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Damages - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 81 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.


 
 Duke of Brunswick v Harmer; QBD 2-Nov-1849 - (1849) 14 QB 185; [1849] EngR 915; (1849) 117 ER 75
 
Dalby v The India and London Life Assurance Company (1854) 15 CB 364; [1843-60] All ER Rep 1040
1854

Parke B
Insurance, Damages
An insurance company (Anchor) had taken out insurance with the defendant on the life of the Duke of Cambridge in the sum of £1000 for which it paid a yearly premium during the life of the Duke. Anchor had itself granted policies of insurance to a Reverend Wright on the Duke’s life in a total amount of £3000. Anchor’s policy with the Defendant was “a cross or counter-assurance”. Before the Duke died Anchor agreed with the Reverend Wright to the surrender and cancellation of his policies in return for an annuity. The issue was whether or not it sufficed that Anchor had an interest in the Duke’s life when the policy with the Defendant was effected or whether such an interest had to subsist at the time of the Duke’s death. No one seems to have bothered with questions whether or not the Reverend Wright had an interest in the Duke’s life. Held: It was sufficient for the interest to exist at the time the insurance was effected and that its value at that time was recoverable under Section 3. The obligation at that time to pay the Reverend Wright was “unquestionably an interest in the continuance of the life of the Duke” under Section 3. (Parke B) “Now, what is the meaning of this provision? On the part of the plaintiff, it is said it means only, that, in all cases in which the party insuring has an interest when he effects the policy, his right to recover and receive is to be limited to that amount; otherwise, under colour of a small interest, a wagering policy might be made to a large amount, - as it might if the first clause stood alone. The right to recover, therefore, is limited to the amount of the interest at the time of effecting the policy. Upon that value, the assured must have the amount of premium calculated: if he states it truly, no difficulty can occur: he pays in the annuity for life the fair value of the sum payable at death. If he misrepresents, by over-rating the value of the interest, it is his own fault, in paying more in the way of annuity than he ought; and he can recover only the true value of the interest in respect of which he effected the policy: but that value he can recover. Thus, the liability of the insurer becomes constant and uniform, to pay an unvarying sum on the death of the cestui que vie, in consideration of an unvarying and uniform premium paid by the assured. The bargain is fixed as to the amount on both sides. This construction is effected by reading the word “hath” as referring to the time of effecting the policy. By the 1st section, the assured is prohibited from effecting an insurance on a life or on an event wherein he “shall have” no interest, - that is, at the time of assuring: and then the 3rd section requires that he shall recover only the interest that he “hath”. If he has an interest when the policy is made, he is not wagering or gaming, and the prohibition of the statute does not apply to his case. Had the 3rd section provided that no more than the amount or value of the interest should be insured, a question might have been raised, whether, if the insurance had been for a larger amount, the whole would not have been void: but the prohibition to recover or receive more than that amount, obviates any difficulty on that head."
Insurance Act 1774 3
1 Citers



 
 Hadley v Baxendale; Exc 23-Feb-1854 - [1854] EWHC Exch J70; [1854] EngR 296; (1854) 9 Exch 341; (1854) 156 ER 145
 
Rolin And Another v Steward, Public Officer of The East of England Bank [1854] EngR 492; (1854) 14 CB 595; (1854) 139 ER 245
8 May 1854


Damages, Banking
Substantial damages may be recovered against a banker, for dishonouring an acceptance and cheques of a customer, there being sufficient assets in his hands at the time to meet them.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Prickett v Badger (1856) 1 CNS 296
1856


Damages

1 Citers



 
 Hamlin v Great Northern Railway Co; 19-Nov-1856 - (1856) 1 H & N 408; [1856] EngR 918; (1856) 156 ER 1261
 
George Franklin, Administrator Of Thomas Franklin, Deceased v The South Eastern Railway Company [1858] EngR 669; (1858) 3 H & N 211; (1858) 157 ER 448
7 May 1858


Damages
In an action on the 9 & 10 Vict c. 93, for injury resulting from death, the damages should be calculated in reference to a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, its of right or otherwise, from the continuance of the life. In an action by a father for injury resulting from the death of his son, it appeared that the father was old and infirm, that the son, who was young and earning good wages, assisted his father in some work for which the father was paid 3s 6d. a week. The jury having found that the father had a reasonable expectation of benefit from the continuatice of his son's life : Held, that the action was maintainable.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Dingle v Hare [1859] EngR 977; (1859) 7 CB NS 145; (1859) 144 ER 770
15 Nov 1859


Contract, Damages
In an action for a breach of warranty on the sale of goods which the buyer has sold again. Held. The proper measure of damages was the difference between the real market value at the time of the sale and the contract price. Quaere, whether the buyer might not have been entitled to recover a sum fairly and reasonably paid by him as compensation to a third person to whom he had upon the faith of the defendant’s warranty sold a portion of the goods?
[ Commonlii ]
 
Davidson v Tullock (1860) 36 LT 97
1860


Damages
In a case framed in deceit the measure of damages involved ascertainment of the "real" or "face" value of the shares at the time of allotment or purchase.
1 Citers


 
Lynch v Knight (1861) 9 HLC 577; [1861] EngR 822; (1861) 11 ER 854
17 Jul 1861
HL
Lord Wensleydale
Damages, Personal Injury
Lord Wensleydale said: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone; though where material damage occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimating it, should altogether overlook the feelings of the party interested."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Chamberlain v West End of London Railway Co (1862) 2 B&S 617 (Ex Ch)
1862
CExC
Erle CJ
Land, Damages
The court had found that, after railway works cut off highway access, and, notwithstanding the provision of a deviation road, the value of the claimant's properties as shops had been "greatly diminished" by the reduction in the number of people passing them. Held: The court accepted, on the basis of the umpire's finding, that the claimants' houses had been depreciated in value "because the highway was stopped up, and the easy access which before existed was taken away".
1 Citers


 
Meikle v Sneddon (1862) 24 D 720
1862

Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis
Scotland, Damages
The pursuers sought damages for the wrongful arrestment of their ship. They claimed £500 as solatium for injury to their feelings. But the only loss that had been actually sustained was the sum required to relieve the vessel from the arrestment, which was less than £10. Held: Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis said: "It is of no consequence whether the pursuers have sustained any substantial damage. Suppose the damage to be such that one farthing is recovered, that will show that a wrong has been done by the defenders to the pursuers; and, consequently, that this action is well founded."
1 Citers


 
Isenberg v East India House Estate Co Ltd (1863) 3 De G J & S 263
1863

Lord Westbury LC
Land, Damages
The court refused a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant to pull down part of a new building which interfered with the plaintiff's light and exercised instead the Court of Chancery's recently-acquired jurisdiction under the 1858 Act to order payment of damages: ". . . I hold it . . . to be the duty of the court in such a case as the present not, by granting a mandatory injunction, to deliver over the defendants to the plaintiff bound hand and foot, in order to be made subject to any extortionate demand that he may by possibility make, but to substitute for such mandatory injunction an inquiry before itself, in order to ascertain the measure of damage that has been actually sustained."
Lord Cairns's Act 1858
1 Citers


 
Allan v Barclay (1864) 2 M 873
1864
IHCS
Lord Kinloch
Damages
Lord Kinloch said: "The grand rule on the subject of damages is, that none can be claimed except such as naturally and directly arise out of the wrong done; and such, therefore, as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the view of the wrongdoer."
1 Citers


 
Strang v Steuart (1864) 2 M 1015
1864

Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis
Damages, Scotland
The court lamented the amount of court time that had been taken by foolish and absurd litigation about a hedge and ditch which separated the parties' properties. Nevertheless that it was the duty of the court to deal with the case: "We are not indeed bound to adjudicate de lana caprina; but if there be a pecuniary or patrimonial interest, however small, depending on the determination of the question, the parties have a right to invoke the aid of a court of law to decide their differences."
1 Citers



 
 Inchbald v Western Neilgherry Coffee, Tea and Cinchona Plantation Co Ltd; 1864 - (1864) 17 CBNS 733
 
Herring v Metropolitan Board of Works (1865) 19 CBNS 509
1865
CCP
Willes J
Land, Damages
All the main sewers in the metropolis were vested in the Metropolitan Board of Works by the Act, gaving it wide powers to maintain and improve them, and for that purpose to carry out works in streets and other land, "making compensation for any damage done thereby…" The Board erected a hoarding in Northumberland Street for the purpose of enabling it to reconstruct a sewer running under the street. The hoarding was very close to the access to the claimant's premises, where he carried on business as a livery stable keeper, and as a result the access to the premises was rendered less convenient. The decision of a magistrate, holding that the claimant was not entitled to compensation, was upheld by the Court of Common Pleas. Willes J: "…I am clearly of opinion that, where the metropolitan board are engaged in the performance of a public work which renders it necessary to erect a hoarding or to deposit materials or rubbish in a public street, the mere fact that thereby the passage along the street becomes more difficult and inconvenient to A than to B and C, gives A no claim to compensation under the act…In other words, it appears to me that, the construction of the hoarding being necessary for the due performance of the works by the board, and the obstruction not having been more than was necessary, or kept for an unreasonable time, would give the appellant no cause of action, and consequently no claim for compensation under the act." and Byles J "My judgment rests upon this ground, that the injury here complained of, viz the temporary obstruction of the public way, rendering the access to the appellant's premises more inconvenient for a short time, gave him no cause of action and no right to compensation. As a general rule, all the Queen's subjects have a right to the free and uninterrupted use of a public way: but, nevertheless, all persons have an equally undoubted right for a proper purpose to impede and obstruct the convenient access of the public through and along the same. Instances of this interruption arise at every moment of the day. Carts and waggons stop at the doors of shops and warehouses for the purpose of loading and unloading goods. Coal-shoots are opened on the public footways for the purpose of letting in necessary supplies of fuel. So, for the purpose of building, rebuilding, or repairing houses abutting on the public way in populous places, hoardings are frequently erected inclosing a part of the way. Houses must be built and repaired and hoarding is necessary in such cases to shield persons passing from the danger from falling substances. If this be the right of private persons, a fortiori must it be the right of a public body to which extensive power is intrusted for the general good of all. On the ground, therefore, that the obstruction here was of a temporary character, and was done for a proper purpose, and not continued for an unreasonable time, I am of opinion that this is not a case for compensation under the Metropolis Local Management Act."
Metropolis Management Act 1855 135
1 Citers


 
Kelly v Sherlock [1866] LR 1 QB 686
1866

Blackburn J
Defamation, Damages
The defendant had claimed that the plaintiff preached a sermon against the appointment of a Roman Catholic chaplain to the Liverpool borough gaol, and another sermon reflecting in strong terms on the conduct of the town council of Liverpool electing a Jew their mayor, and had caused extracts from both sermons to be published in the local newspapers. The defendant relied in part on the plaintiff's own intemperate conduct toward the defendant. Held: Blackburn J said "Now there can be no set-off of libel or misconduct against another, but in estimating the compensation for the plaintiffs injured feelings, the jury might fairly consider the plaintiff's conduct and the degree of respect which the plaintiff himself had shown for the feelings of others; and finding on the evidence, that he published in the local press sermons reflecting on the local authorities that he published a statement (which I own I think borne out by the articles) that the defendant's paper was so conducted as to justify the epithet of "the dregs of provincial journalism," and, above all, that he delivered from the pulpit, and published in the provincial papers, a statement to the effect that some of his opponents (no matter, in my opinion, whether including the defendant or not) had been guilty of subornation of perjury, and would, as he charitably hoped, repent on their deathbeds and confess their guilt, I cannot say that I think the jury were bound to give him substantial damages, though I heartily wish that their verdict had not been such as to give an appearance of triumph to the defendant"
1 Citers


 
Mudhun Mohun Doss, Agent Of The Firm Of Dwarka Doss And Mudhobun Doss v Gokul Doss [1866] EngR 115; (1866) 10 Moo Ind App 563; (1866) 19 ER 1085
1 Mar 1866


Damages

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ricket v Metropolitan Railway Co (1867) LR 2 HL 175
1867
HL
Lord Cranworth
Land, Damages
Lord Cranworth considered the adverse effect of building railways on nearby businesses, and in particular the Pickled Egg public house: "The very existence of a railway must cause loss to many persons in its neighbourhood. Every inn or posting-house at which post horses were kept suffered, as is well known, grievous loss by the first establishment of a railroad in its neighbourhood; in fact, the business of such a house was often utterly destroyed. But it was never contended that this was an injury for which compensation should be demanded." and "there is nothing in authority or logic to say that the letting value of the premises cannot be affected by an interference which makes it less convenient to conduct the kind of business for which they would otherwise have been suitable. A plaintiff who can prove such a reduction in value, for whatever period, is entitled to compensation."
1 Citers


 
Burton v Pinkerton (1867) LR 2 Ex 340
1867

Baron Bramwell, Baron Martin and Baron Channell
Damages, Contract
The Plaintiff agreed to serve on the defendant's ship for twelve months, but left it when the Defendant berthed in a Peruvian port with a cargo which included ammunition, even though Peru was at war with Spain ("'two powers at peace with England"). The Plaintiff regarded the proposed voyage as both illegal and more dangerous than he anticipated at the time of entering into his contract. He was imprisoned for some days as a "Peruvian deserter'' and upon his release discovered that the ship had gone, still with some of his clothes on board. The jury gave damages for both the imprisonment and the clothing. Held: Both heads of damage were too remote. Baron Bramwell: "It is true that in one sense the defendant's conduct caused the imprisonment: but for that, no doubt, the plaintiff would not have been imprisoned. That, however, is not enough. Suppose, for instance, the plaintiff had met robbers whilst ashore, and been injured by them, he certainly could have recovered nothing from the defendant for such injury, yet the defendant might, in that case also, be said to have caused the damage. According to the ordinary rule, damage to be recoverable by a plaintiff must inevitably flow from the tortious act of the defendant. It must be caused by him as the causa causans, and this imprisonment was not so caused". The Plaintiff could only recover for lost wages and possibly something for inconvenience. A new trial was ordered as it was impossible to disentangle how much the jury had included under each of the heads.
1 Citers


 
Carmichael and Others v Caledonian Railway Co [1867] SLR 5 - 413
26 Mar 1867
SCS

Damages

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Ogle v Vane [1868] 3 QB 272; [1867] LR 2 QB 275
1868


Damages

1 Citers


 
British Columbia, etc. Saw Mills Co. Ltd v Nettleship [1868] LR 3 CP 499
1868

Willes J
Contract, Damages
Willes J said: "the mere fact of knowledge cannot increase the liability. The knowledge must be brought home to the party sought to be charged under such circumstances that he must know that the person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with the special condition attached to it . . Knowledge on the part of the carrier is only important if it forms part of the contract. It may be that the knowledge is acquired casually from a stranger, the person to whom the goods belong not knowing or caring whether he had such knowledge or not".
1 Citers



 
 Hammersmith and City Railway Co v Brand; HL 1869 - [1869] LR 4 HL 171

 
 Hart v Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly Co; 1869 - (1869) 21 LT 261
 
Engell v Fitch (1869) LR 4 QB 659; 10 B&S 738; 38 LJQB 304; 17 WR 894 ex Ch
1869
ChD

Land, Damages, Contract
The lease of land was sold at auction. The conditions of sale provided for possessionto be given on completion. The vendors, mortgagees with the right of sale, were unwilling to incur the expense of recovering possession. Held: The vendor was under a duty to do everything possible to make good title. The ordinary rule which would limit the damages on the purchase of real property did not apply. The purchaser could recover, the deposit expenses of investigating title, the loss of profit on a resale and cost of conveyance to a sub-vendee. The measure was the difference between the price in the contract and the value of land at the time of the breach.
1 Citers


 
Prehn v Royal Bank of Liverpool (1870) LR 5 Ex 92
1870

Martin B
Damages
Martin B said: "Special damages are given in respect of any consequences reasonably or probably arising from the breach complained of."
1 Citers


 
Stebbing v Metropolitan Board of Works (1870) LR 6 QB 37
1870

Cockburn CJ
Land, Damages
In compensation for compulsory purchase (in this case, of graveyards), 'value' means value to the owner, not value to the purchaser. The graveyards were therefore of little or no value to the rector.
Cockburn CJ said: 'When Parliament gives compulsory powers, and provides that compensation shall be made to the person from whom property is taken, for the loss that he sustains, it is intended that he shall be compensated to the extent of his loss; and that his loss shall be tested by what was the value of the thing to him, not by what will be its value to the persons acquiring it.'
1 Citers


 
Carmichael v Caledonian Railway Co (1870) 8 M (HL) 119
1870
HL

Damages
Interest can be demanded only in virtue of a contract express or implied "or by virtue of the principal sum of money having been wrongfully withheld, and not paid on the day when it ought to have been paid." Interest was due when money was wrongfully withheld and not paid on the day on which it ought to have been paid.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Caledonian Railway Co v Carmichael and Others [1870] SLR 7 - 666
28 Jun 1870
SCS

Damages

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Jegon v Vivian; 1871 - (1871) LR 6 Ch App 742

 
 Ex parte Llynvi Coal and Iron Co; In re Hide; 1871 - (1871) LR 7 Ch App 28
 
Rodger v Comptior d'Escompte de Paris (1871) LR 3 PC 465
1871


Damages
Where restitution followed the reversal on appeal of a previously satisfied judgment, common law interest was awarded.
1 Citers



 
 Moule v Garrett; CA 1872 - (1872) LR 7 Exch 101
 
Gorris v Scott (1874) L R 9 Ex 125
1874


Damages
In the case of a statutory duty, the scope of the duty is answered by deducing the purpose of the duty from the language and context of the statute.
1 Citers



 
 Bain v Fothergill; HL 1874 - (1874) LR 7 HL 158; 43 LJ Ex 243; 31 LT 387; 39 JP 228; 23 WR 261

 
 Metropolitan Board of Works v McCarthy; HL 1874 - [1874] LR 7 HL 243
 
Bradburn v Great Western Rail Co [1874] LR 10 Ex 1; [1874-80] All ER Rep 195; [1874] 44 LJ Ex 9; [1874] 31 LT 464
1874

Pigott B
Damages
The plaintiff had received a sum of money from a private insurer to compensate him for lost income as a result of an accident caused by the negligence of the defendant. Held: He was entitled to full damages as well as the payment from the insurer. "….I think that there would be no justice or principle in setting off an amount which the plaintiff has entitled himself to under a contract of insurance, such as any prudent man would make on the principle of, as the expression is, "laying by for a rainy day". He pays the premiums upon a contract which, if he meets with an accident, entitles him to receive a sum of money……; and I think that it ought not, upon any principle of justice, to be deducted from the amount of the damages proved to have been sustained by him through the negligence of the defendants."
1 Citers


 
Benjamin v Storr (1874) LR 9 CP 400
1874

Brett J
Nuisance, Damages
The plaintiff’s coffee house was badly affected by the defendant’s wagons standing for long periods in the narrow street outside for the purposes of loading and unloading goods. The wagons blocked his light and the frequent stabling of the horses detracted from his enjoyment of his dwelling. Held: "The cases referred to upon this subject shew that there are three things which the plaintiff must substantiate, beyond the existence of the mere public nuisance, before he can be entitled to recover. In the first place, he must shew a particular injury to himself beyond that which is suffered by the rest of the public. It is not enough for him to shew that he suffers the same inconvenience in the use of the highway as other people do, if the alleged nuisance be the obstruction of a highway.
Other cases shew that the injury to the individual must be direct, and not a mere consequential injury; as, where one way is obstructed, but another (though possibly less convenient one) is left open; in such a case the private and particular injury has been held not to be sufficiently direct to give a cause of action. Further, the injury must be shewn to be of a substantial character, not fleeting or evanescent."
1 Citers


 
Hobbs v London and South Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 QB 111
1875

Mellor J, Cockburn CJ, Blackburn J
Damages, Contract
The court considered an application for damages for inconvenience in a breach of contract case: "for the mere inconvenience, such as annoyance and loss of temper, or vexation, or for being disappointed in a particular thing which you have set your mind upon, without real physical inconvenience resulting, you cannot recover damages. That is purely sentimental, and not a case where the word inconvenience, as I here use it, would apply." However the court upheld an award to a husband and wife for the inconvenience of having to walk home with young children four or five miles late on a drizzling night, although the wife's catching of a cold was found too remote.
1 Citers


 
Hobbs v London and South Western Railway Company (1875) LR 10 QB 111
1875

Sir Alexander Cockburn CJ, Mellor J
Damages
Damages for personal inconvenience "where it is sufficiently serious" is recoverable at law (per Sir Alexander Cockburn CJ). Mellor J said however that: "for the mere inconvenience, such as annoyance and loss of temper, or vexation, or for being disappointed in a particular thing which you have set your mind upon, without real physical inconvenience resulting, you cannot recover damages. That is purely sentimental and not a case where the word inconvenience as I here use it would apply."
1 Citers



 
 Twycross v Grant; 1877 - (1877) 2 CPD 469
 
Fayner v Bilton [1878] 7 Ch Div 815
1878


Housing, Damages

1 Citers


 
Waddell v Blockey (1879) 4 QBD 678
1879


Damages, Contract
The damages for an item bought as a consequence of a misrepresentation or other tort are to be calculated as at the date of sale.
1 Citers



 
 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co; HL 1880 - (1880) 5 App Cas 25

 
 Arkwright v Newbold; CA 1881 - (1881) 17 ChD 301
 
Wallis v Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243
1882
CA
Sir George Jessel MR
Contract, Damages
Jessel MR said: "You may depart from the literal meaning of words, if reading the words literally leads to an absurdity." and "It has always appeared to me that the doctrine of the English law as to non-payment of money - the general rule being that you cannot recover damages because it is not paid by a certain day, is not quite consistent with reason. A man may be utterly ruined by the non-payment of a sum of money on a given day, the damages may be enormous, and the other party may be wealthy."
He dealt with the question of whether a sum of money was a penalty or liquidated damages, saying: "I now come to the last class of cases. There is a class of cases relating to deposits. Where a deposit is to be forfeited for the breach of a number of stipulations, some of which may be trifling, some of which may be for the payment of money on a given day, in all those cases the Judges have held that this rule does not apply, and that the bargain of the parties is to be carried out. I think that exhausts the substance of the cases." However, he also observed that "The ground of that doctrine I do not know"
1 Citers


 
Haigh v Royal Mail Steampacket Co Ltd [1883] 52 LJ QB 640
1883
CA
Brett MR
Damages, Personal Injury
“‘personal injury’ is not ‘loss’ because a limb may be broken without being lost. The word ‘injury’ would certainly have been more apt, but the word ‘damage’ can certainly mean personal injury”.
1 Citers


 
Countess of Ossalinsky v Manchester Corporation (1883) Browne & Allen 659
1883


Land, Damages
Land bounding Thirlmere in the Lake District was acquired for use as a reservoir to supply water to Manchester. The prospect that the land, because of its particular characteristics, would be likely to be developed as a reservoir was a matter which might give the land an enhanced value. That should be taken into account. The particular purpose to which the Manchester Corporation was going to put the land should not be taken into account. But the fact of the acquisition of the land for this particular purpose might have evidential value showing that suggested alternative reservoir development schemes 'are not visionary, but are schemes with a certain probability in them.'
1 Citers


 
Seward v The Vera Cruz (1884) 10 AC 59
1884
HL
Earl of Selbourne LC, Lord Blackburn
Damages
The House was asked to rule upon the nature of a fatal accident claim as established by the 1846 Act, Lord Campbell's Act - was it such as to be within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Division? Held: Earl of Selbourne LC said: "Lord Campbell's Act gives a new cause of action clearly . . because the action is given in substance not to the person representing in point of estate the deceased man, who would naturally represent him as to all his own rights of action which could survive him, but to his wife and children, no doubt suing in point of form in the name of the executor."
He explained the maxim of construction "generalia specialibus non derogant", saying: ‘Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to so.' "
Lord Blackburn said: "a totally new action is given against the person who would have been responsible to the deceased if the deceased had lived . . an action which . . is new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principle, in every way new . ."
Fatal Accidents Act 1846
1 Citers


 
Brunsden v Humphrey (1884) 14 QBD 141
1884
CA
Bowen LJ
Personal Injury, Damages
The defendant had negligently caused damage to a cab driver and his vehicle in the same accident. The cab driver obtained damages for the damage to his vehicle. Held: He was not disentitled from bringing fresh proceedings for damages for personal injury. There were two causes of action.
Bowen LJ discussed the single action rule, saying: "Nobody can doubt that if the plaintiff had recovered any damages for injury to his person, he could not have maintained a further action for fresh bodily injuries caused by the same act of negligence, merely because they had been discovered or developed subsequently." The rule is based on the maxim interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium, "otherwise great oppression might be done under colour and pretence of law."
1 Citers



 
 Lord Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co; HL 1886 - (1886) 11 AC 332

 
 Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell; HL 1886 - (1886) 11 App Cas 127
 
Lever v Goodwin (1887) 36 Ch D 1; (1887) 4 RPC 492
1887
CA
Cotton LJ, Chitty J
Intellectual Property, Damages
In trade mark and patent cases the plaintiff was entitled, if he succeeded in getting an injunction, to take either of two forms of relief: he might claim from the defendant either the damage he had sustained from the defendant's wrongful act or the profit made by the defendant from the defendant's wrongful act.
Chitty J described a class of case where relief was approriate in a passing off case: "In the second class of cases which I am considering, the trade is not deceived. I am speaking from my large experience in these matters. The retail buyers know from whom they are buying, and, if there is anything like a fraudulent device, such as I am referring to, they are not taken in, they are not deceived. But what is done by the manufacturer is this - he puts an instrument of fraud into their hands. It has been said more than once in this case, in substance, that the manufacturer ought not to be held liable for the fraud of the ultimate seller, that is, the shop-keeper, or the shop-keeper's assistant. But that is not the right view of the case. Have the Defendants in this case, or not, knowingly put into the hands of the shopman, who is more or less scrupulous or unscrupulous, the means of deceiving the ultimate purchaser? That is the question which I have to try, and that is a question of fact, and nothing else."
1 Citers



 
 Rust v Victoria Graving Dock Co and London and St Katharine Dock Co; 1887 - (1887) 36 Ch D 113
 
Lloyd's v Harper [1888] 16 CD 290
1888

Lush LJ
Banking, Damages
Lush LJ said: " The next question which, no doubt, is a very important and substantial one, is, that Lloyds, having sustained no damage themselves could not recover for the losses sustained by third parties by reason of the default of Robert Henry Harper as an Underwriter. That, to my mind, is a startling and alarming doctrine, and a novelty, because I consider it to be an established rule of law that where a contract is made with A for the benefit of B, A can sue on the contract for the benefit of B, and recover all that B could have recovered if the contract had been made with B himself."
1 Citers


 
The United Horse-Shoe and Nail Co Ltd v John Stewart and Co 13 AC 401; (1888) 5 RPC 260
1888
HL
Lord Macnaughton
Intellectual Property, Damages
Two patents were held valid and infringed. The first patent was for an invention for improvements in a process for manufacturing horse-shoe nails designed to avoid blanks, from which the nails were made, from being obstructed during movement towards two rolls. The second related to a mechanism for punching out nails from blanks and for producing the blanks. Held: The measure of damages will then normally be the profit which would have been realised by the owner of the patent if the sales had been made by him.

 
Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 App Cas 222; [1888] UKPC 3
21 Jan 1888
PC

Negligence, Damages, Commonwealth
(Victoria) The appellant's gatekeeper had negligently invited the plaintiffs to cross a railway line as a train approached. There was no collision, but the plaintiff sought damages for physical and mental injuries from shock. Held: The defendant's appeal on liability succeeded. It was difficult, if not impossible, to recover damages for "illness which was the effect of shock caused by fright". Such injury was regarded as being too remote a head of damages in an action for negligence. There would be evidential difficulty in deciding upon the causes of psychiatric symptoms. Mere sudden terror unaccompanied by actual physical injury could not in such circumstances be considered a consequence which in the ordinary course would flow from the negligence of the gate keeper.
"Damages arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot under such circumstances, their Lordships think, be considered a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the negligence of the gate-keeper. If it were held that they can, it appears to their Lordships that it would be extending the liability for negligence much beyond what that liability has hitherto been held to be."
1 Citers

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 Derry v Peek; HL 1-Jul-1889 - (1889) 14 App Cas 337; [1889] 58 LJ Ch 864; [1889] 61 LT 265; [1889] 54 JP 148; [1889] UKHL 1
 
Bell v Great Northern Railway Co of Ireland (1890) 26 LR Ir 428
1890

Murphy J
Damages, Ireland
The plaintiff was a passenger in a railway carriage which ran backwards downhill in terrifying circumstances. Medical witnesses testified that she was suffering from fright and nervous shock, one of them describing it as "profound impression on the nervious system" and stating that the shock from which she suffered would be a natural consequence of the fright. Another said he was unable to detect any physical damage, and put down her symptoms to nervous shock. Held: She succeeded. The negligent management by the defendants of the carriage in which she was seated was admittedly the cause of the injury she sustained. Murphy J said: "It appears . . immaterial whether the injuries may be called nervous shock, brain disturbance, mental shock, or bodily injury." She was awarded damages for her "nervous shock," although she had suffered no physical damage in the accident.

 
Maw v Jones (1890) 25 QBD 107
1890


Damages, Employment
An assessment of damages on a dismissal might take into account the greater difficulty which an apprentice dismissed with a slur on his character might have in obtaining other employment.
1 Citers


 
Joyner v Weeks [1891] 2 QB 31
1891


Landlord and Tenant, Damages
The general rule at common law is that the measure of damages for breach of the covenant to repair by a tenant is the cost of putting the premises into the state of repair required by the covenant.
1 Citers


 
Scholes v Brook (1891) 64 LT 674
1891


Negligence, Damages
Counsel for the appellant had submitted that the damages ought to be the difference between the value of the estate as stated by the valuers and the real value at that time. This submission was rejected. Held: The argument was rightly rejected.
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The Iron and Steel Fencing and Buildings Co [1891] 19 R 199
1891


Damages
The particular use of the goods in question on which the pursuers' claim for loss was based was a use which was not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made, and therefore the proper level of damages was that depending on the ordinary use of the goods.
1 Citers


 
Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524
1892

Bowen LJ
Damages, Defamation
The plaintiff was an engineer and boiler-maker. He alleged that a statement in the local newspaper that he had ceased business had caused him loss. The evidence that was given at trial consisted of general evidence of a downturn in trade; but the plaintiff did not give evidence of the loss of any specific customer. The jury awarded him damages of £120. Held: The award was upheld. It is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that publication of defamatory words caused him damage because damage is presumed. As to damages: "If, indeed, over and above this general damage, further particular damage is under the circumstances to be relied on by the plaintiff, such particular damage must of course be alleged and shewn. But a loss of general custom, flowing directly and in the ordinary course of things from a libel, may be alleged and proved generally. "It is not special damage" - says Pollock, C.B., in Harrison v. Pearce . . "it is general damage resulting from the kind of injury the plaintiff has sustained." So in Bluck v. Lovering . . under a general allegation of loss of credit in business, general evidence was received of a decline of business presumably due to the publication of the libel, while loss of particular customers, not having been pleaded, was held rightly to have been rejected at the trial: . Macloughlin v. Welsh was an instance of excommunication in open church. General proof was held to be rightly admitted that the plaintiff was shunned and his mill abandoned, though no loss of particular customers was shewn. Here the very nature of the slander rendered it necessary that such general proof should be allowed. The defamatory words were spoken openly and publicly, and were intended to have the exact effect which was produced. Unless such general evidence was admissible, the injury done could not be proved at all.'
However, in relation to libel: "If, in addition to this general loss, the loss of particular customers was to be relied on, such particular losses would, in accordance with the ordinary rules of pleading, have been required to be mentioned in the statement of claim…" and 'The necessity of alleging and proving actual temporal loss with certainty and precision in all cases of the sort has been insisted upon for centuries: . . In all actions accordingly on the case where the damage actually done is the gist of the action, the character of the acts themselves which produce the damage, and the circumstances under which these acts are done, must regulate the degree of certainty and particularity with which the damage done ought to be stated and proved. As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon less would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist upon more would be the vainest pedantry. The rule to be laid down with regard to malicious falsehoods affecting property or trade is only an instance of the doctrines of good sense applicable to all that branch of actions on the case to which the class under discussion belongs. The nature and circumstances of the publication of the falsehood may accordingly require the admission of evidence of general loss of business as the natural and direct result produced, and perhaps intended to be produced. An instructive illustration, and one by which the present appeal is really covered, is furnished by the case of Hargrave v. Le Breton . . decided a century and a half ago. It was an example of slander of title at an auction. The allegation in the declaration was that divers persons who would have purchased at the auction left the place; but no particular persons were named. The objection that they were not specially mentioned was, as the report tells us, "easily" answered. The answer given was that in the nature of the transaction it was impossible to specify names; that the injury complained of was in effect that the bidding at the auction had been prevented and stopped, and that everybody had gone away. It had, therefore, become impossible to tell with certainty who would have been bidders or purchasers if the auction had not been rendered abortive. This case shows, what sound judgment itself dictates, that in an action for falsehood producing damage to a man's trade, which in its very nature is intended or reasonably likely to produce, and which in the ordinary course of things does produce, a general loss of business, as distinct from the loss of this or that known customer, evidence of such general decline of business is admissible."
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 London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v South Eastern Railway Co; HL 1893 - [1893] AC 429; [1892] 1 Ch 120
 
Wolmershausen v Gullick [1893] 2 Ch 514
1893

Wright J
Limitation, Damages, Contract
Claim for contribution between co-securities. Wright J reviewed the development of the entitlement to contribution from Justinian's statement of it, through its application by the custom of the City of London in the time of Queen Elizabeth to the time of his judgment.
1 Citers


 
Boyd v The Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co (1894) 11 RPC 175
1894


Intellectual Property, Damages
In a claim for damages for infringement of a patent, the plaintiff manufacturers proved that a profit of 7s. per spindle would have been made, and settlements of litigation for lesser rates were discarded.
1 Citers


 
South Hetton Coal Company Ltd v North Eastern News Association Limited [1894] 1 QB 133
1894
CA
Kay LJ, Lord Esher MR, Lopes LJ
Defamation, Damages
The plaintiff company sued for defamation in respect of an article which alleged that it neglected its workforce. The defendants contended that no action for libel would lie on the part of a company unless actual pecuniary damage was proved. Held: This submission was rejected. Kay LJ said: "a trading corporation may sue for a libel calculated to injure them in respect of their business, and may do so without any proof of damage general or special. Of course if there be no such evidence the damages given will probably be small." Words may be defamatory of a professional if they impute lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional activity.
Lopes LJ said that a company may maintain an action for a libel reflecting on the management of its business without alleging or proving special damage.
Lord Esher MR said that the law of defamation is the same for all plantiffs. While there were obvious differences between individuals and companies: "Then, if the case be one of libel - whether on a person, a firm, or a company - the law is that damages are at large. It is not necessary to prove any particular damage; the jury may give such damages as they think fit, having regard to the conduct of the parties respectively, and all the circumstances of the case."
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White v Mellin [1895] AC 134
1895
HL
Lord Watson
Damages
Lord Watson said: "Damages and injunction are merely two different forms of remedy against the same wrong; and the facts which must be proved in order to entitle a plaintiff to the first of these remedies are equally necessary in the case of the second. The onus resting upon a plaintiff who asks an injunction, and does not say that he has as yet suffered any special damage, is if anything the heavier, because it is incumbent upon him to satisfy the Court that such damage will necessarily be occasioned to him in the future."
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Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company, Meux's Brewery Co v Same [1895] 1 Ch 287; [1891-4] All ER Rep 838; (1895) 64 LJ Ch 216; (1895) 72 LT 34; (1895) 12 R 112
1895
CA
Lindley LJ, A L Smith LJ
Nuisance, Damages, Land
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction for nuisance by noise and vibration which was causing structural injury to a public house. Held: The court set out the rules for when a court should not grant an injunction for an infringement of light. The fact that the wrongdoer is in some sense a public benefactor has never been considered a sufficient reason to refuse an injunction against a nuisance he creates. The Act which gave the Courts of Equity a discretion to award damages in place of an injunction did not thereby alter the rules on the grant of injunctions, and where an injunction was a proper remedy, the use of the discretion was not to be used to excuse wrong doing. A party with the benefit of a restrictive covenant is, as a general rule, entitled to an injunction on the trial of the action as distinct from an award of damages unless (1) the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small, (2) it is capable of being estimated in terms of money, (3) it can adequately be compensated for by a small payment and (4) it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction.
AL Smith LJ said: "Many judges have stated, and I emphatically agree with them, that a person by committing a wrongful act (whether it be a public company for public purposes or a private individual) is not thereby entitled to ask the court to sanction his doing so by purchasing his neighbour's rights, by assessing damages in that behalf, leaving his neighbour with the nuisance, or his lights dimmed, as the case may be.
In such cases the well known rule is not to accede to the application, but to grant the injunction sought, for the plaintiff's legal right has been invaded, and he is prima facie entitled to an injunction.
There are, however, cases in which this rule may be relaxed, and in which the damages may be awarded in substitution for an injunction as authorized by this section. In any instance in which a case for an injunction has been made out, if the plaintiff by his acts or laches has disentitled himself to an injunction the court may award damages in its place. So again, whether the case be for a mandatory injunction or to restrain a continuing nuisance, the appropriate remedy may be damages in lieu of an injunction, assuming a case for an injunction to be made out. In my opinion, it may be stated as a good working rule that - (1) If the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small, (2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money, (3) And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment, (4) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction: - then damages in substitution for an injunction may be given.

There may also be cases in which, though the four above-mentioned requirements exist, the defendant by his conduct, as, for instance, hurrying up his buildings so as if possible to avoid an injunction, or otherwise acting with reckless disregard to the plaintiff's rights, has disentitled himself from asking that damages may be assessed in substitution for an injunction. It is impossible to lay down any rule as to what, under the differing circumstances of each case, constitutes either a small injury, or one that can be estimated in money, or what is a small money payment, or an adequate compensation, or what would be oppressive to the defendant. This must be left to the good sense of the tribunal which deals with each case as it comes up for adjudication. For instance, an injury to the plaintiff's legal right to light to a window in a cottage represented by £15 might well be held to be not small but considerable; whereas a similar injury to a warehouse or other large building represented by ten times that amount might be held to be inconsiderable. Each case must be decided upon its own facts; but to escape the rule it must be brought within the exception. In the present case it appears to me that the injury to the plaintiff is certainly not small; nor is it in my judgment capable of being estimated in money, or of being adequately compensated by a small money payment."
Lindley LJ said: 'Ever since Lord Cairns' Act was passed the Court of Chancery has repudiated the notion that the Legislature intended to turn that court into a tribunal for legalizing wrongful acts: or in other words, the Court has always protested against the notion that it ought to allow a wrong to continue simply because the wrondgoer is able and willing to pay for the injury he may inflict. Neither has the circumstance that the wrondoer is in some sense a public benefactor (eg a gas or water company or a sewer authority) ever been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to protect by injunction an individual whose rights are being persistently infringed. Expropriation, even for a money consideration, is only justifiable when Parliament has sanctioned it.' and

"Without denying the jurisdiction to award damages instead of an injunction, even in cases of continuing actionable nuisances, such jurisdiction ought not to be exercised in such cases except under very exceptional circumstances. I will not attempt to specify them, or to lay down rules for the exercise of judicial discretion. It is sufficient to refer, by way of example, to trivial and occasional nuisances: cases in which a plaintiff has shown that he only wants money; vexatious and oppressive cases; and cases where the plaintiff has so conducted himself as to render it unjust to give him more than pecuniary relief. In all such cases as these, and in all others where an action for damages is really an adequate remedy - as where the acts complained of are already finished - an injunction can be properly refused."
Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns' Act)
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Kirby v Harrogate School Board [1896] 1 CH 437
1896
CA
Lindley LJ, Kay LJ, A L Smith LJ
Land, Damages
The Board had power under the 1870 Act to acquire land to build school accommodation. The 1845 Act was to apply "with respect to the purchase of land" for the purposes of the 1870 Act. The Board began to erect a school building on a site which they had acquired by agreement. The plaintiff alleged that it infringed a restrictive covenant attached to his land, and sought an injunction. Held: The claim failed. The work was authorised by the statute, and the only remedy for the infringement of the private right was a claim for compensation under section 68 of the 1845 Act.
Lindley LJ thought the language of the 1845 statute to be unhappy, but: "when regard is had to the object of the section, it would be misreading the Lands Clauses Act if we were to hold that a person injuriously affected by the construction of the works could not have the benefit of section 68 if the company had managed to acquire the land by agreement rather than by the exercise of their compulsory powers. I have not the slightest doubt myself that s. 68 properly applies to all cases of purchase by railway companies under their powers, and to all cases of purchase by school boards under the powers conferred upon them by this Act of 1870."
Kay LJ would not confine the words of section 68 to works on land which had been acquired compulsorily.
Elementary Education Act 1870 - Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845
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 Trego v Hunt; HL 1896 - [1896] AC 7
 
Bray v Ford [1895-99] All ER Rep 1011; [1896] AC 44
1896
HL
Lord Herschell, Lord Halsbury LC
Trusts, Equity, Litigation Practice, Damages, Defamation
An appellate court's power to order a new trial is conditional on "some substantial wrong or miscarriage" being established.
Lord Hershell said: "It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position, such as the plaintiff’s, is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule. But I am satisfied that it might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality, without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of wrong-doing. Indeed, it is obvious that it might sometimes be to the advantage of the beneficiaries that their trustee should act for them professionally rather than a stranger, even though the trustee were paid for his services."
Lord Halsbury LC: What ws required was something sufficiently serious to render the decision of the jury unsafe amounting to "a substantial wrong" in which "the defendant was not permitted to present his case to the jury with the argument that his original complaint was true".
Lord Herschell discussed the approach to damages in defamation cases: "The damages cannot be measured by any standard known to the law; they must be determined by a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, viewed in the light of the law applicable to them. The latitude is very wide. It would often be impossible to say that the verdict was a wrong one, whether the damages were assessed at £500 or £1,000."
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Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538
1896
CA
Rigby, Lindley LJ
Damages
Common law damages for the misuse of property involved an award of a sum equivalent to the price or hire that a reasonable person would pay for such use, even if the owner would not himself actually have been using the property. This case involved trespass to land by tipping.
Lindley LJ observed "that if one man runs trucks on rails over another man's land it does not do any harm whatever, and there is no pecuniary damage", but that the law was now settled. He stated the principle: "if one person has without leave of another been using that other's land for his own purposes, he ought to pay for such user."
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 The Owners of No 7 Steam Sand, Pump Dredger v The Owners of SS 'Greta Holme'; HL 1897 - [1897] AC 596
 
The Kate [1899] P 165
1899


Transport, Damages
The Kate was totally lost in a collision with the defendants' ship, whilst on the ballast leg of a charterparty. The issue was whether in a case of total loss as opposed to partial loss of a ship without a cargo, the plaintiffs could recover only the market value of the ship at the time of the loss (as the defendants contended) or the profit lost under the charterparty as well (as the plaintiffs contended). Held:
Sir Francis Jeune P laid it down that the general principle which governs the assessment of damage is 'restitutio in integrum qualified by the condition that the damage sought to be recovered must not be too remote.' and also said: "Sir Robert Phillimore states that the value should be taken as at the end of the voyage, and therefore lets in freight or interest as an additional compensation . . The present case, which is that of a vessel without cargo, but under charter, being totally lost, is not exactly that contemplated by Sir Robert Phillimore; but it appears to me to follow from his judgment that the value of the vessel may in such case be taken as at the end of her voyage, and something allowed in respect of the period between the time of collision and the end of the voyage . . the profits under the charterparty should take the place of interest, as more accurately representing the loss to the owner, and may fairly be considered to be the equivalent of freight when a cargo is on board. Indeed I can see no distinction in principle between the case of freight when a cargo is on board and . . a charterparty under which cargo is to be taken."
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Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Puncture Proof Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd (1899) 16 RPC 209
1899


Intellectual Property, Damages
There are two essential principles in valuing a claim for damages: first, that the plaintiffs must prove their loss: second, that the defendants being wrong-doers, damages should be liberally assessed but that the object is to compensate the plaintiffs and not punish the defendants.
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Goodfellow v Gray [1899] 2 QB 498
1899


Damages
A right of set-off could be allowed against damages due on a judgment in another action.
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Teacher v Calder [1899] AC 451; [1899] UKHL 1; (1899) 7 SLT 153; (1899) 1 F (HL) 39
24 Jul 1899
HL
Watson L
Contract, Damages
The mere fact that the defendant's breach of his contract with the plaintiff has enabled him to enter into a more profitable contract with someone else should also not be sufficient to justify departing from the normal rules for calculation of damages.
[ Bailii ]
 
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