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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Costs - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 25 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.


 
 Bacal Contracting Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd; 1980 - [1980] 2 All ER 655
 
Walsall Borough Council v Sidhu [1980] ICR 519
1980
EAT
Slynn J
Employment, Costs
EAT The appellant Council had withdrawn its appeal at the last moment. The successful individual respondent in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, had been given assistance by the CRE, and had herself incurred no costs, whereas the CRE, on her behalf, had. As the jurisdiction under the Rule was only that a payor could be obliged to pay costs and expenses "incurred by that other party", it followed upon the respondent having incurred nothing, that she could be paid nothing.
An order for costs by an Industrial Tribunal can only be made in favour of a party, and not for a non-party, such as a solicitor representing one of the parties.
Slynn J said as to the rules: "As a matter of construction, the power to order costs or expenses to be paid to 'any other party' must be a party to the proceedings. That seems to us clear as a matter of construction of the rule; but in any event is put beyond doubt if one turns to paragraph 19 of Schedule 11 to the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 which is repeating earlier legislation and which refers to the power of this Tribunal to order that costs may be paid to any other 'party to the proceedings'.
It seems to us here that before we can make an order the local authority shall pay any monies to the Applicant we must be satisfied that she has incurred costs or expenses. The important word is "incurred". Apparently, the position in this particular case is that the Applicant has not incurred any costs or expenses."
Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1976 2191) - Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978
1 Citers


 
In re Eastwood [1980] 1 WLR 396
1980


Legal Professions, Costs
The court identified two elements to make up a solicitor's hourly rate in contentious matters. The expense of time and a percentage mark up applied to take account of amongst other matters the amount of any money or property involved. Held: These two elements as the general principle governing taxation in contentious work.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wilkinson [1980] 1 WLR 396; [1980] 1 All ER 597
1980

Robert Goff J
Legal Professions, Costs
The court was attracted by the Law Society's submission that the general principles that costs should reflect the amount at stake and the expense of providing the service, should govern also court attendances during litigation. The court identified what it saw to be weakness in the Law Society's booklet, The Expense of Time. The taxing officer's task is to determine 'the broad average direct costs of work done' by a partner and assistant solicitor ' in the relevant area at the relevant time'.
1 Citers


 
Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) [1980] Ch 515
1980
ChD
Brightman J
Costs, Trusts
A claim was made against a trustee for compensation for losses incurred during the administration of the trust. Held: For a court to order an account by a trustee on the basis of wilful default, and make the defendant liable not only for assets which have come to their hands but also in respect of assets which ought to have come to their hands, the claimant must plead and prove at least one act of wilful default. Higher standards may be expected of professional trustees.
Brightman J considered the nature of the remedy of restitution: "the so-called restitution which the [trustee] must now make to the plaintiffs . . is in reality compensation for loss suffered by the plaintiffs . . not readily distinguishable from damages except with the aid of a powerful legal microscope." and "The trustee's obligation is to restore to the trust estate the assets of which he has deprived it." and
"The bank, as trustee, was bound to act in relation to the shares and to the controlling position which they conferred, in the same manner as a prudent man of business. The prudent man of business will act in such manner as is necessary to safeguard his investment. He will do this in two ways. If facts come to his knowledge which tell him that the company’s affairs are not being conducted as they should be, or which put him on enquiry, he will take appropriate action. Appropriate action will no doubt consist in the first instance of enquiry of and consultation with the directors, and in the last but most unlikely resort, the convening of a general meeting to replace one or more directors. What the prudent man of business will not do is to content himself with the receipt of such information on the affairs of the company as a shareholder ordinarily receives at annual general meetings. Since he has the power to do so, he will go further and see that he has sufficient information to enable him to make a responsible decision from time to time either to let matters proceed as they are proceeding, or to intervene if he is dissatisfied."
The normal order in hostile litigation is for costs to be taxed on a standard basis.
A proper rate of interest to be awarded, in the absence of special circumstances, to compensate beneficiaries and trust funds for non-receipt from a trustee of money that ought to have been received was that allowed from time to time on the Short Term Investment Account, a rate which may be taken to be not more favourable than base rate less 0.5 per cent.
1 Citers


 
Macarthys Ltd v Smith (No.2) [1980] EWCA Civ 7; [1981] QB 180
17 Apr 1980
CA
Lord Denning MR, Lawton, Cummin-Bruce LJJ
Employment, European, Costs
The parties had disputed a difference in payment between the woman applicant and men doing similar work. After a lengthy dispute the parties now disputed the costs. Held: The company had correctly been ordered to pay the costs.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (No 1) [1980] ECHR 6; (1981) 3 EHRR 317
6 Nov 1980
ECHR
Mr. G. BALLADORE PALLIERI, P
Human Rights, Costs, Media
The Court had held, inter alia, that there had been a breach of Article 10 by reason of an injunction granted against Times Newspapers Limited in accordance with the English law of contempt of court but no breach of Article 14 (art. 14).
During the proceedings on the merits, the applicants, without quantifying their claim, had requested the Court to declare, in application of Article 50, that the Government of the United Kingdom should pay the costs and expenses which they, the applicants, had incurred in connection with the contempt litigation in the English courts and the proceedings before the Commission and the Court. Held: By thirteen votes to three that the United Kingdom was to pay to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses incurred in connection with the proceedings before the Commission and the Court, the sum of twenty-two thousand six hundred and twenty-six pounds sterling and seventy-eight pence, but rejects unanimously the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
European Convention on Human Rights 50
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Uxbridge Justices, ex parte Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; CA 1981 - [1981] 1 QB 829

 
 Re: Gibson's Settlement Trusts; Mellor v Gibson; 1981 - [1981] Ch 179; [1981] 2 WLR 1; [1981] 1 All ER 233
 
Duke of Norfolk's Settlement Trusts, Re [1981] EWCA Civ 5; [1982] Ch 61; [1981] 3 All ER 220
13 Apr 1981
CA
Cumming-Bruce, Brightman, Fox LJJ
Trusts, Costs
The court considered the jurisdiction of the court to authorise the payment out of trust property of remuneration to a trustee.
[ Bailii ]

 
 M V Yorke Motors v Edwards; HL 1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 444; [1982] 1 All ER 1024

 
 Chamberlain v Boodle and King; 1982 - [1982] 3 All ER 188

 
 Regina v Manchester Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Hill; Hill v Anderton; HL 1982 - [1983] 1 AC 328; [1982] 3 WLR 331; (1982) 146 JP 348; [1982] 2 All ER 963; [1982] Crim LR 755; (1982) 75 Cr App R 346; [1982] 2 All ER 963

 
 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans; HL 1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 1155; (1982) 3 All ER 141; [1982] UKHL 10
 
Potter v Potter [1982] 3 All ER 321
1982
FD

Family, Costs
The court considered the admissibility of without prejudice correspondence on costs decisions.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1164
2 Jan 1982


Costs

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
R and T Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2) [1982] 3 All ER 1086; [1982] QB 1283; [1982] 3 WLR 869
2 Jan 1982
CA
Lord Denning MR
Legal Professions, Costs
The remedy of an award of costs against a solicitor personally is only available to make good loss where the solicitor is guilty of inexcusable misconduct such as to merit reproof.
It is not always easy to separate the effect of a disciplinary order from its purpose or objective.
Lord Denning MR, after reference to the authorities, said of the supervisory compensatory jurisdiction: "The cases show that it is not available in cases of mistake, error of judgment or mere negligence. It is only available where the conduct of the solicitor is inexcusable and such as to merit reproof."
O'Connor LJ, with whom Dunn LJ agreed, said: "The cases show that such an order ought not to be made unless it is shown that the Thews have suffered loss as a result of serious misconduct by the solicitors in the case."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Din and Another v London Borough of Wandsworth; HL 25-Mar-1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 418

 
 Regina v Miller and Glennie; Miller v- Glennie; 1983 - [1983] 1 WLR 1056; [1983] 1 All ER 978
 
Computer Machinery v Drescher [1983] 3 All ER 153
1983
ChD
Sir Robert Megarry VC
Costs, Litigation Practice
Sir Robert Megarry VC said: "For reasons that will appear, I think that I should pause in my recital of the facts in order to say something about these two cases. For a long while it has been settled law that if letters written 'without prejudice' do not result in an agreement, they cannot be looked at by the court even on the question of costs, unless both parties consent: see, for example, Walker v. Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335; Stotesbury v. Turner (1943) KB 370. Thus if in 'without prejudice' correspondence a defendant offers less than the plaintiff is claiming but more than the plaintiff ultimately recovers at the trial, the defendant cannot use his offer in support of a contention that the plaintiff should receive no costs for the period subsequent to the offer. If the claim is purely a money claim, this causes no difficulty: the defendant may pay into court under RSC Ord. 22 the sum that he is offering, and although knowledge of this will be withheld from the court until both liability and quantum have been decided, the fact of payment in is admissible, and usually highly relevant, in deciding what order for costs should be made. If, however, the claim is not solely a money claim, but some other relief is sought, such as an injunction, there was formerly no comparable procedure. What was needed was some procedure whereby the defendant could make an offer to submit to an injunction, give an undertaking or afford other relief on the footing that the offer would be without prejudice until the case was decided but with prejudice when it came to costs.
It was a procedure of this type which was suggested by Cairns L.J. in Calderbank v. Calderbank (1975) 3 A.E.R. 333 at 342, (1976) Fam. 93 at 105-106 and was acted on in McDonnell v. McDonnell (1977) 1 A.E.R. 766 at 770, (1977) 1 W.L.R. 34 at 38. These were both matrimonial appeals from the Family Division, however, and there has been some uncertainty whether the procedure applies to other cases. Thus 17 Halsbury's Laws (4th edn) para 213 cites Calderbank v. Calderbank for the proposition that 'in matrimonial proceedings relating to finance' a party may make this type of offer, and the 1983 cumulative supplement leaves it there. Nor do the cases appear to have been given the prominence which they deserve. Thus leading books which discuss offers made 'without prejudice' still leave unamended statements based on Walker v. Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335, without any mention of either Calderbank or McDonnell: see, for example, Phipson on Evidence (13th edn, 1982) p. 374; Cross on Evidence (5th edn, 1979) p. 301. Nor are the cases mentioned in The Supreme Court Practice 1982."
and
"In my view, the principle in question is one of perfectly general application which is in no way confined to matrimonial cases. Whether an offer is made 'without prejudice' or 'without prejudice save as to costs', the courts ought to enforce the terms on which the offer was made as tending to encourage compromise and shorten litigation; and the latter form of offer has the added advantage of preventing the offer from being inadmissible on costs, thereby assisting the court towards justice in making the order as to costs. I should say at once that no point on this arises for decision, as the parties have very sensibly acted on this footing. What I have been saying is as obiter as what Cairns L.J. said (and Scarman L.J. and Sir Gordon Willmer concurred with) in Calderbank v. Calderbank; but I hope that the attention of the profession (including authors and editors) will be more generally directed to what seems to me to be a valuable procedural process that is too little used."
1 Citers


 
Minelli v Switzerland 8660/79; (1983) 5 EHRR 554; [1983] ECHR 4
25 Mar 1983
ECHR

Human Rights, Costs, Criminal Practice
It was capable of being an infringement of a defendant's right to a fair trial, to refuse to order payment of his costs after an acquittal in such a manner as to cast doubt on his innocence. "In the Court's judgment, the presumption of innocence will be violated if, without the accused's having previously been proved guilty according to law and, notably, without his having had the opportunity of exercising his rights of defence, a judicial decision concerning him reflects an opinion that he is guilty. This may be so even in the absence of any formal finding; it suffices that there is some reasoning suggesting that the court regards the accused as guilty."
European Convention on Human Rights 6
1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Cutts v Head and Another [1984] Ch 290; [1983] EWCA Civ 8; [1984] 2 WLR 349; [1984] 1 All ER 597
7 Dec 1983
CA
Oliver LJ, Fox LJ
Litigation Practice, Costs
There had been a trial of 35 days regarding rights of way over land, which had proved fruitless, and where some orders had been made without jurisdiction. The result had been inconclusive. The costs order was now appealed, the plaintiff complaining that the judge had failed to take into account an offer of settlement made by him before trial. Held: The principles of Calderbank should be of general application, and not just within matrimonial proceedings.
Oliver LJ discussed the attempt to apply the without prejudice rule: "That the rule rests, at least in part, upon public policy is clear from many authorities, and the convenient starting point of the inquiry is the nature of the underlying policy. It is that parties should be encouraged so far as possible to settle their disputes without resort to litigation and should not be discouraged by the knowledge that anything that is said in the course of such negotiations (and that includes, of course, as much the failure to reply to an offer as an actual reply) may be used to their prejudice in the course of the proceedings. They should, as it was expressed by Clauson J. in Scott Paper Co. v. Drayton Paper Works Ltd. (1927) 44 R.P.C. 151, 156, be encouraged fully and frankly to put their cards on the table. The public policy justification, in truth, essentially rests on the desirability of preventing statements or offers made in the course of negotiations for settlement being brought before the court of trial as admissions on the question of liability.'
The rule applies to exclude all negotiations genuinely aimed at settlement whether oral or in writing from being given in evidence. A competent solicitor will always head any negotiating correspondence 'without prejudice' to make clear beyond doubt that in the event of the negotiations being unsuccessful they are not to be referred to at the subsequent trial. However, the application of the rule is not dependent upon the use of the phrase 'without prejudice' and if it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that the parties were seeking to compromise the action, evidence of the content of those negotiations will, as a general rule, not be admissible at the trial and cannot be used to establish an admission or partial admission."
and "As a practical matter, a consciousness of a risk as to costs if reasonable offers are refused can only encourage settlement whilst, on the other hand, it is hard to imagine anything more calculated to encourage obstinacy and unreasonableness than the comfortable knowledge that a litigant can refuse with impunity whatever may be offered to him even if it is as much as or more than everything to which he is entitled in the action."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Davy-Chiesman v Davy-Chiesman [1984] 2 WLR 291; [1984] Fam 48; [1984] 1 All ER 321
1984
CA

Legal Professions, Costs


 
Singer (formerly Sharegin) v Sharegin [1984] FLR 114
1984

Cummin-Bruce LJ
Family, Costs
In family proceedings, the starting point for the award of costs is that they prima facie follow the event but that presumption may be displaced much more easily than, and in circumstances which would not apply, in other divisions of the High Court.
1 Citers


 
Mercer v Oldham [1984] Crim LR 232
1984
QBD

Magistrates, Police, Costs
The respondent had recovered his car from the police via a complaint to the magistrates, having lent it to his brother-in-law, who had used it in a burglary. The magistrates found that he had not known of the intended use. The police had taken no steps to ascertain his state of knowledge, and the magistrates ordered the police to pay his costs. The police appealed by case stated against the order for costs. Held. The appeal was dismissed. The conduct of the police justified the order. In the course of judgment the Court said: "In matters of this kind, it was of the utmost assistance to the justices that the police should be present at court, both to indicate whether or not they objected to the order being made, and to test the evidence of a claimant. In such circumstances, the justices would normally make no order for costs. But they did have a discretion, and if they considered that the police had gone beyond the usual rule merely assisting the justices, and actively opposed the order, then there was no reason why the justices should not, in the exercise of their discretion, order the police to pay costs. That was clearly what happened in the present case."

 
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