Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Criminal Evidence - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 12 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Regina v Ollis [1900] 2 QB 758
1900
CCCR
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ, Mathew, Grantham, Wright, Darling and Channell JJ (Bruce and Ridley JJ dissenting)
Criminal Practice, Criminal Evidence
The defendant had obtained a sum of money by giving a worthless cheque. He was indicted for having obtained the money by false pretences. His defence was that when he gave the cheque he expected a payment into his bank account in time to meet the cheque, and he was acquitted. He was later tried on a second indictment charging him with three other acts of obtaining money by false pretences on three other worthless cheques. Counsel for the prosecution was allowed to call the same evidence that had been called against the defendant on the unsuccessful prosecution in respect of the one cheque, and the defendant was convicted. Held: The evidence was legally admissible and that the conviction was right notwithstanding that the defendant had been acquitted of the former charge.
Lord Russell of Killowen CJ: "The evidence was, after discussion, admitted; and Ramsey made precisely the same statement he had made before upon the trial of the first indictment when the accused was acquitted. The only point for our present determination is, whether that evidence was legally admissible on the ground that the facts disclosed in it were relevant to the subsequent charges. It does not appear to have been argued that it was not relevant as showing guilty knowledge, if it were not inadmissible on the grounds suggested—namely, that the facts sought to be given in evidence had already been given, and that the accused had already been acquitted of the charge to which they related. It is clear that there was no estoppel; the negativing by the jury of the charge of fraud on the first occasion did not create an estoppel; nor is there any question arising upon the maxim 'Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.' The evidence was not less admissible because it tended to shew that the accused was, in fact, guilty of the former charge. The point is, was it relevant in support of the three subsequent charges? In the opinion of the majority of the court, and in my own opinion, it was relevant as shewing a course of conduct on the part of the accused, and a belief on his part that the cheques would not be met."
Darling J: "It seems to me, therefore, that by the admission of this evidence the defendant was not 'bis vexatus,' for I feel sure that those words are not to be understood as meaning that a man is not to be more than once annoyed by the same evidence. I think they mean that he is not to be by legal process twice exposed to the risk of being found guilty of the same crime, or the same tort, or liable twice to pay the same debt, be it to the State or to his fellow citizen.
"To hold otherwise seems to me to rule that evidence which has been given once shall never be produced again against the same defendant; yet it is plain that up to a certain point the evidence must often be the same, although the defendant is accused of wrongs done to two distinct persons, and that in different suits or forensic proceedings."
Channell J: "Judges should be, and I believe generally are, careful not to allow proof of other acts of the prisoner besides those the subject of the indictment to be given, unless those facts have a clear bearing on some issue raised by the indictment, but if they have such a bearing I am unable to see how their proof becomes inadmissible because they have already, for a different purpose, been considered by another jury. Take as an illustration a case of counterfeit coin. Suppose a man passes a counterfeit half-crown, and on his trial, there being no proof of his having possession of any other counterfeit coin, the jury acquit. It is subsequently discovered that either before or after the passing of the one half-crown (in my opinion it matters not which) he has passed another counterfeit half-crown, and upon comparison of the two base coins they appear cast in the same mould. If tried for the secondly discovered case of uttering, the fact of the other uttering would be most cogent evidence, and the fact that when that other case was supposed to be an isolated one a jury had acquitted would neither detract from the weight of the evidence or in any way affect its admissibility, for the prisoner would not be being tried again for the offence of which he had been acquitted, but for a different offence, in respect of which the evidence given in the former case, or some of it, would be relevant . . .
I doubt whether the transaction with Ramsey was relevant on the subsequent indictment, but I am prepared to defer to the opinion of the majority of the court as to the mode in which the case should be dealt with, desiring only to express my clear opinion that, if the evidence was otherwise admissible, it is not the less so by reason of the former acquittal."
1 Citers


 
Rex v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389
1906

Kennedy J
Criminal Evidence
The court considered the rule excluding evidence of the defendant's bad character. Kennedy J said: "The general rule cannot be applied where the facts which constitute distinct offences are at the same time part of the transaction which is the subject of the indictment. Evidence is necessarily admissible as to acts which are so closely and inextricably mixed up with the history of the guilty act itself as to form part of one chain of relevant circumstances, and so could not be excluded in the presentation of the case before the jury without the evidence being thereby rendered unintelligible." The court gave examples of trials for murder or wounding, where evidence is given to show prior assaults by the accused on the victim, or menaces or threats uttered to him.
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Ball; HL 1911 - [1911] A C 47
 
Leach v Director of Public Prosecutions [1912] UKHL 1032; 49 SLR 1032
26 Feb 1912
HL
Lord Chancellor (Loreburn), Earl of Halsbury, Lords Macnaghten, Atkinson, Shaw, and Robson
Criminal Evidence
The Criminal Evidence Act 1898, sec. 4, declares that "the wife or husband of a person charged with an offence under any enactment mentioned in the schedule to this Act may be called as a witness either for the prosecution or the defence and without the consent of the person charged."
Held ( rev. judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal- Lord Alverstone, C.J., Hamilton and Bankes, JJ.) that a husband or wife cannot be compelled to testify against his will.
[ Bailii ]
 
Rex v Christie [1914] AC 545
1914
HL
Lord Atkinson
Criminal Evidence
The House considered the admissibility in evidence of a false statement made in the defendant's presence, but uncontradicted by him: "the rule of law undoubtedly is that a statement made in the presence of an accused person, even on an occasion which should be expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from him, is not evidence against him of the facts stated save in so far as he accepts the statement, so as to make it his own. If he accepts the statement in part only, then to that extent alone does it become his statement. He may accept the statement by word or conduct, action or demeanour, and it is the function of the jury which tries the case to determine whether his words, action, conduct or demeanour at the time when a statement was made amounts to an acceptance of it in whole or in part . . ."
1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Christie [1914] UKHL 641
7 Apr 1914
HL
Lord Chancellor (Viscount Haldane), Earl of Halsbury, Lords Dunedin, Atkinson, Moulton, Parker, and Reading
Criminal Evidence
At the trial of a man for indecent assault upon a child of tender years the child gave evidence as an unsworn witness under section 30 of the Children Act 1908. His mother and a constable also gave evidence as to statements the child had made on being confronted with the accused shortly after the alleged assault. Held that while not admissible as evidence of identification, the testimony of the mother and constable was admissible to prove the accused's demeanour at the time. Held: Decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal reversed on this point, but the quashing of the conviction sustained, because the statements did not amount to the corroboration required by section 30.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Rex v Twiss; 1918 - (1918) 13 Cr App R 177

 
 Thompson v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 1918 - [1918] AC 221; (1918) 13 Cr App R 61

 
 Rex v Voisin; 1918 - [1918] 1 KB 531; [1918-19] All ER 491
 
Rex v Trupedo (1920) App Div 58
1920

Innes CJ
Commonwealth, Criminal Evidence
(South Africa) Evidence concerning the activity of a tracker dog was not admissible. Innes CJ said: "We have no scientific or accurate knowledge as to the faculty by which dogs of certain breeds are said to be able to follow the scent of one human being, rejecting the scent of all others . . there is too much uncertainty as to the constancy of his behaviour and as to the extent of the factor of error involved to justify us in drawing legal inferences therefrom."
1 Citers


 
Rex v White (1926) 5 DLR 2
1926


Commonwealth, Criminal Evidence
(British Colombia) Evidence regarding a tracker dog was held inadmissible.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Rex v Berg and others (1927) 20 Cr App R 38
1927
CCA

Crime, Criminal Evidence
The defendants were said to have conducted a disorderly house in providing exhibitions of a perverted nature. Held: The common law offence of keeping a disorderly house is committed when the house is so conducted as to violate law and good order. Letters found in such a house referring to unnatural practices may be put in evidence of such use.
1 Citers


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.