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		Defamation - From: 1849 To: 1899 This page lists 80 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018. Â Fryer v Gathercole [1849] EngR 741; (1849) 4 Exch 262; (1849) 154 ER 1209 16 Jun 1849 Defamation Evidence of publication [ Commonlii ] Â Â Duke of Brunswick v Harmer; QBD 2-Nov-1849 - (1849) 14 QB 185; [1849] EngR 915; (1849) 117 ER 75 Â The Duke Of Brunswick v Harmer [1850] EngR 681; (1850) 3 Car & K 10; (1850) 175 ER 441 21 Jun 1850 Defamation If JH and MY be registered at the stamp office as "the sole proprietors" of a newspaper, "that is to say, the said JH as legal owner as mortgagee, and MY as owner of the equity of redemption," this is sufficient to fix JH as a proprietor of the newspaper in an action for a libel contained in it. In an alleged libel, the writer suggested the propriety of the plaintiff "withdrawing into his own natural and sinister obscurity," the word "natural" being printed in italics. Held, that the plaintiff could not ask a witness what he understood by the word "natural" thus printed, but that the jury might look at the paper and form their opinion as to the meaning. 1 Cites [ Commonlii ] Â Brookes v Tichborne [1850] EngR 954; (1850) 5 Exch 929; (1850) 155 ER 405 16 Dec 1850 Defamation [ Commonlii ] Â Â Somerville v Hawkins; 1851 - (1851) 10 CB 583; [1851] EngR 73; (1851) 138 ER 231 Â Graham v- -Roy (1851) 13 D 634 1851 SCS Lord Fullerton Scotland, Defamation A report that a person had given information to the officers of Excise against a distiller, and assumed the office of common informer in order to obtain half of the penalties awarded, was a ground for a claim in defamation. Lord Fullerton dealt with the argument that it could hardly be defamatory to say that a person had given information which had the effect of repressing an illegal act such as smuggling by saying "it may be perfectly legitimate to give information, but an informer is by no means a popular character". Â Andrews v Chapman (1853) 3 C & K 286; [1853] EngR 280; (1853) 3 Car & K 286; (1853) 175 ER 558 1853 Defamation A report does not cease to be fair because there are some slight inaccuracies or omissions. However, comment in order to be justifiable as fair comment must appear as comment and must not be so mixed up with the facts that the reader cannot distinguish between what is report and what is comment: 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] Â Gilpin v Fowler (1854) 9 Exch 615; [1854] EngR 231; (1854) 156 ER 263 9 Feb 1854 Defamation The word `privilege' means the existence of a set of circumstances in which the presumption of malice was negatived. `Instead of the expression `privileged communication' it would be more correct to say that the communication was made on an occasion which rebutted the presumption of malice.' The plaintiff was master of a "national school " in the parish of C, of which the defendant wwa rector, and also one of the managers of the school The defendant requested the plaintiff to teach a Sunday school iri connexion with the national school, which he declined, on account of the increased Labour, and was in consequence dismissed The plaintiff being about to set up a school on his own account in the same parish, the defendant wrote, and distributed in that and the adjoining parish a pastoral letter, in which he denounced the plaintiff 's conduct as unchristian-like, and warned his parishioners against affording ariy countenance to the projected school, either by subscriptions or by sending their children to it. The Judge at the trial having ruled that this letter was a privileged communication, and that, there being no evidence of express malice, the defendanit was entitled to a verdict :- Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, on a bill of exceptions to the above ruling, that the communicatiori was not privileged, and that there was evidence for the jury of express malice ; also, that in determining the question of malice the jury might look at the libel itself. 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] Â Shufflebottom v Allday (1857) 5 WR 315 1857 Pollock CB, Martin B Defamation The defendant had been robbed. He described the robber to a constable who arrested the plaintiff. Seeing him in custody, the defendant said: "That is the man". After having been remanded in custody for two days, the plaintiff was then acquitted because the defendant failed to appear at his trial. The defendant procured a new warrant for the apprehension of the plaintiff on the same charge. The plaintiff was brought before the magistrates but the defendant again failed to appear and the plaintiff was again discharged. The defendant issued yet a third warrant for the plaintiff's arrest, but the agreed not to proceed. The plaintiff brought an action for false imprisonment, slander and malicious prosecution. His action succeeded at the trial, the trial judge holding that what the defendant said to the constable was not privileged. The defendant appealed. Held: The occasion was privileged. Pollock CB thought the verdict on the second count (slander) should be entered for the defendant, saying: "This case differs entirely from that which was cited, Toogood v Spyring, where the person to whom the defendant stated he had been robbed by the plaintiff was a perfect stranger to the transaction, and there was no duty or authority for communicating the party's suspicions to him. The defendant having been robbed, had a perfect right to say, acting on his belief, that the person in custody was the man. If he had sought to load him with obloquy, as for example, if he had said that he had been robbed by him on other occasions, that would have been merely gratuitous, and no privilege would have applied to it." Martin B thought the occasion was privileged: "The statement was made to an officer of the law, and was one the defendant was entitled to make. In Toogood v Spyring Park, B., said that "If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within narrow limits." 1 Citers Â The Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Company v Hawkins [1859] EngR 234; (1859) 4 H & N 146; (1859) 157 ER 792; [1859] EngR 252; (1859) 4 H & N 87; (1859) 157 ER 769; [1858] EngR 1210 (B); (1858) 1 F & F 413 2 Dec 1858 CEC Pollock CB Company, Defamation The plaintiff, a company incorporated under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 sued in respect of a libel imputing to it insolvency, mismanagement and dishonest carrying on of its affairs. Held: The action was maintainable. Pollock CB said: "That a corporation at common law can sue in respect of a libel there is no doubt. It would be monstrous if a corporation could maintain no action for slander of title through which they lost a great deal of money. It could not sue in respect of an imputation of murder, or incest, or adultery, because it could not commit those crimes. Nor could it sue in respect of a charge of corruption, for a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption, although the individuals composing it may. But it would be very odd if a corporation had no means of protecting itself against wrong; and if its property is injured by slander it has no means of redress except by action. Therefore it appears to me clear that a corporation at common law may maintain an action for a libel by which its property is injured." 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] - [ Commonlii ] - [ Commonlii ] Â Bruton v Downes [1859] EngR 10 (A); (1859) 1 F & F 668 1859 Defamation [ Commonlii ] Â Eastwood v Holmes [1860] EngR 56 (B); (1860) 1 F & F 347 1860 Willes J Defamation An article in a newspaper describing leaden figures "reported to have been found in the Thames,” and sold as antiquities, as being of recent fabrication, and stigmatizing their sale as an attempt at deception and extortion, held not actionable ; the alleged libel being aimed not at any particular individual but of a class, and being privileged, in the absence of evidence of malice, as pertaining to fair description or criticism on a matter of public interest. Willes J said: Assuming the article to be libellous, it is not a libel on the plaintiff ; it only reflects on a class of persons dealing in such objects ; and it is immaterial in this view whether they are genune or not. If a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him unless there is something to point to the particular individual, which there is not here. There is nothing to show that the article was inserted with any special reference to the plaintiff. It does not appear that the defendant knew of his existence." 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] Â Amann v Damm [1860] EngR 756; (1860) 8 CB NS 597; (1860) 144 ER 1300 22 May 1860 Defamation The defendant, bona fide believing that the plaintiff, who was a clerk to one M, a customer of the defendant's. and who had been sent to the defendant's shop bv M had while there stolen a box from an inner room, went to M., and, after telling him of his loss, intimated his suspicion of the plaintiff, saying, "There was no one else in the room, and he must have taken it." Held, that the communication was privileged by the occasion. Where slanderous words are uttered in a foreign language, the declaration should aver that the persons in whose presence they were spoken understood the language. [ Commonlii ] Â Turnbull v Bird [1861] EngR 132; (1861) 2 F & F 508; (1861) 175 ER 1163 1861 Defamation The court extended the defence of fair comment to include comments on persons in public life. The plaintiff, a Roman Catholic, havlng been appointed Calendarer of Foreign State Papers. The defendant, Secretary of the Protestant Alliance, in the course of a newspaper controversy, on the subject of the propriety of the appointment, published letters, in which (with certain misstatements of facts not shown to have been wilful) - he argued that the papers might not be fairly epitomised by the plaintiff, and also threw out that such papers might not be in safe custody while in the hands of persons of the plaintiff’s views, and that such persons ought possibly through religious prejudices be induced to mutilate, alter, or abstract them :-- Held, that (assurnmg this to be aimed at the plaintiff) if the defendant really believed it, the publications were privileged, provided there was no wilful misstatement, but that it was for the jury whether he really could have believed it. [ Commonlii ] Â Clay v Roberts (1863) 8 LT 397 1863 Pollock CB Defamation Pollock CB considered the requirements for words to be considered defamatory and said: "There is a distinction between imputing what is merely a breach of conventional etiquette and what is illegal, mischievous, or sinful." 1 Citers Â Cox v Feeney (1863) 4 F & F 13; [1863] EngR 18; (1863) 4 F & F 13; (1863) 176 ER 445 1863 Cockburn CJ Defamation In an action for libel, consisting of a publication in a newspaper of a report of an inspector of charities under the Charitable Trusts Act, containing a letter, written some years before, reflecting on the plaintiff in hs management of a college: held, that, as the matter was one of public interest, the defendant was not liable, provided he published it fairly, from an honest desire to afford the public information, and that comments on it were only material as evidence of malice. There are occasions when the public interest requires that publication to the world at large should be privileged: (quoting Lord Tenterden CJ) 'a man has a right to publish, for the purpose of giving the public information, that which it is proper for the public to know'. 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] Â Cox v Feeny (1863) 4 F & F 13 1863 Defamation 1 Citers Â Campbell v Spottiswoode [1863] EngR 12; (1863) 3 F & F 421; (1863) 176 ER 188 1863 Defamation 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] Â Campbell v Spottiswoode (1863) 3 B & S 769; [1863] EngR 405; (1863) 122 ER 288 1863 Crompton J, Cockburn CJ Defamation, Media The plaintiff, a dissenting Protestant minister, sought to advance Christianity in China by promoting a newspaper with letters emphasising its importance. The defendant attacked him in a rival newspaper, saying his motive was not to take the gospel to the Chinese but to profit from the newspaper sales. He then alleged that the subscribers listed were fictitious. The defendant was clear that this was only an inference but one of fact. Held: It was a defence to defamation, that the words were a comment on a matter of public interest. The court distinguished between attacking the scheme and attacking the character of its proponent. Crompton J said: 'it is the right of all the Queen's subjects to discuss public matters, but no person can have a right on that ground to publish what is defamatory merely because he believes it to be true. If this were so, a public man might have base motives imputed to him without having an opportunity of righting himself". A bona fide belief that he is publishing what is true would not provide a defendant with an answer to an action for libel, where he has attributed "base and sordid motives which are not warranted by the facts" and "Nothing is more important than that fair and full latitude of discussion should be allowed to writers upon any public matter, whether it be the conduct of public men, the proceedings in courts of justice or in Parliament, or the publication of a scheme or of a literary work. But it is always to be left to a jury to say whether the publication has gone beyond the limits of a fair comment on the subject-matter discussed. A writer is not entitled to overstep those limits and impute base and sordid motives which are not warranted by the facts, and I cannot for a moment think that, because he has a bona fide belief that he is publishing what is true, that is any answer to an action for libel. With respect to the publication of the plaintiff's scheme, the defendant might ridicule it and point out the improbability of its success; but that was all he had a right to do." Cockburn CJ said: "I think the fair position in which the law may be settled is this: that where the public conduct of a public man is open to animadversion, and the writer who is commenting upon it makes imputations on his motives which arise fairly and legitimately out of his conduct so that a jury shall say that the criticism was not only honest, but also well founded, an action is not maintainable". But it is not because a public writer fancies that the conduct of a public man is open to the suspicion of dishonesty, he is therefore justified in assailing his character as dishonest." 1 Cites 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] Â Irwin v William Brandwood And Jane His Wife [1864] EngR 186; (1864) 2 H & C 960; (1864) 159 ER 397 28 Jan 1864 Defamation Words imputing to a certificated master mariner drunkenness whilst in command of a vessel at sea, are actionable without special damage. [ Commonlii ] Â Alexander v North Eastern Railway (1865) 6 B & S 340 1865 Defamation The defendants published at their stations a notice stating that the plaintiff had been convicted of riding in a train without a ticket and sentenced to a fine of £1 and the alternative of three weeks' imprisonment in default of payment. Held: The fact that the term of imprisonment was two weeks did not prevent the defence of justification from succeeding, and it became a question for the jury whether the notice was substantially true. Â Oddy v Lord George Paulet [1865] EngR 38; (1865) 4 F & F 1009; (1865) B) 1865 Defamation [ Commonlii ] Â Hedley v Barlow And Another [1865] EngR 23; (1865) 4 F & F 225; (1865) 176 ER 541 1865 QBD Cockburn CJ Defamation The right of free discussion on a subject of public interest excuses the pubication of defamatory matter, provided it appears to have been published not in that unfair or improper spirit - that is in the spirit of intemperate and inconsiderate imputation, which implies malice in a legal sense - but in the spirit of fair discussion. And the right of free discussion extends to comments in a journal upon sworn evidence given on a subject of public interest, even to the extent of imputing that such evidence is unfounded, or even unfounded or careless, but if it is imputed, apparently without any fair foundation, that it is wilfully, "maliciously," or "recklessly" false, then there is an excess, which is evidence of what the law deems malice, and which takes away the protection or excuse arising from the exercise of the right of free discussion. 1 Citers [ Commonlii ] Â Kelly v Sherlock [1866] LR 1 QB 686 1866 Blackburn J Defamation, Damages The defendant had claimed that the plaintiff preached a sermon against the appointment of a Roman Catholic chaplain to the Liverpool borough gaol, and another sermon reflecting in strong terms on the conduct of the town council of Liverpool electing a Jew their mayor, and had caused extracts from both sermons to be published in the local newspapers. The defendant relied in part on the plaintiff's own intemperate conduct toward the defendant. Held: Blackburn J said "Now there can be no set-off of libel or misconduct against another, but in estimating the compensation for the plaintiffs injured feelings, the jury might fairly consider the plaintiff's conduct and the degree of respect which the plaintiff himself had shown for the feelings of others; and finding on the evidence, that he published in the local press sermons reflecting on the local authorities that he published a statement (which I own I think borne out by the articles) that the defendant's paper was so conducted as to justify the epithet of "the dregs of provincial journalism," and, above all, that he delivered from the pulpit, and published in the provincial papers, a statement to the effect that some of his opponents (no matter, in my opinion, whether including the defendant or not) had been guilty of subornation of perjury, and would, as he charitably hoped, repent on their deathbeds and confess their guilt, I cannot say that I think the jury were bound to give him substantial damages, though I heartily wish that their verdict had not been such as to give an appearance of triumph to the defendant" 1 Citers Â Strauss v Francis [1866] EngR 42; (1866) 4 F & F 939; (1866) 176 ER 858 1866 Defamation [ Commonlii ] Â Strauss v Francis [1866] EngR 41; (1866) 4 F & F 1107; (1866) 176 ER 926 1866 Defamation [ Commonlii ] Â Ryan v Wood [1866] EngR 39; (1866) 4 F & F 735; (1866) 176 ER 768 1866 Defamation [ Commonlii ] Â Hunter v Sharpe [1866] EngR 8; (1866) 4 F & F 983; (1866) 176 ER 875 1866 Defamation [ Commonlii ] Â Â Watkin v Hall; 1868 - [1868] LR 3 QB 396; (1868) 9 B&S 279; [1868] 37 LJQB 125; [1868] 18 LT 561; [1868] 32 JP 485; [1868] 16 WR 857; [1861-73] All ER 275 Â Wason v Walter; ex parte Wason (1868) LR 4 QB 73; [1861-73] All ER 105 1868 QBD Cockburn CJ, Blackburn, Lush JJ Defamation, Constitutional Defamation proceedings were begun in respect of newspaper reports of debates in Parliament. Held: By analogy with reports of judicial proceedings, that fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings were privileged. It was of paramount public and national importance that the proceedings of either House of Parliament should be communicated to the public. Cockburn CJ said: "It seems to us impossible to doubt that it is of paramount public and national importance that the proceedings of the Houses of Parliament shall be communicated to the public, who have the deepest interest in knowing what passes within their walls, seeing that on what is there said and done, the welfare of the community depends . . Can any man bring himself to doubt that the publicity given in modern times to what passes in Parliament is essential to the maintenance of the relations existing between the government, the legislature, and the country at large? " and "It is clear that statements made by members of either House of Parliament in their places in the House, though they might be untrue to their knowledge, could not be made the foundation of civil or criminal proceedings, however injurious they might be to the interest of a third person. And a conspiracy to make such statements would not make the persons guilty of it amenable to the criminal law." Lush J said: "I am clearly of opinion that we ought not to allow it to be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of members of either House cannot be inquired into by criminal proceedings with respect to anything they may do or say in the House." 1 Citers Â Â Risk Allah Bey v Johnstone; 1868 - (1868) 18 LT 620 Â Â Spill v Maule; CEC 1869 - 38 LJEx 138; (1869) LR 4 Exch 232; 20 LT 675; 17 WR 805 Â Â Mawe v Pigott; 1869 - (1869) Ir R 4 CL 54 Â Davies v Snead (1870) LR 5 QB 608 1870 Blackburn J Defamation There are circumstances where a person is so situated that it 'becomes right in the interests of society' that he should tell certain facts to another, and so might have a defence of fair comment to a charge of defamation. 1 Citers Â William Rainy v Alexander Bravo [1872] EngR 26; (1872) 9 Moo PC NS 35; (1872) 17 ER 427 11 Jun 1872 PC Defamation In an action of libel the defamatory words set out in the declaration must be proved as laid, and it is a fatal variance if the words as alleged are materially qualified by evidence of words not contained in the declaration, although such words as qualified are still libellous. [ Commonlii ] Â Â Alfred Nelson Laughton v The Hon And Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of Sodor And Man; PC 15-Nov-1872 - [1872] EngR 35; (1872) 9 Moo PC NS 318; (1872) 17 ER 534 Â Â Seaman v Netherclift; 1876 - (1876) 2 CPD 53 Â The Bank of British North America v Samuel Strong [1876] UKPC 10 10 Feb 1876 PC Defamation (Nova Scotia) [ Bailii ] Â Purcell v Sowler (1877) LR 2 CP 215 1877 CA Mellish LJ, Fox LJ and Bramwell LJ Defamation, Media A Manchester newspaper reported a public meeting of poor-law guardians, in which a medical officer was said to have neglected to attend pauper patients when sent for. Held: Publication was not privileged. The Court looked beyond the subject-matter, saying the administration of the poor-law was a matter of national concern, but that there was no duty to report charges made in the absence of the medical officer and without his having had any opportunity to meet them. The meeting was a privileged occasion for the speaker, but publication in the press was not. "This review of the authorities shows that, save where the publication is of a report which falls into one of the recognised privileged categories, the court must look at the circumstances of the case before it in order to ascertain whether the occasion of the publication was privileged. It is not enough that the publication should be of general interest to the public. The public must have a legitimate interest in receiving the information contained in it, and there must be a correlative duty in the publisher to publish, which depends also on the status of the information which he receives, at any rate where the information is being made public for the first time." Cockburn CJ said that "it is impossible to doubt that the administration of the poor-law is a matter of national concern" Mellish LJ observed: "there is no reason why the charges should be made public before the person charged has been told of the charges, and has had the opportunity of meeting them . . Such a communication as the present ought to be confined in the first instance to those whose duty it is to investigate the charges." 1 Citers Â Clark v Molyneux (1877) 3 QBD 237 1877 Brett LJ Defamation The test of malice in a defence of qualified privilege is 'has it been proved that the defendant did not honestly believe that what he said was true, that is, was he either aware that it was not true or indifferent to its truth or falsity.' 1 Citers Â Â Botterill v Whytehead; 1879 - (1879) 41 LTNS 588 Â Richardson v Le Con Te [1879] SLR 17 - 235 13 Dec 1879 SCS Defamation Action for Judicial Slander - Counter-Issue of Veritas [ Bailii ] Â Â Bowen v Hall; 1881 - (1881) 6 QBD 333 Â Scott v Sampson [1882] 8 QBD 491 1882 QBD Cave J Defamation The court explained why evidence of particular acts of misconduct on the part of the Plaintiff tending to show his character and disposition should be excluded, saying "Both principle and authority seems equally against its admission. It would give rise to interminable issues which would have but a very remote bearing on the question in dispute, which is to what extent the reputation which he actually possesses has been damaged by the defamatory matter complained of". The court was asked as to the evidence which might be called by a defendant relating to the character of the plaintiff: "Speaking generally the law recognises in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others unaffected by false statements to his discredit; and if such false statements are made without lawful excuse, and damage results to the person of whom they are made, he has a right of action." Cave J said: "The law recognises in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others unaffected by false statements to his discredit." For this purpose, harm to reputation is capable of occurring on each occasion when a false statement referring to a complainant is communicated to another or others: for it is then that they may be likely to think the worse of the complainant. 1 Citers Â Scott v Samson [1882] 8 QBD 491 1882 Defamation 1 Citers Â Â The Capital and Counties Bank Limited v George Henty and Sons; HL 1882 - (1882) 7 App Cas 741 Â Webb v Beavan (1883) 11 QBD 609 1883 Pollock B Defamation There is an exception to the rule that a claimant in slander must have proof of special damage where words imputing to the claimant the commission of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment are actionable per se. It was not necessar that the offence alleged was indictable. Pollock B said: 'The expression 'indictable offence' seems to have crept into the text-books, but I think the passages in Comyns' Digest are conclusive to shew that words which impute any criminal offence are actionable per se. The distinction seems a natural one, that words imputing that the plaintiff has rendered himself liable to the mere infliction of a fine are not slanderous, but that it is slanderous to say that he has done something for which he can be made to suffer corporally.' 1 Citers Â Â Munster v Lamb; CA 1883 - (1883) 11 QBD 588 Â Cowley v Pulsifer (1884) 137 Mass 392 1884 Holmes J International, Defamation (United States - Supreme Court of Massachusetts) The court discussed the advantage nevertheless of having proceedings in public. Holmes J said: "The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings. . . The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern, and that which we understand to be intended by the foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of justice. . . It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed." and "If these [the principles of open justice] are not the only grounds upon which fair reports of judicial proceedings are privileged, all will agree that they are not the least important ones. And it is clear that they have no application whatever to the contents of a preliminary written statement of a claim or charge. These do not constitute a proceeding in open court. Knowledge of them throws no light upon the administration of justice. Both form and contents depend wholly on the will of a private individual, who may not be even an officer of the court. It would be carrying privilege farther than we feel prepared to carry it, to say that by the easy means of entitling and filing it in a cause, a sufficient foundation may be laid for scattering any libel broadcast with impunity." and . . "It may be objected that our reasoning tacitly assumes that papers properly filed in the clerk's office are not open to the inspection of the public. We do not admit that this is true, or that the reasons for the privilege accorded to the publication of proceedings in open court would apply to the publication of such papers, even if all the world had access to them. But we do not pause to discuss the question, because we are of opinion that such papers are not open to public inspection." 1 Citers Â Emmens v Pottle (1885) 16 QBD 354 1885 CA Lord Escher MR Defamation A subordinate distributor, here a vendor of newspapers, can plead the common law defence to defamation, of innocent dissemination. Held: The vendor was prima facie liable, and therefore had to demonstrate the defence to avoid liability. He must show that he did not know that it contained a libel; that his ignorance was not due to any negligence on his part; and that he did not know, and had no ground for supposing, that the newspaper was likely to contain libellous matter. Lord Escher MR said: "But the defendants did not compose the libel on the plaintiff, they did not write it or print it; they only disseminated that which contained the libel. The question is whether, as such disseminators, they published the libel? If they had known what was in the paper, whether they were paid for circulating it or not, they would have published the libel, and would have been liable for so doing. That, I think, cannot be doubted. But here, upon the findings of the jury, we must take it that the defendants did not know that the paper contained a libel." and "In my opinion, any proposition the result of which would be to show that the common law of England is wholly unreasonable and unjust, cannot be part of the common law of England." 1 Citers Â Brims v Reid and Sons (1885) 12 R 1016 1885 Lord President Inglis, Lord Shand Defamation A newspaper had published an anonymous letter concerning the fitness for office of the pursuer who was seeking re-election as a member of a town council and to the public office of Dean of Guild. The publisher refused to disclose the name of the writer of the letter which he had published in his newspaper. It was held that he could not plead privilege in action to the pursuer's action of damages. "It appears to me that, whatever might be the case if these statements had been made in an editorial article, about which I give no opinion, the fact that they were made in an anonymous letter is quite sufficient for the decision of this case. It is difficult to define the exact extent of the privilege of comment which the editor of a newspaper undoubtedly has to some extent upon the doings of public men; it is difficult to define what the class of public men is with reference to whose doings he enjoys that privilege, or what the kind of accusations that may be brought against the conduct of public men is; and yet again it is difficult to distinguish between the doings of a public man, as a public man, and as a private individual." and "But we are relieved of all these difficulties in the present case by the fact that the statements complained of are contained in an anonymous letter to the editor. The editor has declined to disclose the author. The effect of this in point of law is not to entitle this letter to be dealt with as if it had appeared in a leading article or in some part of the paper in which the editor speaks for himself. The law is that the editor accepts the position of the anonymous writer with every liability which could have been laid upon that writer if he had been disclosed. The question, then, is whether malice would require to be put in issue against the writer if he had been disclosed. " and "Now, the answer to that question will depend upon who the writer was, and what his connection was with the matters on which he writes. But in the present case we cannot ascertain who the writer was, whether he was a ratepayer in Wick, whether he ever was in Wick in his life, or whether he is even a subject of Her Majesty. In short, we know nothing about him; he is a mere umbra. He is somebody who has libelled the pursuer, and is not in a position to justify that libel by proving its truth, or to justify it by saying that he has a privilege." and "The newspaper editor can be in no better position then than the anonymous writer himself. Now, if the letter was written with malice, it is conceded that the pursuer is entitled to damages. But how can anyone prove malice on the part of a person of whom he knows nothing at all? What can he tell of his state of mind, or his relation to the matter on which he comments? Or how, on the other hand, can malice in such a case be disproved?" 1 Citers Â Bolton v O'Brien (1885) QB Div vol XVI LR Ir 97 11 Jan 1885 May CJ, O'Brien J Defamation On a motion for a new trial in a claim in defamation, a majority of the court held that passages in the same newspaper which were not complained of might be adduced in evidence to illustrate the meaning of the passages complained of. At the trial, both counsel had read and commented on the various passages without objection. May CJ said: "I have reason to think that Mr. Justice O'Brien entertains doubts as to the legal propriety of adducing in evidence other passages in the same newspaper in order to illustrate the meaning of the passages charged to be libellous. I cannot say that I concur in those doubts. If the language be ambiguous as to the nature of the felony imputed in this particular passage, it appears to me that other passages in the same newspaper, by the same person, dealing with these matters are properly admissible in order to remove such ambiguity." O'Brien J dissented, saying that such passages other than those complained of were not evidence to affect the defamatory sense unless "directly referred to, and in that way virtually made part of the libel." 1 Citers Â Rex v Ensor (1887) 3 TLR 366 1887 Stephen J Defamation, Crime “In the history of the Star Chamber it is said:- 'In all ages libels have been most severely punished in this court, but most especially they began to be frequent about 42 and 43 Elizabeth, (1600, when Sir Edward Coke was her Attorney General). “In this passage therefore he was probably giving his impression of the Star Chamber practice, which no one would now regard as of any authority. There are, I think, many instances in which Lord Coke's views of the criminal law are doubtful and go far beyond the authorities he refers to. In this passage he refers to none.” The court then considered the “only real” authority, R v Topham. and said; “The judgment seems to me to show that a mere vilifying of the deceased is not enough... There must be a vilifying of the dead with a view to injure his posterity. The dead have no rights and can suffer no wrongs. The living alone can be the subject of legal protection, and the law of libel is intended to protect them, not against every writing which gives them pain, but against writings holding them up individually to hatred, contempt or ridicule. This, no doubt, may be done in every variety of way. It is possible, under the mask of attacking a dead man, to attack a living one.....I wish to add that I regard the silence of the authorities and the general practice of the profession as a more weighty authority on this point than the isolated statements of Lord Coke and the few unsatisfactory cases referred to in R v Topham. I am reluctant in the highest degree to extend the criminal law. To speak broadly, to libel the dead is not an offence known to our law.” Â Â Merivale v Carson; CA 1887 - (1887) 20 QBD 275 Â William Coulson and Sons v James Coulson and Co (1887) 3 TLR 846 1887 CA Lord Esher MR, Lindley LJ Defamation Lord Esher MR said: "It could not be denied that the court had jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction before trial. It was, however, a most delicate jurisdiction to exercise, because, though Fox's Act only applied to indictments and informations for libel, the practice under that Act had been followed in civil actions for libel, that the question of libel or no libel was for the jury. It was for the jury and not for the Court to construe the document and to say whether it was a libel or not. To justify the Court in granting an interim injunction it must come to a decision upon the question of libel or no libel before the jury decided whether it was a libel or not. Therefore, the jurisdiction was of a delicate nature. It ought only to be exercised in the clearest cases, where any jury would say that the matter complained of was libellous, and where, if the jury did not so find, the Court would set aside the verdict as unreasonable. The Court must also be satisfied that in all probability the alleged libel was untrue, and if written on a privileged occasion that there was malice on the part of the defendant. It followed from those three rules that the Court could only on the rarest occasions exercise the jurisdiction." Lindley LJ "agreed with the rules laid down by the Master of the Rolls, and he was not prepared to say that the jury might not find that this was no libel, or that the alleged libel was true. The injunction, therefore, ought not to have been granted. Both the Judge at Chambers and the Divisional Court had suggested a form of circular; but it was no part of a Judge's duty to do so, except for the purposes of putting an end to litigation, and the Court ought not to settle a draft form of what might turn out to be a libel." 1 Citers Â Allbutt v General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1889) 23 QBD 400 1889 CA Lopes LJ Defamation The defendant had published a book with minutes of a meeting of the council recording that the plaintiff's name had been removed from the medical register for infamous professional conduct. This followed an inquiry at which the plaintiff had been represented by counsel. Held: The publication was privileged. The court had express regard to the nature of the tribunal, the character of the report, the interests of the public in the proceedings of the council and the duty of the council towards the public. 1 Cites 1 Citers Â O'Brien v Marquis of Salisbury (1889) 6 TLR 137; (1889) 54 JP 215 1889 QBD Field J Defamation The court considered the jury's verdict as to the meaning of the words complained of. Field J said: "If, therefore, as I think, the jury had only relevant evidence submitted to them and were properly directed as to the use they were to make of it, the only remaining question is whether the verdict ought to be set aside as being unreasonable. The limits within which this jurisdiction of the court ought to be exercised in an action like this are thus laid down by Chief Justice Tindal in Broome v Gosden (1 CB 731): - 'unless the jury are manifestly wrong in not finding the alleged libel to bear the meaning that the plaintiff has thought fit to put upon it by the innuendo (or now any defamatory meaning), and unless the court can say with certainty that there has been a miscarriage of justice, no new trial will be granted.' In other words the jury are the appointed tribunal for the decision of the question of libel or no libel, and the court ought not to invade their province unless it can be plainly seen that the verdict is perverse or so unreasonable as to lead to the conclusion that the jury have not honestly taken the facts into their consideration." 1 Citers Â Pullman v Hill and Co [1891] 1 QB 524 1891 CA Lord Esher MR, Lopez LJ Defamation The plaintiff claimed publication of a defamation when the defendant was said to have dictated it to his typist. Held: That was sufficient publication. The Court considered what would amount to publication in the law of defamation. Lord Esher MR said: "The first question is, assuming the letter to contain defamatory matter, there has been a publication of it. What is the meaning of "publication"? The making known of the defamatory matter after it has been written to some person other than the person of whom it is written" . . And: "If the writer of a letter shews it to his own clerk in order that the clerk may copy it for him, is that a publication of the letter? Certainly it is shewing it to a third person; the writer cannot say to the person to whom the letter is addressed, "I have shewn it to you and to no one else". I cannot, therefore, feel any doubt that, if the writer of a letter shews it to any person other than the person to whom it is written, he publishes it. If he wishes not to publish it, he must, so far as he possibly can, keep it to himself, or he must send it himself straight to the person to whom it is written. There was therefore, in this case a publication to the type-writer." . . And: where "the writer of a letter locks it up in his own desk, and a thief comes and breaks open the desk and takes away the letter and makes it contents known . . " no intentional publication by the author occurs. As to qualified privilege, Lord Esher MR said: 'An occasion is privileged when the person who makes the communication has a moral duty to make it to the person to whom he does make it, and the person who receives it has an interest in hearing it. Both these conditions must exist in order that the occasion may be privileged.' As to whether a publication had been in the ordinary course of business", Lord Esher MR said: "Here a communication was made by the defendant's Managing Director to type writer. Moreover, the letter was directed to the plaintiff's firm and opened by one of their clerks. The defendants placed the letter out of their control and took no means to prevent it being opened by the plaintiff's clerks. In my opinion, therefore, there was a publication of the letter, not only to the typewriter but also to the clerks of the plaintiff's firm." 1 Cites 1 Citers Â Anderson v Hunter (1891) 18 R 467 1891 Defamation The pursuer sought election as a county councillor for a division where a parish had been divided into two electoral divisions for county council purposes. The defender lived in the same parish but he was an elector in the other division. He had made various statements to people in the parish that the pursuer was not fit to be elected as he would soon be bankrupt. His argument was that the statements were made in circumstances that were privileged, as he was a ratepayer in the parish and the pursuer was a candidate for the public post of county councillor on one of the divisions of that parish. It was rejected, simply on the ground that he was not a voter in the election with reference to which he was said to have made the statements complained of. 1 Citers Â Â Bonnard v Perryman; QBD 1891 - [1891] 2 Ch 269 Â Manchester Corporation v Williams [1891] 1 QB 94; (1891) 63 LT 805 1891 QBD Day, Lawrance JJ Defamation, Local Government The defendant wrote to a newspaper alleging that "in the case of two if not three departments of our Manchester city council, bribery and corruption have existed and done their nefarious work." Held: The claim disclosed no cause of action. A corporation may sue for a libel affecting property, but not for one merely affecting personal reputation. Day J said (Times): "This action is brought by the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of the city of Manchester to recover damages from the defendant in respect of that which is alleged by them to be a libel on the corporation. The alleged libel is contained in a letter written by the defendant to the editor of the 'Manchester Examiner and Times', which charged, as alleged by the statement of claim, that bribery and corruption existed or had existed in three departments of the Manchester City Council, and that the plaintiffs were either parties thereto or culpably ignorant thereof, and that the said bribery and corruption prevailed to such an extent as to render necessary an inquiry by a parliamentary commission. Now it is for us to determine whether a corporation can bring such an action, and I must say that, to my mind, to allow such a thing would be wholly unprecedented and contrary to principle. A corporation may sue for a libel affecting property, not for one merely affecting personal reputation. This does not fall within the class of case in respect of which a corporation can maintain an action, but does fall within the second class commented on by Pollock C.B. in his judgment in the case of the Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. Ltd. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87, with which I fully agree . . The charge in the present case is one of bribery and corruption, of which a corporation cannot possibly be guilty, and therefore, in my opinion, this action will not lie." Lawrance J agreed. 1 Citers Â Stuart v Bell [1891] 2 QB 341; (1891) 7 TLR 502 1891 CA Lindley LJ Defamation Lindley LJ suggested that a moral or social duty meant "a duty recognised by English people of ordinary intelligence and moral principle, but at the same time not a duty enforceable by legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal". The defendant's belief that he had an interest or duty in making the statement or communicating the information is irrelevant to the question whether the occasion is privileged. 1 Citers Â Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 2 Jan 1891 CA Lord Coleridge CJ, Lord Esher MR, Lindley, Bowen and Lopes LJJ Defamation, Litigation Practice Although the courts possessed a jurisdiction, "in all but exceptional cases", they should not issue an interlocutory injunction to restrain the publication of a libel which the defence sought to justify except where it was clear that that defence would fail. Where the defendant contends that the words complained of are true and swears that he will plead and seek to prove the defence of justification, the court should not grant an interlocutory injunction unless, exceptionally, it is satisfied that the defence is one which cannot succeed. The plaintiff must demonstrate that "it is clear that (the) alleged libel is untrue." Lord Coleridge CJ said that there was a particular need not to restrict the right of free speech in libel cases by interfering before the final determination of the matter by a jury otherwise than in a clear case of an untrue libel, saying: "But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an action for defamation is so special as to require exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong. The right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest that individuals should possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is done; and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong committed; but, on the contrary, often a very wholesome act is performed in the publication and repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions. In the particular case before us, indeed, the libellous character of the publication is beyond dispute, but the effect of it upon the Defendant can be finally disposed of only by a jury, and we cannot feel sure that the defence of justification is one which, on the facts which may be before them, the jury may find to be wholly unfounded; nor can we tell what may be the damages recoverable." 1 Cites 1 Citers Â Lilley v Roney (1892) 61 LJQB 727 1892 Defamation A complaint to the Law Society or its equivalent had been held to be made on occasion of absolute privilege. 1 Citers Â Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431 1892 CA Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ Defamation, Litigation Practice The court described the characteristics of a tribunal to which absolute privilege attaches. Having spoken of "an authorised inquiry which, though not before a court of justice, is before a tribunal which has similar attributes" and similar attributes the question was whether it was "acting . . in a manner as nearly as possible similar to to that in which a court of justice acts in respect of an inquiry before it." 1 Citers Â Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 1892 Bowen LJ Damages, Defamation The plaintiff was an engineer and boiler-maker. He alleged that a statement in the local newspaper that he had ceased business had caused him loss. The evidence that was given at trial consisted of general evidence of a downturn in trade; but the plaintiff did not give evidence of the loss of any specific customer. The jury awarded him damages of £120. Held: The award was upheld. It is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that publication of defamatory words caused him damage because damage is presumed. As to damages: "If, indeed, over and above this general damage, further particular damage is under the circumstances to be relied on by the plaintiff, such particular damage must of course be alleged and shewn. But a loss of general custom, flowing directly and in the ordinary course of things from a libel, may be alleged and proved generally. "It is not special damage" - says Pollock, C.B., in Harrison v. Pearce . . "it is general damage resulting from the kind of injury the plaintiff has sustained." So in Bluck v. Lovering . . under a general allegation of loss of credit in business, general evidence was received of a decline of business presumably due to the publication of the libel, while loss of particular customers, not having been pleaded, was held rightly to have been rejected at the trial: . Macloughlin v. Welsh was an instance of excommunication in open church. General proof was held to be rightly admitted that the plaintiff was shunned and his mill abandoned, though no loss of particular customers was shewn. Here the very nature of the slander rendered it necessary that such general proof should be allowed. The defamatory words were spoken openly and publicly, and were intended to have the exact effect which was produced. Unless such general evidence was admissible, the injury done could not be proved at all.' However, in relation to libel: "If, in addition to this general loss, the loss of particular customers was to be relied on, such particular losses would, in accordance with the ordinary rules of pleading, have been required to be mentioned in the statement of claim…" and 'The necessity of alleging and proving actual temporal loss with certainty and precision in all cases of the sort has been insisted upon for centuries: . . In all actions accordingly on the case where the damage actually done is the gist of the action, the character of the acts themselves which produce the damage, and the circumstances under which these acts are done, must regulate the degree of certainty and particularity with which the damage done ought to be stated and proved. As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon less would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist upon more would be the vainest pedantry. The rule to be laid down with regard to malicious falsehoods affecting property or trade is only an instance of the doctrines of good sense applicable to all that branch of actions on the case to which the class under discussion belongs. The nature and circumstances of the publication of the falsehood may accordingly require the admission of evidence of general loss of business as the natural and direct result produced, and perhaps intended to be produced. An instructive illustration, and one by which the present appeal is really covered, is furnished by the case of Hargrave v. Le Breton . . decided a century and a half ago. It was an example of slander of title at an auction. The allegation in the declaration was that divers persons who would have purchased at the auction left the place; but no particular persons were named. The objection that they were not specially mentioned was, as the report tells us, "easily" answered. The answer given was that in the nature of the transaction it was impossible to specify names; that the injury complained of was in effect that the bidding at the auction had been prevented and stopped, and that everybody had gone away. It had, therefore, become impossible to tell with certainty who would have been bidders or purchasers if the auction had not been rendered abortive. This case shows, what sound judgment itself dictates, that in an action for falsehood producing damage to a man's trade, which in its very nature is intended or reasonably likely to produce, and which in the ordinary course of things does produce, a general loss of business, as distinct from the loss of this or that known customer, evidence of such general decline of business is admissible." 1 Citers Â McKerchar v Cameron (1892) 19 R 383 1892 Lord McLaren Scotland, Defamation A newspaper published an anonymous letter containing statements that the pursuer, a salaried official, was unfit for his post as a teacher in a public school. It was argued that the ratepayers and inhabitants of the neighbourhood had an interest and a right to know the contents of what was published. There was no room for the defence of privilege, so there was no need for the pursuer to plead malice. The court did not need to decide whether a member of the public, in attacking any person holding any office under any public body, was entitled to the defence of privilege. It was difficult to see what duty or right there was on the part of a member of the public, as such, to criticise the conduct of a public servant who was in the public employment. 1 Cites 1 Citers Â Alexander v Jenkins [1892] 1 QB 797 1892 HL Lord Herschell Defamation 'when you are dealing with some legal decisions which all rest on a certain principle, you may extend the area of those decisions to meet cases which fall within the same principles; but where we are dealing with such an artificial law as this law of slander, which rests on the most artificial distinctions, all you can do is, I think, to say that if the action is to be extended to a class of cases in which it has not hitherto been held to lie, it is the Legislature that must make the extension and not the Court'”. Â Bruce v Leisk (1892) 19 R 482 1892 Defamation, Scotland 1 Citers Â Â Hebditch v MacIlwaine; CA 1894 - [1894] 2 QB 54 Â Boxsius v Goblet Freres [1894] 1 QB 842 1894 Defamation An ordinary business representative or adjunct of the associated agents, or any of them, cannot escape iability in defamation by regarding the communication with him as usual in the course of business. 1 Citers Â South Hetton Coal Company Ltd v North Eastern News Association Limited [1894] 1 QB 133 1894 CA Kay LJ, Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ Defamation, Damages The plaintiff company sued for defamation in respect of an article which alleged that it neglected its workforce. The defendants contended that no action for libel would lie on the part of a company unless actual pecuniary damage was proved. Held: This submission was rejected. Kay LJ said: "a trading corporation may sue for a libel calculated to injure them in respect of their business, and may do so without any proof of damage general or special. Of course if there be no such evidence the damages given will probably be small." Words may be defamatory of a professional if they impute lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional activity. Lopes LJ said that a company may maintain an action for a libel reflecting on the management of its business without alleging or proving special damage. Lord Esher MR said that the law of defamation is the same for all plantiffs. While there were obvious differences between individuals and companies: "Then, if the case be one of libel - whether on a person, a firm, or a company - the law is that damages are at large. It is not necessary to prove any particular damage; the jury may give such damages as they think fit, having regard to the conduct of the parties respectively, and all the circumstances of the case." 1 Citers Â Waddell v Roxburgh (1894) 21 R 883 1894 Lord Kinnear Defamation The court discussed the meaning of slander: "It may be that to confine the use of the word slander to cases where the language complained of is obviously and on the face of it defamatory and injurious would be convenient, but I should rather have thought that all actionable words which are either injurious to the character or the credit of the person of whom they are spoken, or which expose the person with reference to whom they are uttered to public hatred and contempt, are defamatory or slanderous words. ... If it is not calculated to expose him to public hatred or contempt, or to do him any injury, - if, when properly construed, it does not assail his character or credit, - then it is not slanderous or actionable at all." 1 Citers Â Australian Newspaper Company v Bennett [1894] AC 284 1894 PC Defamation The Board considered the findings the jury as to the meaning of the words complained of: "It is not disputed that, whilst it is for the court to determine whether the words used are capable of the meaning alleged in the innuendo, it is for the jury to determine whether that meaning was properly attached to them. It was therefore the province of the jury in the present case to determine whether the words used were written of the plaintiff, and whether they bore the defamatory sense alleged. [The judge below] observed in the course of his judgment that he admitted that the Court would only be justified in reversing the finding of the jury "if their decision upon that point is such as no jury could give as reasonable men". This is a correct statement of the law. Their Lordships have not, any more than the Court below had, to determine in the present case what is the conclusion at which they would have arrived, or what is the verdict they would have found. The only point to be determined is, whether the verdict found by the jury, for whose consideration it essentially was, was such as no jury could have found as reasonable men." and "The question therefore is whether in all these circumstances it can be said that a jury of reasonable men could not possibly find that the article, although it contains that which had much better not have been published, did not reflect upon the plaintiff's character, or even upon his conduct in relation to the newspaper. The jury have so found, and their Lordships are of opinion that it would be exceeding the legitimate function of the court if the verdict was set aside and a new trial ordered, that the court would then in reality be taking upon itself the function which the law has committed to the jury, of looking at the alleged libelous matter as a whole, and determining whether it is published of and concerning the plaintiff, and whether it bears the innuendo which the plaintiff seeks to attach to it." 1 Citers Â Â Baker v Carrick; 1894 - [1894] 1 QB 838 Â Hird v Wood (1894) 38 SJ 234 1894 CA Defamation A defamatory placard was placed at the side of the road. The defendant sat by it, pointing it out to passers by, but there was no direct evidence as to who had placed the placard there. Held: This was evidence of his publishing it. 1 Citers Â Â Nevill v Fine Arts and General Insurance Co Ltd; CA 1895 - [1895] 2 QB 156 Â Bray v Ford [1895-99] All ER Rep 1011; [1896] AC 44 1896 HL Lord Herschell, Lord Halsbury LC Trusts, Equity, Litigation Practice, Damages, Defamation An appellate court's power to order a new trial is conditional on "some substantial wrong or miscarriage" being established. Lord Hershell said: "It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position, such as the plaintiff’s, is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule. But I am satisfied that it might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality, without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of wrong-doing. Indeed, it is obvious that it might sometimes be to the advantage of the beneficiaries that their trustee should act for them professionally rather than a stranger, even though the trustee were paid for his services." Lord Halsbury LC: What ws required was something sufficiently serious to render the decision of the jury unsafe amounting to "a substantial wrong" in which "the defendant was not permitted to present his case to the jury with the argument that his original complaint was true". Lord Herschell discussed the approach to damages in defamation cases: "The damages cannot be measured by any standard known to the law; they must be determined by a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, viewed in the light of the law applicable to them. The latitude is very wide. It would often be impossible to say that the verdict was a wrong one, whether the damages were assessed at £500 or £1,000." 1 Citers Â Â Neville v Fine Arts Company; 1897 - [1897] AC 68 Â Bruce v JM Smith [1898] ScotCS CSIH_3; (1898) 6 SLT 247; (1898) 1 F 327 23 Dec 1898 SCS Scotland, Defamation [ Bailii ] Â
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Defamation - From: 1849 To: 1899