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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Criminal Practice - From: 2000 To: 2000

This page lists 106 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Customs and Excise Commissioners v City of London Magistrates' Court [2002] 1 WLR 2020; [2000] 4 All ER 763
2000
QBD
Lord Bingham CJ, Morison J
Criminal Practice, Magistrates
Access orders were sought by the Customs and Excise against banks to facilitate an investigation into the affairs of taxpayers and the issue was whether the resulting proceedings constituted "criminal proceedings" within the meaning of section 19(1). Held: "It is in my judgment the general understanding that criminal proceedings involve a formal accusation made on behalf of the state or by a private prosecutor that a defendant has committed a breach of the criminal law, and the state or the private prosecutor has instituted proceedings which may culminate in the conviction and condemnation of the defendant."
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 19(1)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Tuegel [2000] 2 All ER 872; [2000] 2 Cr App R 361
2000
CACD
Rose LJ
Criminal Practice
The court retains a common law power to adjourn part of its sentencing procedure. Courts should exercise considerable restraint in their interventions.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Sales [2000] 2 Cr App R 431
2000
CACD
Rose LJ
Criminal Practice
The court gave guidance on the proper approach of an appellate court to an application to adduce fresh evidence is contained in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal: “Proffered fresh evidence in written form is likely to be in one of three categories: plainly capable of belief; plainly incapable of belief, and possibly capable of belief. Without hearing the witness, evidence in the first category will usually be received and evidence in the second category will usually not be received. In relation to evidence in the third category, it may be necessary for this Court to hear the witness de bene esse in order to determine whether the evidence is capable of belief. That course is frequently followed in this Court.”
1 Citers


 
Mohammadally v The State (2000 SCJ No 289)
2000


Commonwealth, Criminal Practice, Constitutional
(Supreme Court of Mauritius) The appellant had dispensed with the services of her counsel four days before the date of trial and had not taken steps to engage another. The trial judge refused to grant her a postponement, on the ground that she could readily have made efforts to obtain another counsel in the time. She was convicted of a drugs charge and her appeal against conviction was dismissed. Held: Since she could easily have engaged another counsel in the time and had made no attempt to do so, she had not been denied access to legal advice and there was no breach of section 10 of the Constitution.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Isleworth Crown Court and Uxbridge Magistrates' Court, ex parte Buda [2000] 1 Cr App R (S) 538
2000


Criminal Practice
When a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a plea.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Norwich Crown Court ex parte Estabrook [2000] WL 281287 (QBD)
2000
QBD

Criminal Practice
The court considered the ability of the Crown Court to investigate a suggestion that defendant's plea was made under duress from his lawyer.
1 Cites


 
Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414
2000

Callinan J, Gleeson CJ and Gummow J, McHugh and Hayne JJ
Criminal Practice
(High Court of Australia) Gilbert was tried for murder. The judge directed the jury that manslaughter was not an alternative verdict. The jury, correctly directed on the ingredients of murder, convicted. Held: The court was aksed whether this was a substantial miscarriage of justice. Gleeson CJ and Gummow J recognised the difficulty of knowing whether a misdirection is advantageous to one party or the other and held that while it could, as a general rule, be assumed that juries understand and follow judicial directions, it need not be assumed that juries were unaffected by matters of possible prejudice when making their decisions. An appellate court should not assume that juries adopted a mechanistic approach to the task of fact-finding, oblivious of the consequences of their conclusion: "The system of criminal justice, as administered by appellate courts, requires the assumption, that, as a general rule, juries understand, and follow, the directions they are given by trial judges. It does not involve the assumption that their decision-making is unaffected by matters of possible prejudice."
Callinan J recognised that a jury room might not be a place of undeviating intellectual and logical rigour, and concluded: "The appellant was entitled to a trial at which directions according to law were given. It is contrary to human experience that in situations in which a choice of decisions may be made, what is chosen will be unaffected by the variety of the choices offered, particularly when, as here, a particular choice was not the only or inevitable choice."
McHugh J (dissenting) said that the verdict of a properly directed jury should be respected: "The argument for the appellant is a claim that this Court should proceed on one of two bases, each of which necessarily involves an assumption that, if manslaughter had been left as an issue, the jury might have disregarded their sworn duty to give a verdict in accordance with the evidence. The first assumption is that, if manslaughter had been left, the jury might have convicted of manslaughter even though they knew, because of the trial judge's directions, that the appellant was guilty of murder. The second assumption is that the jurors were not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew that his brother intended to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm on Linsley, that they knew therefore that he was not guilty of murder, but that they nevertheless convicted him of murder rather than acquit him and see him go free. In my respectful opinion, as a matter of legal policy, no court of justice can entertain either assumption.
The criminal trial on indictment proceeds on the assumption that jurors are true to their oath, that, in the quaint words of the ancient oath, they hearken to the evidence and that they obey the trial judge's directions. On that assumption, which I regard as fundamental to the criminal jury trial, the common law countries have staked a great deal. If it was rejected or disregarded, no one - accused, trial judge or member of the public - could have any confidence in any verdict of a criminal jury or in the criminal justice system whenever it involves a jury trial. If it was rejected or disregarded, the pursuit of justice through the jury system would be as much a charade as the show trial of any totalitarian state. Put bluntly, unless we act on the assumption that criminal juries act on the evidence and in accordance with the directions of the trial judge, there is no point in having criminal jury trials."
Hayne J (dissenting): "Nor does the conclusion which I have reached depend upon some judicial assessment of what was acknowledged to be a strong case against the appellant. It is a conclusion which depends entirely upon giving due weight to the verdict of the jury in light of what they were told by the judge and assuming (there being no basis for suggesting otherwise) that they did their duty conscientiously.
The trial to which the appellant was entitled was a trial according to law. There were two questions for the Court of Appeal. First, was there a trial according to law (and all agreed that there was not). Second, and no less important, was the question whether a substantial miscarriage of justice had actually occurred. That second question is not concluded by pointing to the fact that there was a misdirection and that there was, therefore, not a trial according to law. The existence of the proviso denies that the fact of misdirection will, in every case, require an order for retrial. Nor can this second question be answered by making an assumption that the jury might have chosen to disregard what they were told by the judge. Such an assumption is unwarranted. It is an assumption which suggests that emotion (whether induced by the eloquence of counsel or otherwise) might have supplanted the collective common sense and careful reasoning that jurors bring to bear upon a difficult task. It is an assumption which, if effect is given to it, turns the judge's charge to a jury into a ritual incantation which appellate courts must examine for formal correctness but which appellate courts are free (if not bound) to assume a jury may have disregarded."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina (Britton) v Croydon Crown Court (2000) 164 JP 729
2000

Hooper J
Criminal Practice
The Crown Court is a single court.
Supreme Court Act 1981 76 78
1 Citers


 
Regina v Jackson Times, 05 January 2000
5 Jan 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
When a judge was called upon to decide upon public interest immunity disclosures in the absence of one party to a case, it was necessary for the prosecution to act absolutely scrupulously. By accident an earlier misrepresentation was discovered in this case, and a re-trial was ordered.


 
 Regina v Martin (David Paul); CACD 5-Jan-2000 - Gazette, 27 January 2000; Times, 05 January 2000

 
 In Re Pinochet Ugarte; QBD 7-Jan-2000 - Gazette, 07 January 2000; Times, 16 February 2000
 
Practice Direction (Crown Court: Allocation of Business) (No 3) Times, 18 January 2000
18 Jan 2000
LCJ

Criminal Practice
Describes in detail the choice of Crown Courts for dealing with different types of matters and applications. Lists situations and procedures for transfer of matters between Crown Courts, and provision for presiding judges' directions.

 
Fitt v United Kingdom 29777/96; [2000] ECHR 89; (2000) 30 EHRR 480; [2000] Po LR 10; [2000] 30 EHRR 480
16 Feb 2000
ECHR
Wildhaber P
Human Rights, Criminal Practice, Police
(Grand Chamber) Complaint as to non-disclosure of prosecution evidence.
European Convention on Human Rights 5 6.1
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Worldii ]
 
Rowe and Davis v The United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 91
16 Feb 2000
ECHR
Wildhaber P
Human Rights, Criminal Practice
(Grand Chamber) Complaint as to non-disclosure of prosecution evidence.
European Convention on Human Rights 5 6.1
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Amann v Switzerland (2000) 30 EHRR 843; [2000] ECHR 88; 27052/95
16 Feb 2000
ECHR
Mrs E Palm P
Human Rights, Criminal Practice
(Grand Chamber) Complaint as to non-disclosure of prosecution evidence. Held: The holding and use of the information in question had not been "in accordance with the law", as required by article 8(2), because of the absence from the relevant national legislation of adequate protection against arbitrary interference.
European Convention on Human Rights 5 6.1
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Worldlii ]
 
Jasper v The United Kingdom Times, 01 March 2000; 28901/95; (2000) 30 EHRR 441; (2000) 30 EHHR 1; (2000) 30 EHRR 480; [2000] ECHR 90
16 Feb 2000
ECHR
Wildhaber P
Human Rights, Police, Criminal Practice
Grand Chamber - The defendants had been convicted after the prosecution had withheld evidence from them and from the judge under public interest immunity certificates. They complained that they had not had fair trials. Held: The right was breached insofar as the prosecution had themselves sought to make that assessment without judicial involvement. Disclosure at a later stage on appeal was not a sufficient remedy, since the task of the appellate court was different. Nevertheless if the judge had been given some involvement, a necessary withholding could be proper. The court recognised that it was a "fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings, including the elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, should be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and defence. The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party. In addition Article 6(1) requires, as indeed does English law, that the prosecution authorities should disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession for or against the accused" but "the European Court's task is to ascertain whether the decision-making procedure applied in each case complied, as far as possible, with the requirements of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the accused".
European Convention on Human Rights 5 6.1
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Worldlii ]
 
Practice Direction (Crown Court: Trial of Children and Young Persons) Times, 17 February 2000
17 Feb 2000
LCJ

Criminal Practice, Children
Directions given to ensure that young persons tried in a Crown Court receive a fair trial allowing for their age and understanding. The trial procedure must not expose the child to humiliation or distress, consideration should be given to splitting off of any adult defendants, consideration should be given to the physical layout of the court, and the court's daily timetables and otherwise.

 
Regina v Worcester Crown Court Ex Parte Norman Times, 17 February 2000
17 Feb 2000
QBD

Criminal Practice
Where a defendant was remanded in custody pending trial in the Crown Court, the trial date should be fixed at an early stage. Here, after repeated adjournments, the court had, three days before expiry of the limit, fixed a trial three months into the future. That ruling would have to stand, but in cases requiring substantial court time, the date should be fixed at the Plea and Directions Hearing.
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985


 
 Lees, Regina v; CCNI 18-Feb-2000 - [2002] NICC 2450
 
Regina v Leonard Gibson Times, 03 March 2000; Gazette, 09 March 2000; [2000] EWCA Crim 20
23 Feb 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
Where a defendant was accused in relation to the acquisition of assets by criminal conduct, the onus was not on the prosecution to disprove the defendant's assertions about how the assets had been acquired, but rather it was for the defendant to establish on a balance of probabilities that the defence applied.
Where a defendant was accused in relation to the acquisition of assets by criminal conduct, the onus was not on the prosecution to disprove the defendant's assertions about how the assets had been acquired, but rather it was for the defendant to establish on a balance of probabilities that the defence applied.
Criminal Justice Act 1988 93B
[ Bailii ]
 
Alexander Von Starck v The Queen Times, 16 March 2000; [2000] UKPC 5; [2000] 1 WLR 1270; (2000) 56 WIR 424
28 Feb 2000
PC
Lord Clyde
Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
(Jamaica) The defendant had fatally stabbed a woman. On arrest, he admitted killing her and that he had the knife which he had used to do so. He gave the police officer a pouch containing a knife, on which blood of the same group as that of the deceased was found, and a jar containing cocaine. He blamed the cocaine for causing him to commit the crime. He did not give evidence but made an unsworn statement from the dock. He did not deny killing the deceased, or mention taking cocaine, but said that he did not know what had happened. Held: A judge should recognise that counsel presenting a case to the jury may choose to emphasise some possible verdicts and have good reason for not mentioning others. Nevertheless the judge had a duty to place all the possible verdicts before the jury, and whether or not counsel had sought to advance them, provided only that there was evidence which properly raised the issue in the trial. "As a matter of law it is not disputed that the voluntary consumption of drugs, as well as the voluntary consumption of alcohol, may operate so as to reduce the crime to murder to one of manslaughter on the ground that intoxication was such that the accused would not have been able to form the specific intent to kill or commit grievous bodily harm."
Lord Clyde: "The function and responsibility of the judge is greater and more onerous than the function and the responsibility of the counsel appearing for the prosecution and for the defence in a criminal trial. In particular counsel for a defendant may choose to present his case to the jury in the way which he considers best serves the interest of his client. The judge is required to put to the jury for their consideration in a fair and balanced manner the respective contentions which have been presented. But his responsibility does not end there. It is his responsibility not only to see that the trial is conducted with all due regard to the principle of fairness, but to place before the jury all the possible conclusions which may be open to them on the evidence which has been presented in the trial whether or not they have all been canvassed by either of the parties in their submissions. It is the duty of the judge to secure that the overall interests of justice are served in the resolution of the matter and that the jury is enabled to reach a sound conclusion on the facts in light of a complete understanding of the law applicable to them. If the evidence is wholly incredible, or so tenuous or uncertain that no reasonable jury could reasonably accept it, then of course the judge is entitled to put it aside. The threshold of credibility in this context is, as was recognised in Xavier v The State (unreported), 17 December 1998; Appeal No. 59 of 1997 a low one, and, as was also recognised in that case, it would only cause unnecessary confusion to leave to the jury a possibility which can be seen beyond reasonable doubt to be without substance. But if there is evidence on which a jury could reasonably come to a particular conclusion then there can be few circumstances, if any, in which the judge has no duty to put the possibility before the jury. For tactical reasons counsel for a defendant may not wish to enlarge upon, or even to mention, a possible conclusion which the jury would be entitled on the evidence to reach, in the fear that what he might see as a compromise conclusion would detract from a more stark choice between a conviction on a serious charge and an acquittal. But if there is evidence to support such a compromise verdict it is the duty of the judge to explain it to the jury and leave the choice to them. In Xavier v The State the defence at trial was one of alibi. But it was observed by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in that case that, 'If accident was open on the evidence, then the judge ought to have left the jury with the alternative of manslaughter'. In the present case the earlier statements together with their qualifications amply justified a conclusion of manslaughter and that alternative should have been left to the jury."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ PC ] - [ PC ]

 
 Regina v Tibbs; CACD 28-Feb-2000 - Times, 28 February 2000; [2000] 2 Cr App R 309
 
McKerry v Teesdale and Wear Valley Justices; McKerry v Director of Public Prosecutions Gazette, 16 March 2000; Times, 29 February 2000; [2001] EMLR 5
29 Feb 2000
CA
Lord Bingham
Child Support, Criminal Practice, Media
The courts must recognise the need to protect the identity of children involved in criminal proceedings. This derived both from national statute and from international law and practice. Nevertheless, the court had the discretion in appropriate cases to order disclosure of the name of a child convicted before it of criminal charges where the public interest properly required this. As to the giving of reasons for their decision by magistrates: "It is not usual for magistrates to give detailed reasons; nor is it usual for juries, who make very important decisions affecting human rights, to give any reasons at all. If an aggrieved party wishes to obtain more detailed reasons from a magistrates' court, then a request can be made to state a case, as was done here, and the justices have given their reasons at somewhat greater length."
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 49(4A)
1 Citers



 
 Caballero v United Kingdom; ECHR 29-Feb-2000 - Times, 29 February 2000; (2000) 30 EHRR 643; 32819/96; [2000] ECHR 52; [2000] ECHR 53
 
Regina v Neath and Port Talbot Justices, ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions Times, 15 March 2000; Gazette, 02 March 2000
2 Mar 2000
QBD

Magistrates, Criminal Practice
The magistrates had refused an adjournment of a trial after the non-attendance of the complainant. The prosecution offered no evidence, and the charge was dismissed. The prosecutor applied for judicial review, but the case came on only 16 months afterwards. The court held that several factors were to be considered, including the seriousness of the charge, the evidence and effect of any delay upon it, the defendant's contribution if any to the delay, and any justifiable feeling of aggrievement for the complainant.

 
Regina v Wright Times, 03 March 2000
3 Mar 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
Where questions arose during a trial which required discussions of any legal complexity, these should normally take place in the absence of the jury. If possible this should be after the evidence had been called but before the closing speeches. Where as in this case, both counsel felt that the judge was incorrect in law, a judge should normally seek to resolve disagreements before proceeding further.

 
Regina v Van Bokkum Unreported; 199900333/Z3
7 Mar 2000
CACD
Tuckey LJ
Criminal Practice
Tuckey LJ rejected, as contrary to Galbraith, the proposition that in a case dependent on circumstantial evidence, the judge would be required to withdraw the case if some inference other than guilt could reasonably be drawn from the facts proved: he should only withdraw it if he considered it unsafe for the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty on the totality of the evidence.
1 Cites



 
 Regina v Cairns; CACD 8-Mar-2000 - Times, 08 March 2000; [2000] EWCA Crim 21
 
Stephen Jordan v The United Kingdom (1) Times, 17 March 2000; 30280/96; [2000] ECHR 102; [2000] ECHR 103
14 Mar 2000
ECHR

Criminal Practice, Human Rights
A commanding officer had decided that a soldier should be held in custody pending trial. The soldier complained that since the same commanding officer would later be involved in the preparation of the case against him, that decision was tainted and that he had not had a fair hearing. Furthermore he complained that he had not been given any effective means of redress. It was held that the procedure infringed the soldier's rights to a fair trial, and also that no remedy was given.
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 5-3; Violation of Art. 5-5; Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient; Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Criminal Cases Review Commission, Michael John Hunt [2000] EWHC Admin 307
21 Mar 2000
Admn

Criminal Practice

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Goldson and McGlashan v The Queen [2000] UKPC 9; Appeal No 64 of 1998; (2000) 56 WIR 444
23 Mar 2000
PC
Lord Hoffmann
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
PC (Jamaica) The holding of an identification parade was desirable where the witness's claim to have known and recognised the suspect is disputed. Lord Hoffmann referring to the defendant's denial that he was the person whom the identifying witness Claudette claimed to know by his nickname: "The truth of this issue could have been tested by an identification parade. If Claudette had failed to pick out the accused on the parade, her assertion that the accused were known to her would have been shown to be false. By not holding identification parades, the police had denied the accused an opportunity to demonstrate conclusively that she was not telling the truth. On the other hand, if she had picked them out, the prosecution case would have been strengthened, although the judge would have had to direct the jury that the evidence went only to support her claim that she knew them and did not in any way confirm her identification of the gunmen." The function of the parade in such circumstances is not the normal one of testing the accuracy of the witness's recollection of the person identified, but to test the honesty of her assertion that she knew the accused.
Lord Hoffmann said that "a dock identification is unsatisfactory and ought not to be allowed," although "Unless the witness had provided the police with a complete identification by name or description, so as to enable the police to take the accused into custody, the previous identification should take the form of an identification parade."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ PC ]
 
Regina v O'Brien Times, 23 March 2000
23 Mar 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
The question of whether counts separated over a long time could be joined together in one indictment depended upon there being shown a nexus between them. The longer the time span, the greater the need for such a clear link, before evidence of the commission of one offence could be relevant in establishing the next. Time was not determinative, there had to be a sufficient nexus to create a link, and the test of such a link was the cross admissibility of evidence in the one case and the next.

 
Regina v James Archibald Greene [2000] NIECA 6
24 Mar 2000
CANI
Carswell LCJ
Criminal Practice, Northern Ireland
The appellant had been convicted of serious sexual assault against a child. The child later made inconsistent allegations. The appellant sought records from the hospital of interviews with the child. The hospital refused to reveal these without a court order. The Act gave power to order production of documents held by third parties not otherwise involved in the proceedings.
Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 25(1)
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Stephens (Michael) Times, 29 March 2000
29 Mar 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
Counsel had failed to warn his client that if convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, after a previous conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under thirteen, he would be subject to a mandatory life sentence. The prosecution would have been ready to accept a plea to an alternative charge of causing grievous bodily harm, where the mandatory provisions would not have applied. Held: This was sufficient to count as exceptional, and to justify treating the matter under section 2(3) of the Act.
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 2 2(3)


 
 A (A Minor) v Director of Public Prosecutions; QBD 29-Mar-2000 - Times, 29 March 2000
 
Regina v Luton Justices ex parte Judah Abecasis Times, 30 March 2000; Gazette, 30 March 2000
30 Mar 2000
CA

Criminal Practice, Magistrates
Although the rules specified that a form should be used when making application to extend the time for which money could be held pending an application under the Act for its forfeiture, there was no enforceable duty to prove that the form had been used, and its absence was not a fatal flaw in the application. The form was not an originating process, it was not a document served on the respondents, the defendant would be notified directly. No prejudice was established by any failure to us the form.
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 42(1) - Magistrates Courts (Detention and Forfeiture of Drug Trafficking Cash) Rules 1991 (1991 No 1923)

 
Comingersoll S A v Portugal 19, ECHR 2000-IV; 35382/97; [2000] ECHR 159; [2000] ECHR 160
6 Apr 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 6-1; Pecuniary damage - claim rejected; Non-pecuniary damage - financial award
When assessing the affect on fairness of proceedings becoming unreasonably extended in time, the court should look at the particular complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Labita v Italy 26772/95; [2000] 119 ECHR 2000 IV; [2000] ECHR 160; [2000] ECHR 161
6 Apr 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) No violation of Art. 3 with regard to alleged ill-treatment; Violation of Art. 3 with regard to lack of effective investigation; No violation of Art. 3 with regard to conditions of transfer; Violation of Art. 5-3; Violation of Art. 5-1; Violation of Art. 8; Not necessary to examine Art. 6-3; Violation of P4-2; Violation of P1-3; Pecuniary damage - claim rejected; Non-pecuniary damage - financial award; Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings.
Where the authorities detain a suspect for a lengthy period before trial, they must show special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings to justify continued detention. Article 3 prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim’s behaviour.
European Convention on Human Rights 3
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
BBC, Petitioners Times, 11 April 2000; 2001 SCCR 440
11 Apr 2000
HCJ

Media, Criminal Practice, Scotland
The absence of a jury from a criminal trial was not sufficient of itself to set aside the rule against the broadcasting of criminal proceedings. To set aside the rule, the onus was on the broadcaster to justify the departure from the rule and to persuade the court that there would be no interference in the proper administration of justice. It was not for the courts to justify acting in accordance with the rule.
Contempt of Court Act 1981
1 Citers


 
Regina v Middleton Times, 12 April 2000; [2000] TLR 293; [2001] Crim LR 251
12 Apr 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
Where a defendant was shown to have lied in the course of proceedings it need not always be necessary to give a Lucas direction. In some circumstances the jury could properly be expected not to follow a prohibited line of reasoning without such a direction. The direction may even confuse the jury sometimes. The underlying question was why the defendant had lied. It was better to approach this issue from a point of principle in each case than to try a detailed analysis of past cases.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v HM Advocate Times, 14 April 2000
14 Apr 2000
HCJ

Scotland, Criminal Practice, Human Rights
Where the prosecution had delayed nearly four years between interview and charge, that delay was so unreasonable as to render a continuation of the prosecution a breach of the defendant's human rights to a fair trial. The period to be considered not when the police first heard of the allegation and began to investigate, but the substitution of formal proceedings. The convention gave him the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time. The prosecution could have proceeded several years earlier.
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995


 
 In Re A Barrister (Wasted Costs Order) (No 9 of 1990); CACD 18-Apr-2000 - Times, 18 April 2000; Gazette, 29 June 2000
 
Regina v McKnight Times, 05 May 2000; [2000] EWCA Crim 33
19 Apr 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
A drunken intent direction was not necessary in all cases where drunkenness affected the defendant's state of mind in acts leading to a murder trial. A drunken intent remained an intent, and the judge should take care to avoid confusing the jury. Specific evidence was required of drunkenness to the point that intent was not to be inferred.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Harris Unreported, 19 April 2000
19 Apr 2000
CACD
Potter LJ
Criminal Practice
The purpose of section 74(3) was "not to define or enlarge the circumstances in which evidence is admissible of the fact that an accused has committed an offence, but simply to assist in the mode of proof of that fact (which it does in section 75): "21. … This is made doubly clear by the words which make clear that the conviction may not be adduced simply for the purposes of proving or inferring disposition. We also consider that the requirement that the evidence should be relevant 'to any matter in issue' is one which falls to be read not as confined to an issue which is an essential ingredient of the offence charged, but as extending to less fundamental evidential issues arising in the course of the proceedings: cf. the decision of this court in R v. Robertson (1987) 85 Cr App R 304 in relation to the words 'any issue in those proceedings' as contained in s. 74(1) of PACE."
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 74(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Johnson v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Times, 20 April 2000; Gazette, 18 May 2000
20 Apr 2000
QBD

Criminal Practice, Costs
A defendant appealed to the Crown Court against a conviction for causing unnecessary suffering to animals. Her appeal was dismissed, and the Crown Court awarded also the full costs of the prosecution before the magistrates, who had made a reduced award of costs. Though there was no right of appeal on a question of costs, the Crown Court had sufficient power to make an order. A prosecutor seeking a variation should make his intention clear, and set out his reasons.
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 18(1) - Supreme Court Act 1981 48(2)

 
Regina v Hearne and Coleman Unreported 4 May 2000
4 May 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
D appealed a conviction after direction under s34. Held: The appeal failed. "Section 34 is designed, in part at any rate and perhaps principally, to deal with the sort of situation which not infrequently arises where a defence is advanced which has never been previously indicated even though there was sufficient opportunity to do so, as from the provisions we have read make clear would be the case where there has been an interview under caution. It is to allow the jury, in a proper case and subject to safeguards, to draw an inference from the fact that the defence advanced at trial has not been previously entered, the obvious inference being in many such cases that it was or is a sprung defence, that is a recently made up, or improvised defence. It is not the truth or otherwise of the explanation which is the chief concern of the jury, it is the fact that it has not been mentioned previously which may in an appropriate case allow the jury to draw an inference that it is a recent invention, thus assisting the jury to its ultimate conclusion as to whether or not the explanation offered at trial is true or false. That is how the prosecution attempted to employ the provisions of this section at the trial of Hearne and it was in that context that the learned judge directed the jury as he did."
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 34
1 Citers


 
Regina v James (Walter) Times, 09 May 2000
9 May 2000
CACD

Criminal Evidence, Criminal Practice
Where fresh evidence from a witness who was not available for the trial is sought to be adduced on an appeal, the evidence must also include evidence or explanation as to the background of the new evidence or change in evidence.
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 23

 
Sander v The United Kingdom Times, 12 May 2000; 34129/96; (2000) 8 BHRC 279; (2000) 31 EHRR 1003; [2000] ECHR 193; [2000] ECHR 194
9 May 2000
ECHR

Criminal Practice, Human Rights
In a trial of an Asian defendant a juror complained that other jurors had made racist jokes, and feared that the defendant would not receive a fair trial. The judge obtained re-assurance from the jury that they would not so act, but did so in a way in which the complainor was identified. The trial was defective. The defendant could not be expected to accept that he had had a fair trial. The acquittal of an Asian co-defendant made no difference since the case against him was different.
Hudoc Violation of Art. 6-1; Pecuniary damage - claim rejected; Non-pecuniary damage - claim rejected
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Crummock (Scotland) Ltd v Hm Advocate Times, 09 May 2000
9 May 2000
HCJ

Criminal Practice, Human Rights, Scotland
A company was charged with causing a contamination of the water over a large area, and the jury was drawn from that same area, and therefore might contain members who had drunk the water alleged to have been contaminated. The issues surrounding the impartiality of a jury were different from those about a judge. They were selected at random from a wide area. It was fallacious to view them as potential complainants.
European Convention on Human Rights


 
 Dhesi v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police; CA 9-May-2000 - Times, 09 May 2000
 
Preston Borough Council v McGrath [2000] EWCA Civ 151
12 May 2000
CA
Lord Justice Morritt, Lord Justice Waller and Lord Justice Tuckey
Local Government, Criminal Practice
The defendant had been investigated for fraud against the claimant. He had disclosed documents to the police, but now complained at their use in the civil proceedings against him. Held: The document had not been given to the police under compulsion, reducing their obligations. It was possible that they might have shown it to the authority without having handed it over, In any event any privielge or complaint was now lost since the defendant had himself attached it to his pleadings.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Fennell; CACD 17-May-2000 - Times, 17 May 2000; Gazette, 31 May 2000; [2000] Crim LR 677; [2000] 1 WLR 2011; (2000) 164 JP 386; [2000] 2 Cr App R 318; [2000] EWCA Crim 3544
 
Practice Direction (Criminal Appeals Office Summaries) (No 2) Times, 24 May 2000
24 May 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
In future Court of Appeal summaries should be made available as of course to solicitor advocates. Those representing themselves before the Court of Appeal should also have access, save only that a judge may order otherwise in the case of material which was explicitly salacious or sadistic. This amends the earlier direction Practice Direction (Criminal Appeals Office Summaries) Times 7 Oct 1992.

 
Regina v Abrar Times, 26 May 2000
26 May 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
The jury having retired, and taken with them an exhibited document which had been torn and its pieces contained in an envelope, discovered upon examining the pieces that they had in fact been taken from two separate documents, contrary to what had been asserted in the trial. This was not a case where new evidence had been given to the jury after retirement, and the new evidence did not prejudice the defendant, and the verdict stood. Even so, it was important that documents be properly examined and themselves documented.

 
Practice Direction (Crown Court: Abuse of Process) Times, 30 May 2000
30 May 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
Directions given for those seeking to challenge a prosecution in the crown court as an abuse of process. A notice in the specified form must be served at least fourteen days before the date fixed for the trial, and any other defendant wishing to support the application must apply within seven days thereafter. Automatic directions would be given in accordance with the directions specified in the practice note.


 
 Regina v Lingham; CACD 2-Jun-2000 - Times, 02 June 2000
 
Regina v JO Unreported, 9 June 2000
9 Jun 2000
CACD
Tuckey LJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant who was aged 16 gave a no comment interview on the advice of his solicitor. At trial he waived privilege and his solicitor gave evidence that he had given him before interview a very similar account of the incident to that which the defendant had himself given the jury at trial. The judge failed to tell the jury that they should only draw an inference against him if it was something which he could reasonably have been expected to mention. Held: The appeal succeeded. Tuckey LJ discussed the operation of s34: "Once the preconditions to the operation of section 34 are satisfied the jury are entitled to draw: "such inferences from the failure as appear proper." "The usual inference which the jury are invited to draw is that at the time of the interview the defendant had no answer to the allegations being made against him or none that would stand up to questioning. In other words, his subsequent defence is a late fabrication or one which has been tailored to fit the prosecution case. But the prosecution in this case did not invite the jury to draw such inferences. In his directions to the jury the judge does not say what inference the jury could properly draw if they decided to do so. We think he should have done. He should have reminded the jury of the inference which the prosecution invited them to draw along the lines of the specimen direction.
. . . It was incumbent on the judge in his summing-up to identify the relevant inference."
Criminal Justice nd Public Order Act 1994 34
1 Citers


 
Procurator Fiscal, Glasgow v Boyle [2000] ScotSC 15
14 Jun 2000
ScSf

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
Application to dismiss the complaint as incompetent after delay
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Okolie Times, 16 June 2000
16 Jun 2000
CACD

Evidence, Criminal Practice
Evidence is always required on matters relating to foreign law, and such evidence given in person unless it was agreed or no issue was taken. Untranslated reports of stolen vehicles prepared by employees of the person who claimed to have been the victim of the theft had been incorrectly relied upon by the judge.
1 Cites



 
 Magee v United Kingdom; ECHR 20-Jun-2000 - Times, 20 June 2000; 28135/95; [2000] ECHR 216; (2001) 31 EHRR 35
 
Averill v United Kingdom Times, 20 June 2000; 36408/97; [2000] ECHR 212
20 Jun 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
In general, access to a lawyer should be guaranteed to a suspect before he is interviewed. The right of silence is not absolute. The caution which warns of possible adverse inferences is itself an indirect form of compulsion. However whether a breach occurred is a matter of fact in the circumstances. Because of the possibility of such inferences being drawn, it was necessary to give a suspect access to a solicitor before interview.
[ Bailii ]
 
The Bank v A Ltd, Mr B, C Ltd, Serious Fraud Office interested party
23 Jun 2000
ChD

Criminal Practice, Banking


 
Frydlender v France 30979/96; 43 ECHR 2000-VII; (2001) EHRR 52; [2000] ECHR 352; [2000] ECHR 353
27 Jun 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
The reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute. for Article 6.1, in its “civil” limb, to be applicable there must be a dispute over a “right” that can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The dispute must be genuine and serious. It may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise. Moreover, the outcome of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the civil right in question
European Convention on Human Rights 6.1
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Birse v Hm Advocate Times, 28 June 2000
28 Jun 2000
HCJ

Human Rights, Scotland, Criminal Practice
Where a magistrate had heard a proper description of the reasons for granting a search warrant, it was not an abuse of the suspect's human rights to execute it, even though he had not had chance to make any representations about the search. The right to an effective remedy was not to be enshrined in UK law, and this came close to such a claim.

 
Niedbala v Poland [2000] ECHR 359; 27915/95; [2000] ECHR 360; [2000] 33 EHRR 1137
4 Jul 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 5-3; Violation of Art. 5-4; Violation of Art. 8; Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient; Costs and expenses award
A warrant must be validated by an independent judicial authority.
European Convention on Human Rights 5(3)
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Kerr, Petitioner Times, 04 July 2000
4 Jul 2000
HCJ

Criminal Practice, Scotland
It was appropriate for the court to prepare and rely upon notes prepared from its own records. The appellant had sought to argue that there had be an undue delay in the progress of his case. The court had, before the hearing prepared a schedule from its own records of the hearings. It was for the defendant asserting delay to prepare and present his own version of events. If that had conflicted with the court record, that could have been dealt with.


 
 Regina v C (A Minor); CACD 5-Jul-2000 - Times, 05 July 2000

 
 Regina v Wheeler; CACD 7-Jul-2000 - Times, 07 July 2000; Gazette, 02 November 2000

 
 Darmalingum v The State; PC 10-Jul-2000 - Times, 18 July 2000; [2000] UKPC 30; Appeal No 42 of 1999; [2000] 1 WLR 2303

 
 Regina v Davis, Rowe, Johnson; CACD 17-Jul-2000 - Times, 25 July 2000; Times, 24 April 2000; [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 8; [2000] Crim LR 1012; [2000] UKHRR 683; [2000] HRLR 527; [2000] EWCA Crim 109

 
 Regina v Stone; CACD 19-Jul-2000 - [2000] EWCA Crim 48

 
 Regina v Gill; CACD 21-Jul-2000 - Times, 17 August 2000; [2000] EWCA Crim 49; [2001] 1 Cr App R 11
 
Regina v Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court, Ex Parte Okoli Gazette, 27 July 2000; Times, 02 August 2000
27 Jul 2000
QBD

Criminal Practice
The prosecution gave oral notice of its intention to appeal against a grant of bail at 11:30 am on 7 June, but the case did not come on before the Crown Court until 3:30pm on 9 June, which was outside the 48 hour time limit. It was argued that the prosecution had lost its right of appeal by a failure to get the hearing listed within 48 hours. The right had not been lost. To achieve that effect the statute would have required different and express powers. The act referred in general terms to the date on which the notice of appeal was given.
Bail (Amendment) Act 1993 1(8)

 
The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission for an Order etc [2000] ScotCS 241; 2001 SLT 1198
29 Aug 2000
SCS
Lord Clarke
Criminal Practice
The court drew attention to the difference between the situation where the court itself makes inquiries as to events in the jury retiring room with the aim of bringing the court in question into contempt and that where it makes inquiries with the aim of trying to ensure that justice does not miscarry: "we have some difficulty in applying the idea of contempt of court to a situation where a court itself makes inquiries, not with the aim of bringing the court in question into contempt but with the very different aim of trying to ensure that justice does not miscarry. Moreover, Parliament has not qualified the appeal court's powers under section 104 of the 1995 Act [Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995] by reference to section 8…. In these circumstances, since the point does not actually arise for determination, we need say no more than that we reserve our opinion both as to the effect of section 8 on the appeal court's powers under section 104 of the 1995 Act and as to whether, in any event, the court would ever use those powers to inquire into a jury's deliberations."
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 194(1)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Scarsbrook or Galbraith v Her Majesty's Advocate [2000] ScotHC 86; 2001 SLT 465
7 Sep 2000
HCJ
Lord Justice General
Criminal Practice, Contempt of Court
The purpose of orders under the section is to deal with reports of proceedings which are fair and accurate, but which should nonetheless be postponed, not with other material the publication of which might constitute a contempt of Court.
Contempt of Court Act 1981 4(2)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
IJL GMR And AKP v The United Kingdom (2000) 33 EHRR 225; 29522/95; 30574/96; 30056/96
19 Sep 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
Hudoc Violation of Art. 6-1 as regards the use made at the applicants 29522/95; 30056/96.
An adversarial procedure, with equality of arms and proper disclosure between prosecution and defence, has similarly been seen as fundamental to the fairness of a criminal trial.
European Convention on Human Rights 6
1 Citers


 
Howarth v The United Kingdom Times, 10 October 2000; 38081/97; [2000] ECHR 422; [2000] ECHR 423
21 Sep 2000
ECHR

Criminal Practice, Human Rights
The defendant had been sentenced to a non-custodial sentence, but the crown appealed, and two years later, a custodial sentence was substituted. Held: The delay was a breach of the Convention's reasonable time requirement under article 6 of the convention. The reasonableness must be looked at in the context of the particular case, including its complexity. Here there was no good reason advanced for the delay. The delay was unreasonable. "According to the Court's case-law, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and the authorities dealing with the case."
Hudoc Judgment (Merits and just satisfaction) Violation of Art. 6-1; No violation of Art. 3; Pecuniary damage - claim rejected; Non-pecuniary damage - financial award; Costs and expenses partial award - Convention proceedings
European Convention on Human Rights 6.1
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Practice Direction (Justices: Clerk to Court) [2000] 4 All ER 895; [2000] 1 WLR 1886
2 Oct 2000

Lord Woolf LCJ
Magistrates, Criminal Practice
Lord Woolf gave guidance as to the duties of the clerk to the magistrates as to the manner of assistance to be provided to them. He set out that it was the responsibility of the legal adviser to provide the justices with any advice they might require properly to perform their functions whether or not the justices had requested that advice, on questions of law; questions of mixed law and fact; matters of practice and procedure; the range of penalties available; any relevant decisions of the superior courts or other guidelines; other issues relevant to the matter before the court; and the appropriate decision-making structure to be applied in any given case. In addition to advising the justices it was his responsibility to assist the court, where appropriate, as to the formulation of reasons and the recording of those reasons. The Practice Direction then goes on to note (paragraph 4) that a justice's clerk or legal adviser must not play any part in making findings of fact. It adds that he may assist the bench by reminding him of the evidence, using any notes of the proceedings for this purpose. The practice direction is clear that if the justice's clerk gives any advice to a bench he should give the parties or advocates an opportunity of repeating any relevant submissions prior to that advice being given. If it is given in private he should report that advice to the parties, and the advice should be regarded as provisional and clearly stated to be so. The adviser should subsequently repeat the substance of that advice in open court and give the parties an opportunity to make any representations they wish on that provisional advice. The legal adviser should then state in open court whether the provisional advice is confirmed or, if it is varied, the nature of the variation.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte C Unreported, 6 October 2000
6 Oct 2000
Admn
Penry-Davey J
Criminal Practice
The court upheld a decision to prosecute a 15-year-old applicant for road traffic offences rather than to divert him from prosecution and caution. Penry-Davey J said: "It is clear from the case of R v Chief Constable of Kent ex parte L [1991] 93 Cr App R 416 that the discretion vested in the Crown Prosecution Service to continue criminal proceedings commenced by the police is subject to judicial review by this court, but only where it can be demonstrated that the decision was made regardless of or clearly contrary to a settled policy of the Director of Public Prosecutions evolved in the public interest; for example, the policy of cautioning juveniles, a policy which the Crown Prosecution Service is bound to apply where appropriate to the exercise of its discretion to continue or discontinue criminal proceedings. However, as Watkins LJ pointed out in that case, it would be only rarely that a defendant could succeed in showing that a decision was fatally flawed in such a manner as that."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Practice Direction (Justices Clerk to Couty) Times, 11 October 2000
11 Oct 2000
QBD

Magistrates, Criminal Practice, Human Rights
The direction set out in detail the duties of justices' clerks and legal advisers to the magistrates and the court, in respect of the application of the Act, and generally by restating duties to provide legal advice and assistance with appropriate procedures for allowing representations by those appearing before the court, and also restating and clarifying the limits of a justices' clerk's advice on issues of fact and evidence.

 
Regina v Shannon (Also Known As Alford) Times, 11 October 2000; Gazette, 19 October 2000; [2000] EWCA Crim 1535; [2001] 1 Cr App R 168
11 Oct 2000
CACD
Lord Justice Potter Mr Justice Hidden And Her Honour Judge Ann Goddard QC
Criminal Practice
The defendant had been enticed to commit a crime involving supply of controlled drugs by a journalist acting as an agent provocateur. Held: Entrapment is not a defence in UK law. It was open to the judge hearing the prosecution to exclude the evidence on the grounds that it was unfair, but there was no principle which required its exclusion. When considering whether or not to exclude the evidence on the basis that the offence had been committed at the behest of an agent provocateur, the mere fact of entrapment was not of itself sufficient to justify exclusion. Before excluding such evidence the judge must consider the effect of the entrapment on the unfairness of the proceedings as a whole.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 78
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
McDaid v United Kingdom; Ward v United Kingdom; Giles v UK; Leece v UK; Shorters v UK; Thwaites v UK Times, 17 October 2000; 34822/97; 34957/97; 34988/97; 35575/97; 35576/97; 35578/97; [2000] ECHR 463
17 Oct 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
The court had previously found that the applicants' rights to a fair trial had been infringed in the UK martial courts, in particular through the role of the convening officer. The court hearing that a friendly settlement had been reached with the applicants, struck out the proceedings.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Montgomery and Coulter v Her Majesty's Advocate Times, 06 December 2000; DRA Nos 1 and 2 of 2000; [2003] 1 AC 641; 2001 SLT 37; [2000] UKHL D1; 2002 SC (PC) 89; 2000 GWD 40-1487; 9 BHRC 641; [2001] UKHRR 124; [2001] 2 WLR 779; 2000 SCCR 1044
19 Oct 2000
PC
Lord Hoffmann
Criminal Practice, Human Rights, Media
The test of whether a defendant's common law right to a fair trial had been damaged by pre-trial publicity was similar to the test under the Convention, and also where there was any plea of oppression. The substantial difference is that no balancing exercise was to be carried out under the Convention test. The right to a fair trial is absolute, and unqualified. It was not to be subordinated to the public interest in the detection and suppression of crime. The Court need not look only at the effect on the jurors, but could also allow for the part which the judge would play. A question of Scottish criminal law and procedure falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court of Justiciary. Lord Hoffmann said: "events before the trial may create the conditions for an unfair determination of the charge. For example, an accused who is convicted on evidence obtained from him by torture has not had a fair trial. But the breach of Article 6(1) lies not in the use of torture (which is, separately, a breach of Article 3) but in the reception of the evidence by the court for the purposes of determining the charge. If the evidence had been rejected, there would still have been a breach of Article 3 but no breach of Article 6(1)."
European Convention on Human Rights 6(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ PC ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Francom; Regina v Latif (Clare); Regina v Latif (Melna); Regina v Bevis; Regina v Harker Times, 24 October 2000; [2000] Crim LR 1018; [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 17
24 Oct 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice, Human Rights
The judge failed to give a direction in accordance with recommendations from the Judicial Studies Board and counsel in the case as to the need for the jury not to draw inferences from the defendants' failure to mention certain facts on interview. The concepts of fairness and safety were accepted to be different, but the issue of fairness was to be decided in the context of all the circumstances of the case. In this case, the entire case had been presented on the basis that no inference was to be drawn, and the jury could not be expected to have drawn any such inference. The trial was fair and the verdict safe.
European Convention on Human Rights Art 6.1
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Sanghera; CA 26-Oct-2000 - Times, 26 October 2000
 
Regina v Hanratty Times, 26 October 2000
26 Oct 2000
CACD

Criminal Evidence, Criminal Practice
Persuasive but not conclusive evidence of the deceased's involvement in a notorious murder for which he had hanged had been found by subsequent DNA analysis. That analysis could only be improved by direct DNA analysis to be obtained by exhuming his body. In these circumstances, there was an over-riding public interest in obtaining positive confirmation or otherwise of the deceased's guilt or innocence.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Swaine; CACD 1-Nov-2000 - Times, 01 November 2000
 
Regina v Thorpe Times, 02 November 2000
2 Nov 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
Where events or disturbances in the public gallery at a trial were such that the court could not be sure that a jury had not been influenced by them, the trial should not have been concluded. The jury appeared to have been so afraid as to be unable at first to find one of its members willing to act as foreman. The judge's direction to the jury about the connections between members of the public and the defendant did not retrieve that doubt.

 
Regina v Togher, Regina v Doran, Regina v Parsons Times, 21 November 2000; [2000] EWCA Crim 111; [2001] 1 Cr App R 33; [2001] 3 All ER 463; [2001] Crim LR 124; [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 33
9 Nov 2000
CACD
Lord Woolf CJ, Steel, Butterfield JJ
Criminal Practice, Human Rights
In the light of the Human Rights Act, it would now be almost inevitable that a finding that the defendant had not had a fair trial, would lead to a finding that his conviction could not be regarded as safe. Where a defendant had pleaded guilty, but the circumstances suggested some abuse of process, it may be proper to allow an appeal to stand. The question of whether the rights of the defendant.
Lord Woolf CJ observed: "However, in the case of Francom [2001] 1 Cr.App.R. 17, this Court indicated, in a judgment which I gave on behalf of the Court, that we would expect . . that the approach of this Court applying the test of lack of safety would produce the same result as the approach of the ECtHR applying the test of lack of fairness. We would suggest that, even if there was previously a difference of approach, that since the 1998 Act came into force, the circumstances in which there will be room for a different result before this Court and before the ECtHR because of unfairness based on the respective tests we employ will be rare indeed. Applying the broader approach . . we consider that if a defendant has been denied a fair trial it will almost be inevitable that the conviction will be regarded as unsafe . . "
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Goc v Turkey 35-37, ECHR 2002-V; 36590/97
9 Nov 2000
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
The applicant had claimed compensation for unlawful detention and mistreatment during that detention; although the proceedings were civil in nature, they were governed by the code of criminal procedure. The applicant was not given an oral hearing before the first instance court which was responsible for establishing the facts and assessing the compensation; Turkey sought to rely on the fact that there could have been an oral hearing before the Court of Cassation and, as the applicant had not sought a hearing before that Court, he had waived his right. Held: The Grand Chamber, divided, found that the denial of an oral hearing breached Article 6. An integral part of his case was that during the three days he was wrongfully held in police custody he was ill treated, endured personal suffering and harm and that; "He was never given the opportunity to explain orally to a court in the context of an adversarial procedure the injustice which had been done to him and his family. According to the applicant had he been given the opportunity to state his case to the domestic courts they would have been persuaded of the reality of the suffering which he and his family endured and of the harm caused to his reputation". The court set out the criteria for allowing a case not to be heard in public: "That case law lays down three criteria for determining whether there are exceptional circumstances which justify dispensing with a public hearing; there must be no factual or legal issue which requires a hearing; the questions which the court is required to answer must be limited in scope and no public interest must be at stake." As to the waiver argument: "… Even assuming that Article 438 of the Code of Civil Procedure could have provided the basis for a request for a hearing before the Court of Cassation, the crucial question is whether the applicant should have been afforded a hearing before the Karsiyaka Assize Court, the tribunal which was responsible for establishing the fact of the case and assessing the amount of compensation to be awarded to the applicant. To the extent that the Government imply this, the applicant cannot be considered to have waived his right to an oral hearing by failing to request one before the Court of Cassation since that court did not have full jurisdiction to substitute its own view of the amount of compensation which should be awarded to the applicant for that of the first-instance court (see mutatis mutandis, Diennet v France, judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A nn.325-A, p.15, § 34 [21 EHHR 554]) Having regard to the above considerations, the Court will examine whether there were any exceptional circumstances which justified dispensing with an oral hearing on the applicant's compensation claim."
European Convention on Human Rights 6.1
1 Citers


 
Regina v Barwick Times, 10 November 2000; [2001] 1 Cr App R (S) 445
10 Nov 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice, Criminal Sentencing
The defendant had defrauded women of in excess of £500,000. He admitted dishonesty. The court ordered confiscation under the 1988 Act, with the benefit assessed as that figure, adjusted to £600,000 to allow for the return he should have made. No assets were traced, and the police said that he had hidden it, since he did not appear to have lived extravagantly or spent large sums of money. The appellant said he had gambled it away, but gave no evidence of this. His evidence was found evasive but the benefit figure was reduced by £150,000 as an acknowledgement that some of the money had probably been spent over the years. He appealed contending that the judge had been wrong to place the burden on the appellant to establish that his realisable assets were less than the amount of the benefit. Held: Where an application for a confiscation order was being resisted, the onus of proving the ‘benefit’ obtained is first upon the prosecution. The burden then lay on the defendant to establish to the civil standard, that he had no realisable assets and how the proceeds of the criminal activity were no longer available. The Act requires two distinct tasks. To determine the benefit, and then determine the amount that might be realised. The amount may be quite unrelated to the identifiable proceeds of the offence, eg a lottery win, inheritance, or other lawfully acquired property. The task of the court at the second stage is to determine the amount "appearing to the court" to be the amount that might be realised. But once the benefit has been proved, it is permissible and ought normally to be the approach of the court, to conclude that the benefit remains available until the defendant proves otherwise; subject to the issue of changes in the value of the money.
“it is likely that an offender may take steps to make the proceeds of crime difficult to trace. Once it is proved that he has received the benefit, it is pragmatic, and entirely fair to the defendant, to place upon him the onus of showing (to the civil standard) that he no longer has the proceeds or that their extent or value has diminished” and “We stress that the scheme of the Act requires the court to perform two distinct and discrete tasks. First, to determine the benefit. Secondly, to determine the amount that might be realised at the time the order is made, which may be very different. Further, the amount that might be realised may be quite unrelated to the identifiable proceeds of the offence, e.g. a lottery win, inheritance, or other lawfully acquired property. In the end, the task of the court at the second stage is to determine the amount ‘appearing to the court’ to be the amount that might be realised. But once the benefit has been proved, it is permissible and ought normally to be the approach of the court, to conclude that the benefit remains available until the defendant proves otherwise . .”
Criminal Justice Act 1988 71
1 Citers


 
Regina v Johnson (Harold) Times, 21 November 2000
21 Nov 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
When a court of Appeal now assesses the fairness of a trial conducted under earlier and different standards, it must apply the current standards for the purposes of the appeal. That need imply no criticism of a court which was acting accordance with then good or standard practice. There is a risk of a substantial number of appeals for old and very old cases, if this approach is followed, but no evidence as it stands that the risk is proving real.

 
Regina v Denton Times, 22 November 2000
22 Nov 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
In a trial for affray, two witnesses said they were reluctant to give evidence in person in fear for their own safety. Their evidence was admitted by the judge using his discretion under the Act for this purpose. He directed the jury as to the care they had to exercise, and there was other evidence. He did not give his reasons for exercising this discretion. It was held that although he should have given his reasons, in this case there had been no injustice, and the verdict stood.
Criminal Justice Act 1988 26
1 Citers


 
Regina v Croydon Justices, ex parte W H Smith Ltd Gazette, 30 November 2000; Times, 22 November 2000
22 Nov 2000
QBD

Health and Safety, Criminal Practice, Magistrates
The power to institute proceedings for a breach of the Act lay in the inspector, and he could not delegate it. The Act was explicit in its requirements as to who could issue proceedings. The informations were not laid when the inspector requested a local authority solicitor to issue them, and there was nothing to justify any inference of a power to delegate.
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 38

 
Regina v Nangle Times, 09 January 2001; Gazette, 23 November 2000
23 Nov 2000
CACD

Legal Professions, Criminal Practice, Human Rights
The test of whether the defence conducted on behalf of the defendant, was so incompetent that his trial could not be described as fair, may now, because of the Human Rights Convention be less than the 'flagrant incompetence' formerly required. If the incompetence did reach such a level as to have denied him a fair trial, then his right might have been reached. The case before the court involving various allegations was not such as to make the trial not fair, and in this case there was no need to decide in detail what that standard might be.
The provisions of the Human Rights Act may have made inappropriate the old standard for judging the need for a retrial in a criminal matter where incompetence was alleged against counsel, but the case before the court involving various allegations was not such as to make the trial not fair, and in this case there was no need to decide in detail what that standard might be.

 
Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 2000) Times, 23 November 2000
23 Nov 2000
CACD
Kennedy LJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant had faced a charge of possessiong an offensive weapon, namely a rice flail. The judge invited the prosecution to reconsider the case before it started, but the case went ahead. After the jury was empanelled, but before the prosecutor opened, the judge discharged the jury, saying that the defendant had a reasonable excuse for having the rice flail, and that the prosecution was bound to fail. Held: The authorities were clear, and the judge did not have that power. Once a case reached the Crown Court, the defendant was to be arraigned and tried unless: I) on a motion to quash, the indictment was found defective; ii) the defendant successfully pleaded autrefois acquit or convict; iii) a nolle prosequi was entered by the Attorney General ; iv) The offence was not capable of being tried at the Crown Court; or v) the proceedings amounted to an abuse. Non of these applied in this case.
1 Cites


 
Regina v Criminal Cases Review Commission, ex parte Hunt Times, 24 November 2000; [2001] QB 1108
24 Nov 2000
CA
Lord Woolf CJ
Taxes Management, Criminal Practice
The Commissioners of the Inland Revenue did have power to conduct a prosecution at the Crown Court without first obtaining the consent of the Attorney General, even though it was a police officer had actually laid the charge. A prosecution was conducted on behalf of a police force where the force had been involved in investigation, arrest, and charge. The charge alone was insufficient. The Court of Appeal should be reluctant to allow too many challenges of the discretion allowed the Criminal Cases Review Commission.
Lord Woolf CJ spoke in support of the common law power of the Inland Revenue Commissioners to bring prosecutions: "Great importance has always been attached to the ability of an ordinary member of the public to prosecute in respect of breaches of the criminal law. If an ordinary member of the public can bring proceedings for breaches of the criminal law, it would be surprising if the Inland Revenue were not in a similar position."
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 3 (2)
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Regina v Calum I MacLeod Times, 20 December 2000
29 Nov 2000
CACD

Human Rights, Criminal Practice, Contempt of Court, Crime
The defendant had approached a prosecution witness after she had completed her evidence, but before she left, and challenged her on the basis that she had been lying. On the following day the judge considered whether his behaviour was a contempt of court, and having found it proved, and sentenced him. In this case, and the judge was not himself a witness to what had happened, and it was appropriate for him to act as an independent tribunal, and it was also necessary to act quickly and decisively. The Article 6 right to a fair trial did not add, in these circumstances, to the requirements which already applied to an English courts. The judge should, however, have requested prosecuting counsel to lead the witness through her evidence.

 
Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Tawfick Times, 05 December 2000; Gazette, 11 January 2001
5 Dec 2000
QBD

Administrative, Criminal Practice
The applicant had been convicted and imprisoned following a trial in which he had defended himself, and in which the judge had attacked his honesty before the jury, and his honesty was an issue in the charge. The conviction had been set aside, and he sought compensation the Secretary of State who had refused this on the grounds that the circumstances were not exceptional. Held: The Secretary of State's decision was irrational. The complaint went to behaviour of the judge, and was justified. The Secretary of State's decision was outside the range of reasonable responses, and he should have granted the application.

 
Abrahams v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis Gazette, 01 February 2001; Times, 21 December 2000; [2001] 1 WLR 1257; [2000] EWCA Civ 3043; [2000] Po LR 374
8 Dec 2000
CA
Mantell LJ, Kay LJ
Torts - Other, Criminal Practice, Police
The claimant had been arrested for swearing at a police officer. After her arrest, the claimant made admissions to secure a caution, rather than risk prosecution. She later sought to begin a civil action for damages against the police in the course of which she the denied the matters which she had earlier admitted. Held: The claimant's appeal against a strike out of her claim succeeded. The admissions had been secured by an apparent breach of duty by the officer, and she was not be estopped from bringing the claim. The formal caution is not so closely analogous to a conviction that the claimant should be barred from beginning civil proceedings because of it. An attack on the caution did not involve attacking any decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
Lord Justice Mantell said: 'the caution was not brought about by any decision of a court of justice, so did not fall foul of the rule in Saif Ali. An attack on it did not involve attacking a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.'
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Everad Nicholls v Regina Times, 30 January 2001; Appeal No 14 of 2000; [2000] UKPC 52
13 Dec 2000
PC

Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
(St. Vincent & The Grenadines) It was wrong for an appellate court to order a retrial in order allow the prosecution to bring evidence to make good its case which evidence should have been brought at the first trial. The correct approach was to quash the conviction. It was wrong in principle to allow the prosecution to have a second bite at the cherry when it could have got its evidence together the first time around. The first instance judge could have put the issue squarely before the jury, but did not do so. That caused a mistrial.
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Attorney General's Reference No. 3 of 1999 [2000] UKHL 71; [2001] 2 AC 91; [2001] 1 All ER 577; [2001] Crim LR 394; [2001] HRLR 16; [2001] 2 WLR 56; [2001] 1 Cr App R 34; [2000] Po LR 386
14 Dec 2000
HL
Lord Steyn, Lord Cooke of Thorndon, Lord Clyde, Lord Hutton, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough
Criminal Practice, Human Rights, Police
An horrific rape had taken place. The defendant was arrested on a separate matter, tried and acquitted. He was tried under a false ID. His DNA sample should have been destroyed but wasn't. Had his identity been known, his DNA could have been kept because of other convictions. He was arrested for the rape after a DNA match. It was argued that under the 1984 Act, the sample could not be used in evidence against him. The House considered whether the section was mandatory or directory. Held: The direction to destroy such a sample was mandatory, and the sample should not have been used for the investigation of an offence. However, "paragraph (b), in contrast with paragraph (a), does not go on to provide that, in the event of such unlawful use, the results of the investigation shall not be admissible in evidence against the person who was entitled to the destruction of the sample. Nor does it provide that an unlawful investigation shall be null and void or deemed never to have occurred " Any question as to the fairness of the admissibility of the evidence could still be addressed by the court under section 78.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 64(3B) - Human Rights Act 1998
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Regina v Smith (Joe) Times, 20 December 2000; [2001] 2 Cr App R 1; [2001] 1 WLR 1031
20 Dec 2000
CACD

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
The defendant was arrested for burglary and a non-intimate sample taken without his consent. The DNA profile matched blood at the scene of the burglary, and this match was the bedrock of the prosecution case. Before the trial, prosecuting counsel applied ex parte to withhold disclosure of certain material. The defence were notified of the application but not of the category into which the material was said to fall. The judge ruled that the material should not be disclosed and the defence were so informed. The defence then submitted to the judge that the DNA evidence derived from the non-intimate sample should be excluded under section 78 on the ground that the police had had no reasonable grounds for suspecting the defendant of committing the burglary, and had not therefore been entitled to arrest him or take the sample. There was no evidence before the jury to show that the police had had reasonable cause to suspect the defendant of the burglary but the judge relied on the PII information to rule that the police had had reasonable grounds for suspicion and declined to exclude the DNA evidence. Held: There is nothing in human rights law, or in common law jurisdiction to say that the use of material not disclosed to the defence in an ex parte application for a public interest immunity certificate, was a breach of the defendant's article 6 right which guaranteed a fair trial. Here, the defendant's arrest was challenged as unlawful. The police sought to justify the arrest on the basis that they had reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the offence, but they sought permission not disclose the basis of that reasonable suspicion, and there is no provision to allow a hearing with special counsel appointed to represent the defendant's interest in such a situation, although this might be considered in future.
European Convention on Human Rights 6 - Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 78
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Regina v Milford [2000] EWCA Crim 84
21 Dec 2000
CACD
Potter LJ
Criminal Practice
D was charged with three co-defendants with conspiring to import cannabis. He gave a largely no comment interview to the interviewing customs officer, but at trial said that the contacts with his co-defendants were innocent. Since this account had not been given in interview, the judge gave a section 34 direction. Held: The appeal failed "the words 'any fact' do not fall to be read only in the narrow sense of an actual deed or thing done but in the fuller sense contemplated by the Oxford English Dictionary of 'something that … is actually the case … hence, a particular truth known by actual observation or authentic testimony, as opposed to what is merely inferred, or to a conjecture or to fiction'." and "it seems to us necessary to approach the meaning to be attributed to 'any fact' having regard to the apparent purpose of the statute and, in particular, the context and stage of proceedings with which s.34(1)(a) is concerned, that is to say the questioning of a suspect at a stage when the facts available to the prosecution without the benefit of any explanation of the defendant give rise to a suspicion or inference of his involvement in the crime under investigation, and the questioning is being directed to establishing whether such suspicion or inference is well founded in fact. The facts relevant to establishing whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime in respect of which he is being interrogated go far wider than the simple matter of what might have been observed to happen on a particular occasion and frequently involve what reasons or explanations the defendant gives for his involvement in the particular event observed which, if true, would absolve him from the suspicion of criminal intent or involvement which might otherwise arise. The significance for the jury of a failure by the defendant when first questioned to mention facts relied on at his trial is whether or not that failure is an indication that the facts which he now adopts or advances before the jury (including any explanation for his involvement in undisputed but equivocal events) can or cannot be relied on."
Criminal Justice amd Public Order Act 1994 34
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 Regina v Canterbury Crown Court ex parte Regentford Ltd; Admn 21-Dec-2000 - Times, 06 February 2001; [2000] EWHC Admin 440
 
Regina v Doubtfire Times, 28 December 2000; Gazette, 20 April 2001
28 Dec 2000
CACD

Criminal Practice
The defendant's trial had involved the use of material subject to a public interest immunity certificate. Held: The need for courts to give reasons for their decisions could be balanced against other public interests, such as the need to protect sources of information. In this, exceptional, case the Court of Appeal was entitled to allow the appeal against conviction, but to decline at the same time to provide reasons which would, or might, threaten such sources.

 
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