Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Defamation - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Associated Leisure (Phonographic Equipment Co) Ltd v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1970] 2 QB 450; [1970] 2 All ER 754
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR
Defamation, Litigation Practice
The defendant sought to be allowed to amend its pleadings to add justification. They now appealed against refusal. Held: The amendment was allowed. However, in general, in a libel action, if the defendant seeks at a late stage to amend his defence by adding a plea of justification, his application will be closely inquired into and it will be allowed where he has shown due diligence in making his inquiries and investigations, but it may well be refused if he has been guilty of delay or has not made proper inquiries earlier.
Lord Denning MR said: "Like a charge of fraud, [counsel] must not put a plea of justification on the record unless he has clear and sufficient evidence to support it."
1 Citers


 
News Media Ownership v Finlay [1970] NZLR 1089
1970

North P
Constitutional, Commonwealth, Media, Defamation
(New Zealand Court of Appeal ) The plaintiff, a Member of Parliament, brought libel proceedings against a newspaper in respect of an article appearing in the newspaper which alleged that the plaintiff had been acting improperly and for purposes of personal profit in making statements in the House. North P said: "Mr McKay was right when he submitted that while violence of language is not in itself enough to take away privilege even though it may provide evidence of malice, yet privilege is lost if the reply becomes a counter attack raising allegations against the plaintiff which are unrelated or insufficiently related to the attack he made on the defendant. In other words he cannot claim the protection of privilege if he decides to bring fresh accusations against his adversary." and, as to a contention that the words complained of were not defamatory:
"In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention, for surely it is plain enough that it is harmful to the trading reputation of a newspaper company to allege that it conducts its business without regard for the public interest, its principal concern being merely with the making of profits."
1 Citers


 
Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688; [1970] 1 All ER 1094
1970
CA
Lord Denning MR, Pearson LJ
Defamation
The court considered whether an article published in the British Medical Journal was capable of bearing a meaning defamatory of the plaintiff dentist. The article made an attack upon the plaintiff's technique for anaesthesia. Held. Words may be defamatory of a professional person if they impute a lack of knowledge, judgment, efficiency or competence in the conduct of that person’s profession. Lord Denning said that the question that arose was: "are these words reasonably capable of being understood as being defamatory of the plaintiff? Understood, that is, by the sort of people likely to read them. These are, I take it, the medical men who read the British Medical Journal" and "words may be defamatory of a trader or business man or professional man, although they do not impute any moral fault or defect of personal character. They [can] be defamatory of him if they impute lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional activity."
A reasonable cause of action, according to Pearson LJ, connotes a cause of action which has some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered. As long as the statement of claim discloses some cause of action, or raises some question fit to be decided at the trial, the mere fact that the case is weak and is not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. Where a statement of claim is defective only in not containing particulars to which the defendant is entitled, the application should be made for particulars under O 18 r 12 and not for an order to strike out the statement.
Lord Pearson's said that in principle: "Words may be defamatory of a trader or business man or professional man, though they do not impute any moral fault or defect of personal character. They can be defamatory of him if they impute lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional activity." and
" I doubt whether the analogy sought to be drawn in the present case between a trader's goods and a professional man's technique is sound. Goods are impersonal and transient. A professional man's technique is at least relatively permanent, and it belongs to him: it may be considered to be an essential part of his professional activity and of him as a professional man. In the case of a dentist it may be said: if he uses a bad technique he is a bad dentist and person needing dental treatment should not go to him. "
Sir Gordon Willmer referred to the importance of considering the person, or class of persons, whose reaction to the publication should be the test of the wrongful character of the words used. His Honour considered that, because the article was of a highly technical nature, dentists were the class of persons whose reaction to the publication was to be considered.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd; HL 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 1239; [1971] 2 All ER 1156

 
 Church of Scientology of California v Johnson-Smith; QBD 1971 - [1972] 1 All ER 378; [1971] 3 WLR 434; [1972] 1 QB 522
 
Cassell and Co Ltd v Broome and Another [1971] 2 QB 354; [1971] 1 All ER 262
24 Mar 1971
CA
Denning MR, Salmon and Phillimore LJJ
Damages, Defamation

1 Citers



 
 Beech v Freeson; QBD 1972 - [1972] 1 QB 14

 
 Cassell and Co Ltd v Broome and Another; HL 23-Feb-1972 - [1972] 2 WLR 645; [1972] AC 1027; [1972] UKHL 3

 
 Rothermere v Times Newspapers Ltd; CA 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 448

 
 Horrocks v Lowe; HL 1974 - [1975] AC 135; [1974] 1 All ER 662
 
Cook v Alexander [1974] QB 279
1974
CA
Lord Denning MR
Defamation
One may comment upon reports which are themselves the subject of privilege. A report to be fair and accurate must constitute a fair presentation of that which took place on the relevant occasion. It need not be a verbatim report. It can be selective and concentrate on one particular aspect as long as it reports fairly and accurately the impression that the reporter would have received as a reasonable spectator in the proceedings.
Lord Denning MR: "He need not report it verbatim word for word or letter for letter and it is sufficient if it is a fair presentation of what took place so as to convey to the reader the impression which the debate itself would have made on a hearer of it. Test it this way: if a member of the house were asked: "What happened in the debate ? Tell me about it." His answer would be a sketch giving in words the impression it left on him, with more emphasis on one thing and less emphasis on another, just as it stuck in his memory."
1 Citers



 
 Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd; CA 1977 - [1977] 1 WLR 478; [1977] 2 All ER 566
 
Fulham (orse Fullam) v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd and Another [1977] 1 WLR 651
1977
CA
Lord Denning MR, Scarman LJ
Litigation Practice, Defamation
A local newspaper circulating in Teesside, where the claimant had been appointed deputy headmaster of a school, published an article in 1973 saying of the claimant that he was a former Roman Catholic priest who had left his parish in the Salford diocese and later married and it was claimed of him that he "went off very suddenly from the parish where he was a curate about seven years ago". In fact he had given up the priesthood in 1962, married in 1964, and his wife had a child in 1965. Held: Where an innuendo is relied on the claimant must generally specify the persons who are said to know the "special facts" that would lead them to the identification or meaning relied on. Only a reader with special knowledge of the facts, either of the date of the claimant's marriage or of that of the birth of his child, could derive an adverse impression from the article and that it was unlikely that readers with such special knowledge lived in the area of the newspaper's circulation. That being so, the claimant was bound to identify readers whom he alleged knew of those facts.
Scarman LJ said that sometimes facts relied upon to support an innuendo may be sufficiently widely known to enable the claimant to rely on a presumption or inference that some readers will have known them, and "there may well be cases in which it would not be necessary to plead more than the fact of publication by a newspaper and the extrinsic circumstances, leaving it to be inferred that there would be readers with knowledge of the facts.
For instance, the facts may be very well known in the area of the newspaper's distribution - in which event I would think it would suffice to plead merely that the plaintiff will rely on inference that some of the newspaper's readers must have been aware of the facts [about his wife and child] which are said to give rise to the innuendo."
Lord Denning MR stated that it was "just possible" that someone "had jumped to the conclusion that before he left the Salford diocese, and while still a priest, he [the claimant] had married and fathered a child. But such a person would be so rare and so exceptional that the case on legal innuendo would not stand a chance unless that person was called".
1 Citers



 
 D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children; HL 2-Feb-1977 - [1978] AC 171; [1977] 2 WLR 201; [1977] 1 All ER 589; [1977] UKHL 1
 
Edwards v National Audubon Society [1997] 556 F. 2d 113
1 May 1977


International, Defamation
(The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) The defendant environmental Society opposed the use of DDT saying it endangered birds. Its proponents argued that without DDT, millions would die of insect-carried diseases and starvation caused by the destruction of crops by insect pests. The Society published an annual Christmas bird count which showed a steady increase in bird sightings despite the growing employment of pesticides in the past 30 years. These statistics were seized upon by the scientists as proof of the fallacy of the Society's claims. In riposte the Society prefaced the next year's bird count with an article explaining that the count was the result not of more birds, but of more "birders" (bird watchers). The article added: "Any time you hear a 'scientist' say the opposite, you are in the presence of someone who is being paid to lie …" A journalist on the New York Times realised that the Society's charges were a newsworthy development in the already acrimonious debate and he accordingly telephoned the author of the article to obtain the names of those the Society considered to be "paid liars". The plaintiffs were named. The reporter sought their comment. The New York Times published an account of the article, of the names given at interview and of the response of the accused men. Held: "At stake in this case is a fundamental principle. Succinctly stated, when a responsible prominent organisation like the National Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their validity. … What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made. We do not believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy comments merely because it has serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press take the cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish them without fear of liability for defamation.
The public interest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for them.
The contours of the press's right of neutral reportage are, of course, defined by the principle that gives life to it. Literal accuracy is not a prerequisite: if we are to enjoy the blessings of a robust and unintimidated press, we must provide immunity from defamation suits where the journalist believes, reasonably and in good faith, that his report accurately conveys the charges made.
It is equally clear, however, that a publisher who in fact espouses or concurs in the charges made by others, or who deliberately distorts these statements to launch a personal attack of his own on a public figure, cannot rely on a privilege of neutral reportage. In such instances he assumes responsibility for the underlying accusation.
It is clear here, that [the journalist] reported Audubon's charges fairly and accurately. He did not in any away espouse the Society's accusations: indeed, [he] published the maligned scientists' outraged reactions in the same article that contained the Society's attack. The Times article, in short, was the exemplar of fair and dispassionate reporting of an unfortunate but newsworthy contretemps. Accordingly, we hold that it was privileged under the First Amendment."
1 Citers


 
Chernesky v Armadale Publishers Ltd (1978) 90 DLR (3rd) 321
1978

Lloyd LJ
Commonwealth, Defamation
(Supreme Court of Canada) The defendants were the editor and the owner and publisher of a newspaper which had published a letter to the editor in which the writers accused the plaintiff of holding racist views. The writers of the letter did not give evidence, but the defendants in their evidence made it clear that the letter complained of did not represent the honest expression of their own views. The trial judge refused to leave the defence of fair comment to the jury. Held: (by a majority of six to three) The judge was correct.
1 Citers


 
Stopforth v Goyer (1978) 87 DLR (3d) 373; (1978) 4 CCLT 265
1978

Lief J
Commonwealth, Constitutional, Defamation, Media
(High Court of Ontario) A claim was made for defamation in remarks made by the defendant about the plaintiff to media representative who were present in parliament, just after he left the Ottawa chamber at the conclusion of the question period. The plaintiff had been a senior member of a team having conduct of the delivery of weapons systems to the government. The defendant had been the relevant minister. It was accepted that the defendant was taken to assume that his acceptedly defamatory words would be repulished by the media. The defendant claimed qualified privilege. Held: The defence was not made out. There was no duty falling on him at the time to utter the words he did, and nor was there a reciprocal duty in the press to receive the statement.
1 Citers


 
Trapp v Mackie [1979] 1 WLR 377; [1979] 1 All ER 489
1979
HL
Lord Diplock
Defamation
Dr Trapp had been dismissed from his post by the Aberdeenshire Education Committee of which Mr Mackie was chairman. Dr Trapp petitioned the Secretary of State for an inquiry into the reasons for his dismissal. An inquiry was set up, and in the course of that inquiry Mr Mackie gave evidence. On the basis of that evidence Dr Trapp sued Mr Mackie for damages for loss, injury and damage which he claimed to have suffered as a result of 'maliciously false evidence'. Held: "That absolute privilege attaches to words spoken or written in the course of giving evidence in proceedings in a court of justice is a rule of law, based on public policy, that has been established since earliest times. That the like privilege extends to evidence given before tribunals which, although not courts of justice, nevertheless act in a manner similar to that in which courts of justice act, was established . . by the decision in . . Dawkins." The tribunals attracting absolute privilege were described in O'Connor v. Waldron and confirmed in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson. "No single touchstone emerges from the cases; but this is not surprising for the rule of law is one which involves the balancing of conflicting public policies, one general: that the law should provide a remedy to the citizen whose good name and reputation is traduced by malicious falsehoods uttered by another; the other particular: that witnesses before tribunals recognised by law should give their testimony free from fear of being harassed by an action on an allegation whether true or false that they acted from malice . . So, to decide whether a tribunal acts in a manner similar to courts of justice and thus is of such a kind as will attract absolute, as distinct from qualified, privilege for witnesses when they give testimony before it, one must consider first, under what authority the tribunal acts, secondly the nature of the question into which it is its duty to inquire; thirdly the procedure adopted by it in carrying out the inquiry; and fourthly the legal consequences of the conclusion reached by the tribunal as a result of the inquiry.' and "In deciding whether a particular tribunal is of such a kind as to attract absolute privilege for witnesses when they give testimony before it, your Lordships are engaged in the task of balancing against one another public interests which conflict. In such a task legal technicalities have at most a minor part to play."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Whitehouse v Lemon; Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd [1979] 2 WLR 281; [1979] AC 617
21 Feb 1979
HL
Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Scarman
Defamation, Crime, Ecclesiastical
The appellants challenged their conviction for blasphemous libel. They had published a poem which described homosexual acts carried out on the body of Christ after his death. Held: For a conviction, it was necessary to show that the defendant had published the material, and that it was of the necessary character, namely that it vilified Christ in his life and crucifixion. It was not necessary to show that the defendant intended the blasphemy. A blasphemous libel is a publication of material calculated to shock or outrage the feelings of Christians. There is no need to show additionally a tendency to cause a breach of the peace.
Lord Scarman gave the rationale for the existence of an offence of blasphemy: "I do not subscribe to the view that the common law offence of blasphemous libel serves no useful purpose in the modern law. On the contrary, I think there is a case for legislation extending it to protect the religious beliefs and feelings of non-Christians. The offence belongs to a group of criminal offences designed to safeguard the internal tranquillity of the kingdom. In an increasingly plural society such as that of modern Britain it is necessary not only to respect the differing religious beliefs, feelings and practices of all but also to protect them from scurrility, vilification, ridicule and contempt . . I will not lend my voice to a view of the law relating to blasphemous libel which would render it a dead letter, or diminish its efficacy to protect religious feelings from outrage and insult"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ lip ]
 
Hutchinson v Proxmire [1979] USSC 139; [1979] 443 US 111
26 Jun 1979


International, Constitutional, Defamation
(United States Supreme Court) The petitioner had been funded by the state to carry out research on aggression in certain animals, particularly monkeys. He complained of criticism of his work decsribing it as wasteful. Held: Efforts to influence executive agencies are not privileged acts. Not every public employee is a public official.
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ]
 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.