feb-1997 - Times, 10 March 1997; [1997] EWCA Civ 1107; [1997] EMLR 397

 
 Gaillemar Sarl v Guardian Newspapers Limited; Dyer and Rusbridger; CA 28-Feb-1997 - [1997] EWCA Civ 1125
 
Balli Group Plc Transbas Ve Ticaret SA Vahid Alaghband v Kemal Ulusoy [1997] EWCA Civ 1214
12 Mar 1997
CA

Defamation

[ Bailii ]
 
Captain Brian Leonard Friend v Civil Aviation Authority and Captain Brian Leonard Friend v Kenneth J Anderson; Captain John G Ninpriss; John W Page; John W Saull and Russell Williams [1997] EWCA Civ 1285
20 Mar 1997
CA

Defamation

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Isaac Jehuda Schapira v Jonathan Ahronson; Chanoch Marmari and Hotza'at Iton Ha'Aretz Ltd [1997] EWCA Civ 1303
21 Mar 1997
CA

Jurisdiction, Defamation

1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Brooks v Lind and Others Times, 26 March 1997
26 Mar 1997
OHCS

Defamation
Local councillors complained when they had been described as the 'Monklands Mafia'. Held The phrase was not defamatory.

 
Cunningham v Essex County Council Times, 31 March 1997
31 Mar 1997
QBD

Defamation
Implied undertaking for use of document continued after read out in Crown Court.


 
 Grovit and others v Doctor and others; HL 24-Apr-1997 - Gazette, 21 May 1997; Times, 25 April 1997; [1997] UKHL 13; [1997] 1 All ER 417; [1997] 1 WLR 640
 
Rupert W S Allason MP v Alastair Campbell; Andy McSmith and MGN Limited [1997] EWCA Civ 1668
9 May 1997
CA

Defamation

[ Bailii ]
 
Velasco v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EWCA Civ 1670
9 May 1997
CA

Defamation
Application for leave to appeal.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Right Hon Aitken MP and Preston; Pallister and Guardian Newspapers Ltd; CA 13-May-1997 - [1997] EWCA Civ 1682

 
 Right Hon Aitken MP and Preston; Pallister and Guardian Newspapers Ltd; CA 15-May-1997 - Times, 21 May 1997; [1997] EWCA Civ 1710; [1997] EMLR 415
 
Captain Brian L Friend v Civil Aviation Authority (1) [1997] EWCA Civ 1763
23 May 1997
CA

Defamation

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Colchester Oyster Fishery Limited v Purslow Unreported, 10 June 1997
10 Jun 1997

Eady J
Defamation
Qualified privilege - malice
1 Citers


 
Mahon and Another v Rahn and Others (1) Times, 12 June 1997; [1998] QB 424
12 Jun 1997
CA
Otton LJ, Staughton LJ
Defamation, Evidence
Two company directors sued Swiss bankers who had responded to enquiries from the police in London. The charges which followed had been dismissed, and the directors sued in defamation, seeking to rely upon the materials sent to the police. Held: The appeal succeeded. There is no implied undertaking as to the use of disclosed documents in criminal proceedings preventing their use in civil proceedings. It was foreseeable that the information, if acted upon, would be made public. This applied whether or not the material was obtained under compulsion. There was no analogy between the position of the Crown in a criminal case and that of a party in civil proceedings. It could not be said that the Crown would be deterred from complying with its obligations of disclosure, whether at common law or now under statute, by concern that the accused might use the documents for some ulterior purpose. The rules of public interest immunity, immunity from suit and qualified privilege should be sufficient protection for people who might be adversely affected by collateral use of disclosed documents.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
McDonald's Corporation, McDonald's Restaurants Limited v Helen Marie Steel, David Morris [1997] EWHC QB 366
19 Jun 1997
QBD

Defamation

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Goldsmith and Another v Bhoyrul and Others Times, 20 June 1997; Gazette, 16 July 1997; [1998] QB 459
20 Jun 1997
QBD
Buckley J
Defamation
A political party is not to have the power to sue in defamation proceedings. Such a power would operate against public policy in that it would restrict democratic debate.
Buckley J said that the principle that a local authority may not sue in defamation, established in Derbyshire v Times and Hector, must apply equally to a democratically electable political party.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Richard Branson v Guy Snowden and Richard Branson v Gtech UK Corporation (a Body Corporate) and Robert Rendine [1997] EWCA Civ 2021
3 Jul 1997
CA
Lord Justice Butler-Sloss, Lord Justice Auld, Lord Justice Aldous
Defamation, Litigation Practice
The respective parties had been preparing competing bids for the National Lottery. One (Branson) alleged that the other had offerered a bribe. The other responded that the allegation was a lie, and each sued the other for defamation. Held: The Lucas-Box defence could not be struck out. Litigious advantage resulting to one or other party from discovery and inspection is an aspect of securing fairness in disposal of the matter. The court refused leave to appeal against an order requiring disclosure of Mr Snowden's statement as part of a mutual disclosure.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520
8 Jul 1997

DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND KIRBY JJ
Commonwealth, Defamation
(High Court of Australia) The court propounded a test of reasonableness of conduct in respect of the publication of political information. Generally publication will not be reasonable unless the maker of the statement had reasonable grounds for believing the defamatory imputation was true.
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Loveless v Lawrence Earl and Capital and Counties (Financial Services) Limited [1997] EWCA Civ 2061
9 Jul 1997
CA

Defamation
Application for leave to appeal granted.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Taylor Monarch Assurance Plc v Director of Serious Fraud Office, McKenzie, Law Society Rogerson; CA 22-Jul-1997 - Gazette, 24 September 1997; Times, 27 August 1997; [1997] EWCA Civ 2163
 
Williamson v Commissioner of Police for Metropolis [1997] EWCA Civ 2177
23 Jul 1997
CA

Police, Defamation, Litigation Practice

[ Bailii ]
 
Mann v O'Neill (1997) 71 ALJR 903; (1997) 191 CLR 204; (1997) 145 ALR 682; (1997) 12 Leg Rep 21; [1997] Aust Torts Reports 81-436
31 Jul 1997


Litigation Practice, Defamation
High Court of Australia - Courts should be reluctant to extend the immunity given to witnesses: "the general rule is that the extension of absolute privilege is viewed with the most jealous suspicion, and resisted, unless its necessity is demonstrated"
Defamation - Absolute privilege - Absolute privilege only attaches out of necessity - Judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings - Complaint procedures and disciplinary proceedings - Letter to Attorney-General questioning special magistrate's fitness to hold office - Letter not a step in disciplinary proceedings - Letter invoked investigative function equating with prosecuting authority's function - Not necessary that statements to prosecuting authorities be absolutely privileged - Complaints to prosecuting authorities enjoy qualified privilege.
1 Citers

[ ]
 
Bhatt v Chelsea and Westminster NHS Trust Unreported, 16 October 1997
16 Oct 1997
QBD
Sir Maurice Drake
Defamation
The defendant trust's press officer had issued information to the press which was defamatory of the claimant in response to inquiries from the press indicating that articles based on the claimant's criticisms of the trust were about to be published. The court heard an interlocutory appeal against the Master's refusal to strike out the claimant's case saying that it had the protection of qualified privilege. Held: This form of qualified privilege extends to a statement in rebuttal of an anticipated attack. It would be bad law to treat a response to an attack as privileged but not "a pre-emptive press release intended to stop the mischief which would be done by publication".
1 Citers


 
Adams v Associated Newspapers Limited and others, O'Keefe, Northumbrian Fine Foods Plc Third Parties [1997] EWCA Civ 2563
24 Oct 1997
CA

Defamation, Litigation Practice
Appeal against dismissal of contribution claim against third parties by defamation defendants.
[ Bailii ]
 
Terence Venables v Mihir Bose [1997] EWCA Civ 2687
10 Nov 1997
CA
Lord Justice Auld, Sir Christopher Slade
Defamation
The appellant was respondent in a defamation action brought by Mr Venables. He appealed an interlocutory order striking out an alternative meaning proposed by the defendant for some of the words complained of. Held: It was for the judge to settle the range of potential meanings. The words however clearly bore the meaning alleged by the claimant and could not reasonably be read to refer to a lower allegation of misbehaviour than dishonesty. Appeal dismissed.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Srichand P Hinduja and Gopichand P Hinduja v Asia TV Limited Times, 12 December 1997; [1997] EWCA Civ 2824; [1998] EMLR 516
25 Nov 1997
CA
Hirst, Henry LJJ and Harman J
Defamation
The procedure for determining whether words were defamatory was intended to be summary; appeals are to be discouraged. The new rule was intended to lay down a swift and inexpensive procedure in chambers to eliminate meanings which the words are plainly incapable of bearing. Hirst LJ said: "I would strongly wish to discourage appeals under O.82,r.3A on which the decision seems to me to lie essentially within the province of the judge in chambers. This rule is intended to lay down a swift and inexpensive procedure in chambers to eliminate meanings which the words are plainly incapable of bearing." Held: it is quite clear, in my judgment, that the crucial question at the present juncture is not what meaning the words do bear, which will be a question for the jury to decide at the trial, but rather what meaning the words are capable of bearing i.e. whether the meaning pleaded in the defence was one which the average viewer could have derived from the programme. I would say at once that it is by no means improbable that the jury will conclude, in line with Mr. Price's submissions before us today, that the sting does lie in the reference to the Bank of England's involvement. But having considered the words carefully, I am by no means satisfied that that is an inevitable conclusion, nor am I satisfied that the defendants' more restricted meaning is one which the jury must necessarily conclude the words are incapable of bearing; in my judgment, the real sting, in the eyes of the reasonable one-off viewer as a matter of first impression, may well lie in the imputation that the grounds for suspicion are in themselves sufficiently credible."
Rules of the Supreme Court Order 82 Rule 3A
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Daniels v Griffiths; CA 27-Nov-1997 - Gazette, 17 December 1997; Times, 02 December 1997; [1997] EWCA Civ 2836; [1998] EMLR 488

 
 Holley, SD and R Trading Limited, Henry Ansbacher and Co Limited, Ansbacher (Jersey) Limited v Smith; CA 4-Dec-1997 - Times, 20 December 1997; Gazette, 14 January 1998; [1997] EWCA Civ 2914; [1998] QB 726; [1998] 1 All ER 853
 
Wendy Waple v Surrey County Council Times, 29 December 1997; Gazette, 04 February 1998; [1997] EWCA Civ 3032; [1997] EWCA Civ 3033
17 Dec 1997
CA

Defamation, Local Government
The applicant and her husband had adopted a son. After problems he was taken into care and fostered. The council sought a contribution to the cost of care. The parent requested details as to the circumstances behind the application, and had relayed to them allegations against them. The allegations were withdrawn, and apologised for, but the claimant sought damages. She appealed an order striking out her claim on the basis that the statement was privileged. Held: The statement was made in the course of a procedure which was short of court proceedings being started. The authority said that its conduct of child care proceedings would be severely hampered if such statements could not be communicated between the parties' legal representatives. Letters written by a solicitor in the performance of his or her duties to a client of the firm attract qualified privilege. Absolute privilege could not be extended similarly. Appeal allowed.
Children Act 1989 Sch 2 Part III
1 Cites

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
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