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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Criminal Practice - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 51 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Regina v Pettit (1850) 4 Cox 164
1850


Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Regina v Scaife (1851) 17 QB 238
1851


Criminal Practice
A witness's written statement might be admitted where his absence from court was caused by the defendant.

 
Rex v Vodden (1853) Dears 229; (1853) 169 ER 706
1853

Pollock CB
Criminal Practice
The court considered when a jury might be allowed to change its verdict. one of the jurors delivered a verdict of not guilty. The clerk heard, so did the chairman, who heard the same words. The prisoner was discharged from the dock. Others of the jury interfered. They said the verdict was guilty. The prisoner was brought back to the dock. The chairman asked the jury what the verdict was. All the 12 jurors answered that it was guilty. They had been unanimous. The chairman asked Owen Hughes why he had said "not guilty", to which he replied that he had said "guilty". A verdict of guilty was recorded. Held: Pollock CB said: "We do not think the Court is called upon to say at what interval of time a correction should be made. All we do is to say that in the present case the interval was not too long. Nothing has been done but what daily takes place in the ordinary transactions in life; namely, a mistake is corrected within a reasonable time, and on the very spot on which it was made."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Berriman (1854) 6 Cox 388
1854


Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Regina v Hicks [1855] 19 JP 515
1855

Lord Campbell CJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant appealed against his conviction in a private prosecution under the 1852 Act which controlled the right to set up and operate market stalls. The Act was a local Act. The court considered when magistrates should allow a private prosecution. Held: Only the operator of the market could bring a prosecution. A summons may be issued where the offence is not an individual grievance, but is rather a matter of public policy and utility, and concerns public morals. In such a case anyone has the general power to prosecute, unless the statute gauging the offence contains some restriction or regulation limiting the right to some particular person or party.
Lord Campbell CJ said: "The clause on which this conviction proceeds appears to have been framed solely and exclusively for the protection and benefit of the Torquay market company . . This enactment is not for the benefit of the inhabitants of Torquay, nor of licensed hawkers, but merely for the benefit of the company, that they may be reimbursed the expenses they have incurred from purchasing the new market-place and erecting sheds and stalls, stations and other conveniences therein . . the penalty under section 31 cannot be recovered, except upon an information laid with the authority of the company."
Torquay Market Act 1852
1 Citers


 
Regina v Britton And Others [1858] EngR 91 (A); (1858) 1 F and F 354
1858


Criminal Practice
Evidence of footmarks alone was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of a felony.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Cassidy [1858] EngR 417; (1858) 1 F and F 79; (1858) 175 ER 634
1 Mar 1858


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Caswell v Morgan [1859] EngR 524; (1859) 1 El and El 809; (1859) 120 ER 1114
30 Apr 1859


Criminal Practice
A common informer may lay an information against a pawnbroker, for an offence under the Pawnbrokers Act 39 and 40 G 3 c 99; and is entitled under sect 26 of the Act to a moiety of the penalty imposed upon the offender.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Coles v Coulton [1860] 24 JP 596
1860

Lord Cockburn CJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant appealed his conviction under the Act, a private one. It was said that as an innkeeper, he had knowingly suffered four common prostitutes to assemble at and continue in his house and premises contrary to that Act. The Clerk of the Paving Commissioners brought the prosecution. Held: The prosecutor had standing to issue the summons. Lord Cockburn CJ said: "The offence is not a matter of individual grievance as to which provision is made merely for the protection of individual rights, but the matter is one of public policy and utility with a view to the preservation of public morals. The general act gives authority to any one to prosecute for penalties who chooses to do so . . There is a plain distinction between the case of an offence which must be prosecuted for the public protection and where the enactment is one for the protection of individuals."
King's Lynn Waterworks and Borough Improvement Act 1859
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Boyes; 1860 - [1860] EngR 170; (1860) 2 F and F 157; (1860) 175 ER 1004
 
Regina v Tempest [1860] EngR 166 (B); (1860) 1 F and F 381
1860


Criminal Practice
The Court has no power to adjourn a criminal trial when once the jury are sworn.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Elrington [1861] 1 B and S 688; 121 ER 170
1861

Cockburn CJ
Criminal Practice
The appellant's co-accused had been summarily tried and acquitted of common assault. The accused was subsequently indicted on the same facts for assault causing grievous bodily harm and assault causing actual bodily harm. The accused demurred. Held: The demurrer was upheld, and the case could not proceed. By virtue of sections 28 and 29 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1828, a certificate of acquittal of common assault released the accused "... we must bear in mind the well-established principle of our criminal law that a series of charges shall not be preferred, and, from all further or other proceedings, civil or criminal, for the same cause". The plea of autrefois is that 'whether a party accused of a minor offence is acquitted or convicted, he shall not be charged again on the same facts in a more aggravated form.' The presumption in favour of a stay is even stronger where the second charge does not merely arise out of the same facts but is an aggravated form of the first.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Leathem (1861) 8 Cox CC 498
1861

Crompton J
Criminal Practice
The court overruled an objection to production of a letter which had been discovered in consequence of an inadmissible statement made by the accused: "It matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Burton, Scott And Lockwood [1861] EngR 76 (A); (1861) 2 F and F 788
1861


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Regina v Boyes; 27-May-1861 - (1861) 1 B and S 311; [1861] EngR 626; (1861) 121 ER 730
 
Regina v Southey [1865] EngR 64; (1865) 4 F and F 864; (1865) B)
1865


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Giorgetu [1865] EngR 51; (1865) 4 F and F 546; (1865) B)
1865


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Webb [1865] EngR 68; (1865) 4 F and F 862; (1865) A)
1865


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Williams [1865] EngR 70; (1865) 4 F and F 515; (1865) 176 ER 670
1865


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Puddick (1865) 4 FandF 497
1865

Crompton J
Criminal Practice
Crompton J directed the jury as to the duty of the prosecutor in a criminal trial: "I hope that in the exercise of the privilege granted by the new Act to counsel for the prosecution of summing up the evidence, they will not cease to remember that counsel for the prosecution in such cases are to regard themselves as ministers of justice, and not to struggle for a conviction, as in a case at Nisi Prius – nor be betrayed by feelings of professional rivalry – to regard the question at issue as one of professional superiority, and a contest for skill and pre-eminence."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Dowse [1865] EngR 48; (1865) 4 F and F 468; (1865) A)
1865


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina, On The Prosecution of G Romaine, v The Inhabitants Of East Stoke [1865] EngR 463; (1865) 6 B and S 536; (1865) 122 ER 1293
9 May 1865


Criminal Practice
Certiorai -Recognizance - Costs
[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Riley (1866) 4 FandF 964
1866

Baron Channell
Criminal Practice
The court described the workings of the Act, saying that once the whole of the deposition is before the jury: "… it will appear how far the suggested contradiction exists, and the absence of a particular statement may be explained by the context; or even if there is a discrepancy on the point, it may appear that it is only one minute point, and that in all the rest of the evidence there is perfect consistency, so that the general result of the comparison may be confirmation rather than contradiction."
Criminal Procedure Act 1865
1 Citers


 
Regina v Richards [1866] EngR 31; (1866) 4 F and F 860; (1866) 176 ER 824
1866


Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hugo Levinger v Our Sovereign Lady The Queen [1870] EngR 43; (1870) 7 Moo PC NS 68; (1870) 17 ER 26
25 Jul 1870


Commonwealth, Criminal Practice

[ Commonlii ]
 
Our Sovereign Lady The Queen v Edward Coote [1873] EngR 4; (1872-73) 9 Moo PC NS 463; (1873) 17 ER 587
11 Mar 1873


Criminal Practice, Commonwealth

[ Commonlii ]
 
Wemyss v Hopkins (1875) LR 10 QB 378
1875


Criminal Practice
The defendant had been convicted under a statutory offence, on the basis that as a driver of a carriage he had struck a horse ridden by the prosecutor causing hurt and damage to the prosecutor. He was then summoned again for what appeared to be a different offence, of having unlawfully assaulted, struck and otherwise abused the prosecutor. The two offences were in fact founded on one and the same incident. Held: On a case stated the second conviction was quashed.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hughes (1879) 4 QBD 614
1879

Baron Huddleston, Hawkins J
Criminal Practice, Magistrates
Baron Huddleston said that: "objections and defects in the form of procuring the appearance of a party charged will be cured by appearance."
Hawkins J said: "The information, which is in the nature of an indictment, of necessity precedes the process; and it is only after the information is laid, that the question as to the particular form and nature of the process can properly arise. Process is not essential to the jurisdiction of the justices to hear and adjudicate. It is but the proceeding adopted to compel the appearance of the accused to answer the information already duly laid, without which no hearing in the nature of a trial could take place (unless under special statutory enactment)."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Fennell (1880) LR 7 QBD 150
1880


Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Webb v Catchlove (1886) 3 TLR 159
1886


Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
In re Dillet [1887] 12 App Cas 459
1887
PC

Criminal Practice
Leave to appeal to the Board will not be granted unless ‘by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done.’
1 Citers



 
 Tuck and Sons v Priester; 1887 - (1887) 19 QBD 629
 
Back v Homes [1887] 51 JP 693
1887

Wills J
Criminal Practice
The court was asked whether a Highway Act applied to London. Held: It did. Mr A L Smith asked: "the second question is whether the initiative can be taken by the police in the prosecution under section 72 of the act. Why not? Anybody may prosecute if an offence has been committed." Wills J said: " the Highway Act seems to apply generally, and a prosecution for this offence under section 72 of the Highway Act was competent; and if so, anybody could prosecute."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Gavin (1888) (15 Cox 656)
1888

AL Smith, J
Criminal Practice, Evidence
The court excluded a statement made to a constable, who questioned his prisoner in a way that amounted to cross-examination. A constable has no right to ask questions without expressly saying that the answers cannot be relevant evidence.
1 Citers


 
Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494
1890

Lord Esher
Criminal Practice, Torts - Other
The plaintiff claimed damages for malicious prosecution. He called the Director of Public Prosecutions as a witness, who refused to identify the name of the person who had given him the information on which he had acted against the plaintiff. Held: The judge's decision not to do so was upheld.
Lord Esher said: "this rule as to public prosecutions was founded on grounds of public policy, and if this prosecution was a public prosecution the rule attaches . . I do not say it is a rule which can never be departed from; if upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of opinion that the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to shew the prisoner's innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the policy that must prevail. But except in that case, this rule of public policy is not a matter of discretion; it is a rule of law, and as such should be applied by the judge at the trial, who should not treat it as a matter of discretion."
The rule applied: "not only to the trial of the prisoner, but also to a subsequent civil action between the parties on the ground that the criminal prosecution was maliciously instituted or brought about."
1 Citers



 
 Pirie v Caledonian Railway Company; 1890 - (1890) 17 R 1157
 
Regina v Miles (1890) 24 QB 243
1890

Pollock B
Criminal Practice

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Hall [1891] 1 QB 747
1891


Criminal Practice
On taking an office of trust concerning the public, a person makes himself answerable to the Crown irrespective of who they had been appointed by, and in what way the appointment arose. It is an "old principle that where an Act of Parliament creates an offence and prescribes no remedy for it, the offence is indictable at common law." Where an offence was not expressly made subject to summary jurisdiction, it could only be tried by a jury.
1 Citers


 
HM Advocate v Kemp (1891) 3 White 17
1891


Criminal Practice, Scotland

1 Citers


 
Riel's Case, ubi supra; ex parte Deeming (1892) AC 422
1892
PC

Criminal Practice
The Board (PC) has repeatedly treated applications for leave to appeal and the hearing of criminal appeals as being upon the same footing.
1 Citers


 
Robinson v Canadian Pacific Railway Co [1892] AC 481; [1892] UKPC 37
23 Jul 1892
PC

Criminal Practice
When construing a statutory povision, it may be justifiable to turn back to the common law where it contains provisions of doubtful import, or uses language which had previously acquired a technical meaning, or on some other special ground.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Male; 1893 - (1893) 17 Cox 689

 
 Ex parte Macrea; PC 1893 - (1893) AC 346

 
 Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales; PC 12-Dec-1893 - [1894] AC 57; [1893] UKPC 56
 
Regina v Lushington ex parte Otto [1894] 1 QB 420
1894
QBD
Wright J
Criminal Practice
The end of a criminal trial is not necessarily the end of the court's power to control the evidence submitted.
1 Citers


 
Rogers v Hawken [1894] 67 LJ QB 526
1894
QBD
Russell, LCJ and Mathew J
Criminal Practice, Evidence
(Year unknown) In a case of the admissibility of questions put before arrest, the Divisional Court, (judges not prone to lean against a prisoner) Held: The statement was admissible and observed that "R. v. Male must not be taken as laying down that a statement of the accused to a police constable without threat or inducement is not admissible. There is no rule of law excluding statements made in such circumstances".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Goddard (1896) 60 JP 491
1896

Cave, J
Criminal Practice, Evidence
The court admitted a statement made by a prisoner in custody to a constable who had cross-examined him.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Lillyman [1896] 2 QBD 167
1896
CCCR
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ, Hawkins J
Criminal Practice
Evidence of a contemporaneous complaint by the complainant to her employer was admitted against objections that such evidence ought not to be admitted and the evidence should be confined merely to the fact of the complaint. The evidence of the complaint was similar to the complainants. Held: As to the objection in principle to the admission of such evidence: "It is necessary, in the first place, to have a clear understanding as to the principles upon which evidence of such a complaint not on oath nor made in the presence of the prisoner nor forming part of the res gestae can be admitted. It is clearly not admissible as evidence of the facts complained of: those facts must therefore be established, if at all, upon oath by the prosecutrix or other credible witness, and, strictly speaking, ought to be given before evidence of the complaint is admitted. The complaint can only be used as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness box, and as being inconsistent with her consent to that of which she complains. In every one of the old textbooks, proof of complaint is treated as a most material element in the establishment of a charge of rape or other kindred charge. … It is too late, therefore now to make serious objection to the admissibility of evidence of the fact that a complaint was made, provided it was made as speedily after the acts complained of as could reasonably be expected." He then proceeded to consider whether it was only the fact of the complaint that should be admitted: "We proceed to consider the second objection, which is that the evidence of complaint should be limited to the fact that a complaint was made without giving any particulars of it. No authority binding on us was cited during the argument, either in support of or against this objection. We must therefore determine the matter upon principle." After setting out the authorities, he concluded: "After very careful consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion that we are bound by no authority to support the existing usage of limiting evidence of the complaint to the bare fact that a complaint was made, and that reason and good sense are against our so doing. The evidence is admissible on the ground that it was a complaint of that which is charged against the prisoner and can be legitimately used only for the purposes of enabling the jury to judge for themselves whether the conduct of the woman was consistent with her testimony on oath given in the witness-box negativing her consent, and affirming that the acts complained of were against her will, and in accordance with the conduct they would expect in a truthful woman under the circumstances detailed by her. The jury, and they only, are the persons to be satisfied whether the woman's conduct was so consistent or not. Without proof of her condition, demeanour and verbal expressions, all of which are of vital importance in the consideration of that question, how is it possible for them satisfactorily to determine it? Is it to be left to the witness to whom the statement is made to determine and report to the jury whether what the woman said amounted to a real complaint? And are the jury bound to accept the witnesses' interpretation of her words as binding upon them without having the whole statement before them, and without having the power to require it to be disclosed to them, even if they may feel it essential to enable them to form a reliable opinion? … In reality, affirmative answers to such stereotyped questions as these "Did the prosecutrix make a complaint (a very leading question by the way) of something done to herself? Did she mention a name?" amount to nothing to which any weight ought to be attached; they tend to embaEvidence of a contemporaneous complaint by the complainant to her employer was admitted against objections that such evidence ought not to be admitted and the evidence should be confined merely to the fact of the complaint. The evidence of the complaint was similar to the complainants. Held: As to the objection in principle to the admission of such evidence: "It is necessary, in the first place, to have a clear understanding as to the principles upon which evidence of such a complaint not on oath nor made in the presence of the prisoner nor forming part of the res gestae can be admitted. It is clearly not admissible as evidence of the facts complained of: those facts must therefore be established, if at all, upon oath by the prosecutrix or other credible witness, and, strictly speaking, ought to be given before evidence of the complaint is admitted. The complaint can only be used as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness box, and as being inconsistent with her consent to that of which she complains. In every one of the old textbooks, proof of complaint is treated as a most material element in the establishment of a charge of rape or other kindred charge. … It is too late, therefore now to make serious objection to the admissibility of evidence of the fact that a complaint was made, provided it was made as speedily after the acts complained of as could reasonably be expected." He then proceeded to consider whether it was only the fact of the complaint that should be admitted: "We proceed to consider the second objection, which is that the evidence of complaint should be limited to the fact that a complaint was made without giving any particulars of it. No authority binding on us was cited during the argument, either in support of or against this objection. We must therefore determine the matter upon principle." After setting out the authorities, he concluded: "After very careful consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion that we are bound by no authority to support the existing usage of limiting evidence of the complaint to the bare fact that a complaint was made, and that reason and good sense are against our so doing. The evidence is admissible on the ground that it was a complaint of that which is charged against the prisoner and can be legitimately used only for the purposes of enabling the jury to judge for themselves whether the conduct of the woman was consistent with her testimony on oath given in the witness-box negativing her consent, and affirming that the acts complained of were against her will, and in accordance with the conduct they would expect in a truthful woman under the circumstances detailed by her. The jury, and they only, are the persons to be satisfied whether the woman's conduct was so consistent or not. Without proof of her condition, demeanour and verbal expressions, all of which are of vital importance in the consideration of that question, how is it possible for them satisfactorily to determine it? Is it to be left to the witness to whom the statement is made to determine and report to the jury whether what the woman said amounted to a real complaint? And are the jury bound to accept the witnesses' interpretation of her words as binding upon them without having the whole statement before them, and without having the power to require it to be disclosed to them, even if they may feel it essential to enable them to form a reliable opinion? … In reality, affirmative answers to such stereotyped questions as these "Did the prosecutrix make a complaint (a very leading question by the way) of something done to herself? Did she mention a name?" amount to nothing to which any weight ought to be attached; they tend to embarrass rather than to assist a thoughtful jury, for they are consistent either with there having been a complaint or no complaint of the prisoner's conduct. To limit the evidence of complaint to such questions and answers is to ask the jury to draw important inferences from imperfect materials, perfect materials being at hand and in the cognizance of the witness in the box. In our opinion, nothing ought unnecessarily be left to speculation." The court went on to make it clear that a direction was to be given as to the purpose for which the evidence was admissible.rrass rather than to assist a thoughtful jury, for they are consistent either with there having been a complaint or no complaint of the prisoner's conduct. To limit the evidence of complaint to such questions and answers is to ask the jury to draw important inferences from imperfect materials, perfect materials being at hand and in the cognizance of the witness in the box. In our opinion, nothing ought unnecessarily be left to speculation." The court went on to make it clear that a direction was to be given as to the purpose for which the evidence was admissible.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Miller (1898) 18 Cox 54)
1898

Hawkins, J
Criminal Practice, Criminal Evidence
The court allowed the accused’s answers to be proved against him, when he had been cross-examined before arrest: "Every case must be decided according to the whole of its circumstances"

 
Regina v Histed (1898) 19 Cox 16
1898

Hawkins, J.
Criminal Practice, Evidence
The court excluded the answers of a prisoner in custody, on the authority of R. v. Gavin, saying that the constable was entrapping the prisoner and trying by a trick to set a broken-down case on its legs again.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Cockshott and Others [1898] 1 QB 582
1898

Wright J
Criminal Practice
The defendant had not been informed of his right to be tried by a jury (on an either way offence) before he pleaded guilty in the magistrates' court. Held: The appeal succeeded. The guilty plea was bad.
Wright J discussed the argument that the defendant had waived his right: "As to the waiver which has been suggested, there cannot be a waiver of a right which the defendant does not know that he has. I doubt whether he could waive the right to be informed of his option to be tried by a jury if he knew that he had the option. I am inclined to think that, the duty to inform having been imposed upon the Court for the protection of all accused persons, the right to be informed could not be waived"
1 Citers


 
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