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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Defamation - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 23 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Orbison [1985] 1 QB 475
1985
CA
Sir John Donaldson MR
European, Jurisdiction, Defamation
In the course of proceedings brought by the European Commission against Hasselblad, Mr Orbison wrote a letter to the Commission upon which the appellant then sued for damages for libel. The court considered the dangers of national and European courts separately examining evidence in cases where each had some jurisdiction. Held: Sir John Donaldson MR said: "The first question which arises is whether this letter is to be regarded as sufficiently closely connected to the process of giving evidence for it to be necessary to extend absolute privilege to it, assuming always that absolute privilege would attach to evidence to the like effect given to the Commission." and as to jurisdiction "it cannot be right that the national courts and Community institutions shall both independently weigh the force of particular evidence with the possibility of inconsistent results." The privilege of immunity given to a court was a privilege that should not be extended.
Sir John Donaldson MR continued (obiter): "Mr Burton [counsel for the appellant] takes the point that an informer in England has only the benefit of qualified privilege: Shufflebottom v Allday (1857) 5 W.R. 315. Bringing the matter more up to date and relating it to an inquiry similar to that undertaken by the Commission, Mr Burton submits, rightly, that if Mr Orbison's letter had been addressed to the Director General of the Fair Trading, he could have been sued for libel and would have had to be content with the defence of qualified privilege."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Riches v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] QB 256; [1985] EWCA Civ 20; [1985] 3 WLR 432; [1985] 2 All ER 845
20 Feb 1985
CA
Stephenson LJ, Parker LJ, Park J
Defamation, Damages
The defendant published serious defamatory allegations against several plaintiff police officers. The defendant newspaper appealed against an award of £250,000 exemplary damages for their defamation of the respondent police officers. Held: Damages for defamation might be increased where a newspaper advertised the story complained of. Nevertheless, a retrial was ordered. The jury should be asked to make one award of exemplary damages which should then be divided between the plaintiffs. The award of exemplary damages was proper because there was evidence that the defendant had calculated the risk of damages against the benefit of increased sales.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Polly Peck PLC v Trelford [1986] QB 1000
1986
CA
O'Connor LJ
Defamation
The plaintiffs complained of the whole of one article and parts of two other articles published about them in The Observer. The defamatory sting was that Mr Asil Nadir (the fourth plaintiff) had deceived or negligently misled shareholders, investors, and members of the general public as to the operation of the first three plaintiffs, which were companies run, but not controlled, by him. The defendants sought, inter alia, to justify in their defence allegations in the second and third articles of which the plaintiffs had not made complaint. They pleaded that the words complained of were fair comment on a matter of public interest and/or were true in substance and in fact, and set out 54 particulars of fair comment and justification. Held. Where a publication contains two or more separate and distinct defamatory statements, the plaintiff is entitled to select one of them for complaint, and the defendant is not entitled to assert the truth of the other(s) by way of justification. "In my judgment Section 5 plainly requires the distinct charges against the plaintiff to be founded on separate words, and these must be contained in the passages of which the plaintiff complains." An important principle "is that the trial of the action should concern itself with the essential issues and the evidence relevant thereto and that public policy and the interest of the parties require that the trial should be kept strictly to the issues necessary for a fair determination of the dispute between the parties."
Defamation Act 1952 5
1 Citers


 
Khashoggi v IPC Magazines Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1412
1986
CA
Sir John Donaldson MR
Defamation
The plaintiff sought to restrain the publication of an article. The defendants asserted that they would justify what they said at trial by reference to a Polly Peck defence, as to which: "I cannot see why the Bonnard v Perryman principle should not be applied. Quite apart from any question of public interest in the freedom of the press, there is a much wider principle which covers it, and that is this. The injunctive powers of the court can only be invoked in support of a right or in defence of an interest. If the Polly Peck defence were to succeed the plaintiff would have no right. She therefore cannot expect to have it defended. That does not of course answer the question which arises as to how likely she is to succeed. That is a problem which always arises in libel and elsewhere. The point is that Bonnard v Perryman, apart from its reference to freedom of speech, is based on the fact that courts should not step in to defend a cause of action in defamation if they think that this is a case in which the plea of justification might, not would, succeed."
1 Cites

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 Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd; Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc v Trelford, Viscount De L'Isle v Times Newspapers Ltd; CA 1986 - [1986] 1 WLR 147; [1986] 1 All ER 177
 
Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407; 9815/82; [1986] ECHR 7
8 Jul 1986
ECHR
Ryssdal P
Human Rights, Defamation, Media
Freedom of expression, as secured in paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society'. "The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance. No doubt article 10(2) enables the reputation of others--that is to say, of all individuals--to be protected, and this protection extends to politicians too, even when they are not acting in their private capacity; but in such cases the requirements of such protection have to be weighed in relation to the interests of open discussion of political issues."
European Convention on Human Rights 10
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Cunningham v Scotsman Publications 1987 SLT 698; 1987 SCLR 314; 1987 SC 107; [1986] ScotCS CSOH_1
27 Nov 1986
SCS
Lord Clyde
Scotland, Defamation
The pursuers complained of court reports in which, it was said, the reports went beyond what had been read out in court, and that therefore as defamatory material, were not protected by privilege.
[ Bailii ]
 
Maxwell v Pressdram Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 298; [1987] 1 All ER 656
1987
CA
Kerr LJ, Parker LJ
Defamation, Vicarious Liability, Damages, Contempt of Court, Media
The court was asked whether disclosure should be ordered in the context of the statutory privilege which was created by s.10 of the 1981 Act. The publisher defendant had deposed that it would justify the material. At trial, however, the defence of justification was abandoned and the judge said he would make a (strong) comment adverse to the defendant in the course of his charge of the jury, but he held that the witness need not reveal the source of his material. Held: The appeal failed. A plea of negligence is insufficient to found a claim for exemplary damages. Some conscious wrongdoing is necessary.
Parker LJ made the point that "it is not sufficient merely to say that the information which is sought (to be obtained) is information which is relevant to the determination of an issue before the court. Were that so, it would always be possible to obtain an order for disclosure . "
Contempt of Court Act 1981 10
1 Citers


 
Barnet v Crozier [1987] 1 WLR 272
1987
CA
Ralph Gibson LJ
Litigation Practice, Defamation
The court considered an application by a third party to proceedings to prevent a statement being read out in open court in defamation proceedings. Justification had originally been pleaded by both defendants but, as part of a settlement with the second defendant the Spectator accepted that the libel could not be justified and withdrew that defence. The other defendant in the case was a journalist who was maintaining his justification defence. The journalist sought to oppose the reading of a statement in open court on the footing that it was unfair to him, particularly bearing in mind that the defence of justification was still being run and that it would be unfair on him to have the justification claim effectively conceded by the other defendant.
Ralph Gibson LJ said: ""Parties to an action do not need the consent of the court to make an effective settlement of their dispute; nor do they need the consent of the court to announce to the world that they have settled it on stated terms. The importance of the making of a statement in open court is, first, that it is likely to come to the attention of the press, who will give to it such attention as its public interest is seen by them to merit and, secondly, since the statement is part of a judicial proceeding, it is made on an occasion of absolute privilege. Thus, the parties to the statement are protected and, moreover, the statement can be reported without the publisher of the report incurring the risk of being sued in respect of it . .
It seems to me that an opportunity to make a statement in open court was thus seen more than 50 years ago as something which was an incident, or part of the available procedure, in a defamation action which the plaintiff was at least entitled to expect to be available to him, provided that the terms of the statement were approved by the judge and there was nothing in the case which made it unfair to another party to the statement to be made.
The present rule, RSC, Ord 82, r.5, which derives from the previous RSC, Ord 22, r.2 introduced in 1933, provides for the making of a statement in open court with the leave of the judge, both when there has been acceptance of money paid in and when the action is settled before trial without a payment into court.
The judge was right, in my view, to regard the settlement of proceedings as a public good which the court should encourage and facilitate if, having regard to the interests of all the parties, it is right and just so to do. Although a party has no right to make a statement in open court upon which he can insist if the circumstances are such that the judge cannot in his discretion approve that course, it seems to me that parties who have made a bona fide settlement of a defamation action and ask leave to make a statement in open court may expect to be allowed to do so unless some sufficient reason appears on the material before the judge why leave should be refused to them. By saying that he did not regard either party as having a burden of proof, while acknowledging that it is desirable for settlement to be facilitated, I think the judge meant, as he said, that he must have regard to the interests of all parties; but, if there is no sufficient reason to refuse it, a plaintiff who has reached a settlement with a defendant should be allowed to make an approved statement. I think the judge was right in his approach . .
Finally for the reasons already given, the opportunity to make a statement in open court is an incident of the court's procedure which parties who settle such an action can be expected to be allowed to use unless there is some sufficient reason to cause the court to refuse to approve that course."
1 Citers



 
 Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd; CA 1988 - [1988] 1 WLR 64

 
 Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd (2); CA 1988 - [1988] 1 WLR 116; [1988] 1 All ER 282
 
De L'Isle v Times Newspapers [1988] 1 WLR 49
1988
CA

Defamation
A defendant who pleading justification may plead any reasonable meaning that a jury, properly directed, might find to be the real meaning.
1 Citers


 
Prager v Times Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 77; [1988] 1 All ER 300
1988
CA
Purchas LJ
Defamation
The plaintiff claimed in libel, alleging certain meanings. The defendant sought to plead in justification to support certain defamatory meanings, but not those alleged. Held: Where the words used were capable of being read by the judge to imply the meanings supported by the proposed defence, the defendant could advance that defence even though the plaintiff had not raised them. However, a defendant pleading such a justification must plead the exact meaning, and the facts which support it. The defence as filed was deficient, but could be corrected by appropriate amendment.
Furthermore, it is not open to a defendant to plead specific facts in partial justification of a libel with the sole purpose of mitigating damages.
1 Citers


 
Williams v Reason [1988] 1 WLR 96
1988


Defamation
An allegation that the plaintiff had broken the code of Rugby Union in writing a book for money was held reasonably capable of bearing the wider meaning of a charge of 'shamateurism' and hence evidence that the plaintiff had taken 'boot money' could be adduced by way of justification.
1 Citers



 
 Viscount de L'Isle v Times Newspapers Ltd; CA 1988 - [1988] 1 WLR 49; [1987[ 3 All ER 499
 
Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney General [1989] 3 NZLR 148
1989


Commonwealth, Negligence, Defamation
There were alternative cases put in defamation and negligence. Held: negligence could not operate in that sort of case.
1 Citers


 
Control Risks v New English Library [1990] 1 WLR 183; [1989] 3 All ER 577
1989
CA
Nicholls LJ
Defamation
In a defamation claim, there is a parallel to be drawn between what is necessary in respect of the defence of justification and what is necessary where the defence of fair comment is raised. Where justification is pleaded, a defendant is required to spell out the meaning of the words which he would seek to justify - the "Lucas-Box" particulars.
Nicholls LJ said: "In my view by parity of reasoning, when fair comment is pleaded the defendant must spell out, with sufficient precision to enable the plaintiff to know what case he has to meet, what is the comment which the defendant will seek to say attracts the fair comment defence."
1 Cites

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 Bookbinder v Tebbitt; 1989 - [1989] 1 WLR 640
 
Telnikoff v Matusevitch Unreported, 24-May-89
24 May 1989

Drake J
Defamation
The plaintiff claimed in libel. Drake J upheld a submission that there was no case to go before the jury, in respect that (1) any reasonable jury properly directed would be bound to sustain the defence of fair comment, and (2) there was no evidence of express malice.
1 Citers


 
Hartt v Newspaper Publishing PLC Transcript No. 1015; Unreported, 26 October 1989
26 Oct 1989
CA
Neill LJ
Defamation
The possible variety of meanings of the words complained of in a defamation action is already factored into the single meaning rule. Neill LJ said: "The court should give to the material complained of the natural and ordinary meaning which it would have conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching the programme once in 1985 . . The hypothetical reasonable reader . . is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read an implication more readily than a lawyer, and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking. But he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available."
1 Citers


 
Markt Intern Verlag Gmbh And Klaus Beermann v Germany 10572/83; [1989] ECHR 21; (1989) 12 EHRR 161; [1989] ECHR 21
20 Nov 1989
ECHR

Human Rights, Defamation

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Lord Aldington v Tolstoy, Watts Unreported, 30 November 1989
30 Nov 1989
QBD
Justice Michael Davies
Defamation, Damages
The plaintiff sought damages after the article published by the defendants falsely accused him of complicity in war crimes. Held: As to damages the jury awarded one and a half million pounds after being directed inter alia: "Let us now, members of the jury . . deal with the aspect of damages . . If the plaintiff wins, you have got to consider damages. Some would say that the only direction on damages necessary in this particular case was to say: [the applicant] says that if damages are to be payable he agrees they should be enormous. Mr Rampton [defence counsel], I do not think, in his final speech could quite bring himself to utter that word, but he said they will be very generous - and I could stop there. But that is not the way, you see, because the parties do not dictate (even if they are making concessions) how you should approach damages. You do it in accordance with the law, and that is what I am now going to tell you. You have to accept my directions about it, and you will apply them of course as you think fit." and
"the means of the parties - the plaintiff or the defendant - is immaterial . . Neither, as I think I said earlier but I say it now, is the question whether Lord Aldington or [the applicant], or for that matter Mr Watts, have been or will be financially supported by any well wishers as to damages relevant at all. Nor is it relevant the undoubted fact that legal aid is not available in libel cases to a plaintiff or a defendant. All irrelevant, and if it is to be changed it is up to Parliament to do something about it . . what you are seeking to do, what a jury has to do, is to fix a sum which will compensate the plaintiff - to make amends in financial terms for the wrong done to him, because wrong has been done if you have got to the stage of awarding damages. It is not your duty or your right to punish a defendant . . What [Lord Aldington] does claim, of course, is for 'general damages', as lawyers call it, a sum of money to compensate him. First of all, you have to take into account the effect in this case, as in every case where there is libel, on the position, standing and reputation of the successful plaintiff . . If they [the allegations made in the pamphlet] were untrue and not fair comment, where it is suggested that they were comment, he is entitled to be compensated for that, so that that will register your view of that. Then you have got to consider . . the injury to his feelings. I told you that he cannot, of course, claim on behalf of his wife or any member of his family, although the affect on them may have had an affect on him which is a reaction, which you are entitled to take into account.
It is not just his feelings when he read this . . It is his feelings during the time whilst awaiting the trial . . and the publicity . . you have to consider . . what lawyers call 'vindication' . . You may think - it is a matter for you - that in this particular case vindication - showing that he was right - is the main reason for Lord Aldington bringing this action - that is what he says anyway - to restore his character and standing . . 'An award, an enormous award', to use [the applicant's] words - 'a very generous award' to use Mr Rampton's words, will enable him to say that put the record straight.
Members of the jury, of course, you must not, as a result of what I have just said, just bump and bump the damages up. You must, at all times, as they say, keep your feet on the ground.
. . You have to take into account the extent and nature of the publication.
. . whilst you must leave aside any thought of punishing the defendants if you find for the plaintiff, juries are always entitled, as I have hinted already, to take into account any conduct of the defendant which has aggravated the damages - that is to say, made the damage more serious and the award higher - or mitigated them - made the damage done less serious and the award smaller.
Now, two general remarks which I make in every case: nobody asks you how you arrive at your verdict, and you do not have to give reasons like a Judge does, so it is exceedingly important that you look at the matter judicially, and that means that you should not be outrageously or unreasonably high, or outrageously or unreasonably low.
The second matter I say to every jury is: please, I beg you, if you come to damages, do not pay the slightest attention to any other case or the result of any other case you may have read about or heard about. The facts and the legal considerations are like[ly] to have been completely different. There is no league of damages in defamation cases. There is no first division, there is no fourth division, there is no Vauxhall conference, if any of you are interested in football.
So, members of the jury, please forget other cases. Use your own common sense about it. How do you translate what I have said into money terms? By our rules and procedure, members of the jury, counsel can use, and a judge can use, words like 'very substantial' or 'very small', but we do not either of us, counsel or judges, mention figures. Some people again, who have not really considered the matter very carefully, wonder about that, and they say juries should be given guidance, and I say to you what I say to every jury in these cases, it would not be a great deal of help for you, because inevitably, it is human nature and it would be their duty - counsel for the plaintiff would be at the top end of the scale and perhaps in some cases, I do not suggest this one, off the clock, and counsel for the defendant would be at the bottom end of the scale in the basement. Now, that would not be much good to anybody. As for the Judge, well the jury might think - you may have an exactly opposite view - a jury might think: 'Well, on the whole, whatever other people say about this particular Judge in this case, we think he tried to be fair, why doesn't he suggest a figure to us?'
Supposing a Judge, myself in this case, were to suggest a figure to you, or a bracket between so and so and so and so, there would be two possibilities: one is that you would ignore what I said and either go higher than my figure or bracket, or much lower, in which case of course the losing party that did not like it would be off to the Court of Appeal saying: 'Look, the Judge suggested a figure and the jury went above it or below it.'
Supposing you accepted my suggestion, and gave a figure that I recommended, or close to it. Well, all I can say is that you would have been wasting your valuable time in considering the matter of damages because you would just have been acting as a rubber stamp for me, or the Judge, whoever it was. So we do not have that over-bidding or under-bidding, as the Court of Appeal has called it, by counsel, and we do not have Judges trying to lay down to juries what they should award, and I do not hesitate to say, whatever other people say, I hope and pray, for the sake of our law and our court, we never get the day when Judges dictate to juries so that they become rubber stamps.
I am, however, allowed - indeed encouraged - by the Court of Appeal just to say a little bit more. I say it not perhaps in the words of the Court of Appeal, but in my own way, which may be too homely for some, but I say to you that you must remember what money is. You do not deal in Mickey Mouse money just reeling off noughts because they sound good, I know you will not. You have got to consider money in real terms. Sometimes it is said 'Well, how much would a house cost of a certain kind', and if you are giving a plaintiff as compensation so much money how many houses is he going to buy? I do not mean to suggest that Lord Aldington or any other plaintiff would take his damages and go and buy a house or a row of houses, but that relates it to the sort of thing, if you will allow me to say, you and I do know something about, because most of us have a pretty good idea how much houses are worth. So remember that."
1 Citers



 
 Sergi v Australian Broadcasting Commission; 20-Dec-1989 - [1989] NSWCA 184; [1983] 2 NSWLR 418; [1983] 2 NSWLR 669
 
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