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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Criminal Practice - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 34 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Regina v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758
1900
CCCR
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ, Mathew, Grantham, Wright, Darling and Channell JJ (Bruce and Ridley JJ dissenting)
Criminal Practice, Criminal Evidence
The defendant had obtained a sum of money by giving a worthless cheque. He was indicted for having obtained the money by false pretences. His defence was that when he gave the cheque he expected a payment into his bank account in time to meet the cheque, and he was acquitted. He was later tried on a second indictment charging him with three other acts of obtaining money by false pretences on three other worthless cheques. Counsel for the prosecution was allowed to call the same evidence that had been called against the defendant on the unsuccessful prosecution in respect of the one cheque, and the defendant was convicted. Held: The evidence was legally admissible and that the conviction was right notwithstanding that the defendant had been acquitted of the former charge.
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ: "The evidence was, after discussion, admitted; and Ramsey made precisely the same statement he had made before upon the trial of the first indictment when the accused was acquitted. The only point for our present determination is, whether that evidence was legally admissible on the ground that the facts disclosed in it were relevant to the subsequent charges. It does not appear to have been argued that it was not relevant as showing guilty knowledge, if it were not inadmissible on the grounds suggested—namely, that the facts sought to be given in evidence had already been given, and that the accused had already been acquitted of the charge to which they related. It is clear that there was no estoppel; the negativing by the jury of the charge of fraud on the first occasion did not create an estoppel; nor is there any question arising upon the maxim 'Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.' The evidence was not less admissible because it tended to shew that the accused was, in fact, guilty of the former charge. The point is, was it relevant in support of the three subsequent charges? In the opinion of the majority of the court, and in my own opinion, it was relevant as shewing a course of conduct on the part of the accused, and a belief on his part that the cheques would not be met."
Darling J: "It seems to me, therefore, that by the admission of this evidence the defendant was not 'bis vexatus,' for I feel sure that those words are not to be understood as meaning that a man is not to be more than once annoyed by the same evidence. I think they mean that he is not to be by legal process twice exposed to the risk of being found guilty of the same crime, or the same tort, or liable twice to pay the same debt, be it to the State or to his fellow citizen.
"To hold otherwise seems to me to rule that evidence which has been given once shall never be produced again against the same defendant; yet it is plain that up to a certain point the evidence must often be the same, although the defendant is accused of wrongs done to two distinct persons, and that in different suits or forensic proceedings."
Channell J: "Judges should be, and I believe generally are, careful not to allow proof of other acts of the prisoner besides those the subject of the indictment to be given, unless those facts have a clear bearing on some issue raised by the indictment, but if they have such a bearing I am unable to see how their proof becomes inadmissible because they have already, for a different purpose, been considered by another jury. Take as an illustration a case of counterfeit coin. Suppose a man passes a counterfeit half-crown, and on his trial, there being no proof of his having possession of any other counterfeit coin, the jury acquit. It is subsequently discovered that either before or after the passing of the one half-crown (in my opinion it matters not which) he has passed another counterfeit half-crown, and upon comparison of the two base coins they appear cast in the same mould. If tried for the secondly discovered case of uttering, the fact of the other uttering would be most cogent evidence, and the fact that when that other case was supposed to be an isolated one a jury had acquitted would neither detract from the weight of the evidence or in any way affect its admissibility, for the prisoner would not be being tried again for the offence of which he had been acquitted, but for a different offence, in respect of which the evidence given in the former case, or some of it, would be relevant . . .
I doubt whether the transaction with Ramsey was relevant on the subsequent indictment, but I am prepared to defer to the opinion of the majority of the court as to the mode in which the case should be dealt with, desiring only to express my clear opinion that, if the evidence was otherwise admissible, it is not the less so by reason of the former acquittal."
1 Citers


 
NA Subramania Iyer v The King [1901] UKPC 47
2 Aug 1901
PC

Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
(Madras) The defendant said that he had been charged with a multiplicity of charges in breach of a local provision limiting the numbers of charges to be dealt with together.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Bros (1902) 85 LT 581
1902

Lord Alverstone CJ
Criminal Practice
A magistrate should consider, before issuing a summons, whether it appears to be vexatious.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551
1905
CCCR
Ridley J
Criminal Practice
The court considered the circumstances under which a court would hear evidence of a similar complaint against the defendant.
Ridley J said: "We think, however, if it were a question of the meaning of words, that the better construction of the judgment is that while the Court dealt with the charge in question, as involving in fact, though not in law, the question of consent on the part of the prosecutrix, yet the reasons given for admitting the complaint were two-first, that it was consistent with her story in the witness-box; and, secondly, that it was inconsistent with consent . ." . . it appears to us that, in accordance with principle, such complaints are admissible, not merely as negativing consent, but because they are consistent with the story of the prosecutrix. In all ordinary cases, indeed, the principle must be observed which rejects statements made by anyone in the prisoner's absence. Charges of this kind form an exceptional class, and in them such statements ought, under proper safeguards, to be admitted. Their consistency with the story told is, from the very nature of such cases, of special importance. Did the woman make a complaint at once? If so, that is consistent with her story. Did she not do so? That is inconsistent. And in either case the matter is important for the jury." and "It is only to cases of this kind that the authorities on which our judgment rests apply; and our judgment also is to them restricted. It applies only where there is a complaint not elicited by questions of a leading and inducing or intimidating character, and only when-it is made at the first opportunity after the offence which reasonably offers itself. Within such bounds, we think the evidence should be put before the jury, the judge being careful to inform the jury that the statement is not evidence of the facts complained of, and must not be regarded by them, if believed, as other than corroborative of the complainant's credibility, and, when consent is in issue, of the absence of consent. "
1 Citers


 
Regina v Knight and Thayre (1905) 20 Cox 711
1905

Channell, J
Criminal Practice, Evidence
Statements were rejected, because they had been obtained from the accused before arrest by means of a long interrogation by a person in authority over him. The court adverted thus to the case of questions put by a constable after arresting:- "when he has taken anyone into custody . . he ought not to question the prisoner . . I am not aware of any distinct rule of evidence that, if such improper questions are asked, the answers to them are inadmissible, but there is clear authority for saying that the judge at the trial may in his discretion refuse to allow the answers to be given in evidence."
1 Citers


 
Giebler v Manning [1906] 1 KB 709
1906

Lord Alverstone CJ
Criminal Practice
The court was asked whether a private person could prosecute a butcher for exposing rotten meat for sale. Held: Provided the purpose of the offence was to protect the public, any person could bring a prosecution. Lord Alverstone CJ said: "Can a private person institute proceedings under section 47, sub-s.2? Apart from express provisions limiting the right, I should have thought the point was too clear for argument . . Having regard to the object of the statute, the protection of the public against the offering of diseased meat for sale, I think that if it had been intended to limit the right to take proceedings for the recovery of penalties to a limited class of persons, such as medical officers and sanitary inspectors, words would have been introduced into the section taking away from private persons the right to lay informations under the section."
Public Health (London) Act 1891 47(2)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Andrew Brown (1907) 7 NSWSR 290
1906

Darley CJ
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
(New South Wales - Australia) Darley CJ said: "I have come to the conclusion that the authorities are all one way, and that the Court cannot look at the affidavits of jurymen for any purpose, whether it be for the purpose of granting a new trial, or for the purpose of establishing the misconduct of a juryman".
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Andrew Brown; 1907 - (1907) 7 NSW State Reports 290
 
Rex v Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454
1908
CCA

Criminal Practice
The court adopted the practice for selecting cases for which leave to appeal should be given which was set down in Makin
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Best (1909) 1 KBD 692
1909
CCA
Channell, J
Criminal Practice, Evidence
Referring to the admissibility of answers to questions put before an arrest, "it is quite impossible to say that the fact that a question of this kind has been asked invalidates the trial".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Elliott (1909) 2 Cr App R 171
1909

Channell J
Criminal Practice
The absence or insufficiency of a shorthand note is not of itself a ground upon which a prisoner can succeed upon appeal, nor the existence of a proper note a condition precedent to a good trial. Where, however, there is reason to suspect that there is something wrong in connection with the hearing of a case, the absence or insufficiency of a proper shorthand note may be material.
1 Citers


 
Rex v Cohen and Bateman (1909) 2 Cr App R 197
1909

Channell J
Criminal Practice
The court considered the balance of judicial summings up to juries and the permissible limits of judicial comment: "The learned judge is said to have interfered improperly in the conduct of the case, and not to have put it fairly to the jury, and not to have stated the law properly. The latter would be fatal unless the case came within the proviso of the section. The other observations of the learned judge only become grounds of appeal if they have in fact caused substantial miscarriage of justice. In our view, a judge is not only entitled, but ought, to give the jury some assistance on questions of fact as well as on questions of law. Of course, questions of fact are for the jury and not for the judge, yet the judge has experience on the bearing of evidence, and in dealing with the relevancy of questions of fact, and it is therefore right that the jury should have the assistance of the judge. It is not wrong for the judge to give confident opinions upon questions of fact. It is impossible for him to deal with doubtful points of fact unless he can state some of the facts confidently to the jury. It is necessary for him sometimes to express extremely confident opinions. The mere finding, therefore, of very confident expressions in the summing up does not show that it is an improper one. When one is considering the effect of a summing up, one must give credit to the jury for intelligence, and for the knowledge that they are not bound by the expressions of the judge upon questions of fact. No doubt the learned judge did express himself very strongly. But on the main question we think him right."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Norton; 1910 - (1910) 2 KB 501

 
 Regina v Booth and Jones; 1910 - (1910) 5 Criminal Appeal Reports 179

 
 Regina v West; 1910 - (1910) 4 Cr App R 179

 
 Rex v Fisher; 1910 - [1910] 1 KB 149
 
Lake v Smith [1911] 76 JP 71
1911

Lord Alverstone CJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant was prosecuted under the 1814 Act for offences of remong shingle from the beach at Sidmouth. He questioned the authority of the prosecutor who was not specificlly authorised under regulations to lay the complaint. Held: The prosecution was proper.
Lord Alverstone CJ said: "I think that we must consider that the statute was passed for the protection of the realm, and in those circumstances it seems to me that under s.21 the information could be laid by a person in the position of surveyor to the district counsel."
Harbours Act 1814 14 21
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Marsham ex parte Pethick Lawrence; 1912 - [1912] KB 362

 
 Rex v Parrott; 1913 - (1913) 8 Cr App R 186

 
 Regina v Hopper; CCA 1914 - [1915] 2 KB 431
 
Perkins v Jeffery [1915] 2 KB 702
1915


Criminal Practice
Similar fact evidence might be admitted to help identify the defendant.
1 Citers


 
Rex v Banks [1916] 2 KB 621
1916


Criminal Practice

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Rex v Lee Kun; CCA 1916 - [1916] 1 KB 337; (1916) 11 Cr App R 293
 
Rex v Sidney Pitman (1917) 12 Cr App Rep 14
14 Feb 1916

Lord Chief Justice, Ridley, Lawrence JJ
Criminal Practice
On January 28th, 1915, applicant was convicted before Avory J., at Gloucester Assizes, of obtaining goods and credit by false pretences, and of conspiring to defraud, and was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment with hard labour. On January 31st he gave notice of appeal, but on February 5th abandoned his appeal by a formal notice to that effect addressed to the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Roland Oliver made an ex parte application to the Court on his behalf. The applicant asks for leave to withdraw his notice of abandonment, and that his appeal should be proceeded with. When he delivered his notice of abandonment he was under the impression that the fact that his friends were unable to assist him financially rendered it impossible for him to continue with his appeal as he desired. He may not have known that his appeal could be supported out of public funds. It is submitted that in these circumstances the Court will allow the notice of abandonment to be withdrawn, on the ground that there was a mistake of fact. This was allowed in Barker, 3 Cr. App. R. 283 (1910).
The Lord Chief Justice:
The effect of the notice given by the applicant of his desire to abandon his appeal is, by Rule 23 of the Criminal Appeal Rules, 1908 , that his appeal must be deemed to have been dismissed by this Court. There is no doubt that this Court has power either to allow the notice of abandonment [15] to be withdrawn or to re-open an appeal which has been dismissed. But that power will only be exercised where there are special circumstances which in the view of the Court justify a departure from the ordinary procedure. Here the applicant asks to be allowed to withdraw his notice of abandonment merely on the ground that he thought that his friends would not be able to give him financial assistance, and that in consequence he would not be able to proceed with his appeal, whereas he now finds that his friends can help him. In the opinion of the Court these facts do not constitute such circumstances as would justify the re-opening of the appeal. It must be borne in mind that precautions are taken to bring to the notice of every prisoner that he has a right to appeal against his conviction and sentence, and that he does not require money to enable him to do so. There can be no justification for an accused person abandoning his appeal unless he thinks that there is no ground upon which to appeal, and that it would be useless for him so to do. For these reasons this application must be refused. Application dismissed

 
Rex v O'Donnell (1917) 12 Cr App R 219
1917


Criminal Practice
The appeal court considered the position of a defendant where the judge had summed up strongly against him: " . . a judge, when directing a jury, is clearly entitled to express his opinion on the facts of the case, provided that he leaves the issues of fact to the jury to determine. A judge obviously is not justified in directing a jury, or using in the course of his summing up such language as leads them to think that he is directing them, that they must find the facts in the way which he indicates. But he may express a view that the facts ought to be dealt with in a particular way, or ought not to be accepted by the jury at all. He is entitled to tell the jury that the prisoner's story is a remarkable one, or that it differs from the accounts which he has given of the same matter on other occasions. No doubt the judge here did express himself strongly on the case, but he left the issues of fact to the jury for their decision and therefore this point also fails."
1 Citers


 
Rex v Frampton (1917) 12 Cr App R 202
1917

Lord Reading CJ
Criminal Practice
In this case it was held that the trial judge had gone too far in his comments and could not really be said to have put the defendant’s case to the jury. "We cannot allow a summing up which puts the case so strongly against the prisoner to stand..."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Gibbins and Proctor; CCA 1918 - (1918) 13 Cr App R 134

 
 Rex v Jones; CCA 1918 - [1918] 1 KB 416

 
 Rex v Smellie; CCA 1919 - (1919) 14 Cr App R 128

 
 Regina v Camelleri; 1922 - [1922] 2 KB 122
 
HM Advocate v Aldred 1922 JC 13
1922
HCJ
Lord Salvesen
Criminal Practice
Lord Salvesen said: "It is however, I think, a fundamental and well established principle in criminal law that no expenses are awarded by the High Court - sitting as such and not as a court of review - either in favour of, or against, the accused. The rule, I think, was established primarily in the interests of accused persons, because, if one were dealing with matters of this kind according to the principles which regulate civil proceedings, it would seem to follow that the unsuccessful party would generally be subjected to expenses, which would mean in the case of an accused person that he would have to bear the expense of the trial in addition to the penalty which a conviction must impose upon him.
Now, that rule has been so well established that [the respondents' counsel] was unable to find a single exception to it, because the fact that in bills of suspension the procurator fiscal, if he fails, is found liable in expenses does not seem to me really to constitute an exception. The proceedings here are for the purpose of reviewing procedure which has taken place in an inferior Court, and the High Court is appealed to in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Here that is not the case; and the petitioner is the Lord Advocate, who is presumed to be actuated solely by a regard for the public interest in the conduct of matters connected with the crime of which he has charge".
Lord Ormidale agreed because: "the fundamental principle that determines the liability of the Lord Advocate to meet expenses of proceedings taken at his hand is simply this, that he takes these proceedings, not on private or personal grounds, but in what he conceives to be the public interest, and that it would be entirely wrong to hamper him in the performance of his public duty".
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Armstrong; HL 1922 - [1922] 2 KB 555
 
Rex v Harris [1927] 2 KB 587
1927


Criminal Practice
A prosecutor has no obligation to call a witness whose evidence he does not consider to be material.
1 Citers


 
Slater v HM Advocate 1928 JC 94
1928
HCJ

Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
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