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Damages - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 69 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Ruabon Steamship Co v The London Assurance Co [1900] AC 61
1900

Lord Halisbury
Contract, Damages
Lord Halisbury said: "I cannot understand how it can be asserted that it is part of the common law that where one person gets some advantage from the act of another, a right of contribution towards the expense from that act arises." Rejecting the argument, he continued: "But this is the first time in which it has sought to advance that principle where there is nothing in common between the two persons, except that one person has taken advantage of something that another person has done, there being no contract between them, there being no obligation by which each of them is bound, and the duty to contribute is alleged to arise only on some general principle of justice, that a man ought not to get an advantage unless he pays for it. So that if a man were to cut down a wood which obscured his neighbour's prospect and gave him a better view, he ought in principle to be compelled to contribute to cutting down the wood."
1 Citers


 
The Owners of the Steamship Mediana v The Owners, Master and Crew of the Lightship Comet [1900] AC 113
1900
HL
Lord Halsbury LC
Damages
A lightship was damaged by negligence. The plaintiff harbour board kept a ship ready for emergencies, and consequently the damaged ship was replaced with the spare while she was being repaired. The question was whether the claimant could recover damages for the temporary loss of the damaged ship. Held: A claim for loss of use will (at least potentially) lie whenever a chattel is damaged: "where by the wrongful act of one man something belonging to another is either itself so injured as not to be capable of being used or is taken away so that it cannot be used at all, that of itself is a ground for damages . . the broad principle seems to me to be quite independent of the particular use the plaintiffs were going to make of the thing that was taken, except – and this I think has been the fallacy running through the arguments at the bar – when you are endeavouring to establish the specific loss of profit, or of something that you otherwise would have got which the law recognises as special damage".
The House explained the award of nominal damages: "'Nominal damages' is a technical phrase which means that you have negatived anything like real damage, but that you are affirming by your nominal damages that there is an infraction of a legal right which, though it gives you no right to any real damages at all, yet gives you a right to the verdict or judgment because your legal right has been infringed."
Lord Halsbury LC said ""Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case: how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. In truth, I think it would be very arguable to say that a person would be entitled to no damages for such things. What manly mind cares about pain and suffering that is past? But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given.
Now, in the particular case before us, apart from a circumstance which I will refer to immediately, the broad proposition seems to me to be that by a wrongful act of the defendants the plaintiffs were deprived of their vessel. When I say deprived of their vessel, I will not use the phrase "the use of the vessel." What right has a wrongdoer to consider what use you are going to make of your vessel? Here, as I say, the broad principle seems to me to be quite independent of the particular use the plaintiffs were going to make of the thing that was taken." Lord Halsbury gave an example of using his own chair: "Supposing a person took away a chair out of my room and kept it for twelve months, could anybody say you had a right to diminish the damages by showing I did not usually sit in that chair, or that there were plenty of other chairs in the room? The proposition so nakedly stated appears to me to be absurd… what an arbitrator or jury very often do is to take a perfectly artificial hypothesis and say "well if you wanted a chair, what would you have to give for it for the period"; and in that way they come to a rough sort of conclusion as to what damages ought to be paid for the unjust and unlawful withdrawal of it from the owner. Here, as I say, the broad principle seems to me to be quite independent of the particular use the plaintiffs were going to make of the thing that was taken, except… when you are endeavouring to establish the specific loss of profit, or of something that you would otherwise have got which the law recognises as special damages. In that case you must show it and by precise evidence… But when we are speaking of general damages no such principle applies at all, and the jury might give whatever they thought would be the proper equivalent for the unlawful withdrawal of the subject matter then in question."
1 Citers


 
Credit Lyonnais v George Stevenson and Co Ltd (1901) 9 SLT 93
1901

Lord Kyllachy
Damages, Scotland
Lord Kyllachy explained the relationship between a claim and a defence in the law of unjustified enrichment: "The money in question was paid in error under a mistake of fact. It was therefore reclaimable, unless (the pursuer's remedy being equitable) there was an equitable defence to repetition."
1 Citers


 
Dulieu v White and Sons [1901] 2 KB 669
1901
KBD
Phillimore J, Kennedy J
Torts - Other, Damages
A pregnant barmaid suffered nervous shock causing her to give premature birth as a result of the tortfeasor's horse van bursting into her bar at the Bonner Arms in Bethnal Green from the roadway. The defendant pleaded that the damages claimed were too remote. Held: In principle "terror wrongfully induced and inducing physical mischief gives a cause of action." The plaintiff could recover in respect of the physical consequences of 'nervous shock' caused by reason of "reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself".
Kennedy J considered the argument that fright, where physical injury is directly produced by it, cannot be a ground of action merely because of the absence of any accompanying impact, to be "both unreasonable and contrary to the weight of authority." The argument was unreasonable and contrary to the weight of authority, but he limited the type of shock for which damages were recoverable to that suffered from fear for oneself only: "The shock, where it operates through the mind, must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself."
1 Cites

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Cooper v Caledonian Railway Co (1902) 4 F 880
1902


Damages, Negligence
Recovery of damages for psychiatric injury.
1 Cites



 
 Bwllfa and Merthyr Dare Steam Collieries (1891) Ltd v Pontypridd Waterworks Co; HL 1903 - [1903] AC 426
 
In re Gough and Aspatria, Silloth and District Joint Water Board [1903] 1 KB 574
1903

Wright J
Land, Damages
On assessment of value for a compulsory purchase of land for a reservoir, if the site had 'peculiar natural advantages' for the supply of water that could be taken into account, but 'there is no value for which compensation ought to be given on this head if the value is created or enhanced simply by the Act or by the scheme of the promoters' .
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Cowper v Laidler [1903] 2 Ch 337
1903
ChD
Buckley J
Land, Damages
Buckley J said: "The court has affirmed over and over again that the jurisdiction to give damages where it exists is not so to be used as in fact to enable the defendant to purchase from the plaintiff against his will his legal right to the easement."
1 Citers


 
Broome v Speak [1903] 1 Ch 586
1903


Damages

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 McConnel v Wright; CA 1903 - [1903] 1 Ch 546
 
The Harmonides [1903] P 1
1903

Gorell Barnes J
Damages
The measure of damages for the loss of a profitable ship is to include its economic value: "So that the real test, where there is no market is, as counsel on both sides agree, what is the value to the owners as a going concern, at the time the vessel was sunk? You cannot get at this with any great certainty, for you cannot get at it from the market value. Possibly, for such a ship at such a time there would be no buyers and she would have to be sold for old iron. You cannot deal with it like an ordinary commodity being sold every day. You must look at it and see what is the loss to the owners. It has been pointed out that you may look at the original cost, plus the money expended on her, and so forth. That is of assistance, but it is not complete assistance, because it is a rough, and ready method. You may look and see also how the ship is paying. That, however, is not a complete test, because you cannot be sure that the way she has been paying will continue. But one tiling is absolutely certain - you cannot say the test is per market value."
1 Citers


 
Smith v Giddy [1904] 2 KB 448
1904


Nuisance, Damages
Damage was caused to the plaintiff’s fruit trees by trees from the defendant’s premises overhanging his. Held: The plaintiff was not confined to his remedy of cutting the offending trees; he could claim damages.

 
Shepheard v Broome [1904] AC 342
1904


Damages

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Johnson v The King [1904] AC 817
1904


Damages

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Clippens Oil Co v Edinburgh and District Water Trustees; HL 1907 - [1907] AC 291
 
Black and Others v The North British Railway Company [1907] 15 SLT 840
1907

Lord President Dunedin
Scotland, Damages
The widow and children of man who had been killed while travelling as a passenger on one of their trains claimed damages against the railway company. A court of seven judges was asked to lay down the principles on which on which damages should be assessed under the head of solatium. For the pursuers it was contended that they should be found entitled to enhanced damages if they were able to show that the accident was caused by gross negligence. Held: The argument was rejected. There was no authority for any distinction between damages and exemplary damages in the law of Scotland
1 Citers


 
Lodge Holes Colliery Company v Wednesbury Corporation [1908] AC 323
1908
HL
Lord Loreburn LC
Damages
Lord Loreburn LC said: "Now I think a Court of Justice ought to be very slow in countenancing any attempt by a wrong-doer to make captious objections to the methods by which those whom he has injured have sought to repair the injury. When a road is let down or land let down, those entitled to have it repaired find themselves saddled with a business which they did not seek, and for which they are not to blame. Errors of judgment may be committed in this as in other affairs of life. It would be intolerable if persons so situated could be called to account by the wrong-doer in a minute scrutiny of the expense, as though they were his agents, for any mistake or miscalculation, provided they act honestly and reasonably. In judging whether they have acted reasonably, I think a Court should be very indulgent and always bear in mind who was to blame."
1 Citers


 
In re Lucas and Chesterfield Gas and Water Board [1909] 1 KB 16
1909
CA
Fletcher Moulton LJ, Vaughan Williams LJ
Land, Damages
Land suitable for construction of a reservoir was the subject of a compulsory purchase for that purpose. The circumstances made it very unlikely that anyone other than the Water Board would have wanted, or been able, to construct the reservoir and exploit the water collected in it. In these circumstances, and bearing in mind the "value to the owner" principle, could the site's suitability for use as a reservoir enhance its value to the owner for which the Water Board should pay? Held: When assessing compensation on the compulsory purchase of land, the value to the owner, as distinct from the value to the purchaser, is 'to be estimated as it stood before the grant of the compulsory powers'. This was an absolute rule. 'The owner is only to receive compensation based upon the market value of his lands as they stood before the scheme was authorized by which they are put to public uses.' Where the special adaptability of land gives the land a special value which exists only for a particular purchaser with compulsory powers, that value cannot be taken into consideration when fixing the price. It is otherwise where the special value exists also for other possible purchasers so as to create a real though limited market for that special value.
Fletcher Moulton LJ had a restrictive approach: “The scheme which authorises the new reservoir only entitles the owner of the land to receive as compensation the value of the land unenhanced by that scheme, and, unless its situation and peculiarities create a market for it as a reservoir site for which other possible bidders exist, I do not think that the single possible purchaser that has obtained parliamentary powers can be made to pay a price based on special suitability merely by reason of the fact that it was easy to foresee that the situation of the land would lead to compulsory powers being some day obtained to purchase it.”
1 Citers



 
 Addis v Gramophone Company Limited; HL 26-Jul-1909 - [1909] AC 488; [1909] UKHL 1

 
 Meters Limited v Metropolitan Gas Meters Limited; ChD 1910 - (1910) 27 RPC 721

 
 E Hulton and Co v Jones; HL 1910 - [1910] AC 20; [1908-1910] All ER Rep 29; 79 LJKB 198; [1909] 2 KB 444; [1908-10] All ER 29; [1910] AC 20
 
Sally Wertheim v The Chicoutimi Pulp Company [1911] AC 301; [1910] UKPC 1
18 Mar 1910
PC
Lord Macnaghten, Lord Atkinson, Lord Collins, Lord Shaw
Damages, Commonwealth
The buyer sought damages for late delivery of goods calculated on the difference between the market price at the place of delivery when the goods should have been delivered and the market price there when the goods were in fact delivered. If successful, he would have recovered rather more than if the contract had not been broken. Held: The governing purpose of damages is to put the party whose rights have been violated in the same position, so far as money can do so, as if his rights had been observed. An award of damages for breach of contract should not put the claimant in a better position than he would have been in had the contract been performed.
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[ Bailii ]

 
 Meters Limited v Metropolitan Gas Meters Limited; CA 1911 - (1911) 28 RPC 157

 
 Chaplin v Hicks; CA 1911 - (1911) 27 TLR 244; [1911] 2 KB 786; [1911-13] All ER 224; 80 LJKB 1292
 
British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co v Underground Electric Railways Co (London) Limited [1912] AC 673; [1911-13] All ER Rep 63; 81 LJKB 1132
1912
HL
Viscount Haldane LC
Damages, Contract
The plaintiffs purchased turbines from the defendants. They proved defective, and the plaintiffs sought damages. In the meantime they purchased replacements, more effective than the original specifications. In the result the railway company obtained benefits over and above their contractual entitlement. Additional benefits obtained as a result of taking reasonable steps to mitigate loss were to be brought into account in the calculation of damages. It was necessary to balance loss against gain when the amount of the damages was being calculated. The House distinguished cases in which the plaintiff had received benefits which "did not arise out of the transactions the subject-matter of the contract." These were res inter alios acta. But where -"the person whose contract was broken took a reasonable and prudent course quite naturally arising out of the circumstances in which he was placed by the breach" it was necessary to look at any additional benefits which he thereby acquired and to "balance loss and gain."
Viscount Haldane LC said: "i) The fundamental basis of damages is compensation for the pecuniary loss to a party naturally flowing from the breach.
ii) This principle is qualified by the duty of a plaintiff to take all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach.
iii) Where in the course of business a party has taken action arising out of the transaction which has mitigated his loss, the effect in actual diminution of the loss he has suffered may be taken into account even if he had no duty to act.
iv) Where the subsequent arrangement was not between those parties, but between a claimant and a third party, the court should look at what actually happened and balance loss and gain."
and "The quantum of damage is a question of fact, and the only guidance the law can give is to lay down general principles which afford at times but scanty assistance in dealing with particular cases . . Subject to these observations I think that there are certain broad principles which are quite well settled. The first is that, as far as possible, he who has proved a breach of a bargain to supply what he contracted to get is to be placed, as far as money can do it, in as good a situation as if the contract had been performed. The fundamental basis is thus compensation for pecuniary loss naturally flowing from the breach; but this first principle is qualified by a second, which imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach . ."
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 Reid-Newfoundland Co v Anglo-American Telegraph Co Ltd; PC 1912 - [1912] AC 555
 
Taff Vale Railway v Jenkins [1913] AC 1; [1911-13] All ER 160
1913
HL
Lord Haldane
Damages
Damages can be awarded under the Fatal Accidents Acts only in respect of pecuniary loss and not as a solatium for injured feelings. The House set down the test that award of damages in fatal accident action is compensation for the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit by the deceased's family. The purpose of award of compensation is to put the dependants of the deceased, who had been bread-winner of the family, in the same position financially as if he had lived his natural span of life; it is not designed to put the claimants in a better financial position in which they would otherwise have been if the accident had not occurred.


 
 Meyer v Sanderson; 1913 - [1913] 108 LT 428

 
 Watson Steamship Co v Merryweather and Co; 1913 - [1913] 18 Com Cas 294

 
 Harpur v Mayor of Swansea; HL 1913 - [1913] AC 567
 
Cedars Rapids Manufacturing and Power Co v Lacoste [1914] AC 569
1914
PC
Lord Dunedin
Land, Damages
Land at the St Lawrence river was to be valued for a compulsory purchase. Held: Value does not mean the value of 'the realized undertaking as it exists in the hands of the undertaker'. It means the price which possible undertakers would give. This should be tested by the imaginary market which would have ruled if the land had been exposed for sale 'before any undertakers had secured the powers, or acquired the other subjects which made the undertaking as a whole a realized possibility', and "For the present purpose it may be sufficient to state two brief propositions: (1) The value to be paid for is the value to the owner as it existed at the date of the taking, not the value to the taker. (2) The value to the owner consists in all advantages which the land possesses, present or future, but it is the present value alone of such advantages that falls to be determined. Where, therefore, the element of value over and above the bare value of the ground itself (commonly spoken of as the agricultural value) consists in adaptability for a certain undertaking …. the value …. is merely the price, enhanced above the bare value of the ground which possible intended undertakers would give. That price must be tested by the imaginary market which would have ruled had the land been exposed for sale before any undertakers had secured the powers, or acquired the other subjects which made the undertaking as a whole a realised possibility."
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 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd v New Garage and Motor Company Ltd; HL 1-Jul-1914 - [1915] AC 67; [1914] UKHL 1; (1904) 12 SLT 498; (1904) 7 F (HL) 77
 
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd v Houlder Brothers and Co Ltd (1917) 86 LJKB 1495
1917


Damages
A vessel was delayed in sailing and torpedoed on 25 May 1916. It would not have been torpedoed if it had made the same voyage two or three days earlier. Held: The claim failed. There was no cuasative link.
1 Citers


 
Fraser v City of Fraserville [1917] AC 187
1917
PC
Lord Buckmaster
Land, Damages
One ground on which the arbitrators' valuation award on a compulsory purchase, was set aside was that, in valuing the falls of a river and adjacent land acquired for electricity generation purposes, the arbitrators had taken into account the enhanced value emanating from a reservoir being built by the acquiring authority higher up the river. Held: The question of what is the scheme is a question of fact. "…. the value to be ascertained is the value to the seller of the property in its actual condition at the time of expropriation with all its existing advantages and with all its possibilities, excluding any advantage due to the carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired …."
1 Cites

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Admiralty Commissioners v Steamship Amerika (Owners), The Amerika [1916-17] All ER Rep 177; [1917] AC 38
1917

Sumner L
Damages
The Admiralty sought to recover as an item of loss the pensions payable to the widows of sailors killed in an accident to a submarine:
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Evans v London and Provincial Bank (1917) 3 LDAB 152
1917


Banking, Damages
Only nominal damages were awarded by a jury for damage to the plaintiff's reputation after his bank had wrongly failed to pay on his cheque.
1 Citers


 
Payzu Limited v Saunders [1919] 2 KB 581
1919
CA
Bankes LJ, Scrutton LJ
Damages
The innocent plaintiff buyers had been found to have failed to mitigate their damages because they had not accepted an offer from the defendant sellers (who were in breach of contract) to supply goods on cash terms, the contract having originally provided for sales on credit. the plaintiffs submitted that as a matter of law they had not been bound to consider any offer made by the defendants because of their prior conduct. Held: Whether a plaintiff or applicant has taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss is a question of fact and not of law. He may not have to risk starting uncertain litigation himself, but might have to consider an offer made by the wrongdoer himself.
Bankes LJ said: "It is plain that the question what is reasonable for a person to do in mitigation of his damages cannot be a question of law but must be one of fact in the circumstances of each particular case. There may be cases where as [a] matter of fact it would be unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to consider any offer made in view of the treatment he has received from the defendant. . But that is not to state a principle of law, but a conclusion of fact to be arrived at on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case."
Scrutton LJ said: "Whether it be more correct to say that a plaintiff must minimize his damages, or to say that he can recover no more than he would have suffered if he had acted reasonably, because any further damages do not reasonably follow from the defendant's breach, the result is the same . . Mr Matthews [for the plaintiff] has contended that in considering what steps should be taken to mitigate the damage all contractual relations with the party in default must be excluded. That is contrary to my experience . . in commercial contracts it is generally reasonable to accept an offer from the party in default. However, it is always a question of fact. About the law there is no difficulty."
1 Citers



 
 Wilson v United Counties Bank Ltd; HL 1920 - [1918-19] All ER Rep1035; [1920] LR AC 102; [1920] AC 102
 
Slater v Hoyle and Smith Ltd [1920] 2 KB 11
1920


Contract, Damages
Cotton cloth was sold. The buyer was to use it to fulfil his own contract with a sub-buyer. The cloth was not of the contractual quality but the buyer was able to perform the sub-contract by delivering the same cloth. The sub-buyers paid the full price. Held: The normal measure of damages applied namely the difference between the market price at the time and place of delivery of cloth of the contractual quality and the market price at the time and place of delivery of the cloth actually delivered.
1 Citers


 
Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956
1920
HL
Lord Sumner, Lord Wrenbury
Intellectual Property, Damages
A physical cause may be irrelevant as a matter of law. The law is concerned not with causation, but with responsibility. Lord Sumner said: "more than half of human kind are tale-bearers by nature".
Where a legal wrong was committed without loss or damage being sustained, and a financial remedy was the only remedy available, the court could award a nominal sum.
Lord Wrenbury said: "It has, I think, long been settled law that if an act is manifestly unlawful, or the doer of it knows it to be unlawful, as constituting either a civil wrong or a criminal offence, he cannot maintain an action for contribution or for an indemnity against the liability which results to him therefrom."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd; HL 10-May-1920 - [1920] AC 508; [1920] UKHL 1; [1920] All ER 80; (1920) 36 TLR 600; (1920) 122 LT 691
 
Murphy v The County Council of Wexford [1921] 2 Ir R 230
1921


Damages, Ireland
(Eire)
1 Citers


 
In re Polemis and Furness, Withy and Co [1921] 3 KB 560
1921
CA
Scrutton L.J
Damages, Negligence
A wrongdoer was liable for all the direct consequences of his negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated. "Once the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial."
1 Citers


 
Admiralty Commissioners v SS Volute (Owners), The Volute [1921] All ER Rep 193; [1922] 1 AC 129
1921
HL
Lord Birkenhead LC
Damages, Negligence
When assessing negligence the court must ask whether it was "so much mixed up with the state of things brought about" by the defendant that "in the ordinary plain common sense of this business" it must be regarded as having contributed to the accident. It is preferable to deal with causation as a question of fact "dealt with broadly, and upon common-sense principles as a jury would probably deal with it." There are cases where two acts of negligence "come so closely together, and the second act of negligence is so much mixed up with the state of things brought about by the first act that the party secondly negligent . . Might . . invoke the prior negligence as being part of the cause of the collision so as to make it a case for contribution."
1 Citers


 
French Marine v Compagnie Napolitaine d'Eclairage et de Chauffage par le Gaz [1921] 2 AC 494
1921
HL
Lord Dunedin, Lord Sumner
Contract, Damages
A ship had been requisitioned after an instalment of advance hire had become due, leading to the frustration of the charterparty. The parties disputed whether the charterers were still liable to pay the hire in full. Held: They were. The Tonnelier case had been so long acted upon in the time-chartering business and had been followed in such a multitude of settlements of ships' accounts, that, unless it was manifestly wrong, it ought not to be overruled.
Lord Dunedin described the principle 'frustra petis quod mox es restiturus' as a 'brocard' of the civil law and held that judgment for the full charter hire should not be given where, although the hire had been due, it could be shown that it would be repayable in part, because, as Lord Dunedin put it, "it would be useless to give judgment for the respondents" for more than the sum which was not repayable. Lord Dunedin said: "The question must therefore, in my opinion, be thus approached: On August 10 the respondents were bound to pay a month's hire, on August 16 the further performance of the contract became impossible. Was there or was there not an accrued right on the appellants' part to get repayment of such portion of the hire paid on August 10 as did not, as we conveniently term it in Scotland by a word which is wanting in English, "effeir" to the period from August 10 to 16. The sheet anchor of the appellants' argument is the expression used by Rigby L.J. and the Master of the Rolls in Tonnelier's Case , that the payment in advance is "provisional"; coupled with the admission which had to be given by the respondents' counsel that had there been a delivery at a coal port in the United Kingdom in the ordinary course on the 16th that sum would have been recoverable. I confess I was much moved by that argument, but on further consideration it appeared to me that the word "provisional" might be too hard pressed. I do not think that by terming the payment "provisional" the learned judges meant to say that the payment in advance was not really a payment, but only a deposit, leaving the question of payment over. The payment in advance is truly payment, but it can only be a payment of what the contract says is earned."
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1 Citers


 
Atlantic Shipping and Trading Co v Louis Dreyfus and Co [1921] 2 AC 250; [1922] 10 Ll Rep 703
1921
HL
Lord Dunedin
Litigation Practice, Damages
Lord Dunedin said: "My Lords in these commercial cases it is I think of the highest importance that authorities should not be disturbed and if your lordships find that a certain doctrine has been laid down in former cases and presumably acted upon you will not be disposed to alter that doctrine unless you think it clearly wrong."
1 Citers


 
Jacob and Youngs Inc v Kent (1921) 230 NY 239
1921

Cardoza J
Damages, Construction, International
Court of Appeals of New York. A building contract specified that the plumbing should use a particular type of piping. In fact the builder used a different type of piping. Cardozo J. stated: "In the circumstances of this case, we think the measure of the allowance is not the cost of replacement, which would be great, but the difference in value, which would be either nominal or nothing . . It is true that in most cases the cost of replacement is the measure . . The owner is entitled to the money which will permit him to complete, unless the cost of completion is grossly and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be obtained. When that is true, the measure is the difference in value. Specifications call, let us say, for a foundation built of granite quarried in Vermont. On the completion of the building, the owner learns that through the blunder of a subcontractor part of the foundation has been built of granite of the same quality quarried in New Hampshire. The measure of allowance is not the cost of reconstruction. "There may be omissions of that which could not afterwards be supplied exactly as called for by the contract without taking down the building to its foundations, and at the same time the omission may not affect the value of the building for use or otherwise, except so slightly as to be hardly appreciable."
1 Citers


 
Jacob and Youngs v Kent [1921] 129 NE 869
1921


Damages

1 Citers


 
Abrahams v Herbert Reiach Limited [1922] 1 KB 477
1922
CA
Scrutton LJ, Banks LJ, Atkin LJ
Contract, Damages
Scrutton LJ said: "A defendant is not liable in damages for not doing what he is not bound to do."
Atkin LJ said: "The proper method of assessment is . . to make a reasonable computation of the amount the respondents would have received had the contract been fulfilled." and . .
"[i]f a merchant makes a contract to deliver goods to a shipowner to be carried by him for reward, and the merchant fails to provide the goods, the Court must first find what is the contract which has been broken; and if it was to carry the goods to one of two alternative ports at different distances from the port of loading at rates of freight differing according to the distance, the only contract on which the shipowner can sue is a contract for carriage to the nearer port. The plaintiff cannot prove a contract for performance of the more onerous obligation. This explains why in cases of this kind the Court regards only the lesser of two alternative obligations."
1 Citers


 
Elliot Steam Tug Co Ltd v Shipping Controller [1922] 1 KB 127
1922
CA
Scrutton LJ
Damages
Scrutton LJ said: "At common law there is no doubt about the position. In case of a wrong done to a chattel the common law does not recognize a person whose only rights are a contractual right to have the use or services of the chattel for purposes of making profits or gains without possession of or property in the chattel. Such a person cannot claim for injury done to his contractual right."
1 Citers


 
Baker v Dalgleish Steam Shipping Co Ltd [1922] 1 KB 361
1922

Bankes LJ
Damages
The court considered the deduction of a pension from an award of damages: "The fact that the continuance of the pensions is in the discretion of the Minister does not, in my opinion, exclude them from consideration. The reasonable expectation of their continuance must, I think, be taken into account."
1 Citers


 
Admiralty Commissioners v Valeria (Owners) [1922] All ER Rep 463; [1922] 2 AC 242
1922

Lord Dunedin
Damages
The court referred to the correct sum of damages as that pecuniary sum which will make good to the sufferer, so far as money can do, the loss which he has suffered as the natural result of the wrong done to him.
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Wilson v William Baird and Co, Ltd [1922] SLR 141
6 Dec 1922
SCS

Damages

[ Bailii ]
 
Pitchers v Surrey County Council [1923] 2 KB 57
1923

Swift J
Police, Damages
In 1919 there was a riot involving Canadian soldiers from a local Camp. They released fellow soldiers in custody and raided the officers' mess, and damaged and stole the contents of a tailor's shop and other shops known as "Tin Town" – a group of shops erected with the permission of the military authorities on a part of the Portsmouth Road which ran through the camp. The plaintiff was the owner of the tailor's shop and sued the defendant police authority under the 1886 Act. Held: Swift J said: "The defendants contend that although it is true that a house, shop or building has been destroyed it is not a house, shop or building in any police district, as the police had no jurisdiction over Witley Camp, the action of the military having taken Witley Camp completely out of the police district." and "But the Act of Parliament does not give a citizen a right to compensation for damage by riot on any principle of blaming the police over the matter. The fact that the damage has been done in spite of the care and protection of the police or because of the negligence of the police does not affect the right of the claimant to have compensation. It is a right which is given to the individual who is hurt by a riot to have his damages shared by the whole of the community, and the community for the purpose of this sharing is the police district within which the building injured or destroyed is situated."
Swift J went on to say that the fact that the camp was a private place did not prevent it from being a place in which a riot could take place"But it is said that the police had no control over the soldiers and that they were helpless to do anything. I do not think that that contention is right. I think that the police had the right of control directly a felony was committed in their presence. Of course they had not the power of exercising control. I have stated what opinion I have formed of the three police officers who gave evidence before me. I have not the slightest doubt that they had sufficient courage to try to stop the disturbance; they would, however, have been foolish men had they attempted to do so, as it could not possibly have done any good and they might have been very seriously hurt if not actually killed in endeavouring to quell the disturbance, but the fact that it may not be physically possible for the police to quell a disturbance does not affect the question of their legal rights. I am far from being satisfied that if the police in the neighbourhood of a military camp see the soldiers breaking it up they have not a legal right to apprehend them for the breach of the peace or for the felony which they are committing." and
"The right to compensation does not seem to me to be in the least degree dependent upon any action or inaction on the part of the police. It is quite clear that it would have been physically impossible for all the police in Surrey, who I think numbered 280 at this time, to have taken control of that camp without the assistance and support of the military authorities. It would have been a physical impossibility for them to have reduced some hundreds of rioters, many of whom I suppose were armed or had access to arms, to such a state that they could say that the riot was quelled. But no one here suggests any neglect or impropriety on the part of the police. Every one who has heard this case I should think has come to the conclusion that they acted with great discretion and great propriety in the matter. But the Act of Parliament does not give a citizen a right to compensation for damage by riot on any principle of blaming the police over the matter. The fact that the damage has been done in spite of the care and protection of the police or because of the negligence of the police does not affect the right of the claimant to have compensation. It is a right which is given to the individual who is hurt by a riot to have his damages shared by the whole of the community, and the community for the purpose of this sharing is the police district within which the building injured or destroyed is situated. The plaintiff is entitled to have the wrong which was done to her shared by all the contributors to the police fund in the police district of Surrey."
Riot (Damages) Act 1886
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Pitchers v Surrey County Council [1923] 2 KB 70
2 Jan 1923
CA
Lord Sterndale MR, Warrington and Atkin LJJ
Police, Damages
The claimant sought payment for damages to his property after imprisoned Canadian troops were released and came into the town causing damage. Held. Lord Sterndale said: "it is said that this camp under the circumstances ceased to be within the police district. The circumstances are that this camp was inhabited by soldiers who were under military discipline and control by military police. It was more convenient and very much wiser that soldiers . . should be controlled by their own police than by the civilian police in the district…But that is a long way from saying that the camp and the soldiers are to be taken out of the jurisdiction, if I may call it so, of the civilian police, and that the civilian police are in law to be deprived of the rights they would otherwise have within that part of the police district. There is no foundation, in my opinion, for saying anything of that sort. For convenience the officers wisely employed pickets and military police to look after the soldiers, and for convenience the police do not interfere, as a rule, but they still maintain their rights in that part of the police district just the same as they do in other parts of it. There may be difficulties in their way in exercising those rights because of the necessarily superior forces possessed by the military powers in time of war; but that does not affect the legal position in the least. Therefore it seems to me quite clear that this camp was within the police district, and the first requisite to bring the matter within the act is satisfied."
Warrington LJ said: "Then it is said that the act must be so construed, whether by rule of commonsense or otherwise, as to exclude for the purposes of the Act from the expression "Police District" any district in which a body, not the ordinary civilian police, is by law charged with the maintenance of law and order, and is itself empowered to maintain a police force; and it is said that this area is such a district because the military authorities were charged with the maintenance of law and order, I suppose so far as those who were under their jurisdiction were concerned, and were empowered to maintain a police force. In my opinion that proposition is quite unsustainable; there is no authority for it; nor can I in reason see any ground for contending that, because the particular individuals who formed the military body were subject to military discipline, the area in which they lived should be withdrawn from the ordinary police protection of the rest of the county…But it is said that because they were soldiers and because their offence had the added gravity of being a mutiny, therefore they were not in civil law riotously and tumultuously assembled together. Really I fail to follow that. The Act of Parliament makes no exception at all – it provides simply that if injury is done by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, then compensation is to be paid by the police authority in whose district that riot takes place."
Atkin LJ said: "The area is part of the county of Surrey, but it is said that by virtue of the powers which the military authorities possess, having taken possession of it as I have mentioned, that area ceased to be part of the police district as defined under the Act and was taken out of it . . No authority has been suggested for that proposition, and it cannot be contended that military barracks are an Alsatia. The law runs there. Everybody in the military barracks is subject to the criminal law and to the civil law, and the police authorities have the ordinary rights to enforce process there, subject to such limitations as may be imposed by the fact that the premises are premises of the Crown…The argument to the contrary consisted of a combination of two circumstances – namely that they were both soldiers and acting within the area of the camp. It can hardly be doubted but that if they were soldiers, that is to say subject to military law, and this offence were committed outside the camp, it would be within the Act. I can see no reason why it should not be. The possibility of a disturbance by three or four soldiers, which is enough to constitute a riot, must have been well within the contemplation of the Legislature at the time when they made this provision, and if in fact a riot took place within a camp or within barracks and damage is done, I see no reason why a person so damaged should not recover compensation. In an ordinary case if damage is done in barracks, the damage for the most part would be done to Crown property. I am far from saying that the Crown would not be entitled under those circumstances to recover compensation. Of course questions would arise which under the Act with regard to damage would make it difficult in some cases, at any rate, to recover compensation. For the above reasons it appears to me that the case is made out."
Riot (Damages) Act 1886
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Wood v Carwardine [1923] 2 KB 185
2 Jan 1923

McCardie J
Damages
The court held that trivial services, the amount of which could be measured, did not amount to "attendance" within the meaning of section 12(2)(i) of the 1920 Act. The rule had to be applied with robust vigour in favour of the tenant unless the protective object of the Act was to be substantially defeated.
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 12(2)(I)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Slack v Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd; CA 1924 - [1924] 2 Ch 475

 
 Hewitt v Rowlands; CA 1924 - [1924] All ER 344

 
 Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack; HL 1924 - [1924] AC 851

 
 Hambrook v Stokes Brothers; CA 1925 - [1925] 1 KB 141

 
 Moss v Christchurch Rural District Council; 1925 - [1925] 2 KB 750

 
 Reavis v Clan Line Steamers Ltd; 1925 - 1925 SC 725
 
Admiralty Commissionersrs v Chekiang (Owner), The Chekiang [1926] AC 637; [1926] All ER Rep 114
1926
HL
Lord Sumner, Viscount Dunedin
Damages
There had been a collision at sea in which the defendant's vessel caused damage to HMS Cairo. The House was asked to assess damages after damage to the plaintiff's vessel, and whether in the case of a warship the registrar had been entitled to award by way of general damages interest on the capital value of the vessel. Held: He had been so entitled, but it was not a universal rule. It was not good enough to hide behind the fact that the assessment of general damages is a matter of fact for the jury. Damages must be assessed in accordance with a proper direction from the judge as to what the law requires and that involves the application of principle. Lord Sumner said: 'The measure of damages ought never to be governed by mere rules of practice, nor can such rules override the principles of the law on this subject'." There is no absolute rule requiring general damages to be calculated by reference to interest on capital a
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Admiralty Commissioners v Owners of the Steamship Susquehanna; The Susquehanna [1926] AC 655
1926
HL
Viscount Dunedin
Damages, Transport
An Admiralty oiler, the 'Prestol', was damaged in a collision with the defendants' vessel in the Baltic. Her place was taken by another oiler, the 'Belgol', which was withdrawn from service on the Clyde. In effect, the Admiralty was able to make do with the resources at its disposal, making it unnecessary to charter in a substitute vessel. The Admiralty claimed general damages at the rate of £225 a day in respect of the period during which the 'Prestol' was out of service while undergoing repairs, that being the rate at which she could have been chartered out. The registrar awarded damages at the rate of £200 a day. The House considered the principles to be applied in assessing damages. Held: The Admiralty was not entitled to recover general damages assessed by reference to the rate at which the vessel could be chartered out and on that point their Lordships were agreed. Viscount Dunedin said: "There is no difference in this matter between the position in Admiralty law and that of the common law . ."
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 Currie v Wardrop; 1927 - 1927 SC 538

 
 Baron Vernon v Metagama; HL 19-Dec-1927 - [1927] UKHL 2; 1928 SLT 117; (1927-28) 29 Ll L Rep 253; 1928 SC (HL) 21

 
 Marbe v George Edwardes (Daly's Theatre) Ltd; CA 1928 - [1928] 1 KB 269

 
 R and H Hall Ltd v WH Pim Junr and Co Ltd; HL 1928 - [1928] 30 LLR 159
 
James Finlay and Co Ltd v N V Kwik Tong HM [1928] All ER 110; [1929] 1 KB 400
1929
CA
Sankey LJ
Damages
It will be regarded as unreasonable to require a claimant to take steps which are likely to injure its commercial reputation, or otherwise t in a way it perceives to be commercially unwise, as a mitigation of damages.
Sankey LJ said of the decision of this House in Re Hall Limited's & Pim (Jr) & Co's arbitration (1928) 139 LT 30, that it had "astonished the Temple and surprised St Mary Axe."
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