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Damages - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 126 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.


 
 Clark v Urquhart; HL 1930 - [1930] AC 28; 141 LT 641; 99 LJPC 1
 
Herbert Clayton and Jack Waller Ltd v Oliver [1930] AC 209
1930
HL
Lord Buckmaster
Damages, Contract
When awarding damages for breach of contract courts should take care to confine the damages to their proper ambit: making good financial loss. When considering an award of damages to an actor who should have been billed to appear at the London Hippodrome, the court regarded loss of publicity rather than loss of reputation as the preferable expression.
1 Citers


 
Kitano Maru (Owners) v Otranto (Owners) (The Otranto) [1931] AC 194
1931
HL
Lord Buckmaster
Damages
The House considered the ability of an appeal court to reapportion responsibility after a finding as to responsibility for a collision at sea: 'Upon the question of altering the share of responsibility each has to take, this is primarily a matter for the judge at the trial, and unless there is some error in law or in fact in his judgment it ought not to be disturbed.'

 
Arneil v Paterson [1931] AC 560
1931

Viscount Dunedin, Viscount Hailsham
Damages, Negligence
Viscount Dunedin spoke of a hypothetical case in which two dogs had worried a sheep to death: "Would we then have to hold that each dog had half killed the sheep?"
Viscount Hailsham said: The owner of one of the two dogs which had worried the sheep was liable for the whole damage because 'each of the dogs did in law occasion the whole of the damage which was suffered by the sheep as a result of the action of the two dogs acting together'
1 Citers



 
 Kolbin and Sons v Kinnear and Co Ltd; HL 6-Jul-1931 - [1931] UKHL 4; (1931) 40 Ll L Rep 241; 1931 SLT 464; 1931 SC (HL) 128

 
 Stevens v Aldershot Gas, Water and District Lighting Co; 1932 - (1932) LJKB 12

 
 The Regent Taxi and Transport Company, Limited v La Congregation Des Petits Freres De Marie Dit Freres Maristes; PC 25-Jan-1932 - [1932] UKPC 4

 
 Banco de Portugal v Waterlow and Sons Ltd; HL 28-Apr-1932 - [1932] AC 452; [1932] UKHL 1
 
Withers v General Theatre Corporation Ltd [1933] 2 KB 536
1933
CA
Scrutton LJ, Greer LJ, and Romer LJ
Employment, Damages
An artist was engaged to appear at the London Palladium. The defendant, in breach of contract, refused to allow him to perform. Held: the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the loss of reputation which he would have acquired if the defendant had not committed the breach of contract. But the Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled as a matter of law to damages to his existing reputation.
1 Citers


 
Liesbosch Dredger (Owners of) v Owners of SS Edison, The Liesbosch [1933] AC 449; [1933] All ER Rep 144; [1933] 149 LT 49; [1933] UKHL 2
28 Feb 1933
HL
Lord Wright
Damages
The ship Edison fouled the moorings of the Liesbosch resulting in the total loss of the dredger when it sank. It had been engaged on work in the harbour under contract with the harbour board. All the owners' liquid resources were engaged in the contract, and their deposit under the contract was forfeit if the work was delayed. They were unable to raise the funds that were needed to buy another dredger, so they hired another, the Adria, which was more expensive to hire and work. Due entirely to their lack of means, the owners incurred much more expense in the provision of an alternative dredger than they would have done if they had been able to purchase an equivalent. The owners of the Liesbosch claimed their actual loss, on the basis that all the circumstances should be taken into account and they had acted reasonably in hiring the Italian vessel in view of their financial embarrassment. Held: The sum awarded as damages was restricted to the market price of a comparable dredger at the time of the loss, together with the cost of transporting her and insuring her to Patras. The court should not take into account a claimant's want of means when assessing the amount of his loss. The principle enunciated in the Clippens oil case was as to the existence of any duty of mitigation.
Lord Wright said that: "it follows that the value of the Liesbosch to the appellants, capitalized as at the date of the loss, must be assessed by taking into account: (1.) the market price of a comparable dredger in substitution; (2.) costs of adaptation, transport, insurance, etc., to Patras; (3.) compensation for disturbance and loss in carrying out their contract over the period of delay between the loss of the Liesbosch and the time at which the substituted dredger could reasonably have been available for use in Patras, including in that loss such items as overhead charges, expenses of staff and equipment, and so forth thrown away, but neglecting any special loss due to the appellants' financial position."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Owen and Smith (trading as Nuagin Car Service) v Reo Motors (Britain) Ltd; CA 1934 - (1934) 151 LT 274

 
 Brickenden v London Loan and Savings Co; PC 1934 - (1934) 3 DLR 465

 
 Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures; CA 1934 - (1934) 50 TLR 581

 
 Fishenden v Higgs and Hill Ltd; CA 1935 - [1935] 153 LT 128
 
Millar's Machinery Co Ltd v David Way and Son (1935) 40 Com Cas 204
1935
CA
Maugham LJ, Roche LJ
Contract, Damages
In a contract, the sellers stated: "We do not give any other guarantee and we do not accept responsibility for consequential damages." Held: The purchaser recovered the deposit paid towards the price of a machine prior to delivery and also a further sum paid for the supply of a replacement machine at short notice: "On the question of damages, the word 'consequential' had come to mean 'not direct', but damages recovered by the Defendants on the Counterclaim arose directly from the Plaintiffs' breach of contract under section 51(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893." Roche LJ said: the damages recovered by the defendants on the counterclaim are not merely "consequential" but resulted directly and naturally from the plaintiffs' breach of contract.
The contract provided for the sellers that "We do not give any other guarantee and we do not accept responsibility for consequential damages." The machinery was not delivered on time and the purchaser sought recovery of his deposit. Held: The purchaser recovered his deposit together with a further sum he had paid for the supply of a replacement machine at short notice. The plaintiffs' right to recover those damages was unaffected by the wording of the contract. Maugham LJ said: "On the question of damages, the word 'consequential' had come to mean 'not direct', but damages recovered by the Defendants on the Counterclaim arose directly from the Plaintiffs' breach of contract under section 51(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893."
Roche LJ said that the damages recovered by the defendants on the counterclaim are not merely "consequential" but resulted directly and naturally from the plaintiffs' breach of contract.
Sale of Goods Act 1893 51(2)
1 Citers


 
Ley v Hamilton (1935) 153 LT 384
1935
HL
Lord Atkin
Damages, Defamation
The House approved awards of punitive or exemplary damages. Lord Atkin said: said that damages awards for defamation were not arrived at "by determining the 'real' damage and adding to that a sum by way of vindictive or punitive damages. It is precisely because the ' real' damage cannot be ascertained and established that the damages are at large. It is impossible to track the scandal, to know what quarters the poison may reach; it is impossible to weigh at all closely the compensation which will recompense a man or a woman for the insult offered or the pain of a false accusation. No doubt in newspaper libels juries take into account the vast circulations which are justly claimed in present times. The 'punitive' element is not something which is or can be added to some known factor which is non-punitive ".
1 Citers



 
 Ebbw Vale Steel Co v Tew; CA 1935 - [1935] 79 SJ 593
 
Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd [1936] Ch 323
1936
CA
Lord Wright MR
Intellectual Property, Damages

1 Citers


 
Grein v Imperial Airways Ltd [1937] 1 KB 50
1937
CA
Green LJ
Transport, Damages
A passenger met his death whilst travelling on a return air ticket between London and Antwerp. Belgium was not a state contracting under the Convention. Held: Belgium was engaged on "international carriage" within the meaning of the Convention. The Convention limiting damages to be awarded for any accident occurring on an airplane is to be construed purposively.
1 Citers


 
Rose v Ford [1937] AC 826
1937
HL
Lord Wright
Damages, Personal Injury
Damages might be recovered for a loss of expectation of life.
Lord Wright explained the object of the 1934 Act: "The purpose . . was to abolish in a special and particular way the rule preventing the prosecution of a claim in tort for personal injuries where the person who would otherwise be plaintiff or defendant in an action has died. The rule was expressed in the maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona'".
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 1
1 Citers


 
Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759
1937
HL
Lord Atkin, Lord Wright
Contract, Damages
Mr Way (W), the plaintiff, was employed by Ariston, which had mining operations in Africa, as a consulting engineer and manager. He met the respondent (L) in England. He was asked to seek options to acquire concessions the respondent might acquire. In return, he was promised a share. W returned and acquired concessions. They agreed his reward would be decided on returning, and L promised W a substantial interest in his new Trust copany. They agreed no amount, but only that he should receive a share of the concessions. W now sought his remuneration. At trial he was awarded £30,000 on the basis of a contract between the parties. The court of appeal disagreed and held that no contract was made. Held: There was no concluded contract, and the court could not complete one for the parties but that W was entitled to remuneration on a quantum meruit. The question was the amount of the award. The CA said, applyig evidence from consulting mining engineers, that the proper award was a fee of £600.
Lord Atkin said that the CA decision ignored the real business position, and that the award was to be fixed by reference to the approach to remuneration adopted by the parties: "My Lords, this decision appears to me to ignore the real business position. Services of this kind are no doubt usually the subject of an express contract as to remuneration, which may take the form of a fee, but may also take the form of a commission share of profits, or share of proceeds calculated at a percentage, or on some other basis. In the present case, there was no question of fee between the parties from beginning to end. On the contrary, the parties had discussed remuneration on the footing of what may loosely be called a "participation," and nothing else. The reference is analogous to the well known distinction between salary and commission. There are many employments the remuneration of which is, by trade usage, invariably fixed on a commission basis. In such cases, if the amount of the commission has not been finally agreed, the quantum meruit would be fixed after taking into account what would be a reasonable commission, in the circumstances, and fixing a sum accordingly. This has been an everyday practice in the courts for years. But, if no trade usage assists the court as to the amount of the commission, it appears to me clear that the court may take into account the bargainings between the parties, not with a view to completing the bargain for them, but as evidence of the value which each of them puts upon the services. If the discussion had ranged between 3 per cent on the one side and 5 per cent on the other, all else being agreed, the court would not be likely to depart from somewhere about those figures, and would be wrong in ignoring them altogether and fixing remuneration on an entirely different basis, upon which, possibly, the services would never have been rendered at all. That, in fixing a salary basis, the court may pay regard to the previous conversation of the parties was decided by the Court of Exchequer in 1869, in Scarisbrick v Parkinson, where the terms of an agreement, invalid under the Statute of Frauds, were held to be admissible as evidence in a quantum meruit. This seems to me to be good law, and to give effect to a principle which has been adopted regularly by the courts not only in fixing remuneration for services but also in fixing prices, sums due for use and occupation, and, indeed, in all cases where the court has to determine what is a reasonable reward for the consideration given by the claimant. As I have said, the rule applied in fixing the amount of the remuneration necessarily applies to the basis on which the amount is to be fixed. I have therefore no hesitation in saying that the basis of remuneration by fee should, in this case, on the evidence of the parties themselves, be rejected, and that Mr Way is entitled to a sum to be calculated on the basis of some reasonable participation." He fixed the award at £5,000.
Lord Wright said that the court had to do its best to arrive at a figure which was fair and reasonable to both parties on all the facts of the case. He continued: "One aspect of the facts to be considered is found in the communings of the parties while the business was going on. Evidence of this nature is admissible to show what the parties had in mind, however indeterminately, with regard to the basis of remuneration. On those facts, the court may be able to infer, or attribute to the parties, an intention that a certain basis of payment should apply. This evidence seems to me to show quite clearly that the appellant was employed on the basis of receiving a remuneration depending on results. If he had been unsuccessful, he would have been entitled to no more than his expenses, but the respondent had led him to believe that, if the concessions he obtained were valuable, his remuneration would be on the basis of some proportion of their value." and "While it is not unknown that such services should be remunerated by a fee if it is expressly or impliedly so agreed, this is by no means necessarily, and would not generally be, the case. The idea of such a fee being excluded, it follows that the question of the amount to which the appellant is entitled is left at large, and the court must do the best it can to arrive at a figure which seems to it fair and reasonable to both parties, on all the facts of the case. One aspect of the facts to be considered is found in the communings of the parties while the business was going on. Evidence of this nature is admissible to show what the parties had in mind, however indeterminately, with regard to the basis of remuneration. On those facts, the court may be able to infer, or attribute to the parties, an intention that a certain basis of payment should apply."
1 Citers


 
J and E Hall Ltd v Barclay [1937] 3 All ER 620
1937


Torts - Other, Damages
The company had erected and tested two experimental davits for the appellant. They were then taken down and left unused for many years. The parties disputed the account. The company claimed also for damages for detinue or conversion of the davits which had eventually sold as scrap. The judge had awarded the scrap value of the equipment as sold. Held: The company should have been awarded the values of the equipment sold, at the price of similar articles in the market. In this case there was no such second hand market, and the meausre was the cost of buying alternatives.
1 Citers


 
Aerial Advertising Co v Batchelors Peas Ltd (Manchester) [1938] 2 All ER 788
1938

Atkinson J.
Damages, Contract
Aerial advertising ("Eat Bachelors Peas") took place during Armistice Day services. Held: The court was careful to confine damages to the financial loss flowing from public boycotting of the defendant's goods and to exclude damages for loss of reputation.


 
 A Baily and Co v Clark Son and Morland; HL 1938 - [1938] AC 557
 
Owens v Liverpool Corporation [1939] 1 KB 394; [1938] 4 All ER 727; 55 TLR 246
1938
CA
MacKinnon LJ
Personal Injury, Damages
Four family mourners at a funeral appealed against rejection of their claims for damages for distress caused by witnessing a collision between a negligently driven tramcar and the hearse.The incident had involved no apprehension, or sight, or sound of physical injury to a human being. Held: The appeal succeeded. There is a common law right to a decent burial. Nervous shock is a “form of ill-health” “ascertainable by the physician."
MacKinnon LJ said: "one who is guilty of negligence to another must put up with idiosyncracies of his victim that increase the likelihood or extent of damage to him: it is no answer to a claim for a fractured skull that its owner had an unusually fragile one." and "It may be that the plaintiffs are of that class which is peculiarly susceptible to the luxury of woe at a funeral so as to be disastrously disturbed by any untoward accident to the trappings of mourning."
1 Citers



 
 Hall Brothers Steamship Company Limited v Young; 1938 - (1938) 43 Com Cas 284
 
Gibbons v Westminster Bank Ltd [1939] 2 KB 882; [1939] 3 All ER 577
1939

Lawrence J
Banking, Damages
For a non-trading customer of a bank whose cheque has been wrongfully dishonoured, injury to credit in law must be pleaded and proved as special damages.
1 Citers



 
 Attorney General v Canter; CA 1939 - [1939] 1 KB 318
 
Wallington v Townsend [1939] 1 Ch 588
1939

Morton J
Damages, Land, Contract
Where a vendor of land failed to complete for reasons other than a defect in title and the purchaser was unable to prove a loss of profits he was entitled by way of damages, in addition to the return of the deposit, to interest in respect of the loss of use of the deposit and to the costs of approving and executing the contract, investigating title, preparing the conveyance and of searches.
1 Citers



 
 Hall Brothers Steamship Company Limited v Young; CA 1939 - [1939] 1 KB 748
 
Raza Narayana Gajapatiraju v Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatan (The Indian Case) [1939] AC 302
1939
PC
Lord Collins, Lord Romer
Commonwealth, Land, Damages
Land was to be acquired for anti-malarial works relating to a harbour development. Lord Romer rejected the suggestion in a compulsory purchase valuation that it would be possible to ascertain the potential special value of land to a "special purchaser" by imagining an auction, as being "an entire waste of the arbitrator's imagination". Potentiality should be valued even if the only likely purchaser is the acquiring authority itself.
1 Citers


 
Caxton Publishing v Sutherland Publishing [1939] AC 178; [1938] 4 All ER 389; 108 LJCh 5
1939
HL
Lord Porter
Damages, Torts - Other
The normal measure of damages in conversion is the market value of the goods converted at the date of conversion.
Mere possession is not a conversion. Some act interfering with the true ownrs right must be shown.
1 Citers


 
Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapathiraju v Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam [1939] AC 302; [1939] UKPC 15; [1939] 2 All ER 317
23 Feb 1939
PC
Lord Romer, Lord MacMillan, Sir George Rankin
Land, Damages
Land adjoining a harbour at Vizagapatam which at that time was malarial was to be valued for compulsory purchase. The land contained a spring of clean water. The only potential purchaser of the special adaptability of the land as a water supply was the harbour authority. The High Court valued the land as partly waste and partly cultivated. Held: The appeal was allowed. The market value of land subject to compulsory purchase should include such extra value as might be paid for the facility to collect fresh water which was generated by a spring on the land but which was presently going to waste. The value to be ascertained is not the price a 'driven' buyer would pay to an unwilling seller. Nor should the price be enhanced by the fact that compulsory powers have been obtained for carrying into effect a particular scheme for the profitable use of the subject land's potentiality. The valuation must always be made as though no such powers had been obtained. But the possibility that the acquiring authority, as a willing buyer in a friendly negotiation, might be willing to pay more for land with its potentiality than without was not to be disregarded. That would not be to allow the existence of the scheme to enhance the value of the land: "even where the only possible purchaser of the land's potentiality is the authority that has obtained the compulsory powers, the arbitrator in awarding compensation must ascertain to the best of his ability the price that would be paid by a willing purchaser to a willing vendor of the land with its potentiality in the same way that he would ascertain it in a case where there are several possible purchasers.' The seller should not be regarded as disinclined to sell, nor should the buyer be regarded as under any urgent necessity to buy. 'It must, of course, be conceded that the existence of the scheme must not be allowed to enhance the price, if by "scheme" is meant the fact that compulsory powers of acquisition have been obtained for the purpose of carrying into effect a particular scheme for the profitable use of the potentiality. The valuation must always be made as though no such power had been acquired, and the only use that can be made of the scheme is as evidence that the acquiring authority can properly be regarded as possible purchasers.'
1 Cites

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[ Bailii ]
 
Liffen v Watson 109 LJKB 367; [1940] 1 KB 556; [1940] 2 All ER 213
1940


Damages
After being injured in an accident a domestic servant was unable to continue in her employment in which she received £1 a week wages and board and lodging. After the accident she went to live with her father to whom she made no payment for board and lodging. Held: She was entitled to receive damages, not only in respect of her loss of wages, but also in respect of the board and lodging. The father's kindness in taking his daughter into his house was an extraneous and independent matter and too remote to affect the damages.
1 Citers


 
Saint Line Limited v Richardsons Westgarth and Co. [1940] 2 KB 99
1940

Atkinson J
Contract, Damages
A clause excluding liability for "any indirect or consequential damages or claims whatsoever". A claim was made for for loss of profit. Held: "What does one mean by 'direct damage'? Direct damage is that which flows naturally from the breach without other intervening causes and independently of special circumstances, while indirect damage does not so flow. The breach certainly has brought it about, but only because of some supervening event or some special circumstances unknown to the seller.
In my judgment, the words 'indirect or consequential' do not exclude liability for that which is prima facie recoverable; that is, do not exclude liability for damages which are the direct and natural result of breaches complained of."
1 Citers


 
Davidson v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 316
1940

Hilbery J
Banking, Defamation, Damages
The Plaintiff, a credit bookmaker successfully sued the Bank in libel. The libel proved was writing the words 'not sufficient' on a cheque issued by the Plaintiff when they dishonoured it. He would have had sufficient funds ad the bank followed his instructions to stop an earlier cheque. As applied to cheques, s 49(12) of the 1882 Act required notice of dishonour to be given by the bank within a reasonable time thereafter. Held: Though there was only one cheque Hilbery J thought the effect would have been significant because of the nature of the Plaintiff's business and the speed with which news of dishonour would travel. Hilbery J said damages had to be "a proper sum to be given as a reasonable compensation for the injury which has been done to the plaintiff, and of course it must be sufficient to mark beyond a shadow of doubt the complete lack of justification for making the aspersion which was made by this means on the Plaintiff's credit". He awarded £250.
The bank could not rely on mistake as an occasion of privilege: "you cannot, by making a mistake, create the occasion for making the communication, and what the bank seek to do here is to create an occasion of qualified privilege by making a mistake which called for a communication on their part." No general need was identified which required the engagement of principles of qualified privilege in respect of communication of a notice of dishonour.
Bills of Exchange Act 1882 49(12)
1 Citers


 
United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 4 All ER 20; [1941] AC 1
1940
HL
Lord Romer, Lord Atkin
Torts - Other, Damages
A person whose goods were wrongfully converted by another had a choice of two remedies against the wrongdoer. He could recover damages, in respect of the loss he had sustained by the conversion, or he could recover the proceeds of the conversion obtained by the defendant. It is necessary to distinguish election between remedies from election between rights. The House could hear "ghosts clanking their mediaeval chains."
1 Citers


 
The Gudrun Maersk (1941) 70 LlL Rep 251
1941

Langton J
Transport, Damages
In a collision case there had been a reference to assess damages before the Assistant Registrar and a merchant.£97 10s. was claimed for the wages of an employed superintendent. The Assistant Registrar thought that the superintendent only did "slight extra work" in excess of his ordinary duties. He allowed only £5 5s. Held: On a motion in objection to the report of the Assistant Registrar the court considered that it was impossible to lay down any general principle but the sum allowed was much too small. The superintendent had been put to a very large amount of work outside his normal duties. It was argued that the superintendent was an employee. The court approached the matter by giving the claimants the sum they would have been entitled to if they had put forward a claim properly vouched in respect of extra outside assistance but allowed the wrongdoer some part of the "advantage from the fact that the shipowner has a marine superintendent with special expert knowledge."
1 Citers


 
Foaminol Laboratories Ltd v British Artide Plastics Ltd [1941] 2 All ER 393
1941

Hallett J
Contract, Defamation, Damages
There is no justification for artificially excising from the damages recoverable for breach of contract that part of the financial loss which might or might not be the subject of a successful claim in defamation. A claim for mere loss of reputation is properly for an action for defamation, and cannot ordinarily be sustained by means of any other form of action, but if pecuniary loss can be established, the mere fact that the pecuniary loss is brought about by the loss of reputation caused by a breach of contract is not sufficient to preclude the plaintiffs from recovering in respect of that pecuniary loss.
1 Citers



 
 Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Limited; HL 1941 - 111 LJKB 418; [1942] 1 All ER 657; [1942] AC 601; [1941] 1 KB 519
 
Horn v Sunderland Corporation [1941] 2 KB 26
1941

Scott LJ
Land, Damages
Rule (6) was designed to preserve the effect of the 19th Century case-law under the 1845 Act, by which personal loss caused by the compulsory acquisition was treated as part of the value to the owner of the land: "the owner in a proper case – that is, in a case where he really does incur a loss of money by disturbance due to the taking over and beyond the loss for which he is to be reimbursed in respect of the land taken – is entitled, because it has to do with the land, to have that element of the loss taken into the reckoning of the fair price of the land, as has been held by the Courts from a very early stage." Lord Justice Scott explained the effect of section 68: "There is a third kind [of compensation] given by the [1845] Act, namely by section 68, but that has nothing to do with compulsory acquisition. It is a remedy for injuries caused by the works authorised by the Act to the lands of an owner who has had none of the lands taken in that locality. The remedy is given because Parliament, by authorising the works, has prevented damage caused by them from being actionable, and the compensation is given as a substitute for damages at law." Scott LJ referred to the: “the old sympathetic hypothesis of the unwilling seller and the willing buyer which underlay judicial interpretation of the Act of 1845.”
Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 68
1 Citers



 
 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport; HL 1942 - [1942] AC 691; [1942] 2 All ER 6

 
 Steele v Robert George and Co Ltd; HL 1942 - [1942] AC 497; [1942] 1 All ER 447
 
Bourhill v Young's Executor [1943] AC 92; [1943] SC (HL) 78; 1943 SLT 105; [1942] UKHL 5
5 Aug 1942
HL
Lord MacMillan, Lord Wright, Lord Russell of Killowen
Personal Injury, Damages, Scotland, Negligence
When considering claims for damages for shock, the court only recognised the action lying where the injury by shock was sustained 'through the medium of the eye or the ear without direct contact.' Wright L said: "No doubt, it has long ago been stated and often restated that if the wrong is established the wrongdoer must take the victim as he finds him. That, however, is only true . . on the condition that the wrong has been established or admitted. The question of liability is anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences which go with the liability."
Lord Russell of Killowen: "In considering whether a person owes to another a duty a breach of which will render him liable to that other in damages for negligence, it is material to consider what the defendant ought to have contemplated as a reasonable man. This consideration may play a double role. It is relevant in cases of admitted negligence (where the duty and breach are admitted) to the question of remoteness of damage, ie, to the question of compensation not to culpability, but it is also relevant in testing the existence of a duty as the foundation of the alleged negligence, ie, to the question of culpability not to compensation."
1 Cites

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[ Bailii ]
 
In re the Oropesa [1943] P 32
1943
CA
Lord Wright
Damages, Transport
Two steam vessels collided. One's Master sent fifty of his crew in boats to the other ship and about an hour and a half after the collision decided himself to go to that ship and confer with her Master on measures to be taken. He transferred in another lifeboat, which he embarked with sixteen men. The weather was rough and before the lifeboat could reach the other ship it capsized and sank with nine of the occupants drowning. The badly damaged vessel subsequently sank and its owners sued the owners of the other ship. In addition, the parents of one of the deceased sailors joined as plaintiffs. They recovered against the other shipowners. It was argued that the drowning was not caused by the collision and therefore no liability should ensue. Held: The plea failed: "If the master and the deceased in the present case had done something which was outside the exigencies of the emergency, whether from miscalculation or from error, the plaintiffs would be debarred from saying that a new cause had not intervened. The question is not whether there was new negligence, but whether there was a new cause. I think that is what Lord Sumner emphasized in The Paludina. To break the chain of causation it must be shown that there is something which I will call ultroneous, something unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events, something which can be described as either unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic." They were not prepared to say that in all the circumstances the fact that the deceased's death was due to his leaving the ship in the lifeboat and its unexpected capsizing prevented it from be a direct consequence of the casualty.
1 Citers


 
In re Bradberry [1943] Ch 35
1943


Damages
The parties disputed the date of valuation of an annuity during the course of the administration of an estate. Held: The princple in Bwlfa was applied.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Walter v Alltools (1944) 61 TLR 39
1944

Lawrence LJ
Damages, Torts - Other
The court considered damages to be awarded for false imprisonment: "… any evidence which tends to aggravate or mitigate the damage to a man's reputation which flows naturally from his imprisonment must be admissible up to the moment when damages are assessed. A false imprisonment does not merely affect a man's liberty, it also affects his reputation. The damage continues until it is caused to cease by an avowal that the imprisonment was false."
1 Citers


 
Steel v Glasgow Iron and Steel Co Ltd 1944 SC 237
1944

Lord Justice Clerk Cooper
Scotland, Damages, Negligence
The question was whether the actions of the deceased had broken the chain of causation when he intervened in an attempt to save property. "This rule of the 'reasonable and probable consequence' is a key that opens several locks; for it not only fixes the nature and the measure of the duty to take care, but it may also aid in determining whether the causal nexus is complete and, perhaps, whether the damages claimed are too remote."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Rothwell v Caverswall Stone Co Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 350
1944
CA
duParcq LJ
Negligence, Damages
duParcq LJ set out two propositions: "In my opinion, the following propositions may be formulated upon the authorities as they stand: first, an existing incapacity 'results from' the original injury if it follows, and is caused by, that injury, and may properly be held so to result even if some supervening cause aggravated the effects of the original injury and prolonged the period of incapacity." and: "If, however, the existing incapacity ought fairly to be attributed to a new cause which has intervened and ought no longer to be attributed to the original injury, it may properly be held to result from the new cause and not from the original injury, even though, but for the original injury, there would have been no incapacity."
1 Citers



 
 Richardson v Redpath Brown and Co Ltd; HL 1944 - [1944] AC 62; [1944] 1 All ER 110; 36 BWCC 259

 
 D and L Caterers Ltd v D'Ajou; 1945 - [1945] KB 364
 
Morrison Steamship Co Ltd v Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) [1946] 2 All ER 696; [1947] AC 265; [1947] LJR 297; [1946] 176 LT 66
1946
HL
Lord Porter, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Roche
Negligence, Damages
A ship was damaged in a collision. Though their goods were not damaged, the owners of cargo on the first ship became liable to the owners of the ship for a general average contribution. The owners sued the other ship owners for their negligence. The primary issue was whether the cargo-owners had only a derivative claim arising from an obligation to contribute towards the expenditure of the carrying vessel or whether they had a direct claim against the non-carrying vessel. Held: (Majority) They could recover, even though the damages were a purely financial loss. The House identified an exemption to the general rule.
Lord Porter said: "But it may be said that this is an answer to the contention that the damage is too remote, but does not deal with the allegation that it does not flow from the tortious act but from the contractual relationship between the ship and its cargo. Sir William McNair put this contention in the words " Liability or damage arising from a "contract with a third party gives no ground for a claim for" damages in an action for negligence against a wrongdoer "unless the liability or damage arose from physical injury" to the plaintiff's person or to property owned by or in the "possession of the plaintiff." For this contention there may be much to be said where the person or thing injured was not engaged, as is cargo when being carried in a ship, on a joint adventure. I do not, however, think it applies to such carriage. It is true that general average is not affected by insurance law but the outlook upon the mutual obligation entered into by ship and cargo owners resulting in the undertaking of a common adventure may be illustrated by the fact that whereas in non-marine cases there is no loss unless the thing insured is injured, in marine insurance cases the loss of the adventure constitutes a loss for which underwriters are liable though the cargo itself be safe."
Lord Uthwatt said: "My Lords, under the law of the sea there is recognized a community between ship and cargo that does not obtain between carrier and customer on land. This is shown by two well settled principles. First, if a collision causing damage to cargo occurs, and the carrying ship and the other vessel are both in fault, cargo could under the old law recover only a moiety of the damage and under statute can now only recover a due proportion determined by the degree of blame. That conception finds no place in land carriage, where there would be joint liability for the whole. Secondly, the liability to contribute to general average expenditure is part of the law of the sea. The principle involved in general average contribution is peculiar to the law of the sea and extends only to sea risks. (Cf. Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.) The law of the sea apart, neither at law nor in equity can contribution be obtained on the ground that loss incurred by one person has delivered another from a common danger (see Johnson v. Wild (2)), or that expenditure incurred by one person has incidentally benefited another (cf. Ruabon Steamship Co., Ld. v. London Assurance (3).) Agency is not implied from the circumstances, and there is no equity to claim relief. The sufferer both at law and equity must look to gratitude and not to the courts for his recompense. Under the law of the sea, however, ship and cargo are linked together in the fortunes of the voyage and, in a loose sense, there is in some respects a compulsory partnership between ship and cargo in respect to the venture of sea carriage : Bell's Principles, 9th ed., s. 437 ; Bell's Commentaries, 5th ed., vol. I., p. 534. Section 66 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, aptly refers to the matter as "the common adventure." A breach of the duty to take care involving only damage to the ship may therefore be and in my opinion is a breach of duty owed to cargo."
Lord Roche put it more broadly: "On the other hand, if two lorries A and B are meeting one another on the road, I cannot bring myself to doubt that the driver of lorry A owes a duty to both the owner of lorry B and to the owner of goods then carried in lorry B. Those owners are engaged in a common adventure with or by means of lorry B, and if lorry A is negligently driven and damages lorry B so severely that whilst no damage is done to the goods in it the goods have to be unloaded for the repair of the lorry and then reloaded or carried forward in some other way and the consequent expense is by reason of his contract or otherwise the expense of the goods owner, then in my judgment the goods owner has a direct cause of action to recover such expense. No authority to the contrary was cited and I know of none relating to land transport."
1 Citers


 
Rosenthal v Alderton and Sons Limited [1946] KB 374
1946
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Torts - Other, Damages
The court was asked as to how it should value goods which had disappeared, and where the plaintiff sought damages for their wrongful detention, either as at the date of the detention or as at the date of the judgment. Held: Damages for detinue were to be based on the value of the item at the time of the judgment. Lord Evershed MR said in the course of answering: 'it is further to be noted that the action of detinue was essentially a proprietary action implying property in the plaintiff in the goods claimed', and then a reference is made to Viner's Abridgement vol 8 p23 and Holdsworth, History of English Law vol 7, pp 438 and 439. ' It was, and still is, of the essence of an action of detinue that the plaintiff maintains and asserts his property in the goods claimed.
I think that the rights of the plaintiff as regards these goods were not such as entitled him to bring an action in detinue against the defendant, in whose possession they were, as agent, as the time, of the person in whom the property in the goods was then vested'.
1 Citers


 
British Fame v MacGregor ('The MacGregor') [1943] AC 197; [1943] 1 All ER 33
1947
HL
Viscount Simon, Lord-Chancellor
Damages, Litigation Practice
Two ships had collided. One party sought to appeal the apportionment of damages. Held: The House considered the reluctance of an appellate court to interefere with an apportionment of damages applied by the court at first instance: "It seems to me, my Lords, that the cases must be very exceptional indeed in which an appellate court, while accepting the findings of fact of the court below as to the fixing of blame, none the less has sufficient reason to alter the allocation of blame made by the trial judge. I do not say that there may not be such cases. I apprehend that, if a number of different reasons were given why one ship is to blame, but the Court of Appeal, on examination, found some of those reasons not to be valid, that might have the effect of altering the distribution of the burden. If the trial judge, when distributing blame, could be shown to have misapprehended a vital fact bearing on the matter, that, I think, would be a reason for considering whether a change in the distribution should be made on appeal. But, subject to rare exceptions, I submit to the House that, when findings of fact are not disputed and the conclusion that both vessels are to blame stands, the cases in which an appellate tribunal will undertake to revise the distribution of blame will be rare."
1 Citers



 
 Redpath v Belfast and County Down Railway; CANI 1947 - [1947] NI 167
 
Grant v Sun Shipping Co [1947-1951] CLC 6706
1947


Damages

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
1 Citers


 
Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1947] AC 390
1947


Land, Damages
The amount of interest payable on compulsory purchase of land depends upon the value given to the land and the length of the period from the time of entry until reinstatement, the period during which the claimant is dispossessed. During that time, and possibly thereafter the owner has neither the land nor its value, and he is compensated for non-payment of its value by the award of interest. That is the classic function of such an award.
1 Citers



 
 Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendant of Crown Lands; PC 1947 - [1947] AC 565; (1947) 63 TLR 486
 
The Llanover [1947] P 80
1947

Pilcher J
Transport, Damages
The lost vessel for which the claim was made, was under charter, to the British government in wartime. The war conditions had driven up the need for shipping, and with it the market value of ships. Held: The owner was not awarded damages more than such profit as the vessel would have made if the voyage on which it was engaged at the time of its loss had been completed.
Pilcher J said: "in March, 1942, any British shipowner selling or buying a British ship would do so with the knowledge that his ship would, so long as she was kept efficient, be assured of profitable engagement probably at rates laid down by the Ministry of War Transport. If this were so, it seemed to follow that any enhanced value due to the virtual certainty of profitable employment was already reflected in the prices realized by the sales of comparable ships and was therefore already included in the sum allowed by the assistant registrar" as the going concern value of the vessel.
1 Citers


 
The Llanover [1948] 79 Lloyds LLR 159
1948
CA
Bucknill LJ
Transport, Damages
Bucknill LJ said: "On the undisputed evidence as to the circumstances leading up to the collision, it seems to me that a prima facie case of negligence is made out against the 'Llanover' which she has failed to rebut. Her rebuttal rests on her evidence that her steering gear jammed, which made it impossible for her to keep out of the way. It is not sufficient for a ship to say: 'My steering gear has jammed and therefore I can do nothing.' I think the burden is cast on her of showing that the jamming could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill on her part, or at least that she used all reasonable care and skill to prevent the jamming of the gear, and that it might reasonably have jammed for a cause which they could not have prevented by the exercise of reasonable care and skill."
1 Cites



 
 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 KB 528
 
Hogan v Bentinck West Hartley Collieries (Owners) Ltd [1949] 1 All ER 588
1949
HL
Lord Simonds, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord MacDermott and Lord Reid
Negligence, Damages
The workman plaintiff suffered from a congenital defect, having an extra thumb in his right hand. He met with an industrial accident and fractured the false thumb. It was treated by splinting but he continued to be in pain. He was then sent to the hospital where it was discovered that the fracture had not united. He was advised that an operation was required to remove not just the false thumb, but also the top joint of the normal thumb. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory as it left him with a tender stump which rendered him fit for light work only. The workman applied for compensation on the ground of this incapacity, which applied "Where . . incapacity for work results from the accident" . Held: This later incapacity was not the result of the injury which was caused by the industrial accident.
The question of the effect of a novus actus can only be answered on a consideration of all the circumstances and, in particular, the quality of that later act or event. Questions of causation are pure questions of fact which, if they are to be answered by a judge, must yet be answered by him as an ordinary man.
Medical negligence or inefficiency can be held to amount to a new cause of incapacity in some circumstances.
Lord MacDermott and Lord Reid, dissenting, were of the opinion that in interpreting the words "results from the injury" in the Act, regard ought to had for the social policy of the legislation.
Lord Reid stated that the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that it was bound by authority but he was of the view that the House of Lords, not being bound, ought to change the law as it stood. He said that not only must the new cause come in but the old must go out; there must no longer be any cause or connection between the injury by accident and the present incapacity.
He considered that "grave lack of skill or care on the part of the doctor" would amount to a novus actus interveniens.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ltd [1949] AC 398
1949
HL
Lord Simonds, Lord Reid
Damages, Litigation Practice
The Act required the occupier of a licensed racetrack to take all steps necessary to secure that, so long as a totalisator was being lawfully operated on the track, there was available for bookmakers space on the track where they could conveniently carry on bookmaking in connection with dog races run on the track on that day. Breach of this provision carried a criminal sanction. A bookmaker who contended that he had not been provided with suitable space brought a claim for an injunction and damages against the operator of the track. His claim succeeded in the High Court but not in the Court of Appeal. Held: The bookmaker's appeal failed. There is a general rule of law that where a new statutory obligation is created which at the same time provides a special means of enforcing it, that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. A law which was not intended to create legal rights and duties would be a mere 'pious aspiration'. On a proper construction of the particular statute, there was no parliamentary intention to confer private rights of action on bookmakers at a racetrack: the intended enforcement of rights was by means of criminal prosecution.
Lord Simonds said: "I do not propose to try to formulate any rules by reference to which such a question can infallibly be answered. The only rule which in all circumstances is valid is that the answer must depend upon a consideration of the whole Act and the circumstances, including the pre-existing law in which it was enacted. But that there are indications which point with more or less force to the one answer or the other is clear from authorities which, even where they do not bind, will have great weight with the House. For instance, if a statutory duty is prescribed but no remedy by way of penalty or otherwise for its breach is imposed, it can be assumed that a right of civil action accrues to the person who is damnified by the breach. For if it were not so, the statute would be but a pious aspiration." and "As I have mentioned, sub-contractors experiencing undue delay would be able to enforce performance of the Revenue's duty by an application for judicial review. The absence of a financial remedy for past losses does not deprive the statutory duty of substance."
Lord Reid said: "I find it extremely difficult to reconcile the nature of the provisions of this sub-section with an intention to confer on individual bookmakers rights which each could enforce by civil action. If the legislature had intended to create such rights I would expect to find them capable of reasonably precise definition."
Betting and Lotteries Act 1934 11(2)(b)
1 Citers


 
Workington Harbour and Dock Board v Towerfield (Owners) [1949] P 10
1949
CA
Bucknill LJ
Damages

Pilotage Act 1913 15
1 Citers



 
 Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 KB 291

 
 L Albert and Son v Armstrong Rubber Co; 1949 - (1949) 178 F. 2d 182

 
 Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker A/B; HL 1949 - [1949] AC 196; [1948] UKHL 1; 65 TLR 217; 1949 SC (HL) 1; [1949] AC 196; 1949 SLT 51; (1948-49) 82 Ll L Rep 137; [1949] LJR 772; [1949] 1 All ER 1

 
 Hogan v Bentinck Collieries; HL 1949 - [1949] 1 All ER 588

 
 British Motor Trade Association v Salvadori; 1949 - [1949] Ch 556
 
Power v Central SMT Co Ltd [1949] ScotCS CSIH_4
23 Mar 1949
SCS
Lord Keith
Scotland, Damages
Lord Keith said that the words 'if sued' in the subsection assume that the person from whom the contribution was sought had been: "relevantly, competently and timeously sued; in other words, that all the essential preliminaries to a determination of the other party's liability on the merits have been satisfied."
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 3
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Chandris v Isbrandtsen-Moller Co Inc [1951] KB 240; (1950) 84 Ll LR 347
1950
CA
Devlin J, Tucker LJ
Arbitration, Damages
The court considered whether an arbitrator could award interest in circumstances where section 3 of the 1934 Act expressly conferred such a power on ‘the court’ in proceedings tried in a ‘court of record’. Held: Although section 3(1) of the Act of 1934, by its terms, empowered only courts of record to include interest in sums for which judgment was given for damages or debt, arbitrators were nevertheless empowered by the agreement of reference to apply English law, including so much of that law as is to be found in section 3(1) of the Act of 1934.
Tucker LJ said that he had jurisdiction, not under the 1934 Act, but because the submission to him necessarily gave him implied powers, including implied power to exercise “every right and discretionary remedy given to a court of law”.
Devlin J said: "A rule of construction cannot be more than a guide to enable the court to arrive at the true meaning of the parties."
Devlin J discussed the ejusdem generis rule of interpretation, saying: "Moreover, the main argument of construction which justifies the application of the rule does not apply in commercial documents. It is that if the general words have an unrestricted meaning the enumerated items are surplusage. The presumption against surplusage is of little value in ascertaining the intention of the parties to commercial documents, as many great commercial judges have recognized."
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 3(1)
1 Citers


 
Bailey v Bullock [1950] 2 All ER 1167
1950

Barry J
Damages
The court awarded damages against solicitors for the inconvenience to the plaintiff of having to live in an overcrowded house.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Shearman v Folland; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 KB 43; [1950] 1 All ER 976
 
Payne v Railway Executive [1952] 1 KB 26
1951


Damages
Disablement pensions, whether voluntary or not, are to be ignored in the assessment of damages.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Dooley v Cammell Laird and Co Ltd; 1951 - [1951] 1 Lloyd's Rep 271
 
British Motor Trade Association v Gilbert [1951] 2 All ER 641
1951

Dankwerts J
Contract, Damages
The Association had attempted to control the price of cars in the context of statutory support. It was after the Second World war and new cars were in short supply. Buyers of new cars had to contract not to sell the car bought for two years without first offering it for sale to the plaintiff at a price reflecting the depreciated price as new. The defendant was accused of breaching this term. Held: The contract term was valid. The real value of the car was in fact 100 pounds less than had been paid for it to the defendant. Nevertheless the court awarded pounds 836 in damages. The plaintiff had suffered no direct financial loss but the award of damages for breach of contract would effectively strip the wrongdoer of the profit he had made from his wrongful venture into the black market for new cars. It was appropriate to go to what was described as a surreptitious market that was fed by persons who had broken their covenants.
1 Citers



 
 Stedman v Swan's Tours; CA 1951 - (1951) 95 SJ 727 CA
 
Payne v Railway Executive [1951] 1 All ER 1034
2 Jan 1951

Cohen LJ, Singleton LJ, Birkett LJ
Damages
A Royal Navy sailor was disabled by a railway accident and was awarded a disability pension of £2 16s. 3d. per week. At first instance J Sellers had held that Bradburn's case applied so as to prevent deduction of the value of the pension. If it had been deductible that would have reduced the damages for loss of earnings from £3,000 to £750. Held: The appeal failed. The accident was not the causa causans of the receipt of the pension. Singleton LJ: "If there were no pension rights it is reasonable to assume that the pay would be higher. Why, then, should the pension enure to the benefit of a wrongdoer?" The Minister had power to withhold or reduce the pension.
1 Citers


 
Carslogie Steamship Co Ltd v Royal Norwegian Government [1952] AC 292; [1951] UKHL 4
1952
HL
Viscount Jowitt
Damages
The plaintiff's vessel had been damaged in a collision, and underwent temporary repairs at Port Glasgow. It was certified as authorised "to be confirmed in her present class without fresh record of survey, subject to certain permanent repairs at the owner's convenience" Having sailed for New York on a trading voyage, whether or not she was in ballast, she sustained heavy weather damage which necessitated 30 days of repair time in New York. During 10 days of that period the repairs to the collision damage were also carried out. Held: The claim for loss of use during that 10 day period failed. The vessel was "incapable of gainful use during the 10 days necessary to complete her collision repairs". Viscount Jowitt was willing to assume that the collision was a cause of her detention in New York, but she would have been detained for that period in any event
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Drinkwater v Kimber [1952] 2 QB 281
1952
CA
Morris LJ, Singleton LJ
Damages, Negligence
The female plaintiff had been injured in a collision caused by the concurrent negligence of her husband and the defendant. She could not succeed in a negligence action against her husband, so the defendant could not recover under the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 any contribution to the damages awarded against the defendant to the wife. To overcome this difficulty, by a counter claim against the husband the defendant sought contribution under the Act of 1945. Held: The defendant could not recover under the Act of 1945. That Act gave the defendant no claim against the husband in respect of the wife's injuries and the defendant's liability to the wife was not "damage" suffered by him within the meaning of section 1(1). The Act did not give the defendant a cause of action against the husband; it did not purport to create any new variety of claim; it seemed clear that the word "damage" referred to that which was suffered and for which a "claim" might be made and for which "damages" are recoverable. If the section applied, the court would have to record the total damages which would have been recoverable by the defendant from the husband if the defendant had not been at fault. If the defendant had not been negligent the total damages recoverable would have been nil. To award £135, being the contribution claimed from the husband, would have been "a strange phenomenon of contraction."
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 1(1)
1 Citers


 
Toteff v Antonas (1952) 87 CLR 647
1952

Dixon J
Commonwealth, Damages, Torts - Other
(High Court of Australia) Dixon J said: "In an action of deceit a plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages a sum representing the prejudice or disadvantage he has suffered in consequence of his altering his position under the inducement of the fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendant. When what he has been induced to do is to make a purchase from the defendant and part with his money to him in payment of the price, then, if the transaction stands and is not disaffirmed or rescinded what is recoverable is 'the difference between the real value of the property, and the sum which the plaintiff was induced to give for it' per Abbott L.C.J. Pearson v. Wheeler. As Sir James Hannen P. in Peek v. Perry pointed out, the question is how much worse off is the plaintiff than if he had not entered into the transaction. If he had not done so he would have had the purchase money in his pocket. To ascertain his loss you must deduct from the amount he paid the real value of the thing he got. It may be objected that the point of the application of this doctrine lies in identifying 'the transaction' and that what Mayo J. has done is to identify it as the purchase of the goodwill and that only. But what is meant is the transaction into which the representation induced the plaintiff to enter. The measure of damages in an action of deceit consists in the loss or expenditure incurred by the plaintiff in consequence of the inducement on which he relied diminished by the corresponding advantage in money or moneys worth obtained by him on the other side: Potts v. Miller. You look to what he has been induced to part with as the initial step. He is entitled to say that but for the fraud he would never have parted with his money; per Coleridge L.C.J. Twycross v. Grant. But he cannot recover the entire price he has paid unless the thing prove wholly worthless. If the thing has any appreciable value the damages must be reduced pro tanto: per Cockburn L.C.J., Twycross v. Grant. It must not be forgotten that after all deceit is an action on the case for special damages incurred in consequence of the defendant's fraudulent inducement."
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Attorney General of Ceylon v Mackie [1952] 2 All ER 775
1952
PC
Lord Reid
Company, Damages
The House considered how to value a company. The possibility that a business might be sold as a going concern for a price equal to the net realisable value of the assets employed was envisaged: "If it is proved in a particular case that at the relevant date the business could not have been sold for more than the value of its tangible assets, then that must be taken to be its value as a going concern."
1 Citers


 
Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 2 QB 297
1952
CA
Lord Justice Denning
Damages
Lord Justice Denning said: "It was also said that the damages were the result of the impecuniosity of the sellers and that it was a rule of law that such damages are too remote. I do not think there is any such rule. In the case of a breach of contract, it depends on whether the damages were reasonably foreseeable or not."
1 Citers


 
Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Berisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246
1952


Damages, Torts - Other
The court assessed the amount of damages for the wrongful refusal to deliver up portable switchboards which the owner would not have used anyway. The measure was a sum equivalent to the price or hire that a reasonable person would pay for such use.
1 Citers


 
Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Limited [1952] UKPC 4
24 Mar 1952
PC

Commonwealth, Torts - Other, Damages
Ontario
[ Bailii ]

 
 Otter v Church Adams Tatham and Co; ChD 1953 - [1953] Ch 280

 
 Pilkington v Wood; 1953 - [1953] 1 Ch 770

 
 Griffiths v Evans; CA 1953 - [1953] 2 All ER 1364; [1953] 1 WLR 1424

 
 Harris v Brights Asphalt Contractors Ltd; 1953 - [1953] 1 QB 617
 
Littlewood and George Wimpey and Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation [1953] 2 QB 501; [1953] 2 All ER 915; [1953] 3 WLR 553
1953
CA
Singleton LJ
Limitation, Damages
The words "liable to pay" in s 3 carried their usual meaning as "responsible in law".
1 Citers



 
 Harper v GN Haden and Sons; CA 1953 - [1933] Ch 298

 
 Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd; HL 25-Jun-1953 - [1953] AC 663; [1953] UKHL 4; [1953] 2 All ER 478; [1953] 3 WLR 279

 
 Cullinane v British "Rema" Manufacturing Co Ltd; CA 1954 - [1954] 1 QB 292
 
Wimpey (George) Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation [1955] AC 169; [1954] 3 WLR 932; [1954] 3 All ER 661
1954
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Viscount Simonds, Lord Porter
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other, Damages, Limitation
A joint tortfeasor could escape liability in contribution proceedings if it had been unsuccessfully sued by the injured person in an action brought outside the relevant limitation period. Where a court has to decide between two competing cases, if the arguments are fairly evenly balanced that interpretation should be chosen which involves the least alteration of the existing law.
An employee of BOAC, had been injured in a collision between a vehicle owned by BOAC and another owned by Wimpey. He sued Wimpey, who now claimed a contribution against BOAC. The claimant later joined BOAC, but outside a special one year limitation period under the 1939 Act. The judge had found BOAC one third liable, but that they then escaped liability, the claim against them being time barred. At the Court of Appeal LLJ Denning and Singleton compared the situation with that of co-sureties, and that a six year period applied. Held: The decision and discussion was limited firmly to the point of statutory construction under section 6(1)(c) of the 1935 Act.
Viscount Simonds: "My Lords, at the hearing of the action and of the appeal two questions were raised, upon which there was no argument before your Lordships, the first as to the date upon which Wimpeys' right to contribution arose and the second as to the period of limitation in respect of a claim for contribution against a public authority under section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1939. I am content to assume that the right to contribution arose at any rate not earlier than the date when the existence and amount of Wimpeys' liability to Littlewood was ascertained by judgment and that the relevant period of limitation was six years." The concept of being "held liable" by a judgment for the purpose of setting time running in a claim for contribution involved the ascertainment of the quantum of the liability.
Lord Porter: "The quantum having been determined, the only question is: can the party against whom judgment has been given recover contribution from the other who was in part the cause of the injury?" and "Substantially, their view was that Wimpeys were under no liability until judgment was given against them, that their cause of action arose then and not until then, and accordingly their cause of action against B.O.A.C. arose at that date. I need not, I think, set out the authorities and reasoning upon which these opinions are founded except to refer to such cases as Wolmershausen v. Gullick and Robinson v. Harkin, both of which were claims to contribution between co-sureties, and M'Gillivray v. Hope, which was a claim involving the right of present and former employers to contribution inter se in respect of damages awarded to a workman employed by them consecutively.
If this view be true, Wimpeys' liability did not come into existence until judgment had been given against them, and therefore they had whatever was the appropriate period of limitation from that date. What that appropriate period may be – whether it is a year because B.O.A.C. is a public authority and the action is brought in respect of any act, neglect or default or whether it is six years, because the claim is not in respect of any act, neglect or default, but for contribution – is immaterial in the present case inasmuch as Wimpeys made their claim to contribution in the original action before judgment was given."
Lord Keith of Avonholm: "My Lords, your Lordships are not now concerned with a question which was considered in the courts below, namely, when the cause of action in the claim for contribution accrued. It is conceded, in conformity with the view taken by the Court of Appeal, that the cause of action accrued at earliest at the date when judgment was given in favour of Littlewood against the appellants."
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 - Limitation Act 1939 21
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Peacock v Amusement Equipment Co Ltd [1954] 3 WLR 288; [1954] 2 QB 347; [1954] 2 All ER 689
1954
CA
Somervell LJ
Damages
The deceased received fatal injuries riding a miniature railway. The plaintiff, her surving husband, sought damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts. Her estate included a grocery shop with a flat, in which she and the plaintiff resided. She left the property to a son and married daughter by a previous marriage, who after administration sold the business and voluntarily paid to the plaintiff a sum approximately one-third of the value of the estate. Held: The generosity of the beneficiaries under the will to make a voluntary gift to the plaintiff was a "nova causa interveniens which makes the payment not in consequence or as a result of the death within the meaning of the statements which have been made with regard to this problem." The payment did not therefore fall to be deducted from the damages.
1 Citers


 
Bellgrove v Eldridge (1954) 90 CLR 613
1954


Damages, Commonwealth, Construction
High Court of Australia. The builder built a house with defective foundations, as a result of which the house was unstable. The building owner brought an action against the builder claiming the cost of reinstatement. Held: His claim succeeded on the facts.
The court approved the rule as stated in Hudson on Building Contracts that: "The measure of the damages recoverable by the building owner for the breach of a building contract is . . the difference between the contract price of the work or building contracted for and the cost of making the work or building conform to the contract" as to the case law: "In none of these cases is anything more done than that work which is required to achieve conformity and the cost of the work, whether it be necessary to replace only a small part, or a substantial part, or, indeed, the whole of the building is, subject to the qualification which we have already mentioned and to which we shall refer, together with any appropriate consequential damages, the extent of the building owner's loss. The qualification, however, to which this rule is subject is that, not only must the work undertaken be necessary to produce conformity, but that also, it must be a reasonable course to adopt."
The cost of reinstatement work subject to the qualification of reasonableness was the extent of the loss. Reasonableness was a factor to be considered in determining what was that loss rather than, as had been argued, merely a factor in determining which of two alternative remedies were appropriate for a loss once established.
The land owner, having contracted for a building, is, as a general rule, entitled to have a building which conforms with the contract plans, the High Court continued: "The qualification, however, to which this rule is subject is that, not only must the work undertaken be necessary to produce conformity, but that also, it must be a reasonable course to adopt. No one would doubt that where pursuant to a building contract calling for the erection of a house with cement rendered external walls of second-hand bricks, the builder has constructed the walls of new bricks of first quality the owner would not be entitled to the cost of demolishing the walls and re-erecting them in second-hand bricks. In such circumstances the work of demolition and re-erection would be quite unreasonable or it would, to use a term current in the United States, constitute "economic waste" . . We prefer, however, to think that the building owner's right to undertake remedial works at the expense of a builder is not subject to any limit other than is to be found in the expressions "necessary" and "reasonable", for the expression "economic waste" appears to us to go too far and would deny to a building owner the right to demolish a structure which, though satisfactory as a structure of a particular type, is quite different in character from that called for by the contract. Many examples may, of course, be given of remedial work, which though necessary to produce conformity would not constitute a reasonable method of dealing with the situation and in such cases the true measure of the building owner's loss will be the diminution in value, if any, produced by the departure from the plans and specifications or by the defective workmanship or materials. As to what remedial work is both "necessary" and "reasonable" in any particular case is a question of fact."
1 Citers



 
 Dean v Prince; CA 1954 - [1954] 1 All ER 749; [1954] Ch 409
 
Burgess v Florence Nightingale Hospital [1955] 1 All ER 511
1955

Devlin J
Damages
Damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts should be awarded "for what the child lost by the wife's death, both in respect of the school fees and of what she might have done for the child".
1 Citers



 
 British Transport Commission v Gourley; HL 1955 - [1956] AC 185; [1955] 3 All ER 796; [1956] 2 WLR 41; [1955] UKHL 4
 
Lambe v Secretary of State for War [1955] 2 QB 612
1955
CA

Land, Damages
The acquiring authority was a sitting tenant and the compulsory purchase order related to the freehold reversion. Held: Rule 3 was inapplicable. The marriage value which a reversion has for a sitting tenant does not clothe the land with a special suitability within that rule. The court decided that the correct measure of value was the price the acquiring authority, in the course of Lord Romer's friendly negotiation, would have been willing to pay for the reversion if it had no compulsory powers. This included the marriage value.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Tool Metal Manufactuing Company Ltd v Tungsten Electric Company Ltd; HL 16-Jun-1955 - [1955] UKHL 5; [1955] 1 WLR 761; [1955] 2 All ER 657
 
Philips v Ward [1956] 1 WLR 471; [1956] 1 All ER 874
1956
CA
Denning, Morris and Romer LJJ
Damages
The Plaintiff had relied on a negligent survey to purchase a substantial Elizabethan property and land. The report did not mention that the timbers of the house were badly affected by death watch beetle and worm so that the only course left to him was to replace the roof and to rebuild the timbers etc. The market value was £21,000. After moving in further work was found to be required at £1,000 to put the property into the condition in which it had been described in the report. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, the cost of repairs ruling at the date of trial. The Official Referee awarded £4,000, namely the difference between the value of the property as it should have been described and its value as described. Held: The proper measure of damages was the difference in money between the value of the property in the condition described and its value as it should have been described, namely £4,000.
Denning LJ said: "I take it to be clear law that the proper measure of damage is the amount of money which will put Mr. Philips into as good a position as if the surveying contract had been properly fulfilled: see British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. [1912] A.C. 673, 689, per Lord Haldane L.C. Now if [the surveyor] had carried out his contract, he would have reported the bad state of the timbers. On receiving that report, Mr. Philips would either have refused to have anything to do with the house - in which case he would have suffered no damage - or he would have bought it for a sum which represented its fair value in its bad condition - in which case he would pay so much less on that account. The proper measure of damages is therefore the difference between the value in its assumed good condition and the value in the bad condition which should have been reported to the client.
We were referred to the cases where a house is damaged or destroyed by the fault of a tortfeasor. These cases are, I think, different. If the injured person reasonably goes to the expense of repairing the house, the tortfeasor may well be bound to pay the cost of repair, less an allowance because new work takes the place of old: see Lukin v. Godsall (1795) Peake Add.Cas. 15 and Hide v. Thornborough (1846) 2 Car. & Kir. 250. In other cases, the tortfeasor may only have to pay the value of the house: see Moss v. Christchurch Rural District Council [1925] 2 K.B. 750. It all depends on the circumstances of the case: see Murphy v. The County Council of Wexford [1921] 2 Ir.R. 230. The general rule is that the injured person is to be fairly compensated for the damage he has sustained, neither more nor less." and
"So also in this action, if Mr. Philips were to recover from the surveyor the sum of £7,000, it would mean that Mr. Philips would get for £18,000 (£25,000 paid less £7,000 received) a house and land which were worth £21,000. That cannot be right. The proper amount for him to recover is £4,000." and
"The general principle of English law is that damages must be assessed as at the date when the damage occurs, which is usually the same day as the cause of action arises.
A fall thereafter in the value of money does not in law affect the figure, for the simple reason that sterling is taken to be constant in value".
Morris LJ said: "In my judgment, the damages to be assessed were such as could fairly and reasonably be considered as resulting naturally from the failure of the defendant to report as he should have done. ... It is said ... that [the Official Referee] was not warranted in proceeding on the basis ... of the difference between the value of the property as it was described in the defendant's report and its value as it should have been described. In my view, however, that was the correct basis on the facts of this case."
Romer LJ: "It may well be that if, on learning of the real condition of the house, he had decided to leave and resell, he would have been entitled to recover from the defendant, in addition to the £4,000, his costs and expenses of moving in and moving out and of the resale. As, however, he elected to stay, after all the facts had become known to him, this point does not arise."
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Phillips v Ward [1956] 1 WLR 471; [1956] 1 All ER 874
1956
CA
Denning LJ
Damages, Professional Negligence
A negligent survey had been provided to prospective purchasers of a house. It would have cost £7,000 to put the property into the condition in which it had been described in the report. Held: The correct measure of damages was not £7,000 but £4,000. The latter figure represented the difference between the value of the property as it should have been described at the time of its acquisition and its value as described.
Denning LJ stated that: "The general principle of English law is that damages must be assessed at the date when the damage occurred, which is usually the same day as the cause of action arises . . " and "The proper measure of damages is . . the difference between the value in its assumed good condition and the value in the bad condition which should have been reported to the client."
1 Citers


 
Monmouthshire County Council v Smith [1956] 2 All ER 800; [1956] 1 WLR 1132
1956

Lynskey J
Damages
The court considered whether a police pension which became payable on early retirement through injury was deductible from damages awarded for the injury. Held: Yes.
1 Citers


 
Lee v Sheard [1956] 1 QB 192
1956
CA
Denning LJ
Personal Injury, Damages, Company
The negligence of a car driver resulted in an injury to the plaintiff who was one of two directors and shareholders of a limited company and did outside work of buying and selling linen goods for it. As a consequence of the accident the plaintiff was unable for a time to do his work for the company, its profits were lower than they would otherwise have been and he received £1,500 less from it than he would otherwise have done. Held: The awrd of £1,500 for the reduction in his earnings through the shareholding. The company could not have claimed for the same loss.
1 Citers


 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hambrook [1956] 2 QB 641
1956


Damages
The Revenue claimed for loss resulting from its being deprived of the services of a taxing officer due to a vehicle accident. Held: The action was dismissed. An action for that kind of loss did not lie where its relationship was with an established civil servant.
1 Citers



 
 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw; HL 1-Mar-1956 - [1956] 1 All ER 615 HL(Sc); [1956] 2 WLR 707; [1956] AC 613; 1956 SC (HL) 26; [1956] UKHL 1
 
Cavanagh v London Transport Executive Times, 23 October 1956
23 Oct 1956

Devlin J
Personal Injury, Damages
The deceased stepped onto the road just behind a taxi cab which was stationary or just drawing up. He neither saw nor heard an approaching number bus and walked directly into its path. He suffered a fractured skull. There was evidence that his mental processes became grossly abnormal. Some sixteen months after the accident he committed suicide. Held: The court was satisfied that "an irrational state of mind arising from his head injuries was a cause, if not the main cause, of his suicide." The judge "would, if necessary, hold that the plaintiff (the widow of the deceased) had discharged the burden of causation upon her and that the financial worry did not amount to a novus actus. But if, looked at independently of its origins it would amount to a novus actus, he was satisfied that the deceased's financial position in January, 1955, could be traced back to the accident."
1 Citers


 
Feldman v Allways Travel Service [1957] CLY 934
1957

Judge Alun Pugh
Contract, Damages
The claimant sought damages after a disappointing holiday. Held: Such damages were capable of being awarded.
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 McAuley v London Transport Executive; CA 1957 - [1957] 2 Lloyds Rep 500
 
Monmouthshire County Council v Smith [1957] 1 All ER 78; [1957] 2 QB 154; [1957] 2 WLR 33
1957
CA

Damages
Whether a pension is to be deducted from damages awarded for personal injury.
1 Cites

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Metropolitan Police District Receiver v Croydon Corporation [1957] 1 All ER 78; [1957] 2 QB 154; [1957] 2 WLR 33; 121 JP 63
1957

Lord Goddard CJ
Damages, Employment
Where an employer is under a statutory obligation to pay wages whether the employee is fit for duty or not, the law is that the employee has suffered no loss and can recover no damages, and where the plaintiff continues to be paid these sums, they fall to be deducted from damages for loss of earnings.
1 Cites

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 Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry and Engineering Co Ltd; HL 1957 - [1957] 1 WLR 613; [1957] 1 All ER 776
 
West Suffolk County Council v W Rought Ltd [1957] AC 403
1957
HL

Damages
The principle in Gourley v BTC was applicable to compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land used in a trade or business in a case where it was accepted that the compensation would not be taxable in the owner's hands.
1 Cites


 
Ideal General Supply Co Ltd v Louis Edelson and Edelson (t/a Ideal Clothing Co) [1957] RPC 252
1957

Diplock J
Jurisdiction, Estoppel, Defamation, Damages
The plaintiff had started an action for passing off and slander in the county court. The county court judge declined jurisdiction on the basis he thought they were equity proceedings and the claimant withdrew the proceedings and started again in the High Court. The question was whether this created an estoppel Held: It did not. Diplock J expressed no opinion on the view of the county court judge that he had no jurisdiction. Diplock J refused to award any damages because the plaintiff managed to put an end to the defendant’s passing-off by an injunction after 4 advertisements in a local evening newspaper and the plaintiff had suffered no damage at all. He was prepared to grant injunctive relief in respect of probable damage which would occur if the defendants continued their conduct.

 
Charter v Sullivan [1957] EWCA Civ 2; [1957] 2 QB 117; [1957] 2 WLR 528; [1957] 1 All ER 809
25 Feb 1957
CA
Jenkins, Hodson, Sellers LJJ
Damages

1 Citers

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Feldman v Always Travel Unreported, October 15 1957
15 Oct 1957

Alan Pugh Judge
Damages, Contract, Consumer
The plaintiff complained that the holiday he had booked had been altered by the operator in several ways which inconvenienced and distressed him. Held: The correct measure of damages was the difference between the amount he paid and the value of what had in fact been furnished, allowing for his feelings of annoyance and frustration.

 
Re Jarvis [1958] 1 WLR 815
1958

Upjohn J
Damages
An executrix ran a business which had been left to her and her sister. Held: She was accountable in principle for profit, though the claim failed for other reasons: "What, then, is the proper method of assessing the accountability? Counsel for the defendant submits that one must look to see what is pleaded and what has been proved at the trial. One must then take those assets of the estate, or the benefits which have been so pleaded and proved at the hearing to have flowed to the defendant by reason of her position as a trustee of the estate, and value those benefits. Counsel for the plaintiff says, on the other hand, that that would be an impossible inquiry and that one must make the defendant accountable for the whole business and its profits, making allowances for the time, energy and skill that the defendant has expended, the assets she has brought in, the testator's debts that she has paid, and, of course, her mother's annuity." there was no general rule, save that a trustee may not make a profit out of his trust. It all depended on the facts. On the facts, he held that the executrix had reincarnated the testator's own business, and hence the second method of framing the account was the correct one.
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Goulandris Bros v Goldmann and Sons [1958] 1 QB 74
1958

Pearson J
Transport, Damages
An insurance clause ensuring "loss or damage in connexion with the goods" under the Hague Rules for carriage of goods by sea includes economic loss even in the absence of such physical damage.
1 Citers


 
Cowan v National Coal Board 1958 SLT 19
1958

Lord Cameron
Negligence, Damages
An employee of the defenders suffered an injury to his eye in the course of his employment. He became nervous and depressed and committed suicide about four months after the accident. His widow and children sought damages from the National Coal Board for his death. Held: The House assoilized the defenders on the ground that the employee's suicide was not reasonably foreseeable.
Lord Cameron: "I think that the true test of whether the death of the deceased was caused by the negligence of the defenders is whether the death naturally and directly arose out of the supposed wrong done to him and was therefore such a consequence as might reasonably be supposed to have been in the view of the wrongdoer. This introduces the idea of foreseeability, but it is the foreseeability of the 'reasonable man' - an impersonal test and one not dependent on the actual wrongdoer's own capacity for foresight." and "Now in the present case if it were held to be established that the deceased had received a comparatively moderate injury through the negligence of the defenders and had thereafter had become depressed and worried because of fear for his future working capacity or physical health and then had committed suicide under the influence of such depression and worry no doubt it might be inferred that the suicide was consequent upon that injury and the result of it, in the sense that but for the injury the suicide would in all probability not have occurred, but it does not follow that such a result could properly be described in the ordinary course of language as the 'natural and direct' result of the initial injury so as to make the delinquent liable in damages to the dependents of the deceased for the suicide. In the present case not only is there no proof of injury to the skull or brain but there is no physical connection between the initial injury (assuming it to have been caused by the defender's negligence and the assumed suicide."
1 Cites

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 National Coal Board v Galley; CA 1958 - [1958] 1 WLR 16; [1958] 1 All ER 91
 
Harvey v R.G.O'Dell Ltd [1958] 2 QB 78
1958


Limitation, Damages

1 Citers



 
 Phipps v Orthodox Unit Trusts Limited; CA 1958 - [1958] 1 QB 314
 
Kuchenmeister v Home Office [1958] 1 QB 496
1958
QBD
Barry J
Torts - Other, Damages
The plaintiff, a German national landed at Heathrow airport en route to Dublin. The immigration officers, instead of refusing him leave to land (as they had been instructed to do), detained him at the airport until it was too late for him to catch the Dublin flight. They might have had other powers to detain him, but had wrongly acted under the 1953 Order which gave no such power. Held: He had been wrongfully imprisoned. The immigration officers had no power to detain the claimant in such a way as to prevent his transiting from one aircraft to another The right of liberty is a precious right entitled to protection. Barry J said: "His liberty was restricted to a greater degree than the immigration authorities were entitled to restrict it under [the particular power they sought to rely upon]. The fact that they might have restricted his mobility by employing the powers conferred upon them by other articles of the Order seems to me to be immaterial. It is no answer, when a man says 'I have been unlawfully arrested without a warrant,' to say 'Well, had I (the person making the arrest) taken the trouble to go and ask for a warrant, I would undoubtedly have got it.' That would be no answer to a claim for unlawful arrest. Similarly here, although the [immigration officers] could have detained the plaintiff by refusing him leave to land, that does not entitle them to detain him on the grounds on which they did."
The judge awarded damages of £150 even though "no pecuniary damage [had] been suffered" on the basis that it was "a fair figure which will vindicate the plaintiff's rights without amounting to a vindictive award".
Aliens Order 1953 2(1)(b)
1 Citers



 
 Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association; CA 1958 - [1958] 1 WLR 563; [1958] 2 All ER 241
 
Mouat v Betts Motors Ltd [1959] AC 71; [1958] UKPC 23; [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep 321
20 Oct 1958
PC
Lord Denning
Damages
When setting a level of damages, a price on a surreptitious market should be used, if that gave the correct measure of the loss.
1 Cites

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[ Bailii ]
 
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