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Crime - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 112 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Smith v Hughes [1960] 2 All ER 859; [1960] 1 WLR 830
1960
QBD
Lord Parker
Crime
A prostitute offered her services from from the balcony of a house. Held: She was guilty of the offence of soliciting "in a street or public place" contrary to section 1(1) of the 1956 Act. Applying the mischief rule, it could be seen that her solicitations took place in a "street or public place" for the purposes of the Act.
Lord Parker said: "Observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must be in the street. Equally it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone. I think that the magistrate came to a correct conclusion in each case, and that these appeals should be dismissed."
Street Offences Act 1959 1(1)

 
HM Advocate v Kidd 1960 SLT 82
1960


Scotland, Crime
The court set out the conditions for finding insanity in criminal law.
1 Citers



 
 Bryan v Robinson; 1960 - [I960] 2 All ER 173
 
Regina v George (1960) 128 Can CC 289
1960

Fauteux J
Commonwealth, Crime
(Canada) Fauteux J described the difference between a crime of basic intent and one of specific intent: "In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made between (i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes and (ii) intention as applied to acts apart from their purposes. A general intent attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent required to constitute the crime while, in others, there must be, in addition to that general intent, a specific intent attending the purpose for the commission of the act."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Byrne [1960] 44 Cr App R 246; [1960] 2 QB 396
1960
CCA
Lord Parker CJ
Crime
The defendant was a sexual psychopath who had strangled and mutilated a young woman resident of the YWCA. The case on his behalf was that he was unable to resist his impulse to gross and sadistic sexual violence. The judge's directions had amounted to excluding from abnormality of mind an inability to control his urges. Held: This was incorrect. When considering a defence of diminished responsibility, lies told by the defendant are not relevant.
Lord Parker CJ explained the meaning of 'abnormality of mind' as "wide enough to cover the mind's activities all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a rational judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment." Whether the defendant suffered from such an abnormality was a matter for the jury, but the jury was entitled to take into consideration all the evidence, "including acts or statements of the accused and his demeanour. They are not bound to accept the medical evidence if there is other material before them which, in their good judgment, conflicts with it and outweighs it." The key phrase "substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing", "points to a consideration of the extent to which the accused's mind is answerable for his physical acts which must include a consideration of the extent of his ability to exercise will power to control his physical acts".
Whether the abnormality of mind was such as substantially impaired the mental responsibility of the accused for his acts in doing or being a party to the killing was "a question of degree and essentially one for the jury." and "Medical evidence is, of course, relevant, but the question involves a decision not merely as to whether there was some impairment of the mental responsibility of the accused for his acts but whether such impairment can properly be called "substantial", a matter upon which juries may quite legitimately differ from doctors.
Furthermore, in a case where the abnormality of mind is one that affects the accused's self - control the step between "he did not resist his impulse" and "he could not resist his impulse" is, as the evidence of this case shows, one which is incapable of scientific proof. A fortiori there is no scientific measurement of the degree of difficulty which an abnormal person finds in controlling his impulses. These problems which in the present state of medical knowledge are scientifically insoluble, the jury can only approach in a broad, common sense way".
Homicide Act 1957
1 Citers



 
 John De Freitas v The Queen; 1960 - [1960] 2 WIR 523
 
Regina v Spraggett [1960] Crim LR 840
1960
CACD
Lord Parker CJ
Crime
Three men had been involved in the burglary of a sub-post office. Two of them went into the building while the third waited outside. During the burglary the owner of the shop came on the scene and was knocked down. The third man was also convicted of burglary and assault with intent to rob. The judge directed the jury that if the defendants jointly decided to break into premises, each was liable for any incidental violence. Held: His appeal succeeded. Where violence is used in furtherance of a criminal venture, a co-adventurer will be liable only if he shared an intention to use violence to resist interference or arrest.
Lord Parker CJ said that the summing-up treated it as a presumption of law that where a person was found to be acting in concert with others to commit a burglary, it should be presumed that he was also acting in concert with others to use violence in the course of the crime, whereas the jury had to be satisfied on the evidence that there was such a preconceived intention to use violence.
1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith; HL 1960 - [1960] 3 All ER 161; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1961] AC 290
 
Regina v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Caborn-Waterfield [1960] 2 QB 498
1960
QBD
Salmon J
Crime, Extradition
When an accused person is committed under the first paragraph of section 10 and surrendered to a foreign government he is surrendered for trial. Before that course is taken the magistrate has to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out. When a convicted person is committed under the second paragraph of section 10 and surrendered to a foreign government he is surrendered to serve his sentence, in which case all that is necessary in the magistrates' court is to prove his conviction. The applicant had been wrongly treated as an accused person when he should, having regard to the final nature of the French judgment ultimately passed upon him, have been treated as a convicted person.
Extradition Act 1870
1 Citers


 
Regina v Moore and Gooderham [1960] 1 WLR 1308
1960

Lord Parker CJ
Crime
The court was asked whether a firearm was 'lethal'. Held: Lord Parker CJ stated: "I think that the Justices were fully entitled to give the word lethal the sense that the injury must be of a kind which may cause death. That is the ordinary meaning of the word, but it is observed that in this connection one is not considering whether a firearm is designed or intended to cause injury of a type from which death results, but rather whether it is a weapon which, however misused, may cause injury from which death may result. Section 19 is designed to prevent, amongst other things, a weapon by firing it point blank and point blank, say, at an eye or an ear, or some particularly vulnerable part; and if it is capable of causing more than trifling and trivial injury when misused, then it is a weapon of causing injury from which death may result."
1 Citers



 
 Fisher v Bell; QBD 10-Nov-1960 - [1961] 1 QB 394

 
 Cugullere, Regina v; 1961 - [1961] 45 Cr App R 108
 
Regina v Spurge [1961] 2 QB 205
1961
CCA

Road Traffic, Crime
The driver claimed automatism as his defence. Held: The defendant "continued to drive when he was unfit to do so, and when he should have been aware of his unfitness."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Metharam (1961) 45 Cr App R 304
1961
CCA

Crime
The court applied a subjective test when asking whether the defendant intended the harm caused.
Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 46
1 Citers



 
 Elvan Rose v The Queen; PC 1961 - [1961] AC 49
 
Towers and Co Ltd v Gray [1961] 2 QB 361
1961

Lord Parker CJ
Crime
The term 'possession' has been the source of constant difficulty of interpretation, and must be construed in the particular context.
1 Citers


 
Seekings v Clarke (1961) 59 LGR 268
1961

Lord Parker CJ
Land, Crime
Lord Parker CJ said: "It is perfectly clear that anything which substantially prevents the public from having free access over the whole of the highway which is not purely temporary in nature is an unlawful obstruction".
1 Citers


 
Templeton v HM Advocate 1961 JC 62
1961

Lord Guthrie
Crime


 
Welham v Director of Public Prosecutions [1961] AC 103; [1960] 1 All ER 805; (1960) 44 Cr App R 124; [1960] 2 WLR 669
1961
HL
Lord Radcliffe, Lord Denning
Crime
The House considered what was required to establish an "intent to defraud". Held: Lord Radcliffe said: "Now, I think that there are one or two things that can be said with confidence about the meaning of this word ' defraud '. It requires a person as its object: that is, defrauding involves doing something to someone. Although in the nature of things it is almost invariably associated with the obtaining of an advantage for the person who commits the fraud, it is the effect upon the person who is the object of the fraud that ultimately determines its meaning . . Secondly popular speech does not give, and I do not think ever has given, any sure guide as to the limits of what is meant by 'to defraud'. It may mean to cheat someone. It may mean to practise a fraud upon someone. It may mean to deprive someone by deceit of something which is regarded as belonging to him or, though not belonging to him, as due to him or his right."
Lord Denning distinguished between "intent to deceive" and "intent to defraud" by saying that the former conveyed the element of deceit which induced a state of mind "without the element of fraud which induces a course of action or inaction". As to "a charge of fraud against that party was in issue" under the 1933 Act: "'Fraud' in ordinary speech means the using of false representations to obtain an unjust advantage . . Likewise in law 'fraud' is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false, see Derry v Peek per Lord Herschell."
Forgery Act 1913 4 - Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 6(3)(1)(a)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Blaikie v British Transport Commission 1961 SC 44
1961

Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson
Crime
The court said that it was necessary for the law to come to a compromise with the doctrine of causation; expediency and good sense dictated that for practical purposes a line had to be drawn somewhere and, in doing so, the court was to be guided by the practical experience of the reasonable man rather than by the theoretical speculations of the philosopher.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Madan; CCA 1961 - [1961] QB 1

 
 Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 4-May-1961 - [1962] AC 220; [1961] UKHL 1; [1961] 2 All ER 446; (1961) 45 Cr App R 113

 
 John De Freitas v The Queen; PC 10-Jul-1961 - [1961] UKPC 33
 
Regina v Bailey (1978) 66 Cr App R 31
1 Oct 1961
CCA

Crime

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland; HL 3-Oct-1961 - [1961] UKHL 3; [1963] AC 386; [1961] 3 All ER 523
 
King v The Queen [1961] UKPC 46; [1962] 1 All ER 816; [1962] AC 199; [1962] 2 WLR 301
14 Nov 1961
PC

Crime
West Indies - Appeal from conviction for murder - allowed
[ Bailii ]
 
The Queen v Sharmpal Singh Son of Pritam Singh, Sharmpal Singh Son of Pritam Singh v The Queen [1961] UKPC 47; [1962] AC 188; [1962] 2 WLR 238
16 Nov 1961
PC

Crime
Eastern Africa
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Quinn and Others [1962] 2 QB 24
1962


Crime
Premises were used for the performance of acts which were "seriously indecent and, in some respects, revolting", and the public was invited to resort to the premises for indulging in "perverted and revolting practices". Held: The conviction for keeping a disorderly house was upheld.
1 Citers


 
Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] 46 Cr App R 129
1962


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Andrea Obonyo v Regina; 1962 - (1962) EALR 542

 
 Watmore v Jenkins; QBD 1962 - [1962] 2 QB 572
 
Regina v Barker [1962] 46 Cr App R 227
1962
CCA

Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Harden (1962) 46 Cr App R 90; [1963] 1 QB 8
1962


Crime
The appellant, in England, sent false hire purchase agreements to a company in Jersey, who posted back cheques to him. The court analysed the transaction in contractual terms, and held that as the post office was the appellant's agent to carry the cheques they had in law been "obtained" by him in Jersey. Held: As to jurisdiction, applying Ellis: "To support the charge, the obtaining relied upon must be an obtaining of the property in the thing charged, and not merely possession or control of it; and when this principle is applied to a cheque, it means that the accused obtains the cheque, when the victim makes actual delivery of it to him, or makes constructive delivery by handing the cheque to an agent duty appointed by the accused to receive it on his behalf."
Larceny Act 1916 32(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 The Queen v King; 1962 - [1962] SCR 746
 
Burge v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] 1 WLR 265
1962


Crime

Street Offences Act 1959 1(1)
1 Citers



 
 Weitz and Another v Monaghan; 2-Feb-1962 - [1962] 1 WLR 262

 
 Chandler (TN) v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 12-Jul-1962 - [1964] AC 763; [1962] UKHL 2
 
Cox v Army Council [1963] AC 48; (1962) 46 Cr App R 258
1963
PC
Viscount Simonds, Lord Reid
Crime, Armed Forces, Commonwealth
The provisions of the English Army Act, are to be applied "in diverse circumstances wherever the armed forces of the Crown happen to be, in developed or undeveloped countries, as conquerors or guests, and their purpose is . . Disciplinary." Criminal law applies only in respect of acts committed or omissions made within England. Viscount Simons said: "apart from those exceptional cases in which specific provision is made in regard to acts committed abroad, the whole body of the criminal law of England deals only with acts committed in England." and "with rare exceptions the whole body of our criminal law is 'domestic' in the sense that it is made for the order and good government of this country and is applicable only to acts done on English soil."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Payne; CCA 1963 - [1963] 1 All ER 848
 
Regina v Chisam (1963) 47 Cr App R 130
1963
CCA
Lord Parker CJ
Crime
A defendant's belief founding a plea of self defence must be both honest and reasonable. A sufficient justification was established if the accused genuinely believed on reasonable grounds that a relative or friend was in imminent danger of injury, even though that belief was based on an honest mistake of fact.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Jordan v Burgoyne; 1963 - [1963] 2 QB 744; [1963] 2 All ER 225
 
British Basic Slag Limited v Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements [1963] 1 WLR 727; [1963] 2 All ER 807
1963
CA
Wilmer, Diplock LJJ
Crime, Commercial
The court considered the meaning of section 6 of the 1956 Act. It was argued that the trial Judge had erred in holding that an arrangement within the meaning of the expression exists when, by communications between the parties, “each has intentionally aroused in the other an expectation that he will act in a certain way”. It was submitted that the expression also required “that there must be mutuality in the acceptance of rights and obligations”. Held:
Willmer LJ said: "I think it is highly significant that Parliament did not see fit to include any definition of ‘arrangement.’ I infer from this that it was intended that the word should be construed in its ordinary or popular sense. Though it may not be easy to put into words, everybody knows what is meant by an arrangement between two or more parties. If the arrangement is intended to be enforceable by legal proceedings, as in the case where it is made for good consideration, it may no doubt properly be described as an agreement. But the Act of 1956 clearly contemplates that there may be arrangements which are not enforceable by legal proceedings, but which create only moral obligations or obligations binding in honour. This seems to me to be entirely consistent with the dictum of Upjohn J. to which I have already referred. Nor do I consider that there is any inconsistency between that and the view expressed by the judge in the present case. For when each of two or more parties intentionally arouses in the others an expectation that he will act in a certain way, it seems to me that he incurs at least a moral obligation to do so. An arrangement as so defined is therefore something ‘whereby the parties to it accept mutual rights and obligations.’"
Diplock LJ said that there were many ways in which arrangements might be made: "it is sufficient to constitute an arrangement between A and B, if (1) A makes a representation as to his future conduct with the expectation and intention that such conduct on his part will operate as an inducement to B to act in a particular way, (2) such representation is communicated to B, who has knowledge that A so expected and intended, and (3) such representation or A’s conduct in fulfilment of it operates as an inducement, whether among other inducements or not, to B to act in that particular way." and
"Arrangement is not a term about; under section 6(3) of the Act. I agree with my Lords that it bears the meaning of that an ordinary educated man would ascribe to it. It involves a meeting of minds because under s.6(1) it has to be an arrangement ‘between two or more persons’ and, since it must be an arrangement ‘under which restrictions are accepted by two or more parties’, it involves mutuality and that each party, assuming he is a reasonable and conscientious man, would regard himself as being in some degree under a duty whether moral or legal to conduct himself in a particular way or not to conduct himself in a particular way as the case may be, at any rate so long as the other party or parties conducted themselves in the way contemplated by the arrangement."
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 6
1 Citers


 
Straker v Director of Public Prosecutions [1963] 1 QB 926
1963
QBD

Crime
The defendant had been prosecuted with respect to negatives of films, and argued that a negative was not an article within section 1(2); it was not a film, and that even if it were an article thus defined, it could not be obscene unless published, and negatives were not published - they were used only to produce prints produced from the negatives. Held: It was possible, without deciding, for a negative to come within the words "any film or other record of a picture," but it was impossible to say that a negative was capable of publication - as publication was defined in the 1959 Act - since the negative was not itself shown, played or projected to some member of the public.
Obscene Publications Act 1959
1 Citers


 
Regina v Betty (1964) 48 Cr App R 6; [1963] 3 All ER 602
1963

Lord Parker CJ
Crime
If two men attack another without any intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm, and during the course of the attack one man forms an intention to kill the victim, and strikes the fatal blow with that intention, he may be convicted of murder while the other participant in the plan may be convicted of manslaughter
Lord Parker CJ approved a direction that "anybody who is a party to an attack which results in an unlawful killing which results in death is a party to the killing".
1 Citers


 
Arrowsmith v Jenkins [1963] 2 QB 561
1963

Lord Parker CJ
Crime, Land
Lord Parker CJ said that "wilfully" in the context of an accusation of wilfully obstructing a highway means "intentionally as opposed to accidentally, that is, by an exercise of his or her free will"
1 Citers


 
Regina v Mayling [1963] 2 QB 717; [1963] 47 Cr App R 102
1963


Crime
To establish the offence of outraging public decency, it is not necessary to prove that any particular person was outraged.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Smith (Wesley); 1963 - [1963] 1 WLR 1200; 128 JP 13; [1963] 3 All ER 597
 
Regina v Clayton and Halsey [1963] 1 QB 163
1963


Crime

1 Citers


 
HM Advocate v Cunningham 1963 SLT 345
1963


Scotland, Crime

1 Citers


 
Lim Chin Aik v The Queen [1963] AC 160
1963
PC

Crime
In considering how the presumption against an absolute offence having been created, can be displaced "it is not enough in their Lordships' opinions merely to label the statute as one dealing with a grave social evil and from that to infer that strict liability was intended."
1 Citers


 
Lee Chun-Chuen v The Queen [1963] AC 220
1963
PC
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Crime
Their Lordships explained the meaning of the words of Viscount Salmon in Holmes: "It is plain that Viscount Simon must have meant the word "actual" to have a limiting effect and that he had in mind some particular category of intention. He cannot have meant that any sort of intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm was generally incompatible with manslaughter because that would eliminate provocation as a line of defence…"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Almon Eugene Hardtmann v The Queen [1963] UKPC 7
1 Apr 1963
PC

Commonwealth, Crime
(Bermuda)
[ Bailii ]
 
Bremme v Dubery [1964] 1 WLR 119
1964

Parker L
Transport, Crime
The defendant was charged with unlawfully travelling on a railway without paying the fare and with intent to avoid payment. He said that having left the train, he was no longer travelling. Held: A man who has been physically conveyed on a railway does not cease to travel on that railway merely by alighting on the platform.
Regulation of Railways Act 1889 3 - Transport Act 1962

 
Regina v Desmond [1964] 3 All ER 587; [1964] 3 WLR 1148
1964
CCA

Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v King [1964] 1 QB 285
1964


Crime

1 Citers


 
Adler v George [1964] 2 QBD 7; [1964] 1 All ER 628
1964
QBD

Crime
The defendant had entered an RAF station, which was a prohibited place within the Act. He was prosecuted for having obstructed a member of Her Majesty's forces who was engaged in security duty in relation to the station ‘in the vicinity of a prohibited place’ He argued that being in a prohibited place, he could not be said to be "in the vicinity" of that place. Held: Applying the golden rule of statutory interpretation, he was guilty. "In the vicinity of" should be interpreted to mean in or near the prohibited place.
Official Secrets Act 1920

 
Regina v Chandler [1964] EWCA Crim 1
5 Feb 1964
CCA

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Simcox The Times 25 February 1964; [1964] Crim LR 402
25 Feb 1964
CCA

Crime
A man who had previously murdered his second wife and had now sought out his third wife, with whom he was in dispute, taking with him a rifle with which he shot her sister when it was her whom he encountered. Some four psychiatrists agreed that he had an abnormality of mind, namely a paranoid personality. Each said that it impaired his self-control, but none was prepared to say that the impairment was substantial; they spoke of "moderate" impairment, or of his finding it "harder" than others to control himself. The judge left the question to the jury in the terms of the section, adding only that they should ask: "do we think, looking at it broadly as commonsense people, there was a substantial impairment of his mental responsibility in what he did? If the answer to that is 'yes' then you find him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. If the answer to that is 'no, there may be some impairment but we do not think it was substantial. We do not think it was something which really made any great difference although it may have made it harder to control himself to refrain from crime', then you would find him guilty as charged." Held: Whilst observing that the final sentence needed the previous focus on the word "substantial" in order that it should not be thought that the absence of self-control had to be total, approved this direction.
1 Citers


 
Nagy v Weston [1965] 1 All ER 78; [1965] 1 WLR 280
1965
QBD
Lord Parker CJ
Crime, Land
The defendant was prosecuted after selling hot dogs from a van parked on a busy street in Oxford. The court was asked when such would become an illegal obstruction. Held: Such a use "could not . . be said to be incidental to the right to pass and repass along the street."
Lord Parker CJ said: "It is undoubtedly true - counsel for the appellant is quite right - that there must be proof that the user in question was an unreasonable use. Whether or not the user amounting to an obstruction is or is not an unreasonable use of the highway is a question of fact. It depends on all the circumstances, including the length of time the obstruction continues, the place where it occurs, the purpose for which it is done, and, of course, whether it does in fact cause an actual obstruction as opposed to a potential obstruction."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Church [1966] 1 QB 59; [1965] EWCA Crim 1; 129 JP 366; 49 Cr App Rep 206; [1965] 2 WLR 1220; [1965] 2 All ER 72
1965
CCA
Edmund Davies J, NMarshall J, Widgery J
Crime
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. After he had been unable to satisfy his female victim sexually, he had become angry and had seriously assaulted her. He mistakenly thought she was dead and tipped her in the river where she drowned. Held: Edmund Davies J: "For such a verdict inexorably to follow, the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Kane [1965] 1 All ER 705
1965

Barry, J
Crime
The court considered whether a private car was a public place when the car was on the public highway. Held: A private club was a public place in the context of a charge of affray. "The real question is whether [the place] is open to the public, whether on payment or not, or whether on the other hand access to it is so restricted to a particular class or even to particular classes of the public such as for example the members of an ordinary householder's family and his relations and friends and the plumber or other tradesmen who come to do various repairs about the house. If it is restricted to that sort of class of person then of course it is not a public place, it is a private place."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Desmond [1965] AC 960
1965
HL
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Crime
The House analysed the authorities on the law of larceny and robbery, and declared its current state. While in earlier times robbery may have been limited to where there was actual violence, it became sufficient that there was "a putting in fear of violence as by a threat of violence".
Lord Pearce discussed the common law elements of robbery: "The essence of the offence is that violence is done or threatened to the person of the custodian who stands between the robber and the property in order to prevent or overcome his resistance and oblige him to part with the property and submit to the thief stealing it."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Miller (1965) 49 CrAppR 241 CCA
1965
CCA

Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Griffiths and Others (1965) 49 Cr App R 279; [1966] 1 QB 589
1965
CCA
Paull J
Crime
A supplier of lime and his employee were accused of conspiring with seven farmers to defraud the Ministry by submitting excessive subsidy claims. They were also charged with fraudulently obtaining money from the Ministry. There was no evidence that any of the farmers was aware of the arrangements being made between the principal defendant and any of the other farmers, but they were all charged with a single count of conspiracy. Held: The convictions were quashed.
Conspiracy charges should be tried separately to substantive counts and the prosecution should not charge persons with conspiracy at all in the absence of evidence from which a jury could infer that the accuseds’ minds went beyond an intention to commit the substantive offences, to an agreement to do an unlawful act. The prosecution case was confusing and that evidence in any event could not have supported the conspiracy charge.
It is not necessary that a defendant in a conspiracy charge should know all the details of the scheme to which he attaches himself. However: "In law all must join in the one agreement, each with the others, in order to constitute one conspiracy. They may join in at various times, each attaching himself to that agreement; any of them may not know the full extent of the scheme to which he attaches himself. But what each must know is that there is coming into existence, or is in existence, a scheme which goes beyond the illegal act or acts which he agrees to do."
Paull J gave an illustration: "I employ an accountant to make out my tax return. He and his clerk are both present when I am asked to sign the return. I notice an item in my expenses of £100 and say: "I don't remember incurring this expense". The clerk says: "Well, actually I put it in. You didn't incur it, but I didn't think you would object to a few pounds being saved." The accountant indicates his agreement to this attitude. After some hesitation I agree to let it stand. On those bare facts I cannot be charged with 50 others in a conspiracy to defraud the Exchequer of £100,000 on the basis that this accountant and his clerk have persuaded 500 other clients to make false returns, some being false in one way, some in another, or even all in the same way. I have not knowingly attached myself to a general agreement to defraud."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Murphy [1965] NI 138
1965
CMAC

Crime, Armed Forces, Northern Ireland
(Courts-Martial Appeal Court of Northern Ireland) The court has a discretion to exclude the evidence of an agent provocateur.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Stanley; CACD 1965 - [1965] 2 QB 327

 
 Liyanage and others v The Queen; PC 2-Dec-1965 - [1965] UKPC 1; [1966] 2 WLR 682; [1967] 1 AC 259; [1966] 1 All ER 650

 
 Regina v Button; Regina v Swain; HL 1966 - [1966] AC 591
 
Goodfellow v Johnson [1966] 1 QB 83
1966

Lord Parker CJ, Widgery J
Licensing, Crime, Consumer
The defendant was the manager and licensee of a public house owned by a brewery. When the premises were visited by a sampling officer the gin supplied by the barmaid was adulterated. She was the servant of the brewery, and the magistrates dismissed the allegation that the defendant had contravened the section which provided "If a person sells to the prejudice of the purchaser any food . . which is not . . of the substance . . demanded by the purchaser he shall . . be guilty of an offence."
Lord Parker CJ said that the statutory provision created an absolute offence which was not correct "The forbidden act is the selling to the prejudice of the purchaser, and it has long been held that a person who has done the forbidden thing through somebody else like a servant or agent is himself liable. Further, as long ago as 1891 it was held in Hotchin v Hindmarsh that the forbidden act in a provision such as this is not the parting with the title by the owner but is the physical handling and handing over of the goods by way of sale: in other words the shop assistant, or in this case the barmaid, is liable, and accordingly in view of the general principle to which I have already referred any person on whose behalf that act of handling and handing over is done is also liable." Widgery J "Rather it is a fact that licensed houses are, by the necessity of the licensing legislation, organised on that footing, and here the act of selling complained of was an act … which could only have been done in that house by the defendant licensee. In those circumstances it seems to me inevitable to conclude that Mrs Wright's act of selling was in law the act of the licensee and he should be responsible for it."
Food and Drugs Act 1955 2 - Licensing Act 1953 120(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Knight [1966] 50 Cr App R 304
1966
CACD

Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Anderson; Regina v Morris [1966] 2 QB 110; [1966] CLY 2603
1966
CACD
Parker CJ
Crime
The court considered criminal liability under the joint enterprise rule where the principle took the action beyond what had been anticipated. Parker CJ said: "It seems to this court that to say that adventurers are guilty of manslaughter when one of them has departed completely from the concerted action of the common design and has suddenly formed an intent to kill and has used a weapon and acted in a way which no party to that common design could suspect is something which would revolt the conscience of people today."
1 Citers


 
Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414; [1966] 3 WLR 17
1966

Lord Parker CJ
Police, Crime
At common law there is no legal duty to provide the police with information or otherwise to assist them with their inquiries. Lord Parker set out three questions to be answered when asking whether there had been an obstruction of an officer in the execution of his duties: (1) Was there any obstruction of a constable? (2) Was the Constable acting lawfully in the execution of his duty? And (3) Was the obstruction intended to obstruct the constable in the execution of his duty?
Lord Parker CJ said: "It is also in my judgment clear that it is part of the obligations and duties of a police constable to take all steps which appear to him necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from criminal injury. There is no exhaustive definition of the powers and obligations of the police, but they are at least those, and they would further include the duty to detect crime and to bring an offender to justice . . it seems to me quite clear that the defendant was making it more difficult for the police to carry out their duties, and that the police at the time and throughout were acting in accordance with their duties. The only remaining ingredient, and the one upon which in my judgment this case revolves, is whether the obstructing of which the defendant was guilty was a wilful obstruction. 'Wilful' in this context not only in my judgment means "intentional" but something which is done without lawful excuse, and that is indeed conceded . . Accordingly, the sole question here is whether the defendant had a lawful excuse for refusing to answer the questions put to him. In my judgment he had. It seems to me quite clear that although every citizen has a moral duty or, if you like, a social duty to assist the police, there is no legal duty to that effect, and indeed the whole basis of the common law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority, and to refuse to accompany those in authority to any particular place; short, of course, of arrest."
. . and "In my judgment there is all the difference in the world between deliberately telling a false story someth ing which on no view a citizen has a right to do - and preserving silence or refusing to answer, something which he has every right to do. Accordingly, in my judgment, looked at in that perfectly general way, it was not shown that the refusal of the defendant to answer the questions or to accompany the police officer in the first instance to the police box was an obstruction without lawful excuse. "
Police Act 1964 51(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233; (1966) 50 Cr App R 5
1966

Nield J
Company, Crime
Bristol Assizes - the defendant was indicted, inter alia, with two counts of conspiring with a company. Each count concerning a separate company. The defendant was the "sole person in either of the companies . . responsible for any of the acts of the company and no one else had any authority to act for the company or any responsibility for the acts of the company." Held: Nield J said that "a company and a director cannot be convicted of conspiracy when the only human being who is said to have broken the law or intended to do so is the one director"
1 Citers


 
Thompson -v Nixon [1966] 1 QB 103
1966
QBD
Sachs J, Lord Parker CJ and Browne J
Crime, Criminal Practice
The court felt bound to follow the interpretation of the meaning of bailee in the 1916 Act from Matthews, even if, given the freedom to do so it would have interpreted it differently: "the present case falls four square within the decision in Reg v Matthews . . That case having been quoted in the textbooks ever since, no writer had ever suggested that it was bad law . . Dealing as we are today with a statute that affects the liberty of the subject, it does not seem to me that it is permissible to adopt a different construction of the relevant words to that which has so long stood as law, and now for the first time in effect to construe them adversely to the defendant in this case."
Larceny Act 1916
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Dwyer v R [2012] EWCA Crim 10
5 Jan 1966
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Simon Runyowa v The Queen [1966] UKPC 1; [1966] 2 WLR 877; [1967] 1 AC 26; [1966] 1 All ER 633
19 Jan 1966
PC

Crime
(Rhodesia and Nyasaland)
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Hazeltine [1967] 51 Cr App R 351
1967


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981
1967


Crime
Manslaughter was not established except by proving that element of intent without which there could be no assault.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Lloyd; CCA 1967 - [1967] 1 QB 175
 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Nasralla [1967] 2 AC 238; (1967) 2 All ER 161
1967
PC
Lord Devlin
Crime
(Jamaica) The constitution provided that no person tried for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted should again be tried for that offence. It was asked whether this was to be treated as declaring the common law or as expressing the law on the subject differently. Held: "All the judges below have treated [section 20(8)] as declaring or intended to declare the common law on the subject. Their Lordships agree. It is unnecessary to resort to implication for this intendment, since the Constitution itself expressly ensures it. Whereas the general rule, as is to be expected in a Constitution and is here embodied in section 2, is that the provisions of the Constitution should prevail over other law, an exception is made in Chapter III. This chapter, as their lordships have already noted, proceeds upon the presumption that the fundamental rights which it covers are already secured to the people of Jamaica by existing law. The laws in force are not to be subjected to scrutiny in order to see whether or not they conform to the precise terms of the protective provisions. The object of these provisions is to ensure that no future enactment shall in any matter which the chapter covers derogate from the rights which at the coming into force of the Constitution the individual enjoyed. Accordingly section 26(8) in Chapter III provides as follows …"
1 Citers



 
 Robson v Hallett; CA 1967 - [1967] 2 QB 939; [1967] 2 All ER 407; (1967) 51 Cr App R 30; [1967] 3 WLR 28
 
Regina v Sneddon [1967] 1 WLR 1051
1967


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Liyanage v The Queen; PC 1967 - [1967] 1 AC 259
 
Mills v Cooper [1967] 2 QB 459
1967
QBD
Diplock LJ, Lord Parker CJ, Ashworth J
Crime, Road Traffic, Criminal Practice
Two sets of criminal proceedings were brought against the defendant for offences under section 127 of the Highways Act 1959 namely that of being a gypsy and, without lawful excuse, camping on a highway. The first proceedings were brought in respect of 22nd December 1965. Those proceedings were dismissed in February 1966 on the ground that the defendant was not a gypsy on that date, being not of the Romany race. Ten weeks later, in the second proceedings, a similar allegation was made in respect of 13th March 1966. The defendant argued that there was an issue estoppel as to his status; he was not a gypsy. The court was asked as to the meaning of the word "gypsy" in the 1959 Act, which made it an offence for a gypsy to pitch a booth or to camp on a highway. Held: There was no issue estoppel. Once it was recognised that being a gypsy was not an unalterable status but depended on the way of life which the person was leading at a particular time, it was clear that the incorrectness of the assertion as to the defendant's status made in the first proceedings was not inconsistent with the correctness of the same assertion made in the second proceedings. The word "gypsy" could not bear the dictionary meaning of a member of the Romany race, but should be given its colloquial or popular meaning of a person leading a nomadic life with no, or no fixed employment and with no fixed abode. "Looked at in that way, a man might well not be a gipsy on one date and yet be one on a later date" A gipsy is a person without fixed abode who leads a nomadic life, dwelling in tents or other shelters, or in caravans or other vehicles. If that meaning is adopted, it follows that being a gipsy is not an unalterable status. It cannot be said, 'once a gipsy always a gipsy'. By changing his way of life a modern Borrow may be a gipsy at one time and not a gipsy at another.
Magistrates, like any court, have a right in their discretion to decline to hear proceedings on the ground that they were oppressive and an abuse of the process of the court.
Lord Diplock said: "[The] doctrine [of estoppel] . . so far as it affects civil proceedings, may be stated thus: a party to civil proceedings is not entitled to make, as against the other party, an assertion, whether of fact or of the legal consequences of facts, the correctness of which is an essential element in his cause of action or defence . . in previous civil proceedings between the same parties or their predecessors in title and was found by a court of competent jurisdiction in such civil proceedings to be incorrect."
Highways Act 1959 127
1 Citers



 
 Churchill v Walton; CA 1967 - [1967] 2 AC 224
 
Regina v Churchill [1967] 2 AC 224
2 Jan 1967
HL

Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for the common law offence of conspiracy to commit a statutory offence. The statutory offence was an offence of strict liability. Held: The conspirator was not guilty of the offence of conspiracy if on the facts known to him the act he agreed to do was lawful.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Mowatt [1967] 3 All ER 47 CA; [1967] 3 WLR 1192; [1968] 1 QB 421; [1967] EWCA Crim 1
20 Jun 1967
CACD
Diplock LJ, Brabin and Waller JJ
Crime
The defendant was attacked by his victim, and he hit his victim in the face. He was charged with wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm with an alternative of unlawful wounding also open to the jury. The judge gave no direction on the meaning of "maliciously" and the jury convicted under section 20. The defendant's appeal against conviction on the ground of this non-direction failed. Held: Following Cunningham, "maliciously in a statutory crime postulates foresight of consequence", but the court regarded Professor Kenny's more general statement as inapposite to the specific alternative statutory offences described in sections 18 and 20. "Maliciously" imports an awareness that an act may have the consequence of causing some physical harm to some other person, even if the harm foreseen was relatively minor. "But where the evidence for the prosecution, if accepted, shows that the physical act of the accused which caused the injury to another person was a direct assault which any ordinary person would be bound to realise was likely to cause some physical harm to the other person (as, for instance, an assault with a weapon or the boot or violence with the hands) and the defence put forward on behalf of the accused is not that the assault was accidental or that he did not realise that it might cause some physical harm to the victim, but is some other defence such as that he did not do the alleged act or that he did it in self-defence, it is unnecessary to deal specifically in the summing-up with what is meant by the word 'maliciously' in the section … In the absence of any evidence that the accused did not realise that it was a possible consequence of his act that some physical harm might be caused to the victim, the prosecution satisfy the relevant onus by proving the commission by the accused of an act which any ordinary person would realise was likely to have that consequence …"
Offences against the Person Act 1861 18 20
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Salter [1968] 1 QB 793
1968


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Partridge v Crittenden; QBD 1968 - [1968] 2 All ER 421; [1968] 1 WLR 1204
 
Regina v Henry (1968) 53 Cr App Rep 150
1968


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Flaherty and Others (1968) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 141
1968

Asprey J
Crime, Commonwealth
Asprey J considered the mistakae as to the woman's consent as a defence to a charge of rape: "a long line of authority establishes, at any rate so far as I am concerned, that the defence of mistake requires that the accused holds both an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of a state of facts which, if true, would make the act charged innocent."
1 Citers


 
King v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 304; [1968] 2 All ER 610
1968
PC
Lord Hodson
Crime, Constitutional, Police
(Jamaica) The defendant said that in searching him the police had acted in breach of his rights guaranteed under the Constitution, which read: "Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry of others on his property." The Crown said that drugs were found. The defendant said they were planted. The magistrate accepted the evidence of the Crown, admitted the challenged evidence, and convicted the defendant. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Held. The defendant's appeal failed. Lord Hodson reviewed the authorities and said: "The appellant relied in support of his submission that the evidence illegally obtained against him should be excluded on the argument that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and reference was made to an Irish case of The People (AG) v. O’Brien, where the point was discussed by the Supreme Court of Eire. The provision of the Jamaican Constitution scheduled to the Jamaica Order in Council, No. 1550 of 1962 (paragraph 19) gives protection to persons against search of persons or property without consent. This constitutional right may or may not be enshrined in a written constitution, but it seems to their Lordships that it matters not whether it depends on such enshrinement or simply upon the common law as it would do in this country. In either event the discretion of the court must be exercised and has not been taken away by the declaration of the right in written form. Having considered the evidence and the submissions advanced, their Lordships hold that there is no ground for interfering with the way in which the discretion has been exercised in this case. This is not in their opinion a case in which evidence has been obtained by conduct of which the Crown ought not to take advantage. If they had thought otherwise they would have excluded the evidence even though tendered for the suppression of crime.”
In considering a right, it matters not whether the right infringed is enshrined in a constitution or is simply a common law right (or presumably an ordinary statutory right).
The requirement for a police officer to be named in a warrant is important because if no such person is named when the legislation so requires, the warrant is invalid.

 
Regina v Sinclair [1968] 1 WLR 1246
1968

James J
Crime
The defendants had been convicted of conspiracy to cheat and defraud a company, its shareholders and creditors by fraudulently using its assets for purposes other than those of the company and by fraudulently concealing such use. Held. James J said: "To cheat and defraud is to act with deliberate dishonesty to the prejudice of another person's proprietary right".
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Robertson; 1968 - [1968] 52 Cr App R 690

 
 Regina v Mills; CACD 1968 - [1968] 68 Cr App Rep 154
 
Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 AC 256; [1968] 2 All ER 356; (1968) 52 Cr App R 373; [1968] 2 WLR 1303
1968
HL
Lord Pearce, Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Guest
Crime
The appellant had been convicted of an offence contrary to section 1 of the 1964 Act, of having been found in possession of drugs. Held: (Reid dissenting) The prosecution had only to prove that the accused knew of the existence of the thing and that it was in general not a defence for him to say that he believed the thing to be something else such as scent and not drugs. Lord Pearce said: "I think that the term 'possession' is satisfied by a knowledge only of the existence of the thing itself and not its qualities and that ignorance or mistake as to its qualities is not an excuse. This would comply with the general understanding of the word 'possess.'"
Lord Reid said: "The rule is firmly established that we may not look at Hansard . . "
Lord Wilberforce said: "Ideally, a possessor of a thing has complete physical control over it, he has knowledge of its existence, its situation and its qualities: he has received it from a person who intends to confer possession of it and he has himself the intention to possess it exclusively of others. But these elements are seldom all present in situation with which the court have to deal, and where one or more of them is lacking, or incompletely present, it has to be decided whether the given approximation is such that possession may be held sufficiently established to satisfy the relevant rule of law. As it is put by Pollock and Wright, possession: is defined by modes of events in which it commences or ceases and by legal incidents attached to it".
Lord Guest defined the possession by citing the Dictionary of English Law and stated that: "Possession, the visible possibility of exercising physical control over a thing, coupled with the intention of doing so, either against all the world, or against all the world exception of doing so, either against all the world, or against all the world except certain persons. There are therefore, three requisites of possession. First, there must be actual or potential physical control, secondly physical control is not possession, unless accompanied by intention, hence, if a thing is put into a hand of a sleeping person, he had not possession of it. Thirdly, the possibility and intention must be visible or evidenced by external signs, for if the thing shows no signs of being under the control of anyone, it is not possessed".
Drugs (Prevention of Misuse) Act 1964 1
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Daly (1968) VLR 257
1968

Smith J
Crime, Commonwealth
The court considered the availability of mistake as to consent as a defence to a charge of rape: "What the learned trial judge did in the present case was to omit from the definition of rape that he gave to the jury all reference to the element of intention ... but to tell the jury that it was a defence to the charge of rape if the accused honestly believed on reasonable grounds that the girl was consenting. He also told them that the Crown had to satisfy them beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have such a belief. Even if it were proper to discuss the mental aspect of a charge of rape in terms of a defence of reasonable mistake of fact, this direction as to onus would be erroneous."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Gould [1968] 2 QB 65
1968
CACD
Diplock LJ
Criminal Practice, Crime
Diplock LJ said: "In its criminal jurisdiction, which it has inherited from the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court of Appeal does not apply the doctrine of stare decisis with the same rigidity as in its civil jurisdiction. If upon due consideration we were to be of opinion that the law had been either misapplied or misunderstood in an earlier decision of this court or its predecessor, the Court of Criminal Appeal, we should be entitled to depart from the view as to the law expressed in the earlier decision notwithstanding that the case could not be brought within any of the exceptions laid down in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd as justifying the Court of Appeal in refusing to follow one of its own decisions in a civil case (Rex v Taylor). A fortiori, we are bound to give effect to the law as we think it is if the previous decision to the contrary effect is one of which the ratio decidendi conflicts with that of other decisions of this court or its predecessors of co-ordinate jurisdiction."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Robertson (1968) 52 Cr App R 690; [1968] 3 All ER 557; [1968] 1 WLR 1767
1968
CACD
Lord Parker CJ
Crime
The evidence suggested that the defendant had a complete understanding of the legal proceedings in which he was involved but, also that, through mental illness, he had suffered delusions which may have effected his ability "properly" to conduct his defence, acting otherwise than in his own best interests. There had been a finding of disability before arraignment, and he now submitted that he should have been tried. Held: He was fit to plead. The fact that a defendant through delusion might not act in his own best interests does not make him unfit to plead: "On the evidence here [he] appears to have had a complete understanding of the legal proceedings and all that is involved and, although he suffers from delusions which at any moment might interfere with a proper action on his part, that is not a matter which should deprive him of his right of being tried."
The test on Pritchard had "been confirmed and followed over and over again" as appropriate to the general issue of fitness to be tried.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Davey v Lee [1968] 1 QB 366
1968

Lord Parker CJ
Crime
Lord Parker CJ defined 'attempt' in criminal law: "What amounts to an attempt has been described variously in the authorities, and for my part I prefer to adopt the definition given in Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, 5th Ed. (1894) art. 50, where it says that: 'An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted.' As a general statement that seems to be right, although it does not help to define the point of time at which the series of acts begins. That, as Stephen said, depends upon the facts of each case. A helpful definition is given in paragraph 4104 in the current edition of Archbold's Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, where it is stated in this form: 'It is submitted that the actus reus necessary to constitute an attempt is complete if the prisoner does an act which is a step towards the commission of a specific crime, which is immediately and not merely remotely connected with the commission of it, and the doing of which cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose than the commission of the specific crime.'"
1 Citers


 
Regina v Grimes [1968] 3 All ER 179
1968
CACD
Judge Kilner Brown
Crime
Judge Kilner Brown confirmed the existence of the crime of attempting to pervert the course of justice: "Certain actions such as cheating or behaving obscenely may not be offences in a private connotation, but once the public is involved, either by agreement with one of its number or more diversely, the law regards such conduct as criminal. Perversion of the course of justice is per se an offence against the public weal. It is recognised as an unlawful act for the purpose of framing a charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and I am of the opinion, whichever way one approaches it, that common law does, and has for many years, recognised an act to pervert the course of justice, or an attempt so to do, as an unlawful act in itself. In my view this count charges an offence which is contrary to the common law and I reject the submission to quash this count." Nothing in Sections 4 or 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 had the effect of implying that the offence no longer existed.
Criminal Law Act 1967 4 5
1 Citers


 
Regina v Carr [1968] 2 QB 944
1968
CACD

Crime
The court was asked whether a person said to be incited to commit an offence was required to have the necessary mens rea to commit that offence.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Llewellyn-Jones [1968] 1 QB 429
1968
CACD
Lord Parker CJ
Crime
The Registrar of a County Court was convicted of offences of misconduct in public office. The indictment charged "misbehaviour in a public office, contrary to common law" and alleged that court orders had been made "with the intention of gaining improper personal advantage and without proper regard to the interest of X". It was submitted that, in the absence of allegations of fraud or dishonesty in the counts of the indictment, the ingredients necessary to constitute a criminal offence were not present. Held: Lord Parker CJ said: "the court proposed to take the same line as the trial judge did when he came to rule on the argument presented before him, when he said that he did not propose to attempt to give an exhaustive definition of what was covered by misbehaviour in a public office, it being sufficient to say that in his opinion what was alleged and what he proposed should be alleged in the count was sufficient. This court proposed to take the same line and to look at the words of the indictment, and looking at those words the court is satisfied that at any rate what is there alleged, if proved, would constitute the offence at common law of misbehaviour in a public office.
Assuming in [Counsel's] favour that there must be some element of dishonesty involved, a dishonest motive, a fraudulent motive, it seems to this court that that is inherent in the words of the count. It is really impossible to conceive of a case in which action of this sort is not taken with the intention of gaining personal advantage and without regard to the interests of the beneficiary. It is true the word "dishonestly" or "fraudulently" does not there appear, but it is inherent in the description of the offence."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Gould [1968] EWCA Crim 1
18 Jan 1968
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Cawthorne (Richard Graves) v Hm Advocate [1968] ScotHC HCJ - 1
15 May 1968
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Fagan v Metropolitan Commissioner; 31-Jul-1968 - (1968) 52 Cr App R 700; [1969] 1 QB 439; [1968] 3 All ER 442; [1968] EWHC 1 (QB)

 
 Norton v Knowles; 1969 - [1969] 1 QB 572
 
Regina v Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567; [1969] 3 WLR 134; [1969] 2 All ER 1117
1969
CACD
Lord Widgery LJ
Crime
The only mens rea necessary for proof of any offence of importing drugs was the knowledge that the goods were subject to a prohibition on importation. The accused must know "that what is on foot is the evasion of a prohibition against importation and he knowingly takes part in that operation . . even if he does not know precisely what kind of goods are being imported. It is, of course, essential that he should know that the goods which are being imported are goods subject to a prohibition. It is essential he should know that the operation with which he is concerning himself is an operation designed to evade that prohibition and evade it fraudulently".
Dangerous Drugs Act 1965
1 Citers


 
Regina v McCormack [1969] 2 QB 442; [1969] 53 Cr App R 514
1969
CACD
Fenton Atkinson LJ
Crime
The defendant was charged with unlawful sexual intercourse and it was held to have been correct to leave to the jury as an alternative verdict a verdict of indecent assault. It was held as "plain beyond argument" that if a man inserted his finger into the vagina of a girl under 16 that would be an indecent assault in view of her age, however willing and co-operative she might be.
"Cases vary so infinitely that one can well envisage a case where the possibility of conviction of some lesser offence has been completely ignored by both prosecution and defence - it may be that the accused has never had occasion to deal with the matter, has lost a chance of giving some evidence himself about it or calling some evidence to cover or guard against the possibility of conviction of that lesser offence - and in such a case, where there might well be prejudice to an accused, it seems to this court there must be a discretion in the trial judge whether or not to leave the lesser offence to the jury."
Fenton Atkinson LJ: "It is said that the prosecution had not specifically run indecent assault as a possible verdict for the jury to consider and, therefore, that the deputy chairman had a discretion whether or not to leave that matter to the jury, and there was some discussion about that and Miss Harper [for the Crown] was submitting to the deputy chairman that it was his duty to put all the alternatives. The deputy chairman said: 'I would like to know whether I have a discretion not to do it. Frankly, I would exercise that discretion'. In fact, he went on to decide that he had no discretion in the matter, he left the alternative of indecent assault to the jury, and the jury convicted. Indeed, on our view as to what constitutes an indecent assault on a girl under 16, and in face of the defendant's own evidence, there was no possible answer to such a lesser charge.
The view this court has formed is that the learned Deputy Chairman did have a discretion in the matter. Cases vary so infinitely that one can well envisage a case where the possibility of conviction of some lesser offence had been completely ignored by both prosecution and defence – it may be that the defendant has never had occasion to deal with the matter, has lost a chance of calling some evidence to cover or guard against the possibility of conviction of that lesser offence – and in such case, where there might well be prejudice to a defendant, it seems to this Court there must be a discretion in the trial judge whether or not to leave the lesser offence to the jury.
But that was not the situation here, and on the facts of this case we think plainly it would have been a wrong exercise of discretion not to leave this question of indecent assault to the jury, because this was a case where the defendant himself had given evidence and had said on oath 'True I did not have intercourse, but I did do that which amounts to an indecent assault'. In view of that perfectly plain evidence which he had given, we think the only right course for the deputy chairman to take was to do what he did and to leave that matter to the jury."
Sexual Offences Act 1956 14(1)
1 Citers


 
Crump v Gilmore (1969) 68 LGR 56
1969

Lord Parker of Waddington CJ, Cantley J
Education, Crime
Justices had found as facts, on a prosecution for non attendance of their child, that the parents had not known about relevant absences until after the event, and that there had been no neglect on their part. The justices acquitted the parents but on an appeal by the prosecutor it was held that the offence is an absolute offence and it is unnecessary to show knowledge on the part of the parents of the child’s absence or any neglect on their part. Such matters merely go to mitigation. The Divisional Court remitted the case to the justices with a direction to convict. The Divisional Court expressed a degree of sympathy with the parents.
Lord Parker of Waddington CJ said: "The real and only question here is whether the 12 occasions out of a possible 114 when this little girl was not attending school and had no reasonable excuse for not attending, amount to a failure to attend regularly.", but went on to hold that they did and that the magistrates must have been of the same opinion.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Flannery and Prendergast (1969) VR 31
1969

Winneke CJ
Crime
(Supreme Court of Victoria) On the defendant's trial for rape, the judge directed the jury: "It is a defence in a charge of rape if a person honestly believed on reasonable grounds that the girl in fact was a consenting party. That involves three things, gentlemen, an honest belief, that means a real genuine bona fide belief based upon reasonable grounds, that is to say, grounds that commend themselves to reasonable men as being reasonable that the girl in fact was consenting." Held: The direction was criticised. Winneke C.J said: " Where there is absence of consent an accused's belief, albeit mistaken in fact, that the woman was consenting to the act of intercourse necessarily relates to ... the element of intention involved in the crime. It is impossible to dissociate that intention from a genuine belief in the mind of the accused, even though mistaken in fact, that such consent existed. The existence of such a belief necessarily negatives an awareness that the woman was not consenting, or a realization that she might not be and a determination to have intercourse with her whether she was consenting or not. It would, accordingly, negative an intention to have intercourse without consent inasmuch as the existence of such a belief would be inconsistent with such an intention:" but "In a case where the evidence at the trial does raise [an issue of honest belief], its relevance is to the ingredient of the crime on which the burden of proof rests on the Crown. ... It is apposite to quote a statement cited by Lord Reid in Warner v. Metropolitan Commissioner, [1968] 2 All E.R. 356, at p. 364: 'The absence of mens rea' really consists in an honest and reasonable belief entertained by the accused of the existence of facts which, if true, would make the act charged against him innocent'".
1 Citers



 
 Sweet v Parsley; HL 23-Jan-1969 - [1970] AC 132; [1969] UKHL 1; [1969] 1 All ER 347; (1969) 53 Cr App R 221; [1969] 2 WLR 470
 
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