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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Costs - From: 1991 To: 1991

This page lists 10 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362; [1991] 2 WLR 27; [1991] 1 All ER 193
1991
HL
Lord Ackner
Damages, Costs
From its enactment it was accepted that s 17 applied to orders for costs to be taxed - even though before taxation was completed there was no sum for which execution could be levied - and did so from the date of the order (the incipitur rule), not the date of the certificate of taxation (the allocatur rule), although the latter rule had for a while prevailed in Chancery.
Lord Ackner said: "If the words used in this section are considered in isolation, the problem would not appear to be a difficult one. It is accepted there cannot be a judgment debt until there is a judgment for a quantified sum, i.e. a final as contrasted with an interlocutory judgment. Such a final judgment is to carry interest from the time of entering up 'the judgment', i.e. the judgment which creates the judgment debt, i.e. the final judgment. This is made doubly clear by the provision that the interest shall run 'until the same shall be satisfied'. Until there is a quantified sum which the judgment debtor is obliged by the terms of the judgment to pay, there is no judgment which he is able to satisfy. The final provision in the section that 'such interest may be levied under a writ of execution on such judgment' must refer to the judgment which has created the judgment debt. That is the final judgment." and . .
"The wording of section 17 clearly envisages a single judgment which constitutes the 'judgment debt'. This 'judgment debt' can only arise where the judgment itself quantifies the sum which the judgment debtor owes to his judgment creditor. The language of the section does not envisage an interlocutory judgment, but only a final judgment."
Judgments Act 1838 17
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Denning [1991] 2 QB 532
1991

Nolan LJ
Criminal Practice, Costs
Nolan LJ considered the test for whether proceedings had been begiun "unnecessarily or improperly"so as to decide the question of costs awards in Magistrates proceedings, saying: "I would add in this connection that the word 'improper' in this context does not necessarily connote some grave impropriety. Used, as it is in conjunction with the word 'unnecessary', it is in my judgment intended to cover an act or omission which would not have occurred if the party concerned had conducted his case properly."
1 Citers


 
Gupta v Comer [1991] 2 WLR 494; [1991] 1 QB 629; [1991] 1 All ER 289
1991
CA

Legal Professions, Costs
The plaintiff applied for an Order that costs be paid personally by the defendant's solicitors on the basis that the solicitors had incurred such costs unreasonably and had failed to conduct the proceedings with reasonable competence and expedition. The solicitors objected to an Order being, saying that the Court had no jurisdiction to make such an Order unless serious dereliction of duty by the solicitor could be established. Held: The solicitors' appeal against an order that certain costs be paid personally by them failed, and the Order had been properly made even though the solicitors had not been guilty of serious dereliction of duty or gross negligence or neglect. The purpose of making a wasted costs order against a solicitor in pursuance of this rule is compensatory and not punitive.
1 Citers



 
 Taylor v Pace Developments; CA 1991 - [1991] BCC 406
 
Roburn Construction Ltd v William Irwin (South) and Co Ltd [1991] BCC 726
1991


Costs, Litigation Practice
When making an order for security for costs, the court will normally order a substantial sum, but need not.
1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Denham and Another [1991] 3 WLR 235
1991


Costs
"Improper" within the regulation does not mean morally reprehensible but improper in the sense of an act or omission which would not have occurred if the party concerned had conducted his case properly.
Criminal Cases (General) Regulations 1986 3
1 Citers


 
Clarke v Clarke (No2) [1991] 1 FLR 179
1991


Costs

1 Citers


 
Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1991] 2 FLR 233; [1992] Fam 40; Times, 01 May 1991; [1992] 1 All ER 267
1 Apr 1991
CA
Butler-Sloss LJ, Russell LJ
Family, Costs
In ancillary relief proceedings, the husband had not made frank disclosure of his assets. The final Calderbank offer of £600,000 was made only the day before the substantive hearing. The offer was rejected. The judge awarded the wife a lump sum of £1 million. The judge made no order as to costs after the date when the wife's solicitors had rejected an earlier, lower, offer by the husband. From that date both sides had acted reasonably. The wife appealed. No counter-offer had been made by the wife. Held: The starting point, is that costs prima facie follow the event but in family cases this rule may be displaced more easily, and it is unusual to order costs in children cases. For financial relief the applicant has to make the application in order to obtain an order. Orders by consent; usually include the applicant's costs. If contested and the applicant succeeds, where money available and no special factors, the applicant spouse is likely to obtain an order for costs. The behaviour of one party, such as in material non-disclosure of documents, may be a material factor. In some few cases the assets are substantial and an order for costs can (if appropriate) be made. The court rules reflect the need for Calderbank offers, subject to conditions, to have teeth. The respondent must make a serious offer worthy of consideration. If he does so, the applicant should accept or reject the offer and make clear any counter-offer. Both should negotiate. There is a very wide discretion in the court in awarding costs. Many reasons may affect costs including material non-disclosure, and delay or excessive zeal. The need to use all the available money to house the spouse and children of the family may be constraints. It would be inappropriate to constrain that wide of discretion. But the starting point in a case where there has been an offer is that, prima facie, if the applicant receives no more or less than the offer made, she/he is at risk not only of not being awarded costs, but also of paying the costs of the other party after communication of the offer and a reasonable time to consider it. "I cannot, for my part, see why there is any difference in principle between the position of a party who fails to obtain an order equal to the offer made and pays the costs, and a party who fails by the offer to meet the award made by the court. In the latter case prima facie costs should follow the event, as they would do in a payment into court, with the proviso that other factors in the Family Division may alter that prima facie position."
Russell LJ: "In his opening submissions to this court, counsel for the husband invited us to lay down guidelines which would, he said, be of assistance to those charged with the responsibility of deciding what, after divorce, is the appropriate level of lump sum payments in cases where very substantial capital assets are available. I do not think that such an exercise is possible. The guidelines already exist. Section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is the enabling provision for an order for the payment of a lump sum. Section 25, as amended by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, in terms, requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case and subsection (2), under no less than eight sub-paragraphs, sets out the matters to which the court in particular shall have regard.
In the individual case, some of those matters will assume greater importance than others and, indeed, the facts of this case well illustrate that proposition. In my judgment in this case we are concerned with a wholly exceptional set of circumstances ……"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Lemmon [1991] EWCA Crim 1; (1992) 13 Cr App R (S) 66; [1991] Crim LR 791
2 May 1991
CACD
Leggatt LJ, Waterhouse, Potts JJ
Criminal Sentencing, Costs

Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986
[ Bailii ]
 
Locke v Camberwell Health Authority [1991] 2 Med LR 249
23 May 1991
CA
Taylor LJ
Health, Costs, Legal Professions
The court discussed the relative duties of solicitor and counsel. Taylor LJ set out the principles that: 1) In general a solicitor, is entitled to rely upon the advice of counsel properly instructed;
2) For a solicitor, without special experience in a particular field, to rely on counsel's advice is to make normal and proper use of the Bar;
3) However the solicitor must not do so blindly but must exercise his independent judgment. If he thinks that counsel's advice is obviously or glaringly wrong, he is under a duty to reject it;
4) Although a solicitor should not assist a litigant where prosecution of the claim amounts to an abuse of process, it is not his duty to assess the result of a conflict of evidence or impose a pre-trial screen on a litigant's claim.
1 Citers


 
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