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Constitutional - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 50 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
Inland Revenue v Hinchy [1960] UKHL TC - 38 - 625; [1960] AC 748
18 Feb 1960
HL
Lord Reid
Constitutional, Income Tax
HL Income Tax - Incorrect return - Amount of penalty - Income Tax Act, 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. VI & 1 Eliz. II, c. 10), Section 25 (3).
A court's search for parliamentary intention is not an enquiry as to what the executive sought to achieve in drafting the Bill, but is ascertained from the applications of canons of statutory construction to the words of the Act. The object of interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, the subjective intention of the Members of Parliament and others involved in the lawmaking process is irrelevant.
Income Tax Act 195225(3)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Prasident Ruhrkolec-Verkaufsgesellschaft Mbh, Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft Mbh, Mausegatt Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft Mbh And I. Nold Kg v High Authority Of The European Coal And Steel Community C-36/59; C-38/59; [1960] EUECJ C-38/59
15 Jul 1960
ECJ

European, Constitutional
ECJ 1. The court has jurisdiction over the legality of decisions taken by the high authority, but it is not the function of the court to ensure respect for national law in force in a member state, and this is true even of constitutional laws. Therefore the court may neither interpret nor apply national law.
2. Community law, such as it arises under the ecsc treaty, does not contain any general principle, whether explicit or otherwise, guaranteeing the maintenance of vested rights.
3. By article 65 (2), the high authority shall authorize specialization agreements or joint-buying or joint-selling agreements if it finds that the conditions set out in paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) are fulfilled. Such authorization therefore depends on a finding which, of its very nature, comprises an assessment of the situation created by the facts or economic circumstances, and for this reason is partly immune from review by this court. Therefore the high authority has an absolute duty to state specific reasons for these authorizations and this rule must be strictly observed. Those reasons must enable the interested parties, as also the court should occasion arise, to check the information on which the high authority has relied in finding that the requirements necessary for the granting of its authorization are met so as to be in a position to examine whether the authorization was rightly granted as a matter both of fact and of law.
4. The advantages which the selling agencies may derive from trading with the smallest possible number of wholesalers do not constitute a sufficient reason to justify the restriction which is thereby imposed on trade, particularly since the very purpose for which the selling agencies have been created is to take away from the mines the effort involved or organizing the sale of their products on a commercial basis and their function, which is to furnish wholesalers with supplies, constitutes the essential reason for their authorized joint-selling agreement.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Clayton v Heffron; 15-Dec-1960 - (1960) 105 CLR 214; [1960] HCA 92

 
 Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 4-May-1961 - [1962] AC 220; [1961] UKHL 1; [1961] 2 All ER 446; (1961) 45 Cr App R 113
 
Close v Steel Company of Wales Ltd [1962] AC 367
1962

Lord Denning
Health and Safety, Scotland, Constitutional
The pursuer sought damages after injury arising from the use of a tool for a purpose other than that for which it was intended to be used. Lord Denning quoted Sir Frederick Pollock to say: "Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision." referring to Selborne LC's judgment in Caledonian Railway, he said: "A judgment which is right, and consistent with sound principles, upon the facts and circumstances of the case which the House had to decide, need not be construed as laying down a rule for a substantially different state of facts and circumstances, though some propositions, wider than the case itself required, may appear to have received countenance from those who then advised the House."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Thornton v The Police [1962] AC 339 PC
1962
PC

Commonwealth, Constitutional
Leave to appeal was refused on the ground that the judgment of Hammet J was clearly correct. He held that nothing in the Act "precludes either the United Kingdom or any of the colonies from enacting such legislation as they chose to regulate and control the entry into their territory or residence therein of persons whatever their status may be".
British Nationality Act 1948
1 Citers


 
Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322; [1962] UKPC 2; [1962] 2 WLR 1153
2 Apr 1962
PC
Lord Denning, Lord Hodson, Lord Devlin
Commonwealth, Natural Justice, Constitutional
A police officer had been dismissed. He complained that he had not been allowed to see the report of the Board of Inquiry which contained prejudicial material and which had been relied upon by the officer adjudicating his case. Held: The failure amounted to a denial of a reasonable opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge and was unfair. Where a conflict was found between an existing law and a provision of the constitution, the Constitution had to prevail.
Lord Denning said: "In the opinion of their Lordships, however, the proper approach is somewhat different. The rule against bias is one thing. The right to be heard is another. Those two rules are the essential characteristics of what is often called natural justice. They are the twin pillars supporting it. The Romans put them in the two maxims: Nemo judex in causa sua: and Audi alteram partem. They have recently been put in the two words, Impartiality and Fairness. But they are separate concepts and are governed by separate considerations. In the present case inspector Kanda complained of a breach of the second. He said that his constitutional right had been infringed. He had been dismissed without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence is given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them . . it follows, of course, that the Judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other. The Court will not enquire whether the evidence or representations did work to his prejudice. Sufficient that they might do so. The Court will not go into the likelihood of prejudice. The risk of it is enough. No one who has lost a case will believe he has been fairly treated if the other side has had access to the Judge without his knowing.” Lord Denning considered the conflict between the provisions under review and the Malaysian constitution: "If there was in any respect a conflict between the existing law and the Constitution . . then the existing law would have to be modified so as to accord with the Constitution." and "In a conflict of this kind between the existing law and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail. The court must apply the existing law with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into accord with the Constitution."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Chandler (TN) v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 12-Jul-1962 - [1964] AC 763; [1962] UKHL 2
 
Burmah Oil Company Limited (Burma Trading) v Lord Advocate 1963 SC 410
1963
IHCS
Lord President Clyde
Constitutional
The 1965 Act was to be construed restrictively, lest "what was intended as a reasonable protection for a public authority would become an engine of oppression."
War Damage Act 1965
1 Citers


 
Deaton v Attorney General and Revenue Commissioners [1963] IR 170
1963


Constitutional, Commonwealth
(Supreme Court of Ireland) The court looked at a law in which the choice of alternative penalties was left to the executive: 'There is a clear distinction between the prescription of a fixed penalty and the selkection of a penalty for a particular case. The prescription of a fixed penalty is the statement of a general rule, which is one of the characteristics of legislation; this is wholly different from the selection of a penalty to be imposed in an individual citizen's case; it states the general rule, and the application of that rule is for the Courts . . . The selection of punishment is an integral part of the administration of justice, and, as such, cannot be committed to the hands of the executive . . . '
1 Citers



 
 Attorney-General of Ceylon v de Livera; PC 1963 - [1963] AC 103

 
 Van Gend En Loos v Administratie Der Belastingen; ECJ 5-Feb-1963 - C-26/62; [1963] ECR 1; [1963] EUECJ R-26/62; (1963) 2 CMLR 128

 
 Da Costa En Schaake Nv, Jacob Meijer Nv, Hoechst-Holland Nv v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration; ECJ 27-Mar-1963 - R-30/62; [1963] EUECJ R-30/62; (1963) 2 CMLR 224
 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa v Senator Chief T. Adebayo Doherty and Others [1963] UKPC 19
3 Jul 1963
PC

Constitutional
(Nigeria)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Ibralebbe Alias Rasa Wattan Another v The Queen; PC 6-Nov-1963 - [1964] All ER 900; [1963] UKPC 34
 
Carson v Carson [1964] 1 WLR 511
1964

Scarman J
Constitutional
The court echoed the description of the rule against retrospectivity in an Act so as to remove existing right, quoting Maxwell "Upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. They are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication."
1 Citers


 
Zoernsch v Waldock [1964] 1 WLR 675
1964
CA
Willmer LJ, Diplock LJ, Danckwerts LJ
Constitutional
A claim was lodged against a former president as well as the current secretary of the European Commission of Human Rights. The former president, Sir Humphrey Waldock, was under the 1960 Order entitled to “the like immunity from legal process as is accorded to an envoy of a foreign sovereign power”. Held: With reference to (inter alia) Rahimtoola, that, after leaving office, state immunity continued to protect such an envoy from suit in respect of “acts performed in his official capacity” or in respect of “acts done in the course of their official duties”. Where domestic legislation, although not incorporating the treaty, requires, either expressly or by necessary implication, resort to be had to its terms for the purpose of construing the legislation, the court may not only be empowered but required to adjudicate upon the meaning or scope of the terms of an international treaty.
Council of Europe (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1960 (1960 No 442)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Geok v Minister of the Interior [1964] 1 WLR 554
1964
PC

Constitutional
A provision of the Constitution of Malaysia allowed the Federal Government to deprive a person of his citizenship 'if satisfied that he has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards the Federation'. The allegations against the appellant were based on what he had said and done after August 1957, when he was treated as a citizen by registration under the Constitution. He had become a citizen of the Federation of Malaya in 1951. Held: The provision applied only to acts done or speeches made after registration. A complaint made was that the particulars provided of the conduct relied on against him were inadequate. The Board found that the notice would be valid even if no particulars were provided, since the ground was that the appellant had shown himself to be disloyal and disaffected towards the Federation of Malaysia.
1 Citers


 
Ibralebbe v The Queen [1964] AC 900
1964
PC

Commonwealth, Constitutional
(Grenada) In an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Grenada, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council forms part of the Grenadian judicial system. Section 53 of the constitution which empowered Parliament to "make laws for the peace, order and good government", connoted "the widest law-making powers appropriate to a Sovereign"
1 Citers


 
Ibralebbe v The Queen [1964] AC 900; [1964] 1 All ER 251; [1964] 2 WLR 76
1964
PC
Viscount Radcliffe
Administrative, Constitutional
(St Kitts) The Privy Council is part of the judicial system of the country whence an appeal comes and it is not an institution of the United Kingdom.
The power to make ordinances for the government of dependencies is extremely wide.
'The words "peace, order, and good government" connote, in British constitutional language, the widest law-making powers appropriate to a sovereign.'
1 Citers


 
Ibralebbe v The Queen [1964] AC 900
1964
PC
Viscount Radcliffe
Commonwealth, Constitutional
(St. Christopher and Nevis) A power to make laws for "peace, order and good government" was used to confer legislative power on the Parliament of independent Ceylon, to connote "in British constitutional language, the widest law-making powers appropriate to a Sovereign". The Privy Council is the final court in the St Kitts hierarchy of courts.
1 Citers



 
 Burmah Oil Company (Burma Trading) Limited v Lord Advocate; HL 21-Apr-1964 - [1965] AC 75; [1965] AC 75; [1965] 2 All ER 348; 1964 SC (HL) 117; [1964] UKHL 6; [1964] 2 WLR 1231; 1964 SLT 218

 
 The Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe; PC 5-May-1964 - [1964] 2 WLR 1301; [1965] AC 172; [1964] 2 All ER 785; [1964] UKPC 1; [1964] UKPC 20

 
 Costa v ENEL (Order); ECJ 3-Jun-1964 - C-6/64
 
Flaminio Costa v ENEL (Procedure) C-6/64; (1964) CMLR 425; [1964] ECR 585; R-6/64; [1964] EUECJ R-6/64; [1964] EUECJ C-6/64
15 Jul 1964
ECJ

Constitutional
"The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of their rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail . ."
ECJ 1. In the context of requests for preliminary rulings, the court has no jurisdiction either to apply the treaty to a specific case or to decide upon the validity of a provision of domestic law in relation to the treaty, as it would be possible for it to do under article 169. Nevertheless, the court has power to extract from a question imperfectly formulated by the national court those questions which alone pertain to the interpretation of the treaty.
2. Article 177 is based upon a clear separation of functions between national courts and the court of justice and cannot empower the latter either to investigate the facts of the case or to criticize the grounds and purpose of the request for interpretation.
3. By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the eec treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and which their courts are bound to apply.
By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.
The integration into the laws of each member state of provisions which derive from the community and more generally the terms and the spirit of the treaty, make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal system. The law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question.
The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights.
4. The commission has the duty of seeing that the member states respect those obligations which have been imposed upon them by the treaty and which bind them as states without creating individual rights, but this obligation on the part of the commission does not give individuals the right to allege, in community law or under article 177, either failure by the state concerned to fulfil any of its obligations or breach of duty on the part of the commission.
5. Article 102 of the eec treaty contains no provisions which are capable of creating individual rights which national courts must protect.
6. Article 93 of the eec treaty contains no provisions which are capable of creating individual rights which national courts must protect.
7. A member state's obligation under the eec treaty, which is neither subject to any conditions nor, as regards its execution or effect, to the adoption of any measure either by the states or by the commission, is legally complete and consequently capable of producing direct effects on the relations between member states and individuals. Such an obligation becomes an integral part of the legal system of the member states, and thus forms part of their own law, and directly concerns their nationals in whose favour it has created individual rights which national courts must protect.
8. Article 53 of the eec treaty constitutes a community rule capable of creating individual rights which national courts must protect.
9. Article 53 of the eec treaty is satisfied so long as no new measure subjects the establishment of nationals of other member states to more severe rules than those prescribed for nationals of the country of establishment, whatever the legal system governing the undertakings.
10. Article 37 ( 2 ) of the eec treaty constitutes in all its provisions a rule of community law capable of creating individual rights which national courts must protect.
11. The provisions of article 37 ( 2 ) of the eec treaty have as their object the prohibition of any new measure contrary to the principles of article 37 ( 1 ), that is any measure having as its object or effect a new discrimination between nationals of member states regarding the conditions in which goods are procured and marketed, by means of monopolies or bodies wich must, first, have as their object transactions regarding a commercial product capable of being the subject of competition and trade between member states, and secondly must play an effective part in such trade.
It is a matter for the court dealing with the main action to assess in each case whether the economic activity under review relates to such a product which, by virtue of its nature and the technical or international conditions to which it is subject, is capable of playing such a part in imports or exports between nationals of the member states.
LMA The case involved a conflict between a number of Treaty provisions, and an Italian statute nationalising the electricity company of which Signor Costa was a shareholder. But here the Italian law was later in time. On being brought before the Milan tribunal for refusing to pay his bill (about £110p.) Signor Costa argued that the company was in breach of EC Law. The company argued "lex posterior" the Italian Act nationalising the electricity company was later in time than the Italian Ratification Act, the act incorporating EC law therefore it took priority. The Italian Court referred this question of priorities to the ECJ. The principle of supremacy of EC law was clearly affirmed by the ECJ. The Court went on to say "The transfer, by MS, from their national orders in favour of the Community order of rights and obligations arising from the Treaty, carries a clear limitation of their sovereign right upon which a subsequent unilateral law, incompatible with the aims of the Community cannot prevail"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Buck v Attorney General [1965] Ch 246
1965
ChD
Wilberforce J
Constitutional
The claimant challenged the validity of an order in council. The order used general enabling words, not expressly stating which power had been used for their creation. Held: The result of those general enabling words was that the order was made under a power conferred by the British Settlements Act 1887 even though that order did not expressly refer to that power. As a result the order was valid.
British Settlements Act 1887
1 Citers


 
Linkletter v Walker (1965) 381 US 618
1965


International, Constitutional
(US Supreme Court) In both criminal and civil cases 'the accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in the interests of justice make the rule prospective.'
1 Citers


 
Buck v Attorney General [1965] 1 Ch 745; [1965] 1 All ER 882
2 Jan 1965
CA
Diplock LJ, Harman LJ
Constitutional
By an action for declaratory relief, a challenge was offered to the validity of the Order in Council giving effect to the 1961 Act. Held: The appeal failed. As a matter of international comity an English court should not grant declarations which would amount to an unwarranted interference in the affairs of an independent member of the British Commonwealth. In proceedings for declarations brought against the Attorney General of England the court has no jurisdiction to make declarations as to the validity of the constitution of an independent sovereign state, in this case Sierra Leone.
Harman LJ: "These courts cannot, in my view, make a declaration impugning the validity of the constitution of a foreign or independent state, at any rate where that is the object of the action. This may be put as a matter of international comity, or upon the ground of effectiveness. No relief effective in this country or anywhere else is sought by the action. Any declaration which the court might make may be ignored with impunity by the independent country into whose affairs it pretends to pry, and I am of opinion that it would be not only improper, but contrary to law in those circumstances to make such a declaration as is here sought".
Diplock LJ: "As a member of the family of nations, the Government of the United Kingdom (of which this court forms part of the judicial branch) observes the rules of comity, videlicet, the accepted rules of mutual conduct as between state and state which each state adopts in relation to other states to adopt in relation to itself. One of those rules is that it does not purport to exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of any other independent state, or to apply measures of coercion to it or to its property, except in accordance with the rules of public international law. One of the commonest applications of this rule by the judicial branch of the United Kingdom Government is the well-known doctrine of sovereign immunity. A foreign state cannot be impleaded in the English courts without its consent: see Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan Government. As was made clear in Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not depend upon the persons between whom the issue is joined, but upon the subject-matter of the issue. For the English court to pronounce upon the validity of a law of a foreign sovereign state within its own territory so that the validity of that law became the res of the res judicata in the suit, would be to assert jurisdiction over the internal affairs of that state. That would be a breach of the rules of comity" and "The only subject-matter of this appeal is an issue as to the validity of a law of a foreign independent sovereign state, in fact, the basic law containing its constitution. The validity of this law does not come in question incidentally in proceedings in which the High Court has undoubted jurisdiction, as, for instance, the validity of a foreign law might come in question incidentally in an action upon a contract to be performed abroad. The validity of the foreign law is what this appeal is about; it is about nothing else. This is the subject-matter over which the English courts, in my view, have no jurisdiction." and
Diplock LJ continued: "Mr. Gardner [for the plaintiffs] urges, however, that there was a moment of time when the Order in Council purported to be in force before Sierra Leone became an independent sovereign state, while the Government of the United Kingdom was still the sovereign government of the colony of Sierra Leone. He submits that, during that period, the English court would have had jurisdiction to declare the Order in Council to be ultra vires, and that it does not lose that jurisdiction merely because Sierra Leone has subsequently become a foreign sovereign state.
I should in any event reject this argument. In applying the rules of comity, one looks to the substance of the issue, not to its form. The Order in Council was, on the face of it, intended to provide the constitution not of the colony of Sierra Leone, but of the new independent foreign state. The issue as to the validity of the Order in Council was thus, in substance, at the date of the writ, an issue as to the validity of the constitution of an independent sovereign state. But there is, I think, a technical answer also. As soon as Sierra Leone became independent, the Order in Council ceased to have any effect as an Order in Council, that is, as an exercise of the sovereign power of the United Kingdom Government represented by the Attorney-General of England. Whatever effect it then had was as part of the law of a foreign sovereign state, into the validity of which this court has no jurisdiction to enquire."
Sierra Leone Independence Act 1961 - British Settlements Act 1887
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Liyanage and others v The Queen; PC 2-Dec-1965 - [1965] UKPC 1; [1966] 2 WLR 682; [1967] 1 AC 259; [1966] 1 All ER 650

 
 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent); HL 1966 - [1966] 3 All ER 77; [1966] 1 WLR 1234
 
Liyange v Regina [1966] 1 All ER 650; [1967] AC 259; [1966] 2 WLR 682
1966
PC

Constitutional, Commonwealth
The appellant, who had been involved in an attempted coup in Ceylon, sought to argue that a retroactive law relating to his trial was void. Held: The argument succeeded. The separation of powers inherent in the Constitution had been infringed, and the appellant's conviction was quashed. However judicial power is distributed between courts, it is to continue to be vested in persons appointed to hold judicial office in the manner and terms set down by the constitution in the chapter on the judicature, and even though it may not be set out explicitly. Under a Westminster style constitution, the legislature not only does not, but can not, prescribe the penalty to be imposed in an individual citizen's case.
"Their Lordships cannot accept the view that the legislature while removing the fetter of repugnancy to English law, left in existence a fetter of repugnancy to some vague unspecified law of natural justice. The terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act and especially the words 'but not otherwise' in section 2 make it clear that Parliament was intending to deal with the whole question of repugnancy. Morover, their Lordships doubt whether Lord Mansfield was intending to say that what was not repugnant to English law might yet be repugnant to fundamental principles or to set up the latter as a different test from the former. Whatever may have been the possible arguments in this matter prior to the passing of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, they are not maintainable at the present date. No case has been cited in which during the last 100 years any judgment (or, so far as one can see, any argument) has been founded on that portion of Lord Mansfield's judgment."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Salomon v Customs and Excise Commissioners; CA 1966 - [1967] 2 QB 116; [1966] 2 All ER 340; [1966] 2 Lloyds Rep 460; [1966] 3 WLR 36
 
Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94; [1966] HCA 14
7 Mar 1966

Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ
Commonwealth, Damages, Constitutional
(High Court of Australia) Damages - Personal Injuries - Loss of earning capacity - Loss of expectation of life - Loss of amenities during reduced life span - Pain and suffering - Plaintiff rendered permanently unconscious by injuries - Basis of assessment.
Precedent - Decisions of House of Lords - Applicability - High Court - Other Australian courts.
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
The Honourable Dr. Paul Borg Oliver and Another v The Honourable Dr. Anton Buttigieg [1966] UKPC 6; [1967] AC 115
19 Apr 1966
PC

Constitutional
The Archbishop of Malta had declared it a mortal sin to print, write, sell, buy, distribute or read a left-wing weekly newspaper, the Voice of Malta. The Maltese Medical and Health Department had followed this up by prohibiting all its 2,660 employees from taking the Voice of Malta into its hospitals and other buildings. The Maltese Constitution provided that: "13. (1) All persons in Malta shall have full liberty of conscience and enjoy the free exercise of their respective modes of religious worship. . .
14. (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference . . "
The Board was asked whether the editor of the Voice of Malta had been hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression. Held: He had: "Though the [editor] was not prevented from imparting ideas and information the inevitable consequence of what was done was that he was 'hindered' and that there was 'interference' with his freedom."
The Board rejected a submission that the measure of any resulting hindrance was slight and could be ignored as de minimis, for two reasons: first, "the hindrance cannot, on the facts of the case, be classed as minimal" and: "In the second place, their Lordships consider that where 'fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual' are being considered a court should be cautious before accepting the view that some particular disregard of them is of minimal account."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex parte Lain; QBD 1967 - [1967] 2 QB 864; [1967] 2 All ER 770; [1967] 3 WLR 348
 
Olivier v Buttigieg [1967] 1 AC 115
1967
PC
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Constitutional, Media
(Malta) Following the condemnation by the Archbishop of Malta of a weekly newspaper the ‘Voice of Malta’, the entry into hospitals and branches of his department of newspapers condemned by the church authorities was “strictly forbidden”. Held: On the basis of the provisions of section 14 of the Constitution even if the prohibition did not “prevent” the editor from imparting ideas and information yet it quite plainly “hindered” him in so doing and was an interference. The very purpose and intention of the prohibition was to hinder such imparting. The prohibition was imposed in order to aid the condemnation of the church authorities. The prohibition did not prevent government employees from buying and possessing and reading the ‘Voice of Malta’ at all such times as would not involve their having a copy in their possession while on government premises. But that said only that the most that the Minister thought that he could do was not effective to prevent government employees from reading the ‘Voice of Malta’ if any of them were determined to do so.
1 Citers



 
 Liyanage v The Queen; PC 1967 - [1967] 1 AC 259
 
Kariapper v Wijesinha [1968] AC 717; [1967] 3 All ER 485
1967
PC

Constitutional, Commonwealth
The legislation at issue imposed "civil disabilities" on Members of Parliament against whom allegations of bribery had been sustained, including the loss of their seats in Parliament. The question arose whether they had been punished. Held: Sir Douglas Menzies contrasted discuplinary and criminal proceedings. In the former category no offence was specified and no declaration of guilt made. "Speaking generally, however, their Lordships would observe that it is not readily to be assumed that disciplinary action, however much it may hurt the individual concerned, is personal and retributive rather than corporate and self-respecting."
The words "amend or repeal" do not cover or allow an alteration of a law by implication.
1 Citers


 
Post Office v Estuary Radio Ltd [1968] 2 QB 740; [1967] 3 All ER 622
1968
CA
Diplock LJ
Constitutional
On the proper inerpretation of the legislation, the extent of application of the legislative regime is determined by reference to the concept of the UK's territorial waters as defined from time to time by the Crown. When the exercise of the Royal Prerogative directly effects an extension or contraction of the jurisdiction without the constitutional need for internal legislation, the court may not only be empowered but required to adjudicate upon the meaning or scope of the terms of an international treaty.
Diplock LJ said: "there is a presumption that the Crown did not intend to break an international treaty (see Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise), and if there is any ambiguity in the Order in Council, it should be resolved so as to accord with the provisions of the Convention in so far as that is a plausible meaning of the express words of the order."
. . And "It still lies within the prerogative power of the Crown to extend its sovereignty and jurisdiction to areas of land or sea over which it has not previously claimed or exercised sovereignty or jurisdiction. For such extension, the authority of Parliament is not required."
1 Citers


 
King v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 304; [1968] 2 All ER 610
1968
PC
Lord Hodson
Crime, Constitutional, Police
(Jamaica) The defendant said that in searching him the police had acted in breach of his rights guaranteed under the Constitution, which read: "Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry of others on his property." The Crown said that drugs were found. The defendant said they were planted. The magistrate accepted the evidence of the Crown, admitted the challenged evidence, and convicted the defendant. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Held. The defendant's appeal failed. Lord Hodson reviewed the authorities and said: "The appellant relied in support of his submission that the evidence illegally obtained against him should be excluded on the argument that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and reference was made to an Irish case of The People (AG) v. O’Brien, where the point was discussed by the Supreme Court of Eire. The provision of the Jamaican Constitution scheduled to the Jamaica Order in Council, No. 1550 of 1962 (paragraph 19) gives protection to persons against search of persons or property without consent. This constitutional right may or may not be enshrined in a written constitution, but it seems to their Lordships that it matters not whether it depends on such enshrinement or simply upon the common law as it would do in this country. In either event the discretion of the court must be exercised and has not been taken away by the declaration of the right in written form. Having considered the evidence and the submissions advanced, their Lordships hold that there is no ground for interfering with the way in which the discretion has been exercised in this case. This is not in their opinion a case in which evidence has been obtained by conduct of which the Crown ought not to take advantage. If they had thought otherwise they would have excluded the evidence even though tendered for the suppression of crime.”
In considering a right, it matters not whether the right infringed is enshrined in a constitution or is simply a common law right (or presumably an ordinary statutory right).
The requirement for a police officer to be named in a warrant is important because if no such person is named when the legislation so requires, the warrant is invalid.

 
Regina v The Secretary of State for The Home Department, ex parte Bhurosah [1968] 1 QB 266
1968
CA
Lord Denning MR
Commonwealth, Constitutional
In Mauritius the Queen is the Queen of Mauritius and the issuing of passports by the Government of Mauritius, although a matter of foreign affairs and therefore under the control of the UK Government, was an act carried out in the name of the Queen in the right of Mauritius, and not the Queen in right of the UK.
1 Citers


 
Lopes v Chettiar [1968] AC 887
1968
PC
Viscount Dilhorne
Commonwealth, Constitutional
(Malaysia) The petitioner had an appeal as of right to the Judicial Committee from the Federal Court of Malaysia under section 74(1)(a)(ii). The Court refused leave to appeal holding that the appeal had no merits and was bound to fail and the petitioner appealed to the Judicial Committee for leave to appeal, or, alternatively, for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court. Held: The Federal Court had no discretion to refuse leave to appeal, but refused to grant special leave to appeal. The granting of special leave to appeal by the Judicial Committee is a matter of discretion and not a right. This case was not a fit one for appeal to the Judicial Committee and leave was not to be granted solely on account of the fact that the appeal was wrongly treated by the Federal Court as one in which that court had a discretion.
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Malaysia) 74(1)(a)(ii)
1 Cites

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Bates v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 483
1968
HL
Lord Upjohn, Lord Reid
Income Tax, Constitutional
Section 402, on its plain meaning, produced results in some cases which were ‘monstrous’ and which Parliament can never have intended. The Commissioners had not sought to amend the legislation, but realising the monstrous result of giving effect to the true construction of the section, worked out what they consider to be an equitable way of operating it which seems to them to result in a fair system of taxation. The court per Lord Upohn, could not understand upon what principle they couldproperly do so.
The words 'if the income of the body corporate' were therefore seen as capable of meaning either the whole of the income or some only of the income.
Income Tax Act 1952 402
1 Citers



 
 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; HL 14-Feb-1968 - [1968] AC 997; [1968] UKHL 1; [1968] 1 All ER 694; [1968] 2 WLR 924

 
 Conway v Rimmer; HL 28-Feb-1968 - [1968] AC 910; [1968] 2 WLR 998; [1968] 1 All ER 874; [1968] UKHL 2

 
 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke; PC 23-Jul-1968 - [1969] 1 AC 645; [1968] 3 All ER 561; [1968] UKPC 2; [1968] UKPC 18

 
 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission; HL 17-Dec-1968 - [1969] 2 AC 147; [1968] UKHL 6; [1969] 1 All ER 208; [1969] 2 WLR 163

 
 Nissan v The Attorney General; HL 11-Feb-1969 - [1970] AC 179; [1969] UKHL 3
 
Johannes Gerhardus Klomp v Inspektie Der Belastingen. (Privileges And Immunities ) R-23/68; [1969] EUECJ R-23/68
25 Feb 1969
ECJ

European, Taxes - Other, Constitutional
Europa Article 16 of the former ECSC protocol and Article 30 of the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a single commission which make Article 177 of the eec treaty and article 150 of the ECSC Treaty applicable to the first-named treaty have an identical objective, namely to ensure a uniform interpretation and application in the six member states of the provisions relating to the privileges and immunities of the communities.
In accordance with a principle common to the legal systems of the member states, the origins of which may be traced back to roman law, when legislation is amended, unless the legislature expresses a contrary intention, continuity of the legal system must be ensured.
Article 11(b ) of the protocol on the privileges and immunities of the ecsc refers to national taxes on salaries and emoluments in whatever form and under whatever name they levied.
A contribution intended to finance a social security scheme does not constitute a tax within the meaning of article 11(b ) of the protocol on the privileges and immunities of the ECSC even if such a contribution is levied in a manner resembling the levying of taxes.
[ Bailii ]

 
 McEldowney v Forde; HL 18-Jun-1969 - [1969] UKHL 6; [1971] 1 AC 632; [1970] NI 11; [1969] 2 All ER 1039
 
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