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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Crime - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 160 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Gosling v Veley (1850) 12 QB 328; [1850] EngR 174; (1850) 12 QB 328; (1850) 116 ER 891
1850

Wilde CJ
Crime, Constitutional
Wilde CJ said: "The rule of law that no pecuniary burden can be imposed upon the subjects of this country, by whatever name it may be called, whether tax, due, rate, or toll, except under clear and distinct legal authority, established by those who seek to impose the burden, has been so often the subject of legal decision that it may be deemed a legal axiom, and requires no authority to be cited in support of it."
Bill of Rights 1688 4
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v John Radley [1850] EngR 52 (A); (1850) 2 Car and K 974
1850


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Walter Noake [1850] EngR 63 (A); (1850) 2 Car and K 620
1850


Crime
An indictment which contains three charges of embezzlement should not only aver that the monies which are the sublect. of the charges were received within six months, but should also aver that they were embezzled within six months
[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v William Jones And James MacDonell [1850] EngR 64; (1850) 2 Car and K 165; (1850) 175 ER 69
1850


Crime
In an indictment preferred at the assizes for a felony committed on the high seas, it is sufficient to allege that the offence was committed "on the high seas," without also averring, that the offence was committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Soltau v De Held (1851) 2 Sim NS 133; 61 ER 291; [1851] EngR 992; (1851) 61 ER 291
11 Dec 1851

Kindersley V-C
Crime
The court considered an allegation of causing a public nuisance: "I conceive that, to constitute a public nuisance, the thing must be such as, in its nature or its consequences, is a nuisance - an injury or a damage, to all persons who come within the sphere of its operations, though it may be so in a greater degree to some than it is to others."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Emanuel Barthelemy And Philippe Eugene Morney [1852] EngR 35; (1852) Dears 60; (1852) 169 ER 636
1852


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Rex v Henson (1852) Dears 24; [1852] 169 ER 621
1852


Crime
The defendant was accused of committing a common nuisance. He led through the streets a horse which was infected with a "contagious, infectious and dangerous disease". He knew of the danger. Held: The conviction was proper.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Holmes (1853) 1 Dears 207
1853

Lord Campbell CJ, Parke B
Crime
The defendant had exposed himself on a bus. He was indicted for exposing himself in a public vehicle frequented and used by divers subjects of the Queen "to the view of" them and in a second count for exposing himself in a public place. It was contended that there was no offence because the bus was not a public place so as to constitute a nuisance. Held: A full court of five judges considered the case.
Lord Campbell CJ said: "It would be a disgrace to the law if we had any doubt that both counts are good. The defendant exposed himself in a public omnibus in the New Road in the presence of several women and this country would not be a fit place to live in if this were not an offence."
Parke B held that the omnibus was a public place and exposure to more than one person was an offence.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Yates (1853) 6 Cox CC 441
1853


Crime
The defendant had been charged with conspiracy by false pretences and subtle means and devices to extort from TE a sovereign and to cheat and defraud him thereof. There was no evidence of any false pretence. Held. The words "false pretences " might be rejected as surplusage and held that the defendant might be convicted of conspiracy to extort and defraud. There was no deceit of TE inducing him to believe something to be true which was false.
1 Citers


 
Regina v John Eagleton (No 1) [1854] EngR 34; (1854) Dears 376; (1854) 169 ER 766
1854


Contract, Crime

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v John Eagleton (No 2) [1854] EngR 35; (1854-55) Dears 515; (1854) 169 ER 826
1854


Contract, Crime
The defendant contracted in writing with the guardians of a parish to supply and deliver for a certain term to the out-door poor, at such times as the guardians should direct, loaves of bread of three and a half pounds weight each. The guardians were, during thesaid term, to pay the defendant after certain rates and prices for the bread so supplied, and of which a bill of particulars should have been sent. The contract contained a provision that in case the defendant broke the terms of his contract in any of the ways therein named, one of which was by a deficiency in the weight stated and charged for in the said bill of particulars, the guardians might employ other persons to supply the bread, and charge the defendant with the costs of such supply above the price contracted for, and might retain any moneys due to te defendant under the contract at the time of such breach towards such costs, or the damages which the board might sustain, and might also put in suit against the defendant a bond which he then executed, and which was conditioned for the due performance of is contract. The indictment contained ten counts, the first seven of which were in substance the same, and charged the defendant with a common law misdemeanour , in supplyimg and delivering, as such contracor, loaves of bread to different poor persons which loaves were deficient in weight, intending to injure and defraud such poor persons and to deprive them of proper and sufficient food and sustenance, and to endanger their healths and constitutions, and to cheat and defraud the said guardians.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
HM Advocate v John Robertson (1854) 1 Irv 469
1854


Scotland, Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Eagleton (1855) Dears CC 515
1855

Parke B
Crime
Parke B defined what constituted an attempt in criminal law: "The mere intention to commit a misdemeanour is not criminal. Some act is required, and we do not think that all acts towards committing a misdemeanour are indictable. Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be considered as attempts to commit it, but acts immediately connected with it are; and if. in this case, after the credit with the relieving officer for the fraudulent overcharge, any further step on the part of the defendant had been necessary to obtain payment we should have thought that the obtaining credit would not have been sufficiently proximate to the obtaining the money. But, on the statement in this case, no other act on the part of the defendant would have been required. It was the last act, depending on himself, towards the payment of the money, and therefore it ought to be considered as an attempt."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Dolan (1855) Dears 436
1855


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Henry Smith [1855] EngR 15 (A); (1855) Dears 560
1855


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Emanuel Tew [1855] EngR 11 (A); (1855) Dears 429
1855


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
In Re Sidney Levien [1855] UKPC 27
27 Nov 1855
PC

Crime
A bill of indictment for libel was found at the assizes held for tho County of Cornwall, in the Island of Jamaica. The prosecution was a private one. The indictment was afterwards removed by certiorari in the Supreme Court of the Island, and tried on the civil side of that Court, when a verdict, of guilty was found. Upon motion for arrest of judgment, the Supreme Court suspended judgment, pending an application to the Queen in Council upon certain grounds raised : Upon a Petition for leave to appeal, their Lordships dismissed the petition, declining to interfere or give any opinion on the merits of the case
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v John Keighley [1856] EngR 36; (1856) Dears and B 145; (1856) 169 ER 953
1856


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v De Salvi (1857) 10 Cox CC 481
1857


Crime
A person convicted of an assault can be charged with murder or manslaughter if the victim subsequently dies from the injuries sustained.

 
Regina v Danger (1857) 7 Cox CC 303
1857

Lord Campbell CJ
Crime
The defendant was charged with obtaining a valuable security by false pretences, on the basis that he had presented a bill to the prosecutor who accepted it and returned it to the defendant, his acceptance having been induced by false pretences on the part of the defendant. Held: In these circumstances the defendant was not guilty of the offence because, before the document came into his possession, the prosecutor had no property in the document as a security, nor even in the paper on which the acceptance was written. Lord Campbell CJ: "... we apprehend that to support the indictment the document must have been a valuable security while in the hands of the prosecutor. While it was in the hands of the prosecutor it was of no value to him nor to any one else, unless to the prisoner. In obtaining it the prisoner was guilty of a gross fraud, but we think not of a fraud contemplated by this Act of Parliament (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 53)."
1 Citers


 
Regina v M'Pherson (1857) Dears and BCC 197; [1857] EngR 33; (1857) Dears and B 197; (1857) 169 ER 975
1857

Cockburn CJ, Baron Bramwell
Crime
The accused was charged with breaking and entering a dwelling house and stealing certain goods therein. At the time of the breaking and entering the goods were not in the house. He was acquitted of the felony but convicted of breaking and entering and attempting to steal the prosecutor's goods. Held: The appeal succeeded.
Cockburn CJ said: "Here the prisoner had the intention to steal before he went into the house ; but when he got there the goods specified in the indictment were not there ; how then could he attempt to steal those goods? There can be no attempt asportare unless there is something asportare." and "The word attempt clearly conveys with it the idea, that if the attempt had succeeded the offence charged would have been committed, and therefore the prisoner might have been convicted if the things mentioned in the indictment or any of them had been there ; but attempting to commit a felony is clearly distinguishable from intending to commit it. An attempt must be to do that which, if successful, would amount to the felony charged ; but here the attempt never could have succeeded, as the things which the indictment charges the prisoner with stealing had already been removed—stolen by somebody else."
Baron Bramwell said: "The argument that a man putting his hand into an empty pocket might be convicted of attempting to steal, appeared to me at first plausible; but suppose a man, believing a block of wood to be a man who was his deadly enemy, struck it a blow intending to murder, could he be convicted of attempting to murder the man he took it to be?"
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Sharpe [1857] Dears and B 160
1857
CCCR
Erle J
Crime
The defendant was charged not with theft of a corpse, but of its removal from a grave: "Our law recognises no property in a corpse, and the protection of the grave at common law as contradistinguished from ecclesiastic protection to consecrated ground depends on this form of indictment."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Primelt and Simmonds [1858] EngR 124 (A); (1858) 1 F and F 50
1858


Crime
On an indictment for unlawfully taking away a girl against the will of her parents, held, that if they have encouraged her in a lax course of life, the case does not come within the statute
[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Gamlen [1858] EngR 103 (B); (1858) 1 F and F 90
1858


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Bernard (1858) 1 F and F 240
1858


Crime
The defendant alien faced charges arising from alleged conduct within the jurisdiction, with being an accessory before the fact to the murder in Paris of people killed by a grenade thrown by an alien. Questions of law reserved included the question of whether the defendant had committed any offence having regard to the fact that the murder had been committed in France by an alien of an alien. The jury acquitted the defendant.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Ashman; 1858 - [1858] 1 F and F 88; [1858] EngR 88 (C)
 
Regina v Tchorzoewski (1858) 8 St Tr NS1091
1858

Lord Campbell CJ
Crime
The defendant was accused of inciting the murder of the Emperor of France. The Attorney -General asked the court to accept undertakings from the defendant on entry of a directed verdict of not guilty. Held: The undertakings were accepted: Lord Campbell CJ: "The defendant being a foreigner, I will only add what I have before observed, that it is the glory of this country that it affords an asylum to proscribed and persecuted exiles from all parts of the world. But those who find an asylum here must ever bear in mind that while they have the protection of the law of England they are bound to obey that law, and that they are equally liable with the subjects of Her Majesty for any crime which may be committed by them while they are resident within the realm. I hope they will bear this in mind and will understand that it is a crime on the part of a British subject, or for a foreigner owing temporary allegiance to the Crown of England, to plot and conspire for the commission of a crime in a foreign country, or for the commission of a crime in this country."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wells [1858] EngR 422 (A); (1858) 1 F and F 109
1 Mar 1858


Crime
A carrier, who, receiving money to procure goods obtained and duly delivered the goods, but fraudulently retained the money, convlcted of larceny under the 4th section of the Frauds by Trustees Act, 20 and 21 Vict c. 54
[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Fletcher (1859) Bell CC 63; [1859] 169 ER 1168
1859


Crime
A conviction for rape was upheld in respect of sexual intercourse with a girl of weak intellect. The jury found that she was incapable of giving consent due to her defect of reasoning.

 
Regina v Bunce [1859] EngR 94; (1859) 1 F and F 523; (1859) 175 ER 836
1859


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Broke (1859) 1 F and F 514
1859

Pollock CB
Land, Crime
The defendant faced an accusation of having blocked a public right of way. The defendant landowner claimed to have instructed his servants to allow only seafaring men and pilots to use the path and to turn back anyone else, and that this proved that there was no intention to create a public right of way. Held: Pollock CB said: "Even supposing these instructions to have been given and acted on, yet, unless it can be proved that they were communicated to the persons who used the path, and that they did so by virtue thereof, and not of right, their user was a user by the public, and the right of way has been gained, if the user has been continued long enough."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Munday [1860] EngR 208 (A); (1860) 2 F and F 170
1860


Crime
Prisoner not to be convicted of larceny if doubtful whether accessory before or after the fact.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Hopley 175 ER 1024; (1860) 2 FandF 202; [1860] EWCC J42; [1860] EngR 191 (B); [1860] EW Misc J73; (1860) 2 FandF 202
11 Jan 1860


Crime
(Summer Assizes, 1860) The prisoner was indicted for the manslaughter of Reginald Cancellor. The prisoner was a schoolmaster at Eastbourne, and in 1859 the deceased, a boy aged thirteen or fourteen, had been entrusted to his charge. He was a dull boy. At Christmas there were some complaints of chastisement inflicted on him by the prisoner. He returned to school, however, after the holidays, and again at Easter on the 16th April. Held: A parent or someone to whom the parent has delegated authority may inflict physical hurt on his or her child, provided that it does not go too far, and is for the purpose of correction and not the gratification of passion or rage.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Commonlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
regina v Elliot and White (1861) Le and Ca 103
1861

Weightman J
Crime
The defendants appealed their convictions for exposing themselves on Wandsworth Common. The indictment charged them with doing so in the "sight and view" of divers others. There was evidence that they had sexual intercourse on the common, but not that it was seen by anyone other than a single witness or within the possible sight and view of anyone else who was shown to be there. Though their act could have been seen by others on the common or a public footway or footbridge, there was no evidence that there were persons on the common or the footway or footbridge at the time. The jury were directed that they could convict if the acts could be seen without difficulty by others. They argued that the exposure had to be public in the sense of being to the offence or injury of more than one person. The Crown argued that an indecent exposure was indictable whether seen by others or not, as they exposed themselves where they might have been seen. Held: Although one judge suggested that all open lewdness was indictable as outraging public decency, the argument centred on the question whether a conviction could be upheld, as there was no evidence that anyone other than the single witness was passing at the time and therefore might have seen it. The court of 5 judges disagreed amongst themselves; it was to be re-argued, but the report notes that the court subsequently decided that it was not desirable to do so and no judgment was delivered.
Weightman J noted: "The case depends on this question, Could the parties be convicted if no one saw them, as for instance, upon their own confession merely?"
1 Citers


 
Emperor of Austria v Day and Kossuth (1861) 2 Giff 628
1861

Lord Campbell LC, Lord Justice Turner
Crime, International
The defendants had printed banknotes in London. Kossuth intended to use the notes in Hungary after overthrowing the Emperor of Austria by revolution. The Emperor obtained an injunction restraining the defendants from continuing to manufacture them. The defendants appealed. Held: The injunction was upheld. One of the defences advanced was that the injunction should be refused because the proceedings were brought to protect the Emperor's political power and prerogatives. Lord Campbell LC:"if the suit were instituted merely to support his political power and prerogatives" he would have denied the Emperor the right to maintain the suit.
Lord Justice Turner agreed and noted that the bill put the plaintiff's case on three grounds: (i) violation of the rights and prerogative of the plaintiff as King of Hungary "by promotion of revolution and disorder and otherwise"; (ii) injury to the State of Hungary by the introduction of a spurious circulation into that kingdom; and (iii) injury to the subjects of the plaintiff by the same cause. There was no doubt that the court did not have jurisdiction to interfere on the grounds that the notes were intended to be used for the purpose of promoting revolution and disorder. He rejected the second ground saying the right of coining and issuing paper money is the prerogative of a sovereign: "so far, therefore, as this bill is founded upon the prerogative rights of the Plaintiff, or upon the political rights of his subjects" the injunction should be refused: "the prerogative rights of sovereigns seem to me, as at present advised, to stand very much upon the same footing as acts of State and matters of that description, with which the municipal courts of this country do not and cannot interfere".
But the court upheld the injunction on the third ground on which the bill was based. Lord Campbell was of the opinion that "if the acts meditated by the defendants and forbidden by this injunction were actually done, a pecuniary loss would be sustained by the plaintiff and by all his subjects, holders of the existing currency". The court has jurisdiction to protect property from an act which, if completed, would give a right of action. Lord Justice Turner said that the third ground on which the bill was based alleged a case of injury to the subjects of the kingdom, "an injury not to the political but to the private rights of the plaintiff's subjects". He concluded: "I agree that the jurisdiction of this Court in a case of this nature rests upon injury to property actual or prospective, and that this Court has no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of acts which are merely criminal or merely illegal, and do not affect any rights of property, but I think there are here rights of property quite sufficient to found jurisdiction in this Court."
1 Citers


 
Davies v The Right Honourable Richard, Baron Berwick [1861] EngR 220; (1861) 3 El and El 549; (1861) 121 ER 548
23 Jan 1861


Crime
Stat. 4 G 4, c. 34, s 3, enacts “That if any servant in husbandry" "shall contract with any person . . to serve him . . for any time or times whatsoever . . And . . having entered into such service shall . . be guilty of any . . misconduct or misdemeanour in the execution" of his contract, he may be convicted by justices and sent to the House of Correction, with hard labour. Appellant was employed by respondent under a contract by the terms of which appellant was to keep the general accounts belonging to a farm of respondent, to weigh out food for cattle, to set the men to work, to lend a hand to anything if wanted, and in all things to carry out the orders of respondents. Appellant entered upon the employment, and, in the course of it, was ordered by respondent to go through the whole cattle stock under appellant’s charge on the farm, and to give particulars of all the animals which had died under his care, and of all bullings arid calvings which had taken place Appellant, having refused to obey this order, was summoned before, and convicted by, justices, under the above enactment, for such refusal. On appeal against this conviction, held that it was bad. First, because appellant was not a servant in husbandry ; secondly, because, assuming that he was such a servant, he had not been guilty of any misconduct or misdemeariour‘ in the execution of his contract to serve in that capacity.
[ Commonlii ]
 
The Queen v Leatham [1861] EngR 313; (1861) 3 El and El 658; (1861) 121 ER 589
12 Feb 1861


Elections, Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Hayes v Stephenson [1860] 25 JP 39
1862


Crime
A defendant found in a park for the purpose of fornication was not guilty of the offence under the Act because fornication was not a criminal offence.
Vagrancy Act 1824
1 Citers


 
Regina v Farrell (1862) 9 CC 446
1862


Crime
An alleged indecent exposure to only one person did not contravene the common law.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Jarvis (1862) 3 FandF 108; [1862] 176 ER 49
1862


Crime
The defendant was convicted of committing a public nuisance by bringing unfit meat to the market.
1 Citers


 
Baryon v Hannant [1862] EngR 5; (1862) 3 B and S 16; (1862) 122 ER 7
1862


Licensing, Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Stevenson (1862) 3 FandF 106; [1862] 176 ER 48
1862


Crime
The defendant was convicted of causing a public nuisance by exposing for sale unfit meat.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Farell (1862) 9 Cox CC 446
1862


Crime
(Court of Criminal Appeal in Ireland) The defendant exposed himself on a public road so that he was seen by one person as there was only one person passing at the time, though he could have been seen by others who might have been passing. Held: Indecent exposure seen by one person and capable of being seen by one person only was not an offence. The Chief Justice giving the judgment of the court said in quashing the conviction: "but it is not to be taken that we lay it down that if the prisoner was seen by but one person, but there was evidence that others might have witnessed the offence at the time, we would not uphold the conviction; but in this case there is no evidence that anyone could have seen the prisoner but one female. Therefore all we say is, that an exposure seen by one person only is not an offence at common law. If there had been others in such a situation that they could have seen the prisoner, there would have been a criminal offence".
1 Citers


 
Regina v Lundie (1862) 8 Jur NS 640
1862
QBD
Cockburn CJ
Local Government, Crime
A byelaw provided: "if any person shall stock or depasture, inter alia, a vicious horse on any part of the common pastures, then, and in every such case, the person or persons so offending, and the owner or owners of the said stock and cattle, shall respectively forfeit and pay for every such offence the sum of £5." The defendant said it was void. Held: The byelaw was valid as against a person responsible for depasturing a vicious horse on the common notwithstanding that it might be unreasonable and therefore ultra vires as against an innocent owner. Cockburn CJ said: "It has been contended that this byelaw is unreasonable, because the owner of such an animal might innocently, and without knowledge or intention, be brought within its scope, and become liable to the penalties thereby imposed. But, admitting so far the justice of this objection, it seems to me that we may, consistently with the authorities, reject this portion, and act upon the remainder of the byelaw, which is perfectly good and reasonable. I think, therefore, the conviction should stand."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Croucher [1862] EngR 145; (1862) 3 F and F 285; (1862) 176 ER 128
1862


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Elizabeth Burgess [1862] EngR 153; (1862) Le and Ca 258; (1862) 169 ER 1387
1862

Pollock CB
Crime
The defendant was accused of attempting to kill herself. The court considered wheher this was a felony rather than a misdemeanour. Pollock CB said: "We are all of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Quarter Sessions is not taken away by the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, and that attempting to commit suicide is not attempting to commit murder within that statute. If it were, it would follow that any one attempting to commit suicide by wounding himself must be indicted for the offence of wounding with intent to commit murder, which until very recently was punishable with death."
Offences against the Person Act 1861 24
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Luck And Others [1862] EngR 172; (1862) 3 F and F 483; (1862) 176 ER 217
1862

ByleS j
Crime
More than nine men, of whom seven were armed with guns, being out at night in pursuit of game, were met, as they passed through a field, from one wood to another, by a party of gamekeepers, without fire-arms, but who at once assaulted them with sticks , and one of them with a dangerous weapon, a flail, likely to inflict deadly injury, with which he struck one of the poachers, upon which another of them fired and killed him The grand jury were directed to throw out bllls for murder agamst two of the men, one of whom was supposed to have fired the fatal shot, and the whole nine were indicted for manslaughter. There was evidence that they all stood in a row and cried "Shoot''Held, that, whether or not the man who fired the shot could be identified, none of the prisoners would be guilty, unless parties to the act of firing, and that though their being in a row, and crying out "Shoot" was evidence that they were parties to the act, it was only evidence, and its effect would depend upon how far all the circumstances showed that the firing was in pursuance of a common design to shoot, or only in consequence of a particular personal encounter.
Held, also, that an approver having given evidence that one of the prisoners fired the shot, a policeman might be asked whether another of them, who had given information, had not stated that it was a different man who fired.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Crawley (1862) 3 FandF 109; [1862] 176 ER 49
1862


Crime
The defendant was convicted of committing a public nuisance by sending unfit meat to a meat salesman.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Peter Rinaldi [1863] EngR 68; (1863) Le and Ca 330; (1863) 169 ER 1417
1863


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Thompson And Simpson [1863] EngR 76; (1863) 3 F and F 824; (1863) A)
1863


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Thallman (1863) 9 Cox CC 388
1863


Crime
Thallman had exposed himself on the roof of a house in Albemarle Street, Piccadilly opposite to a window in a house where females lived. He was indicted for doing this in the "sight and view" of those who lived opposite and of those going along the public highway. His actions could not be seen from the street but only from the windows of neighbouring houses. He was convicted, but argued that the exposure was not visible to anyone passing along the street and therefore was not in a public place. Held: It was not necessary that the exposure be on a public highway. "If it is in a place where a number of the Queen's subjects can and do see the exposure, that is sufficient".
1 Citers


 
Budge v Parsons [1863] EngR 270; (1863) 3 B and S 382; (1863) 122 ER 145
13 Feb 1863


Animals, Crime
Cruelty to Animals
[ Commonlii ]
 
Stephen Mayhew v James Wardley [1863] EngR 671; (1863) 14 CB NS 550; (1863) 143 ER 561
8 Jun 1863


Crime, Land
Firing at game from highway
[ Commonlii ]
 
The Queen v Scott [1863] EngR 755; (1863) 4 B and S 368; (1863) 122 ER 497
27 Jun 1863


Crime

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Regina v James Heywood And Others; 1864 - [1864] EngR 46; (1864) Le and Ca 451; (1864) 169 ER 1468
 
Regina v Collins (1864) 9 Cox CC 497
1864

Cockburn CJ and Bramwell B
Crime
The court considered the case of an attempt where the defendant had put his hand in another's pocket, but the pocket was empty.
Cockburn CJ said: "that an attempt to commit a felony can only be made out when, if no interruption had taken place, the attempt could have been carried out successfully, and the felony completed of the attempt to commit which the party is charged."
Bramwell B said: "an attempt to commit a felony can only be made out when, if no interruption had taken place, the attempt could have been carried out successfully, and the felony completed of the attempt to commit which the party is charged. In this case, if there was nothing in the pocket of the prosecutrix, in our opinion the attempt to commit larceny cannot be established. It may be illustrated by the case of a person going into a room, the door of which he finds open, for the purpose of stealing whatever property he may find there, and finding nothing in the room, in that case no larceny could be committed, and therefore no attempt to commit larceny could be committed."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Turner And Another [1864] EngR 75; (1864) 4 F and F 339; (1864) 176 ER 590
1864

Channell B
Crime
When two or more, one of whom has received the provocation of a blow, are charged with murder, and one of them has received a provocation (as a blow) which would reduce homicide to manslaughter, and it cannot be proved which of them inflicted the fatal blow, neither of them can be convicted of murder, without proof of a common design to inflict the homicidal act, nor of manslaughter, without proof of a common design to inflict unlawful violence. One of two men, being struck by a third, the other incited him to strike in return ; and, after the lapse of several minutes - the assailant having gone away - they both pursued him with that purpose, and it appeared that, without any previous fighting, he was knocked down, and that then one or other of them (it could not be proved which) kicked him in the eye with a heavy iron-clad boot, causing his death Held, that neither of them was guilty of murder, there being no evidence of a common design to kill, or to inflict murderous or felonious violence, but that both were guilty of manslaughter.
Channell B said that: "on a charge of murder there must be evidence not only of a common design to commit a felony, but a common design quoad the homicidal act itself"
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Lonsdale And Another [1864] EngR 59; (1864) 4 F and F 56; (1864) 176 ER 465
1864


Crime

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Regina v James Langmead; CCCR 1864 - [1864] EngR 47; (1864) Le and Ca 427; (1864) 169 ER 1459
 
Regina v Wright (1864) 4 F and F 967
1864

Channell B
Crime
The defendant faced charges of rape and of assault with intent to commit rape. The court was asked whether a jury could convict without being convinced that rape was in his mind. Held: Channell B directed the jury: "even to convict of an assault with intent to commit a rape, and a multi fortiori, in order to convict of a rape, they must be satisfied that there was an intention to commit the act, notwithstanding any resistance on the part of the prosecutrix.
For it was of the essence of the offence that it should be committed without the will and against the consent of the prosecutrix. . . . Both charges required an intent on his part to commit the act by force against her will."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Kohn; 1864 - [1864] EngR 54; (1864) 4 F and F 68; (1864) 176 ER 470
 
Regina v Winsor [1865] EngR 71; (1865) 4 F and F 363; (1865) 176 ER 600
1865


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Fisher (1865) 1 LRCCR 7
1865
CCCR
Pollock CB
Crime
A person who plugged up the feed pipe of a steam engine thus rendering it temporarily useless was guilty of damaging the engine notwithstanding that no actual damage was done to the engine and that the plug could have been removed without damage being done to the machine.

 
Regina v King [1865] EngR 55; (1865) 4 F and F 498; (1865) B)
1865


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Mullany [1865] EngR 43; (1865) Le and Ca 593; (1865) 169 ER 1528
1865


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Charles Stacey v Thomas Teece Whitehurst [1865] EngR 158; (1865) 18 CB NS 344; (1865) 141 ER 477
25 Jan 1865


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Kenyon v Hart [1865] EWHC QB J102; (1865) 122 ER 1188; (1865) 6 B and S 249
3 Feb 1865
QBD
Blackburn J
Crime
The defendant was accused of a trespass by being in the daytime upon certain land in the possession and occupation of Henry Tappenden, in search of game, without the licence or consent of the owner of the land or of any other person having the right to authorize him, &c., contrary to the statute. A pheasant had risen from the respondent's land and been shot whilst over it but had fallen within the complainant's land. Held. Blackburn J said: "the object and spirit of this section we shall see that it was to prevent persons entering land in search or pursuit of game in the sense of living game. I cannot think "game" in this section means game whether living or dead." The entry on the land was a trespass, but not a criminal trespass within the statute.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702
1866

Mellor J, Blackburn J
Crime, Vicarious Liability
The court was asked whether the owner of a slate quarry was answerable for a public nuisance caused by his workmen without his knowledge and contrary to his general orders. Held: Mellor J: "It is quite true that this in point of form is a proceeding of a criminal nature, but in substance I think it is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and I can see no reason why a different rule should prevail with regard to such an act as is charged in this indictment between proceedings which are civil and proceedings which are criminal. I think there may be nuisances of such a character that the rule I am applying here, would not be applicable to them, but here it is perfectly clear that the only reason for proceeding criminally is that the nuisance, instead of being merely a nuisance affecting an individual, or one or two individuals, affects the public at large, and no private individual, without receiving some special injury, could have maintained an action. Then if the contention of those who say the direction is wrong is to prevail, the public would have great difficulty in getting redress. The object of this indictment is to prevent the recurrence of the nuisance. The prosecutor cannot proceed by action, but must proceed by indictment, and if this were strictly a criminal proceeding the prosecution would be met with the objection that there was no mens rea: that the indictment charged the defendant with a criminal offence, when in reality there was no proof that the defendant knew of the act, or that he himself gave orders to his servants to do the particular act he is charged with; still at the same time it is perfectly clear that the defendant finds the capital, and carries on the business which causes the nuisance, and it is carried on for his benefit; although from age or infirmity the defendant is unable to go to the premises, the business is carried on for him by his sons, or at all events by his agents. Under these circumstances the defendant must necessarily give to his servants or agents all the authority that is incident to the carrying on of the business. It is not because he had at some time or other given directions that it should be carried on so as not to allow the refuse from the works to fall into the river, and desired his servants to provide some other place for depositing it, that when it has fallen into the river, and has become prejudicial to the public, he can say he is not liable on an indictment for a nuisance caused by the acts of his servants. It appears to me that all it was necessary to prove is, that the nuisance was caused in the carrying on of the works of the quarry."

Blackburn J: "All that it is necessary to say is this, that where a person maintains works by his capital, and employs servants, and so carries on the works as in fact to cause a nuisance to a private right, for which an action would lie, if the same nuisance inflicts an injury upon a public right the remedy for which would be by indictment, the evidence which would maintain the action would also support the indictment. That is all that it was necessary to decide and all that is decided."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Townsend [1866] EngR 36; (1866) 4 F and F 1089; (1866) 176 ER 919
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Longhurst [1866] EngR 27; (1866) 4 F and F 969; (1866) 176 ER 870
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
In re Coppin (1866) LR 2 ChApp 47
1866

Lord Chelmsford LC
Crime, Extradition
The French sought to extradite Coppin who had been convicted by a court in Paris in his absence in a conviction "par contumace". That conviction might be annulled if he surrendered to the court's jurisdiction, when he would be tried again for the offence with which he had been charged, in exactly the same way as if no proceedings had been taken against him. Held: Coppin had to be treated as an accused person for extradition purposes. Such a trial would not differ from that of a party who was put on his trial without any previous condemnation: "But, if, in order that no part of the argument for the prisoner may be disregarded, I should assume that it has been established that the judgment par contumace does work some prejudice to the party upon the trial, either by reducing the amount of necessary proof, or by changing its character, or by making him liable to costs, how could that possibly take him out of the category of accused persons? He has ceased to be a person condemned, because his condemnation is annulled upon his appearance, and he is to take his trial for offences with which he stands charged. What better, I ought rather to say what other, description of him could be given than that of a person accused?"
1 Citers


 
Regina v Young (1866) 10 Cox CC 371
1866


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Wright [1866] EngR 38; (1866) 4 F and F 967; (1866) 176 ER 869
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v William Smith [1866] EngR 37; (1866) 4 F and F 1066; (1866) 176 ER 910
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Thomas Gray [1866] EngR 35; (1866) 4 F and F 1098; (1866) B)
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Rigg [1866] EngR 32; (1866) 4 F and F 1085; (1866) B)
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Skeet and Others [1866] EngR 34; (1866) 4 F and F 831; (1866) 176 ER 854
1866


Crime
Poachers were stopped by a gamekeeper, who was shot by one of them. Pollock CB explained the law as it affected accessories: " . . the doctrine of constructive homicide . . does not apply where the only evidence is that the parties were engaged in an unlawful purpose: not being felonious. It only applies in cases where the common purpose is felonious, as in cases of burglary: where all the parties are aware that deadly weapons are taken with a view to inflict death or commit felonious violence, if resistance is offered. That doctrine arose from the desire on the part of old lawyers to render all parties who are jointly engaged in the commission of a felony responsible for deadly violence committed in the course of its execution. But that doctrine has been much limited in later times, and only applies in cases of felony, where there is no (sic) evidence of a felonious design to carry out the unlawful purpose at all hazards, and whatever may be the consequences. The possession of a gun would not be any evidence of this, for a gun is used in poaching. And poaching itself is only an unlawful act and a mere misdemeanour."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Noakes [1866] EngR 28; (1866) 4 F and F 920; (1866) 176 ER 849
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Leigh [1866] EngR 26; (1866) 4 F and F 915; (1866) 176 ER 846
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Lawrence [1866] EngR 25; (1866) 4 F and F 901; (1866) 176 ER 840
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Bennett [1866] EngR 17; (1866) 4 F and F 1105; (1866) 176 ER 925
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Quail [1866] EngR 29; (1866) 4 F and F 1076; (1866) 176 ER 914
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Bateman [1866] EngR 16; (1866) 4 F and F 1068; (1866) A)
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Hewitt And Smith [1866] EngR 24; (1866) 4 F and F 1101; (1866) B)
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Birchall [1866] EngR 18; (1866) 4 F and F 1087; (1866) B)
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Clarke [1866] EngR 19; (1866) 4 F and F 1040; (1866) 176 ER 900
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Copley And Another [1866] EngR 20 (A); (1866) 4 F and F 1097
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v David Gray [1866] EngR 21; (1866) 4 F and F 1102; (1866) 176 ER 924
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Frester [1866] EngR 23; (1866) 4 F and F 857; (1866) 176 ER 823
1866


Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Veley [1867] EngR 2; (1867) 4 F and F 1117; (1867) 176 ER 930
1867


Commonwealth, Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Sidney Levien v The Queen [1867] EngR 23; (1867) 4 Moo PC NS 483; (1867) 16 ER 400
8 Jul 1867
PC

Commonwealth, Crime

[ Commonlii ]
 
Regina v Barrow (1868) LR 1 CCR 156
1868

Bovill CJ, Channell B, Byles J, Blackburn J and Lush J
Crime
The defendant appealed aganst his conviction for rape. Held: Bovill CJ said: "It does not appear that the woman, upon whom the offence was alleged to have been committed, was asleep or unconscious at the time when the act of connection commenced. It must be taken, therefore, that the act was done with the consent of the prosecutrix, though that consent was obtained by fraud. It falls therefore within the class of cases which decide that, where consent is obtained by fraud, the act done does not amount to rape."
1 Citers


 
Mulcahy v Regina (1868) LR HL 306
1868
HL

Crime
When two or more agree to carry a criminal scheme into effect, the very plot is the criminal act itself, the conspiracy.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Lewis; 1869 - (1869) 11 Cox CC 404

 
 Regina v Taylor; 1869 - (1869) Law Rep 1 CCR 194

 
 Regina v Welsh; 1869 - [1869] 11 Cox CC 336

 
 Regina v Griffin; CCA 1869 - (1869) 11 Cox CC 402
 
Regina v Hensler (1870) 11 Cox Crim Cas 570
1870


Crime
The accused attempted to obtain money by false pretences by sending a letter. The recipient was not deceived. Held: An attempt to obtain money by a false pretence which is not in fact believed, is criminal notwithstanding that the consequences intended were not achieved. The accused had done all that he could do toward commission of the crime but final commission of the crime had been prevented by the conduct of the victim.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Child; 1871 - (1871) LR1 CCR 307
 
Regina v Jesse Smith (1871 Crown Cases Reserved 266)
1871

Bovill CJ
Company, Crime
Chief Justice Bovill said, referring to the 1861 Act: "At the time that Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96) was passed theft by a partner of the goods of the firm did not fall within the criminal law, either common or statute. This defect was supplied by 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, which, after reciting that ' it is expedient to provide for the better security of the property of co-partnerships and other joint beneficial owners against offences by part owners thereof, and further to amend the law as to embezzlement,' proceeds to enact, by the first section, that if a partner, or one of two or more beneficial owners, shall steal, etc., any property of such co-partnership or such joint beneficial owners, 'every such person shall be liable to be dealt with, tried, convicted, and punished for the same as if such person had not been or was not a member of such co-partnership, or one of such beneficial owners'."
Larceny Act 1861
1 Citers


 
Regina v Horton (1871) 11 Cox CC 670
1871


Crime
The defendant was convicted of bigamy. Held: Whilst there is a presumption that he knew of the circumstamnces creating the offence, that presumprion was not conclusive.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wollaston (1872) 12 Cox CC 180
1872


Crime
On a trial of sexual assault, the Court considered the difference between consent and submission in the victim.
Sodomy and indecent assault belong to the same family or class of offences,
1 Citers


 
Dickenson v Fletcher (1873) LR 9 CP 1
1873

Brett J
Crime
A penal statute should receive a strict or restrictive interpretation. Brett J said: "Those who contend that a penalty may be inflicted must show that the words of the Act distinctly enact that it shall be incurred under the present circumstances. They must fail if the words are merely equally capable of a construction that would, and one that would not, inflict the penalty."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Matthews (1873) 12 Cox CC 489
1873
CCCR

Crime
(Court of Crown Cases Reserved) Interpretation of bailee in law of larceny.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Middleton; 1873 - [1873] LR 2 CCR 38

 
 Regina v Pembliton; CCCR 1874 - (1874) LR 2 CCR 119; [1874-80] All ER 1163

 
 Regina v Handley; 1874 - (1874) 13 Cox 79

 
 Regina v Welch; 1875 - (1875) LR1 QBD 23
 
Regina v Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154
1875

Blackburn J, Brett J
Crime
The defendant was convicted of unlawfully taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out the possession of her father. The defendant bona fide and on reasonable grounds believed that the girl was over 16. Held: This provided no defence. "It seems impossible to suppose that the intention of the legislature in those two sections could have been to make the crime depend upon the knowledge of the prisoner of the girl's actual age. It would produce the monstrous result that a man who had carnal connection with a girl, in reality not quite ten years old, but whom he on reasonable grounds believed to be a little more than ten, was to escape altogether. He could not, in that view of the statute, be convicted of the felony, for he did not know her to be under ten. He could not be convicted of the misdemeanour, because she was in fact not above the age of ten. It seems to us that the intention of the legislature was to punish those who had connection with young girls, though with their consent, unless the girl was in fact old enough to give a valid consent. The man who has connection with a child, relying on her consent, does it at his peril, if she is below the statutable age. The 55th section, on which the present case arises, uses precisely the same words as those in sections 50 and 51, and must be construed in the same way." Brett J (dissenting) "Upon all the cases I think it is proved that there can be no conviction for crime in England in the absence of a criminal mind or mens rea."
Offences against the Persons Act 1861 51 50
1 Citers


 
Bradlaugh v The Queen (1877) 2 QBD 569
1877


Crime
Charles Bradlaugh and Mrs Annie Besant were prosecuted for publishing a treatise on contraceptive methods entitled the Fruits of Philosophy which had originally been published in the United States of America in 1832. They were prosecuted for publishing an obscene libel. Held: They were convicted.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Flattery; 1877 - (1877) 13 Cox CC 388; (1877) 2 QB 410
 
Regina v Faulkner (1877) 13 Cox 550
1877

Barry J
Crime
(Irish Court of Crown Cases Reserved) The defendant had set fire to a ship while stealing rum from its hold. He had been boring a hole by candlelight and some rum had spilled out and been ignited. It was conceded that he had not intended to burn the vessel, and his conviction was quashed. Barry J said: "[R v Pembliton] must be taken as deciding that to constitute an offence under the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, section 51, the act done must be in fact intentional and wilful, although the intention and will may (perhaps) be held to exist in, or be proved by, the fact that the accused knew that the injury would be the probable result of his unlawful act, and yet did the act reckless of such consequences."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Bradlaugh v The Queen (1878) 3 QBD 607
1878
CA

Crime
Conviction for publishing an obscene libel (abortion manual) overturned.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Orton (1878) 39 LT 293
1878


Crime
What would otherwise be classified as a fierce assault in criminal law may not be so in the sporting context of a boxing match.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83
1878


Crime
The court considered the lawfulness of the sport of boxing: "no rules or practice of any game whatever can make lawful that which is unlawful by the law of the land."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Weston (1879) 14 Cox 346
1879


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Most; 1881 - (1881) 7 QBD 244

 
 Regina v Martin; CCCR 1881 - (1881) 8 QBD 54

 
 Regina v Harris; 1882 - (1882) 15 Cox CC 75
 
Beatty v Gilbanks (1882) 9 QBD 308
1882
CA
Field J, Cave J
Crime
A lawful Salvation Army march attracted disorderly opposition and was therefore the occasion of a breach of the peace. Held: It could not be found a case of unlawful assembly against the leaders of the Salvation Army. Accepting that a person is liable for the natural consequences of what he does, the court nevertheless held that the natural consequences of the lawful activity of the Salvation Army did not include the unlawful activities of others, even if the accused knew that others would react unlawfully.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Coney; QBD 1882 - (1882) 8 QBD 534

 
 Beatty v Gillbanks; 1882 - [1882] 9 QBD 308
 
Regina v Bradlaugh (1883) 15 Cox CC 217
1883


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163
1883


Crime
For unlawful act manslaughter, the unlawful act must itself be criminal.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Ramsay and Foote (1883) 15 Cox CC 231
1883

Lord Coleridge CJ
Crime, Ecclesiastical
Lord Coleridge CJ directed a jury on a trial for blasphemous libel: "the mere denial of the truth of the Christian religion or of the Scriptures is not enough per se to constitute a writing a blasphemous libel . . But indecent and offensive attacks on Christianity or the Scriptures, or sacred persons or objects, calculated to outrage the feelings of the general body of the community, do constitute the offence of blasphemy." However, even the fundamentals of religion could be attacked "if the decencies of controversy are observed".
. . And: "The law visits not the honest errors, but the malice of mankind. wilful intention to pervert, insult, and mislead others, by means of licentious and contumelious abuse applied to sacred subjects, or by wilful misrepresentations or artful sophistry, calculated to mislead the ignorant and unwary, is the criterion and test of guilt. A malicious and mischievous intention, or what is equivalent to such an intention, in law, as well as moral, - a state of apathy and indifference to the interests of society, - is the broad boundary between right and wrong."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Gallagher (1883) 15 Cox 291
1883


Crime
Acts of treason did not extend to acts in Ireland.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Dee (1884) 14 Law Reports (Ireland), Common Law, 468; [1884] 14 LR Ir 468
1884

May CJ and Palles CB
Crime
Court of the Crown Cases Reserved of Ireland - May CJ (who had also been the trial judge), set out the facts: "There is not, I think, any doubt or dispute as to the facts and circumstances of the case. Upon the report of the Judge, who was myself, and the findings of the jury, it is, I think, established that Judith Gorman, wife of one J. Gorman, who was absent (having gone out to fish), lay down upon a bed in her sleeping room in the evening, when it was dark; that the prisoner came into the room, personating her husband, lay down upon her and had connexion with her; that she did not at first resist, believing the man to be her husband, but that, on discovering that he was not her husband, which was after the commencement but before the termination of the proceeding, her consent or acquiescence terminated, and she ran downstairs. It appeared, I think, manifestly that the prisoner knew the woman was deceived, as she said to the prisoner in his presence and hearing, when he came into the room, 'You are soon home tonight,' to which he made no reply. At the time my own opinion, founded upon well known cases in England, was that the prisoner was not guilty of rape, but at the request of the counsel for the Crown I left certain questions to the jury, and, upon their findings, directed them to find a verdict of guilty, reserving the case for consideration of the Court, which is now called upon to decide the question which arises." Held: It was the absence of consent, and not the fraud, which made the offence.
Palles CB said: "I think it follows that . . an act done under bona fide belief that it is another act different in its essence is not in law the act of the party. That is the present case a case which it is hardly necessary to point out is not that of consent in fact sought to be avoided for fraud, but one in which that which took place never amounted to consent. The person by whom the act was to be performed was part of its essence. The consent of the intellect, the only consent known to the law, was the act of the husband only, and of this the prisoner was aware."
May CJ said: "Now, rape being defined to be sexual connexion with a woman without her consent, or without, and therefore against, her will, it is essential to consider what is meant and intended by consent. Does it mean an intelligent, positive concurrence of the will of the woman, or is the negative absence of dissent sufficient? In these surgical cases it is held that the submission to an act believed to be a surgical operation does not constitute consent to a sexual connexion, being of a wholly different character. This is no consensus quoad hoc. In the case of personation there is no consensus quoad hanc personam."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 173; [1884] EWHC 2 (QB)
9 Dec 1884
QBD
Lord Coleridge CJ
Crime
Three survivors of the yacht Mignonette were landed from a German sailing barge at Falmouth in September 1884. On the day they landed all three of them described the circumstances in which the fourth member of the crew, the ship's boy had been killed and eaten on their twentieth day of survival on the open sea without water or food (apart from two tins of turnips). Two defendants agreed to, and did eat the cabin boy, the youngest and weakest of the party. The third boat member also ate, but had declined to be involved in the killing. After rescue the two who killed the cabin boy were accused of murder. The facts found, were referred to the Divisional Court for a special verdict. Held: Lord Coleridge CJ said: "From these facts stated with the cold precision of a special verdict it appears sufficiently that the prisoners were subject to terrible temptation, to sufferings which might break down the bodily power of the strongest man, and try the conscience of the best . . But nevertheless this is clear, that the prisoners put to death a weak and unoffending boy upon the chance of preserving their own lives by feeding upon his flesh and blood after he was killed, and with the certainty of depriving him of any possible chance of survival. The verdict finds in terms that 'if the men had not fed upon the body of the boy they would probably not have survived,' and that ' the boy being in a much weaker condition was likely to have died before them . . Now, except for the purpose of testing how far the observation of a man's life is in all cases and under all circumstances, an absolute, unqualified, and paramount duty, we exclude from our considerations all incidents of war. We are dealing with a case of a private homicide, not one imposed upon men in the service of their Sovereign and in the defence of their country. Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well recognised excuse admitted by the law. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excuse, unless the killing was justified by what has been called "necessity." But the temptation to the act which existed here was not what the law has ever called necessity. Nor is this to be regretted. Though law and morality are not the same. and many things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case were to be held by law an absolute defence of it. It is not so. To preserve one's life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in which it is a man's duty not to live, but to die. The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and children, as in the noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others, from which in no country, least of all, it is to be hoped, in England, will men shrink, as indeed they have not shrunk . . It would be a very easy and cheap display of common-place learning to quote from Greek and Latin authors . . passage after passage, in which the duty of dying for others has been laid down in glowing and emphatic language as resulting from the principles of heathen ethics; it is enough in a Christian country to remind ourselves of the Great Example whom we profess to follow. It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle which has been contended for. Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what? It is plain that the principle leaves to him who is to profit by it to determine the necessity which will justify him in deliberately taking another's life to save his own. In this case the weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting, was chosen. Was it more necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? The answer must be 'No . . . ' . . . It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be an excuse for crime it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; how awful the suffering; how hard in such trials to keep the judgment straight and the conduct pure. We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But a man has no right to declare himself to have yielded to it, nor allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime. It is therefore our duty to declare that the prisoners' act in this case was wilful murder, that the facts as stated in the verdict are no legal justification of the homicide; and to say that in our unanimous opinion the prisoners are upon this special verdict guity of murder.' and 'if Lord Bacon meant to lay down the broad proposition that a man may save his life by killing, if necessary, an innocent and unoffending neighbour, it certainly is not law at the present day' (The sentence of death was later commuted to six months imprisonment.)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
HM Advocate v Patrick Slaven and Others (1885) 5 Couper 694
1885


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Latimer; 1886 - (1886) 17 QBD 359
 
Rex v Ensor (1887) 3 TLR 366
1887

Stephen J
Defamation, Crime
“In the history of the Star Chamber it is said:- 'In all ages libels have been most severely punished in this court, but most especially they began to be frequent about 42 and 43 Elizabeth, (1600, when Sir Edward Coke was her Attorney General).
“In this passage therefore he was probably giving his impression of the Star Chamber practice, which no one would now regard as of any authority. There are, I think, many instances in which Lord Coke's views of the criminal law are doubtful and go far beyond the authorities he refers to. In this passage he refers to none.” The court then considered the “only real” authority, R v Topham. and said; “The judgment seems to me to show that a mere vilifying of the deceased is not enough... There must be a vilifying of the dead with a view to injure his posterity. The dead have no rights and can suffer no wrongs. The living alone can be the subject of legal protection, and the law of libel is intended to protect them, not against every writing which gives them pain, but against writings holding them up individually to hatred, contempt or ridicule. This, no doubt, may be done in every variety of way. It is possible, under the mask of attacking a dead man, to attack a living one.....I wish to add that I regard the silence of the authorities and the general practice of the profession as a more weighty authority on this point than the isolated statements of Lord Coke and the few unsatisfactory cases referred to in R v Topham. I am reluctant in the highest degree to extend the criminal law. To speak broadly, to libel the dead is not an offence known to our law.”


 
 Regina v Cunningham Graham and Burns; 1888 - (1888) 16 Cox 420
 
Regina v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23; [1886-90] All ER Rep 133
1888
CCCR
Stephen J, Baron Pollock, AL Smith J
Crime
The defendant knew that he had gonorrhea. He had intercourse with his wife, and infected her. She would not have consented had she known. He appealed convictions for assault and causing grievous bodily harm. Held: "The question in this case is whether a man who knows that he has gonorrhea, and who by having connection with his wife, who does not know it, infects her, is or is not guilty under s20 . . or under s47 of the same [1861] Act. Section 20 punishes everyone who 'unlawfully and maliciously inflicts any grievous bodily harm upon any person." Section 47 punished everyone who is convicted of an "assault occasioning actual bodily harm to any person . ." Is there an infliction of bodily harm either with or without any weapon or instrument?" I think there is not for the following reasons.
The words appear to me to mean the direct causing of some grievous injury to the body itself with a weapon, as by a cut with a knife, or without a weapon, as by a blow with the fist, or by pushing a person down. Indeed, though the word "assault" is not used in the section, I think the words imply an assault and battery of which a wound or grievous bodily harm is the manifest immediate and obvious result . . It is further illustrated by reference to 14 and 15 Vict. C19 sect 4, of which the present section is a re-enactment. Section 4 of the earlier Act begins with the preamble, 'And whereas it is expedient to make further provision for the punishment of aggravated assaults,' and then proceeds in the words of the present section, with a trifling and unimportant difference in their arrangement.
Infection by the application of an animal poison appears to me to be of a different character from an assault. The administration of poison is dealt with under s24, which would be superfluous if poisoning were an 'infliction of grievous bodily harm either with or without a weapon or instrument.' The one act differs from the other in the immediate and necessary connection between a cut or a blow and the wound or harm inflicted, and the uncertain and delayed operation of the act by which infection is communicated. If a man by the grasp of the hand infects another with smallpox, it is impossible to trace out in detail the connection between the act and the disease, and it would, I think, be an unnatural use of language to say that a man by such an act 'inflicted' smallpox on another . . .
Is the case, then, within s37, as 'an assault occasioning actual bodily harm?' The question here is whether there is an assault. It is said there is none, because the woman consented, and to this it is replied that fraud vitiates consent, and that the prisoner's silence was a fraud. Apart however from this, is the man's concealment of the fact that he was infected such a fraud as vitiated the wife's consent to the exercise of his marital rights, and converted the act of connection into an assault? It seems to me that the proposition that fraud vitiates consent in criminal matters is not true if taken to apply in the fullest sense of the word, and without qualifications. It is too short to be true, as a mathematical formula is true." As to the issue of consent to an assault, per Pollock B: "The second count charges an assault ... I should be inclined to hold that ... an assault must in all cases be an act which in itself is illegal and ... I cannot assent to the proposition that there is any true analogy between the case of a man who does an act which in the absence of consent amounts to an indecent assault upon his niece, or any woman other than his wife, and the case of a man having connection with his wife. In the one case the act is, taken by itself, in its inception an unlawful act, and it would continue to be unlawful but for the consent. The husband's connection with his wife is not only lawful, but it is in accordance with the ordinary condition of married life. ... The wife as to the connection itself is in a different position from any other woman, for she has no right or power to refuse her consent."
Stephen J said: "If a man laid a trap for another into which he fell after an interval the man who laid it would during the interval be guilty of an attempt to assault and of an actual assault as soon as the man fell in."
However: "It seems to me that the proposition of fraud vitiates consent in criminal matters is not true if taken to apply the fullest sense of the word, and without qualification." and "Many seductions would be rapes, and so might acts of prostitution procured by fraud, as for instance by promises not intended to be fulfilled."
. . And: "Consent to a surgical operation or examination is not a consent to sexual connection or indecent behaviour. Consent to connection with a husband is not consent to adultery.
I do not think that the maxim that fraud vitiates consent can be carried further than this in criminal matters. It is commonly applied to cases of contract, because in all cases of contract the evidence of a consent not procured by force or fraud is essential, but even in these cases care in the application of the maxim is required, because in some instances suppression of the truth operates as fraud, whereas in others at least a suggestion of falsehood is required. The act of intercourse between a man and woman cannot in any case be regarded as the performance of a contract."
. . and "The woman's consent here was as full and conscious as consent could be. It was not obtained by any fraud as to the nature of the act or as to the identity of the agent."
Wills J said: "That consent obtained by fraud is no consent at all is not true is a general proposition either in fact or in law. If a man meets a woman in the street and knowingly gives her bad money in order to procure her consent to intercourse with him, he obtains her consent by fraud, but it would be childish to say that she did not consent. In respect of a contract, fraud does not destroy consent. It only makes it revocable."
Offences against the Persons Act 1861 20 46
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Regina v Surrey Justices (1888) 52 JP 423
1888

Wills J
Crime
The term 'victuals' means food or other sustenence including drinks.
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 Regina v Tolson; 1889 - (1889) 23 QBD 168
 
Nutton v Wilson (1889) 22 QBD 744
1889

Lindley LJ
Crime, Administrative
Lindley LJ spoke of a statue intended to prevent civil servants dling on behalf of their employers with companies in which they had an interest: "The object obviously was to prevent the conflict between interest and duty that might otherwise inevitably arise".
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 Regina v Vreones; 1891 - (1891) 1 QB 360; 60 LJMC 62
 
Regina v Jackson [1891-4] All ER Rep 61; [1891] 1 QB 67 I
1891
CA

Crime
A husband had no right to confine his wife in order to enforce a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
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John Mcleod v The Attorney General New South Wales [1891] UKPC 31; [1891] AC 455
23 Jul 1891
PC

Crime, International
The claimant appealed against his conviction in New South Wales for bigamy. He had married originally in New South Wales, but then a second time in Missouri in the US. Held: The court in New South Wales did not have jurisdiction. The crime alleged occurred on the second marriage which was not within the jurisdiction of the NSW court.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v De Kromme [1892] 17 Cox CC 492
1892

Lord Coleridge CJ
Crime
The defendant was indicted for soliciting a servant to conspire to cheat and defraud his master by selling his master's goods at less than their proper price. Lord Coleridge CJ said that if the servant had sold the goods at less than their proper price, his employer would have been defrauded. The conviction was upheld. The conspiracy which the defendant was charged with inciting did not involve any deceit of the employer.
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Regina v Villensky [1892] 2 QB 597
1892

Lord Colridge CJ
Crime
The prisoners could not be indicted for receiving stolen goods where the goods were no longer stolen when received.
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Regina v Ring (1892) 17 Cox Crim Cas 491
1892


Crime
The defendant was accused of a mugging offence on the Metropolitan Railway.
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Statham and Statham v Gaekwar of Baroda [1892] P 92
1892


International, Crime
The certificate of the Secretary of State confirmed the state immunity of the defendant.
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 Regina v Brackenbury; 1893 - (1893) 17 Cox 628

 
 Regina v Ram and Ram; 1893 - (1893) 17 Cox CC 609
 
Regina v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450
1893


Crime
It was legitimate to break the law where it was necessary to rescue someone to whom one owed a positive duty of rescue, because a failure to act in such a situation might itself constitute a culpable act or omission.
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 Regina v Williams; 1893 - [1893] 1 QB 320

 
 Regina v Tyrrell; 1894 - [1894] 1 QB 710
 
Dyer v Munday; Morris v Martin [1895] 1 QB 742
1895
CA
Lord Esher MR
Crime, Vicarious Liability
The defendant, a hire purchase furniture dealer, sent his manager to recover back some furniture hired to X and upon which several instalments were unpaid. X had pledged the furniture to his landlord as security for his rent, and the landlord's wife sought to prevent the manager from removing the furniture. The manager assaulted her in the house. Held: The employer had placed his employee in a situation "where he may be expected on occasions to have to resort to personal violence". There is no rule of law that vicarious responsibility should cease to apply when the conduct for which liability is imposed is criminal rather than just tortious. "The liability of the master does not rest merely on the question of authority, because the authority given is generally to do the master´s business rightly; but the law says that if, in course of carrying out his employment, the servant commits an excess beyond the scope of his authority, the master is liable."
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 Sherras v De Rutzen; 1895 - [1895] QB 918
 
Regina v Cotton (1896) 60 JP 824
1896

Pollock B
Crime
The Act provided that on a trial for rape the jury, if not satisfied that the defendant was guilty of rape but satisfied that he was guilty of having intercourse with a girl aged between 13 and 16, contrary to section 5(1) of the Act, might convict of the latter offence. The prosecutor opened the case as one in which that course could be adopted. The court questioned whether that was permissible where (as was the case) more than three months (the time limit for prosecution under section 5) had elapsed between the conduct alleged and the prosecution, and ruled: "The conclusion I have come to is that you cannot go on with the charge under section 5, more than three months having elapsed since the last commission of the offence. In substance, if this could be done, by shaping your charge as a charge of rape, you could always evade the statutory limit of time. In a case such as this, it would be the more reasonable construction of the sections to hold that the time must be considered as the essence of the charge. In substance, an indictment of rape under circumstances such as these must be treated as a charge of the lesser offence." The jury acquitted the defendant of rape, and he was discharged.
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 9
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Dickins v Gill [1896] 2 QB 310
1896

Collins J
Crime
Collins J considered the words of the statute: "It is obvious that the purpose of the Act is in every way to make it illegitimate for persons to do that which by the policy of the law can only be done by, or with the authority of, the Crown; the section therefore deals with as many possible ways of interfering with the monopoly of the Crown as occurred to the draftsman of the Act."
Post Office (Protection) Act 1884
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Bank of New South Wales v Piper [1897] AC 383
1897
PC

Crime
'the absence of mens rea really consists in an honest and reasonable belief entertained by the accused of facts which, if true, would make the act charged against him innocent.'
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Regina v Moore (1898) 14 TLR 229
1898


Crime

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 Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Johnson; HL 1898 - [1898] AC 200
 
Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91; [1895-99] All ER 105
1898

Lord Russell of Killowen CJ, Mathew J
Administrative, Crime, Local Government
The validity of a by-law prohibiting the playing of music in a public place within fifty yards of any dwelling after being requested by a constable or resident of that dwelling to desist was upheld. A private citizen taxed with a criminal charge which is unfounded, because based upon an ultra vires byelaw or administrative decision, may challenge that decision. Where an authority which is clothed with statutory powers orders something to be done and accompanies this with some sanction or penalty for a failure to do it, this restricts the freedom of action by persons who are affected by it, who would otherwise be free to do as they pleased. Legislation of this kind ought to be supported if possible, looking to the character of the body which is legislating, the subject matter and the nature and extent of the authority which is given to the body to legislate in matters of this kind.
Lord Russell of Killowen said as to powers exercised by private bodies: "the court should jealously watch the exercise of these powers, and guard against their unnecessary or unreasonable exercise to the public disadvantage, bearing in mind that their primary purpose is to make money for its shareholders".
He defined a by-law as: "an ordinance affecting the public, or some portion of the public, imposed by some authority clothed with statutory powers ordering something to be done or not to be done, and accompanied by some sanction or penalty for its non-observance."
As to by-laws, he said that: "an oppressive, gratuitous interference with personal rights and freedoms devoid of rational justification would be unreasonable and ultra vires but a by-law was not unreasonable 'merely because particular judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it is not accompanied by a qualification or an exception which some judges may think ought to be there'” and "[when] called upon to consider the by-laws of public representative bodies clothed with . . ample authority . . and exercising that authority accompanied by . . checks and safeguards . . the consideration of such by-laws ought to be approached from a different standpoint. They ought to be supported if possible. They ought to be, as has been said, "benevolently" interpreted and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that they will be reasonably administered . . I think courts of justice ought to be slow to condemn as invalid any by-law so made under such conditions, on the ground of supposed unreasonableness."
Mathew J (dissenting) included certainty among the conditions of validity of a by-law.
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Regina v Quinn [1898] 19 Cox CC 78
1898


Crime
The defendants were convicted of conspiring to cheat and defraud the Great Northern Railway of Ireland of fares by abstracting return half tickets and selling them to members of the public. Held: There was no deceit of their employers.
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Regina v Jones [1898] 1 QB 119
1898
CCR

Crime
There must be some deceit spoken, written or acted to constitute a false pretence.
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The Queen v Boutzeff (1898) 127 Cent Cr Ct Ses Pap 284
1898


Crime

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Regina v Ellis [1899] 1 QB 230
1899


Crime
In the case of what is a result crime in English Law, the offence is committed in England and justiciable by an English court if any part of the proscribed result takes place in England. The gist of the offence of obtaining by false pretences lies in the act of obtaining, and that if this act is done within the jurisdiction it matters not that the false pretence was made abroad.
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