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Criminal Practice - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 51 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Regina v Prater [1960] CLY 671; [1960] 1 All ER 298; [1960] 2 QB 464
1960
CCA

Criminal Practice
Where one defendant gave evidence incriminating his co-defendant, just as in cases where an accomplice gave evidence for the prosecution, a full corroboration warning was desirable.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Carter (Josef) [1960] 44 Cr App R 225
1960

Lord Parker of Waddington CJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant appealed against his conviction. Though unrepresented at trial, the judge had not informed him of his opportunity to call witnesses. Counsel had failed to attend and an adjournment has been refused. Held: The appeal succeeded. A trial court must inform an unrepresented accused of his constitutional entitlement to the facilities both to examine witnesses for the prosecution and to call his own witnesses and to facilitate the process in that behalf.
Lord Parker of Waddington CJ said: “it became imperative to ensure that this appellant, who was unrepresented, had every opportunity of putting forward his defence, calling his witnesses, and for that purpose, the court should have given him every assistance.” and "the appellant, unrepresented as he was did not in the result have a fair trial, and . . it would be wrong in this case to apply the proviso."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hogan [1960] 2 QB 513
1960
CA

Criminal Practice
A prison adjudication in relation to an escaped prisoner did not prevent subsequent criminal proceedings in respect of the same escape
1 Citers


 
Regina v Sharp (Note) [1960] 1 QB 357
1960


Criminal Practice
If a defendant refuses to take part in his trial, as if he absconds, in order to prevent trial he may not rely on silence or absence to avoid or postpone trial.
1 Citers


 
Poole v The Queen [1960] UKPC 29; [1960] 3 All ER 398; [1960] 3 WLR 770; [1961] AC 223
28 Jul 1960
PC

Criminal Practice
(Eastern Africa)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Caslin; CCA 1961 - (1961) 45 Cr App R 47

 
 Chitambala v The Queen; 1961 - [1961] R and N 166
 
Nominal Defendant v Clements [1961] 104 CLR 476
1961

Dixon CJ
Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
(High Court of Australia) Dixon CJ said of the rules regarding the significance of previous inconsistent statements: "in as much as the rule forms a definite exception to the general principle excluding statements made out of court and admits a possibly self-serving statement made by the witness, great care is called for in applying it. The judge at the trial must determine for himself upon the conduct of the trial before him whether a case for applying the rule of evidence has arisen and, from the nature of the matter, if there be an appeal, great weight should be given to his opinion by the appellate court . . It is obvious that it may not be easy sometimes to be sure that counsel is laying a foundation for impugning the witness's account of a material incident or fact as a recently invented, devised or reconstructed story. Counsel himself may proceed with a subtlety which is the outcome of caution in pursuing what may prove a dangerous course. That is one reason why the trial judge's opinion has a peculiar importance."
1 Citers



 
 Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher; HL 1961 - [1961] 3 All ER 299; [1963] AC 349; [1961] UKHL 2
 
Regina v Porritt [1961] 1 WLR 1372; [1961] 3 All ER 463; (1961) 45 Cr App Rep 348
1961
CCA
Ashworth J
Criminal Practice
Ashworth J said: 'As has already been said, the issue of manslaughter was not raised at the trial, but there is ample authority for the view that notwithstanding the fact that a particular issue is not raised by the defence, it is incumbent upon the judge trying the case, if the evidence justifies it, to leave that issue to the jury.'
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Thompson (1962) 4 Cr App R 72
1962
CCA
Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Practice
There was tendered to the court what appeared to be a statement from a juror asserting that a majority of the jury had been ready to acquit until the foreman read out a list of the previous convictions of the accused. Held: "This court is now asked to enquire into the matter and to adjourn in order to see whether the alleged statement by the juryman can be supported by some statement or affidavit made by him. But the court has come to the conclusion that it is perfectly idle to adjourn the case for that purpose, because the court is quite satisfied that they would have no right at all to enquire as to what did occur in the jury room. It has for long been a rule of practice, based on public policy, that the court should not enquire by taking evidence from jurymen as to what did occur in either the jury box or the jury room."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857; [1963] 1 All ER 832; (1963) 47 Cr App R 79; [1963] 2 WLR 585
1963
CCA
Winn J
Criminal Practice, Evidence
The court considered the status in evidence of a used air ticket. Held: Where the prosecution have available evidence to establish an essential part of the case for the prosecution, that evidence should be called as part of the case for the prosecution, and the prosecution should not, as a matter of proper practice, seek to supplement and complete the case for the prosecution by cross examination of the accused.
The court accepted into evidence an airline ticket displaying the name of the accused on the basis that its relevance and legal admissibility stemmed from the likelihood that a ticket with a name or names on it had been used on a flight by a person of that name or names on the ticket. The ticket could be used to infer that the accused had taken the flight to which the ticket applied. The court distinguished the relevance and probative significance of the ticket itself as opposed to its content.
A trial judge's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the case law and in such a way and subject to such safeguards as seem to the judge best suited to achieve justice between the Crown and the defendant.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Bullock [1964] 1 QB 481
1964
CCA
Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Practice
The appellant was granted leave to move for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the quarter sessions and the Court of Criminal Appeal then sat as a Divisional Court to hear the motion. Quarter sessions had no jurisdiction to commit an offender to themselves for sentence. s31 of the 1879 Act provided “quarter sessions may by their order . . vary the decision of the court of summary jurisdiction or may make such other order in the matter as they think just and by such order exercise any power which the court of summary jurisdiction might have exercised.” The appellant had been sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment at Marlborough Street Magistrates’ Court. He appealed to the County of London Sessions and having dismissed his appeal against conviction the quarter session purported to exercise the powers of committal which the magistrate would have had. They then sentenced the appellant to 12 months’ imprisonment. Held: Lord Parker CJ said: “It immediately strikes one as highly artificial that a court can commit a person for sentence to itself the essence of committing being a committal by one court to another, from a court of lower jurisdiction to a court of higher jurisdiction. It is also to be observed that if the course taken by the London Sessions is right, Parliament has here provided in effect a double appeal on sentence.”
Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 31
1 Citers


 
Regina v West [1964] QB 15
1964


Magistrates, Criminal Practice
The justices had purported to hear and determine an information of accessory after the fact of a larceny. Held: The action was a nullity; and thus the defendant's acquittal was also a nullity. The justices had therefore not exhausted their jurisdiction and had not barred themselves from acting in their other and quite distinct capacity of examining magistrates. Thus the committal of the defendant to stand trial at quarter sessions was a valid committal.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 1964 - [1964] 2 AC 1254; [1964] 2 All ER 401

 
 Callis v Gunn; CCA 1964 - [1964] 1 QB 495; (1963) 48 Cr App R 36; [1963] 3 WLR 931
 
Regina v Carter and Canavan [1964] 2 QB 1; [1964] 48 Cr App R 122
1964


Criminal Practice
The court considered when a jury might change its verdict.
1 Citers


 
Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348; [1964] 2 All ER 610
1965
CACD
Lord Denning MR, Goddard LJ, Diplock LJ
Criminal Practice, Police
It is for the detaining authority to justify all periods of detention.
The court described the common law duty on a prosecutor to disclose material. Lord Denning MR said: "The duty of a prosecuting counsel or solicitor, as I have always understood it, is this: if he knows of a credible witness who can speak to material facts which tend to show the prisoner to be innocent, he must either call that witness himself or make his statement available to the defence. It would be highly reprehensible to conceal from the court the evidence which such a witness can give. If the prosecuting counsel or solicitor knows, not of a credible witness, but a witness whom he does not accept as credible, he should tell the defence about him so that they can call him if they wish. Here the solicitor, immediately after the court proceedings [for committal before the magistrates], gave the solicitor for the defence the statement of Mr. and Mrs. Stamp; and thereby he did his duty."
Diplock LJ said that it is for the trial judge objectively to determine whether the suspicion held by a police officer and used to justify an arrest was reasonable and that whether there are such grounds or not is a question of law: "The test whether there was reasonable and probable cause for the arrest or prosecution is an objective one, namely, whether a reasonable man, assumed to know the law and possessed of the information which in fact was possessed by the defendant, would believe that there was reasonable and probable cause."
He described the continuing nature of an arrest: "The trespass by the arrestor continues so long as he retains custody of the arrested person, and he must justify the continuance of his custody by showing that it was reasonable. What is reasonable conduct on the part of a police officer in this respect may not be the same as what would be reasonable conduct on the part of a private arrestor."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Woolwich Justices ex parte Toohey, Toohey v Metropolitan Police [1965] 49 Cr App R 148
1965


Criminal Practice
The court described the limits for the admission of psychiatric evidence in criminal trials.
1 Citers


 
Law v McNicol 1965 JC 32
1965


Scotland, Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Regina v Priestley (1965) 51 Cr App R 1
1965
CACD
Sachs LJ
Criminal Practice
Sachs LJ considered the meaning of the word 'oppression' in the context of a police interview, saying: "this word, in the context of the principles under consideration, imports something which tends to sap and has sapped that free will which must exist before a confession is voluntary . . whether or not there is oppression in an individual case depends upon many elements . . they include such things a the length of time of interviewing between periods of questioning, whether the accused person had been given proper refreshment or not and the characteristics of the person who makes the statement. What may be oppressive as regards a child, an invalid or an old man, or somebody inexperienced in the ways of the world may turn out not to be oppressive when one finds that the accused person is of tough character and an experienced man of the world." and "the courts are not concerned with ascertaining the precise motive of a particular statement. The question before them is whether the prosecution have shown the statement to be voluntary, whatever the motive may be, and that is always the point to which all arguments must return. To solve it, the court has to look to the questions which I have already mentioned. First, was there in fact something which could properly be styled or might well be oppression? Secondly, did whatever happened in the way of oppression or likely oppression induce the statement in question?"
1 Citers


 
Regina v Cole (1965) 49 Cr App R 199 (CCA); [1965] 2 QB 388; [1965] 2 All ER 29
1965
CCA
Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Practice
Six men robbed the bank manager and his assistant of monies in a safe in the vault of the bank premises. Two days later the appellant paid part of the proceeds of the robbery into two banks, located nearby to the vicinity of the robbery. Wax seals used by the bank were found in the appellant's flat, a piece of which matched a piece found outside the bank. On being arraigned, the appellant pleaded not guilty to counts of conspiracy to rob (Count 1) and armed robbery (Count 2), but guilty to a count of receiving stolen goods (Count 3). The appellant stood trial three times on that indictment. At the first trial, Widgery J refused to accept the plea of guilty to Count 3 and ordered a not guilty plea to be entered. That jury could not agree on a verdict and were discharged. At the second trial Lawton J refused to accept that plea of guilty. That jury was also discharged. At the third trial, Lawton J ordered Count 3 to be severed from the indictment. Having been discharged from entering a verdict in respect of Count 1, the jury found the appellant guilty of Count 2. It was argued for the appellant that Widgery J had erred in refusing to accept the plea of guilty to Count 3 and in ordering that a plea of not guilty be entered. Having been found guilty of receiving the stolen goods, subsequently the appellant could not be tried for conspiracy to rob or armed robbery. Held: Lord Parker CJ said it was contended for the appellant "...that a plea of guilty must be recorded, that once recorded it ranks as a conviction...; that the judge had no power to direct that that plea should be altered and entered as one of not guilty; and that, on the basis that the plea of guilty remained and was a conviction, it was not possible for the prosecution to proceed further and have the appellant tried for armed robbery."
Of the issue of when a conviction occurs, following a plea of guilty by a defendant on arraignment, Lord Parker CJ said: "It is quite clear that it does not occur at the time of the recording, because otherwise it would be impossible for a judge to allow a plea to be changed, as is perfectly possible up to sentence, and indeed in one of the cases the verdict of the jury itself was set aside before sentence. In the judgment of the court, it only ranks as a conviction when the defendant is sentenced."
Of the appropriate procedure, where a defendant pleads to an alternative separate count on an indictment, Lord Parker CJ said: "This court has been invited to lay down what is the proper practice. It is merely sufficient to say that in the ordinary case a judge should allow the plea of guilty to stand. In those circumstances a defendant will only be put in charge of the jury on the serious charge, in this case the armed robbery. If he was acquitted of the armed robbery, then he can be sentenced on the count to which he has pleaded guilty. If, on the other hand, he is convicted of the armed robbery then the proper course for the judge is to allow the count to which he has pleaded guilty to remain on the file and not to proceed to sentence him."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Oliva [1965] 1 WLR 1028; [1965] 49 Crim App Reps 298
18 May 1965
CCA
Lord Chief Justice Parker
Criminal Practice
The defendant appealed his conviction for wounding one Brian Rutledge with intent to do him grievous bodily harm. Both the victim, Mr Rutledge, and also a man named Hampden gave evidence at the committal proceedings and their names appeared on the back of the indictment. At a later stage, both Rutledge and Hampden made statements withdrawing their original evidence against the accused. At the trial the prosecution refused to call either Rutledge or Hampden. Held: The prosecution had exercised their discretion rightly in refusing to call the witnesses since they were "abundantly entitled to form the view that, to say the very least, these two witnesses were wholly unreliable and that the interests of justice would not be furthered by calling such witnesses." and "Accordingly, as it seems to this court, the principles are plain. The prosecution must of course have in court the witnesses whose names are on the back of the indictment, that there is a wide discretion in the prosecution whether they should call them either calling and examining them, or calling and tendering them for cross examination.
The prosecution do not, of course, put forward every witness as a witness of truth, but where the witness's evidence is capable of belief, then it is their duty, well recognised, that he should be called, even though the evidence that he is going to give is inconsistent with the case sought to be proved. Their discretion must be exercised in a manner which is calculated to further the interest of justice, and at the same time be fair to the defence. If the prosecution appear to be exercising that discretion improperly, it is open to the judge of trial to interfere and in his discretion in turn to invite the prosecution to call a particular witness, and, if they refuse, there is the ultimate sanction in the judge himself calling that witness."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Webb v Leadbetter [1966] 1 WLR 245
1966
QBD
Lord Parker CJ, Winn LJ and Sachs J
Criminal Practice, Magistrates
One of two witnesses whom the prosecution desired to call at the hearing of an information had not arrived. The available witness was called. The prosecution case closed. The defendant gave evidence and his case closed. The justices had retired to consider their decision when they were informed that the second prosecution witness, whose car had broken down, had arrived. They returned to court and allowed the prosecution to call him. His evidence corroborated that of the first prosecution witness. The defendant was convicted. Held: Although justices have a discretion to allow further evidence to be called in particular circumstances, the manner of exercise depends on the stage of the case. In the absence of very special circumstances, they should not allow evidence to be called after they have retired, and that such circumstances being absent, the further evidence for the prosecution had been wrongly admitted, and the appeal would be allowed and the conviction quashed.
Lord Parker CJ: "It is, of course, quite clear under our law that he who affirms must prove. Therefore strictly once the prosecution have closed their case there will be no opportunity for them to call further evidence, subject of course to evidence in rebuttal, with which we are not concerned. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that there must always be some residuary discretion of the court to allow, in particular circumstances, evidence to be called, but the manner in which that discretion is exercised must depend on the stage of the case. When one turns to indictable offences it is perfectly clear that it has become now an established rule of law that no evidence can be called after the summing up and the judge, who in his discretion sought to exercise his discretion by allowing evidence to be called at that stage, would be acting entirely wrongly and the conviction would be quashed.
The same considerations do not wholly apply in the Magistrates' Court but, nevertheless, as a general rule and in the absence of some special circumstances it would certainly be wholly wrong for the justices to purport to exercise a discretion to allow evidence to be called once they have retired and, indeed, probably after the defence had closed their case. At an earlier stage it may well be proper to exercise the discretion in favour of allowing the witness to be called and indeed that was suggested in the decision of this court in Saunders v Johns."
"So far as this case is concerned I am quite satisfied that there was only one way in which any residuary discretion in the justices could have been exercised, the prosecution having closed their case, the defence having closed their case and they having retired. In those circumstances, I think there is no option but to quash this conviction."
Winn LJ: "This is not one of those cases in which there were the very special circumstances to which Lord Parker CJ has referred."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Sullivan (1966) 51 Cr App R 102
1966
CACD
Lord Parker CJ, Salmon LJ and Fenton Atkinson J
Criminal Practice
The defendant had refused to answer any questions at his trial. The court asked what significance could be atached to his exercise of this right if he was innocent. Held: Authority showed in many cases that a court must not draw adverse inferences from an accused's silence, but there were exceptions: "and this is one of them, in which the circumstances are such that it does not appear that there is any unfairness involved in the comment. The line dividing what may be said and what may not be said is a very fine one, and it is perhaps doubtful whether in a case like the present it would be even perceptible to the members of any ordinary jury. But there can be no doubt, on the authorities, that this court must hold that, in the present state of the law, what was said to the jury in the passage from the summing-up which has been cited amounted to a misdirection."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Gearing [1968] 1 WLR 344; [1966] 50 CAR 18
1966
CACD
Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Practice
Lord Parker CJ said: "It has always been a very strict rule of this court that no evidence whatever must be introduced after the jury have retired."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Flower; 1966 - [1966] 50 Cr App R 34
 
Thompson -v Nixon [1966] 1 QB 103
1966
QBD
Sachs J, Lord Parker CJ and Browne J
Crime, Criminal Practice
The court felt bound to follow the interpretation of the meaning of bailee in the 1916 Act from Matthews, even if, given the freedom to do so it would have interpreted it differently: "the present case falls four square within the decision in Reg v Matthews . . That case having been quoted in the textbooks ever since, no writer had ever suggested that it was bad law . . Dealing as we are today with a statute that affects the liberty of the subject, it does not seem to me that it is permissible to adopt a different construction of the relevant words to that which has so long stood as law, and now for the first time in effect to construe them adversely to the defendant in this case."
Larceny Act 1916
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436; [1966] USSC 143; (1966) 86 SCt 1602; (1966) 16 LEd2d 694
10 Oct 1966

Warren CJ
International, Human Rights, Criminal Practice
(United States Supreme Court) The prosecution may not use statements, whether incriminatory or exculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards which were sufficient to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. These safeguards require that, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform the accused person of the right to silence and to assure continuous opportunity to exercise it, he must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement that he does make may be used as evidence against him, that he has the right to consult with an attorney and that, if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. "Custodial interrogation" for the purposes of this rule means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ]

 
 Regina v Weaver and Weaver; 1967 - [1968] 1 QB 353; (1967) 51 Cr App R
 
Mills v Cooper [1967] 2 QB 459
1967
QBD
Diplock LJ, Lord Parker CJ, Ashworth J
Crime, Road Traffic, Criminal Practice
Two sets of criminal proceedings were brought against the defendant for offences under section 127 of the Highways Act 1959 namely that of being a gypsy and, without lawful excuse, camping on a highway. The first proceedings were brought in respect of 22nd December 1965. Those proceedings were dismissed in February 1966 on the ground that the defendant was not a gypsy on that date, being not of the Romany race. Ten weeks later, in the second proceedings, a similar allegation was made in respect of 13th March 1966. The defendant argued that there was an issue estoppel as to his status; he was not a gypsy. The court was asked as to the meaning of the word "gypsy" in the 1959 Act, which made it an offence for a gypsy to pitch a booth or to camp on a highway. Held: There was no issue estoppel. Once it was recognised that being a gypsy was not an unalterable status but depended on the way of life which the person was leading at a particular time, it was clear that the incorrectness of the assertion as to the defendant's status made in the first proceedings was not inconsistent with the correctness of the same assertion made in the second proceedings. The word "gypsy" could not bear the dictionary meaning of a member of the Romany race, but should be given its colloquial or popular meaning of a person leading a nomadic life with no, or no fixed employment and with no fixed abode. "Looked at in that way, a man might well not be a gipsy on one date and yet be one on a later date" A gipsy is a person without fixed abode who leads a nomadic life, dwelling in tents or other shelters, or in caravans or other vehicles. If that meaning is adopted, it follows that being a gipsy is not an unalterable status. It cannot be said, 'once a gipsy always a gipsy'. By changing his way of life a modern Borrow may be a gipsy at one time and not a gipsy at another.
Magistrates, like any court, have a right in their discretion to decline to hear proceedings on the ground that they were oppressive and an abuse of the process of the court.
Lord Diplock said: "[The] doctrine [of estoppel] . . so far as it affects civil proceedings, may be stated thus: a party to civil proceedings is not entitled to make, as against the other party, an assertion, whether of fact or of the legal consequences of facts, the correctness of which is an essential element in his cause of action or defence . . in previous civil proceedings between the same parties or their predecessors in title and was found by a court of competent jurisdiction in such civil proceedings to be incorrect."
Highways Act 1959 127
1 Citers


 
Regina v Riebold [1967] 1 WLR 674
1967
QBD
Barry J
Criminal Practice
When looking at a plea of autrefois acquit, the court had to ask whether there were any exceptional circumstances which would make it not oppressive to grant the prosecution leave to proceed.
Barry J said: "I feel that I am bound to apply this general rule to the facts of the present case and to ask myself whether there are here any exceptional circumstances which would make it not oppressive to grant the prosecution leave to proceed . ."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Jeffries [1968] CLY 661
1968
CACD

Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Regina v Hall [1968] 52 Cr App R 528
1968
CACD

Criminal Practice
Defendant's right to apply to vacate a plea of guilty.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Hood; CCA 1968 - [1968] 1 WLR 773; [1968] 2 All ER 56
 
Regina v Ptohopoulos (1968) Cr App R 47
1968
CACD

Criminal Practice
The judge withdrew from the jury the central issue whether the appellant was habitually in the company of a prostitute.
Sexual Offences Act 1956 30(2)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hunt (1968) 52 Cr App R; (1968) 2 QB 433
1968
CACD
Lord Parker, Chief Justice
Criminal Practice
The appellant said the different verdicts against him were inconsistent. Held: "The principle in every case is whether the inconsistency is such that it would not be safe to allow the verdict to stand. The fact that two verdicts are logically inconsistent does not however make the verdict complained of unsafe unless the only explanation of the inconsistency must or might be that the jury was confused or adopted the wrong approach". "When an appellant seeks to persuade this Court as his ground of appeal that the jury has returned a repugnant or inconsistent verdict, the burden is plainly on him. He must satisfy the Court that the two verdict cannot stand together, meaning thereby that no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion and once one assumes that they were an unreasonable jury, or that they could not have reasonably come to the conclusion, then the convictions cannot stand . . . the burden is on the Appellant to show that verdicts upon different counts are not merely inconsistent but are so inconsistent as to demand interference by an appellate court."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Jefferies (1968) 52 Cr App R 654
1968

Widgery LJ
Criminal Practice
The appellant died pending his appeal being heard and his widow wished to pursue a challenge to the order for payment of prosecution costs. Held: The powers of the court were derived from statute and did not permit such a course.
Widgery LJ said: "We take it to be a general principle that whenever a party to proceedings dies, the proceedings must abate, unless his personal representatives both have an interest in the subject matter and can by virtue of the express terms of a statute (or from rules of court made by virtue of jurisdiction given by a statute) take the appropriate steps to have themselves substituted for the deceased as a party to the proceedings."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Gould [1968] 2 QB 65
1968
CACD
Diplock LJ
Criminal Practice, Crime
Diplock LJ said: "In its criminal jurisdiction, which it has inherited from the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal does not apply the doctrine of stare decisis with the same rigidity as in its civil jurisdiction. If upon due consideration we were to be of opinion that the law had been either misapplied or misunderstood in an earlier decision of this court or its predecessor, the Court of Criminal Appeal, we should be entitled to depart from the view as to the law expressed in the earlier decision notwithstanding that the case could not be brought within any of the exceptions laid down in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd as justifying the Court of Appeal in refusing to follow one of its own decisions in a civil case (Rex v Taylor). A fortiori, we are bound to give effect to the law as we think it is if the previous decision to the contrary effect is one of which the ratio decidendi conflicts with that of other decisions of this court or its predecessors of co-ordinate jurisdiction."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Angel [1968] 1 WLR 669
1968
CACD

Criminal Practice
The failure to obtain the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions to a prosecution under section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 rendered the whole of the trial, including the committal proceedings, a complete nullity.
Sexual Offences Act 1967 8
1 Citers


 
Gooranah v The Queen [1968] MR 122
1968

Rivalland CJ
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
(Supreme Court of Mauritius) The appellant had appeared three times before the court before the date of trial. On the morning of trial he produced a letter from a member of the Bar stating that he had just been instructed for the defence, but as he was engaged elsewhere and had not had time to study the case he must ask for a postponement. The trial judge refused. Held: His decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. After referring to section 10(2) of the Constitution: "The all important words of paragraph (d) in my view are 'shall be permitted to defend himself'. The duty on the Court is clear and is impliedly twofold: an accused party must be given a reasonable opportunity to retain the services of a legal representative of his choice and, at the trial of the case, the legal representative must be given full latitude – in accordance with the law of this country – to defend the accused. On the other hand, the duty to retain the services of a legal representative of his choice lies on an accused party and the words 'of his choice' are here again important: they necessarily connote the idea that, if he has a wide choice from among the members of the Bar, the responsibility for the choice is his, not that of the Court. The duty cast on the Court is purely a passive one in so far as the presence of counsel at the trial is concerned, while the responsibility for the briefing of the legal representative and ensuring his presence in Court devolves from the very words of the Constitution on the accused party." The provisions of the Constitution were never intended to be a cloak for the laches of an accused party."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Mondon (1968) 52 Cr App R 695
1968
CACD
Edmund Davies LL
Criminal Practice
The appellant had been unrepresented throughout her trial. She appealed, complaining that the prosecutor had been allowed to make a closing speech. Held: The conviction was quashed. Lord Justice Edmund Davies drew attention to the impact which that speech might have had on the jury's determination of the issues in relation to fact which arose, saying: "The practice is now well established that in circumstances such as these, where an accused person is professionally unrepresented and calls no witnesses, other than giving evidence for herself or himself, the Crown is not entitled to make a second speech. That has long been a rule of practice.
In Harrison Salter J said . . 'we desire to point out very clearly that the rule about counsel in such circumstances not addressing the jury a second time is one which ought to be carefully observed, and it might be that in another case this Court would have to hold that a conviction, in a trial where such an irregularity occurred, must be quashed.' In that particular case the Court, applying the proviso to section 4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, came to the conclusion that despite the irregularity there had been no miscarriage of justice, and the conviction was accordingly affirmed and the appeal dismissed."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Bathurst [1968] 2 QB 99
1968
CACD

Criminal Practice
The judge was bound to direct the jury that a defendant was fully entitled to sit back and see if the prosecution had proved its case, and that they must not make any assumption of guilt from the fact that he had not gone into the witness box. Diminished responsibility is not an issue to which the credibility of the defendant is in any way relevant.
Homicide Act 1957 2
1 Citers


 
Regina v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118; [1968] 1 All ER 763; [1968] 2 WLR 893
1968
CA
Lord Denning MR
Police, Criminal Practice
The constitutional status of the Commissioner had never been defined, either by statute or by the courts. By common law police officers owe to the general public a duty to enforce the criminal law. The court considered the extent to which a court could interfere with decisions made by a Chief Constable.
Lord Denning MR said: "Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law, there are many fields in which they have a discretion with which the law will not interfere. For instance, it is for the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, or the chief constable, as the case may be, to decide in any particular case whether inquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest should be made, or a prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide on the disposition of his force and the concentration of his resources on any particular crime or area. No court can or should give him direction on such a matter. He can also make policy decisions and give effect to them, as, for instance, was often done when prosecutions were not brought for attempted suicide."
. . And "No Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement is on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone."
The decision as to the offence for which a person is to be prosecuted is a matter for the prosecuting authority, which has a wide discretion in the matter.
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Regina v Kray [1969] 53 Cr App R 412
1969
CACD
Lawton J
Criminal Practice, Media
Ronald Kray had been convicted of murder on 4th March 1969, and on 15th April 1969 he and a number of others were facing a second indictment charging them with murder and other offences. His counsel sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause on the ground that the previous trial had been extensively reported, and that prejudice to Kray resulting therefrom would be likely to influence the minds of the jurors in the second trial. Held: Lawton J confirmed the right to report the first trial and said: "What is more, the mere fact that a newspaper has reported a trial and a verdict which was adverse to the person subsequently accused ought not in the ordinary way to produce a case of probable bias against jurors empanelled in a later case." and "The situation, however, is, in my judgment, entirely different when newspapers, knowing that there is going to be later trial, dig up from the past of the convicted who have to meet further charges discreditable allegations which may be either fact or fiction, and those allegations are then publicised over a wide area. This does, in my judgment, lead to a prima facie presumption that anybody who may have read that kind of information might find it difficult to reach a verdict in a fair-minded way. It is, however, a matter of human experience, and certainly a matter of the experience of those who practise in the criminal courts, first, that the public's recollection is short, and, secondly, that the drama, if I may use that term, of a trial almost always has the effect of excluding from recollection that which went before. A person summoned for this case would not, in my judgment, disqualify himself merely because he had read any of the newspapers containing allegations of the kind I have referred to; but the position would be different if, as a result of reading what he had, his mind had become so clogged with prejudice that he was unable to try the case impartially."
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Regina v Cooper (Sean) [1969] 1 QB 267
1969
CACD
Widgery LJ
Criminal Practice
The court considered its power to interfere with a jury's verdict where a trial had been properly conducted: "every issue was before the jury and in which the jury was properly instructed, and, accordingly, a case in which this court will be very reluctant indeed to intervene. It has been said over and over again throughout the years that this court must recognise the advantage which a jury has in seeing and hearing the witnesses, and if all the material was before the jury and the summing-up was impeccable, this court should not lightly interfere. Indeed, until the passing of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1966 . . it was almost unheard of for this court to interfere in such a case. However, now our powers are somewhat different, and we are indeed charged to allow an appeal against conviction if we think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that under all the circumstances of the case it is unsafe or unsatisfactory. That means that in cases of this kind the court must in the end ask itself a subjective question, whether we are content to let the matter stand as it is, or whether there is not some lurking doubt in our minds which makes us wonder whether an injustice has been done. This is a reaction which may not be based strictly on the evidence as such; it is a reaction which can be produced by the general feel of the case as the court experiences it." "The test whether each member of an appellate court considers the verdicts "unsafe or unsatisfactory" is part of the very alphabet of the criminal law. "
Criminal Appeal Act 1966
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 Regina v Bradbury; 1969 - [1969] 2 QB 471; (1969) 53 Cr App R 217
 
Regina v Kray (1969) 53 Cr App R 412; [1970] 1 QB 125; (1969) 53 Cr App R 569
1969
CACD
Lawton J, Widgery LJ
Criminal Practice
The court dealt with a case where prejudice was claimed on behalf of the defendant because of publicity before the trial. Lawton J said: "The drama of a trial almost always has the effect of excluding from recollection that which went before."
The court discussed how cases could be joined: "All that is necessary to satisfy the rule is that the offences should exhibit such similar features as to establish a prima facie case that they can properly and conveniently be tried together."
Widgery LJ discussed the combunation of separate offence allegations on the same indictment, saying: "offences cannot be regarded as of a similar character for the purposes of joinder unless some sufficient nexus exists between them. Such nexus is certainly established if the offences are so connected that evidence of one would be admissible on the trial of the other, but it is clear that the rule is not restricted to such cases."
and "It is not desirable, in the view of this court, that rule 3 should be given an unduly restricted meaning, since any risk of injustice can be avoided by the exercise of the judge's discretion to sever the indictment. All that is necessary to satisfy the rule is that the offences should exhibit such similar features as to establish a _prima facie_ case that they can properly and conveniently be tried together."
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Regina v Palin (1969) 53 Cr App R 535
1969


Criminal Practice
Effect on trial of admission by mistake of prejudicial evidence.
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Regina v Brandon (1969) 53 Cr App R 466
1969
CACD

Criminal Practice
The court considered whether events outside the jury room having possible effects on deliberations might leave those open to enquiry. The jury bailiff had told the jury of the accused's previous convictions. This was a grave irregularity, was admissible, and the conviction was quashed.
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Regina v Hamilton Unreported, 9 June 1969
9 Jun 1969
CACD
Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Practice
Lord Parker CJ discussed the duties of a judge in a criminal trial: "Of course it has been recognised always that it is wrong for a judge to descend into the arena and give the impression of acting as advocate . . Whether his interventions in any case give ground for quashing a conviction is not only a matter of degree, but depends to what the interventions are directed and what their effect may be. Interventions to clear up ambiguities, interventions to enable the judge to make certain that he is making an accurate note, are of course perfectly justified. But the interventions which give rise to a quashing of a conviction are really three-fold; those which invite the jury to disbelieve the evidence for the defence which is put to the jury in such strong terms that it cannot be cured by the common formula that the facts are for the jury . . The second ground giving rise to a quashing of a conviction is where the interventions have made it really impossible for counsel for the defence to do his or her duty in properly presenting the defence, and thirdly, cases where the interventions have had the effect of preventing the prisoner himself from doing himself justice and telling the story in his own way."
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