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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Constitutional - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 57 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.


 
 The Grand Junction Canal Company v Dimes; 1-May-1849 - [1849] EngR 576; (1849) 12 Beav 63; (1849) 50 ER 984
 
Gosling v Veley (1850) 12 QB 328; [1850] EngR 174; (1850) 12 QB 328; (1850) 116 ER 891
1850

Wilde CJ
Crime, Constitutional
Wilde CJ said: "The rule of law that no pecuniary burden can be imposed upon the subjects of this country, by whatever name it may be called, whether tax, due, rate, or toll, except under clear and distinct legal authority, established by those who seek to impose the burden, has been so often the subject of legal decision that it may be deemed a legal axiom, and requires no authority to be cited in support of it."
Bill of Rights 1688 4
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Grand Junction Canal Company v Dimes [1850] EngR 242; (1850) 2 Mac and G 285; (1850) 42 ER 110
4 Feb 1850
CA
Lord Cottenham LC,
Constitutional
The defendant had been committed for the breach of an injunction which he believed had been unlawfully granted in that the Lord Chancellor, on appeal, had decided in favour of the plaintiff company in which he held shares. The defendant again applied for the discharge of the order. Held: The application was dismissed. The Master of the Rolls sat with the Lord Chancellor to concur in the opinion.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Dimes v Lord Cottenham [1850] EngR 499 (A); (1850) 5 Exch 311
2 May 1850


Constitutional, Litigation Practice
The Court will not, on the application of the plaintiff, grant a trial at bar merely because the defendant is Lord Chancellor and the plaintiff an attorney of the Court.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Wadsworth v The Queen Of Spain [1851] EngR 93; (1851-1852) 17 QB 215; (1851) 117 ER 1262
1851


Constitutional

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal and others; HL 26-Jun-1852 - (1852) 3 HL Cas 759; [1852] EngR 789; (1852) 3 HLC 759; (1852) 10 ER 301
 
Egerton v Earl of Brownlow [1853] 4 HLC 484; [1853] 4 HLC 1; [1853] EngR 885; (1853) 10 ER 359
1853
HL
Lord Truro, Parke B
Trusts, Constitutional
The House considered a challenge to the terms of a trust on the basis that it offended public policy. The House therefore considered the nature and importance of public policy. Held: Public policy 'has been confounded with what may be called political policy; such as whether it is politically wise to have a sinking fund or a paper circulation, or the degree and nature of interference with foreign States; with all which, as applied to the present subject, it has nothing whatever to do.' For these reasons, in our view, the defendants' point on public policy is wholly unfounded." (Lord Truro)
Parke B: "Public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term, and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error, when applied to the decision of legal rights; it is capable of being understood in different senses; it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean 'political expedience,' or that which is best for the common good of the community; and in that sense there may be every variety of opinion, according to education, habits, talents, and dispositions of each person, who is to decide whether an act is against public policy or not. It is the province of the statesman, and not the lawyer, to discuss, and of the Legislature to determine, what is best for the public good, and to provide for it by proper enactments. It is the province of the judge to expound the law only; the written from the statutes: the unwritten or common law from the decisions of our predecessors and of our existing courts, from the text writers of acknowledged authority, and upon principles to be clearly deduced from them by sound reason and just inference; not to speculate upon what is best, in his opinion, for the advantage of the community. Some of these decisions may have no doubt been founded upon the prevailing and just opinions of the public good; for instance, the illegality of covenants in restraint of marriage or trade. They have become part of the established law, and we are therefore bound by them, but we are not thereby authorised to establish as law everything which we may think for the public good, and prohibit everything which we think otherwise."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Taylor v Best (1854) 14 CB 487; [1854] 8 State Tr NS 317; [1854] 23 LJCP 89; [1854] 22 LTOS 287; [1854] 18 Jur 402; [1854] 2 WR 259; [1854] 2 CLR 1717; [1854] 139 ER 201
1854


Constitutional
The defendant was a counsellor of a foreign legation, and was subject to the directions of the minister plenipotentiary. In the absence of the minister, he acted up as charge d'affaires. He sought the protection of the 1708 Act. Held: A person acting in such a position was entitled to the protection as if he were an ambassador. However, once he vountarily appeared in a suit and therefore submitted to the court's jurisdiction, he was not entitled to rely upon that protection, having waived it by his submission. He would not lose his privilege by trading here, but his servants might.
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1708
1 Citers


 
Bowditch v Balchin [1850] EngR 599; (1850) 5 Exch 378; (1850) 155 ER 165
1855

Pollock CB
Constitutional
Pollock CB said: 'In a case in which the liberty of a subject is concerned we cannot go beyond the natural construction of the statute.'
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Harrison v Bush (1855) 5 E and B 344; [1855] EngR 41; (1855) 5 El and Bl 344; (1855) 119 ER 509
1855

Lord Campbell CJ
Administrative, Police, Constitutional
The office of Secretary of State is in theory one and indivisible.
Lord Campbell CJ stated: "In practice, to the Secretary of State for the Home Department . . belongs peculiarly the maintenance of the peace within the kingdom, with the superintendence of the administration of justice as far as the Royal prerogative is involved in it."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Wensleydale Peerage [1856] EngR 294; (1856) 5 HLC 958; (1856) 10 ER 1181
22 Feb 1856
HL

Constitutional
Sir James Parke, a distinguished judge of the Court of the Exchequer, was created a Life Peer but the House of Lords refused to allow him to sit and vote in the House because, they decided, that as the law then stood, the creation of Life Peers was not within the Crown's prerogative powers.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Magdalena Steam Navigation Company v Martin [1859] 34 LTOS 30; [1859] 5 Jur NS 1260; [1859] 7 WR 598; [1859] 121 ER 36; (1859) 2 E and E 94; [1859] 28 LJQB 310
1859


Constitutional
The defendant asserted that he was entitled to diplomatic privilege to protect him from an action here. He was public minister of a foreign state. He had been received by the Court and given formal accreditation. He had no real property in Britain. Held: Since he had done nothing to disentitled himself from such protection, he remained entitled in a civil action 'although such action may arise out of commercial transactions by him here, and although neither his person nor his goods be touched by the suit.'
1 Citers


 
Wright v Hale (1860) 6 H and N 227; [1860] EngR 1191; (1860) 6 H and N 227; (1860) 158 ER 94
23 Nov 1860

Wilde B
Constitutional, Litigation Practice
When considering the retrospective effects of an Act, "where the enactment deals with procedure only, unless the contrary is expressed, the enactment applies to all actions, whether commenced before or after the passing of the Act."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Long v Lord Bishop of Cape Town; PC 13-Feb-1863 - [1863] EngR 277; (1863) 1 Moo PC NS 411; (1863) 15 ER 756
 
Auld v Murray (1864) SAPP 53 LC
1864

Boothby J
Constitutional

1 Citers


 
Tobin v The Queen (1864) 16 CB (NS) 310
1864

Erle CJ
Constitutional
The Commander of a Queen's ship, employed in the suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Africa, seized a schooner belonging to the suppliant, which he suspected of being engaged in slave traffic. It being inconvenient to take the ship to port for condemnation in a Vice-Admiralty Court, the Commander caused the ship to be burned. The shipowners proceeded by Petition of Right. The supplicant-petitioners claimed to have sustained damages to the amount of £10,000 and humbly prayed that Her Majesty would be pleased to do what was right and just in the premises and to cause her suppliants to be reimbursed and compensated for the losses, damages and injuries so sustained. The Attorney General, on demurrer, argued that if wrong had been done the remedy was against the Commander as the person who did it and, secondly, that the Crown was not responsible for acts such as those detailed in the petition. In the course of a long argument on behalf of the petitioner Sir Hugh Cairns drew attention to Blackstone's Commentaries – 3 BL Comm 254: "That the King can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principle of the English Constitution: meaning that, in the first place, whatever may be amiss in the conduct of public affairs is not chargeable personally on the King, nor is he, but his ministers, accountable for it to the people; and, second, that the prerogative of the Crown extends not to do any injury; for, being created for the benefit of the people, it cannot be exerted to their prejudice. Whenever, therefore, it happens that that, by misinformation or inadvertence, the Crown hath been induced to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no action will lie against the sovereign (for, who shall command the King?), yet the law hath furnished the subject with a decent and respectful mode of removing that invasion, by informing the King of the true state of the matter in dispute: and, as it presumes, that, to know of any injury and to redress it are inseparable in the Royal Breast, it then issues as of course, in the King's own name, his orders to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved." Held: Erle CJ said: "The maxim that the King can do no wrong is true in the sense that he is not liable to be sued civilly or criminally for a supposed wrong. That which the sovereign does personally, the law presumes will not be wrong: that which the sovereign does by command to his servants, cannot be a wrong in the sovereign, because, if the command is unlawful, it is in law no command, and the servant is responsible for the unlawful act, the same as if there had been no command." He referred to 3 BL Comm: "The King can do no wrong; which antient and fundamental maxim is not to be understood as if everything transacted by the government was of course just and lawful, but means only two things, – first, whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the King, nor he is answerable for it personally to his people; for, this doctrine would destroy the constitutional independence of the Crown, – and, secondly, that the prerogative of the Crown extends not to do any injury."
That maxim, said the Chief Justice, had been constantly recognised and he rejected that the King could be responsible in damages for a supposed wrong. He then turned to the use and abuse of petitions of right. The court held that such petitions did not enable an award of damages to be made against the King; if damages were sought, they were to be obtained, if at all, from the officer who did the wrong.
1 Citers



 
 Feather v The Queen; 1865 - (1865) 6 BandS 257
 
In re Lord Bishop of Natal (1865) 3 Moore (NS) 114
1865


Constitutional

1 Citers


 
Galloway v The Corporation Of London [1865] EngR 241 (B); (1865) 34 Beav 203
13 Feb 1865


Land, Constitutional
In July 1862 the Corporation of London obtained Parliamentary powers for taking the Plaintiffs land for public purposes. But, prior thereto (June 1862) the Corporation had contracted to sell these lands to another company, not then empowered to purchase them, The Court held that the Corporation had so fettered their judgment and discretion, by contracting to sell that which they had no power to purchase, and that, to a company not then authorized to buy them that the Plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain the Corporation from taking more of his land than they bona fide required. After this, another Act passed in 1864, which, after referring to the contract of 1862, provided that that Act should not prejudice the right of the conipany under that agreement, but that the covenants thereof shou!d be as applicable to the said land, if purchased under the powers of this Act, as they would have been, if they had been purchased under the Act of 1863. Held, by the Master of the Rolls, that the last Act removed the objection to the agreement, and amounted to a declaratory enactment as to its validity, and that, consequently, the Plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction. The decision was affirmed, Lord Justice Turner dissentiente.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Galloway v The Mayor, Commonalty And Citizens Of The City Of London [1865] EngR 415; (1865) 2 De G J and S 639; (1865) 46 ER 523
2 May 1865


Land, Constitutional
The Corporation of London in 1862 obtained an Act authorising them to make a new street and buy land for that purpose, with certain powers of reselling land not required for the street. About the same time a railway company obtained an Act authorizing the company and the Corporation to enter into agreements for the sale of land by the corporation to the company. Shortly before either Act had passed the corporation entered into an agreement with the company to take under the powers of their Act and sell to the company certain lands, including land of the plaintiff. The Plaintiff filed his bill to restrain the corporation from taking his land on the ground of this agreement and obtained an injunction. After this another Act was passed authorising the corporation to take lands for another undertarking ; and by this Act, after reciting that certain lands might be taken under it which were liable to be taken by the corporation under their fomer Act, and with respect to which an agreement was "under the authority" of that Act and the Railway Act entered into between the Corporation and the company, and that it was expedient "that the rights of the company under such agreement, should be preserved," it was enacted that nothing in the present Act should prejudice "the rights of that company under the said agreement," but that all the provisions of the agreement should be as applicable to the lands if purchased under the powers of the present Act as they would have been if they had been purchased under the former Act. The Plaintiff land was liable to be taken under this latter Act. Held. by the Lord Justice Knight Bruce, affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Justice Turner dissenting, that the Legislature had by the latter Act recognized the validity of the agreement, and that the agreement was therefore no obstacle to the corporation taking the land of the Plaintiff under the latter Act.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Galloway v The Mayor, Commonalty And Citizens of London [1865] EngR 639; (1865) 3 De G J and S 59; (1865) 46 ER 560
29 Jun 1865
HL

Land, Constitutional
A bill filed by the Plaintiff to restrain the Defendant from taking certain property of his under their statutory powers had been dismissed and the order of dismissal enrolled. The Plaintiff presented a petition of appeal to the House of Lords, and now applied to the Court for an interim order to protec the property till the appeal could be heard. Held, that as the bill had been simply dismissed without any reservation, the Court had no jurisdiction to make the order asked.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Queen v Walter Watson Hughes And Edward Stirling [1865] EngR 794; (1865) 3 Moo PC NS 439; (1865) 16 ER 166
22 Dec 1865
PC

Constitutional, Commonwealth, Landlord and Tenant
Leases granted by the Governor of South Australia under powers conferred on him by the Colonial Act, 21st Vict. No. 5, sec. 13, for regulating the sale and other disposal of waste lands belonging to the Crown, sealed with the public seal of the Province, but not enrolled or recorded in any court, are not in themselves Records; and, though bad on the face of them, being for a larger quantity of land than allowed by that Act, cannot be annulled or quashed by a writ of Scire facias
[ Commonlii ]
 
Galloway v Mayor and Commonalty of London (1866) LR 1 HL 34
1866
HL
Lord Cranworth LC
Land, Constitutional
Lord Cranworth LC said: "The principle is this, that when persons embarking in great undertakings, for the accomplishment of which those engaged in them have received authority from the Legislature to take compulsorily the lands of others, making to the latter proper compensation, the persons so authorized cannot be allowed to exercise the powers conferred on them for any collateral object; that is, for any purposes except those for which the Legislature has invested them with extraordinary powers."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In The Matter Of The Jersey Jurats [1866] EngR 60; (1866) 3 Moo PC NS 456; (1866) 16 ER 173
18 Jan 1866
PC

Constitutional

[ Commonlii ]
 
Wason v Walter; ex parte Wason (1868) LR 4 QB 73; [1861-73] All ER 105
1868
QBD
Cockburn CJ, Blackburn, Lush JJ
Defamation, Constitutional
Defamation proceedings were begun in respect of newspaper reports of debates in Parliament. Held: By analogy with reports of judicial proceedings, that fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings were privileged. It was of paramount public and national importance that the proceedings of either House of Parliament should be communicated to the public.
Cockburn CJ said: "It seems to us impossible to doubt that it is of paramount public and national importance that the proceedings of the Houses of Parliament shall be communicated to the public, who have the deepest interest in knowing what passes within their walls, seeing that on what is there said and done, the welfare of the community depends . . Can any man bring himself to doubt that the publicity given in modern times to what passes in Parliament is essential to the maintenance of the relations existing between the government, the legislature, and the country at large? " and "It is clear that statements made by members of either House of Parliament in their places in the House, though they might be untrue to their knowledge, could not be made the foundation of civil or criminal proceedings, however injurious they might be to the interest of a third person. And a conspiracy to make such statements would not make the persons guilty of it amenable to the criminal law."
Lush J said: "I am clearly of opinion that we ought not to allow it to be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of members of either House cannot be inquired into by criminal proceedings with respect to anything they may do or say in the House."
1 Citers



 
 Appendix; HL 1870 - [1870] EngR 3; (1870) 6 Moo PC NS 9; (1870) 16 ER 827
 
Lee v Bude and Torrington Junction Railway Co (1871) LR 6 CP 576
1871

Willes J
Constitutional
It was alleged that Parliament had been induced to pass an Act by fraudulent recitals. Held: Willes J said: "Are we to act as regents over what is done by parliament with the consent of the Queen, lords and commons? I deny that any such authority exists. If an Act of Parliament has been obtained improperly, it is for the legislature to correct it by repealing it: but, so long as it exists as law. the Courts are bound to obey it. The proceedings here are judicial, not autocratic, which they would be if we could make laws instead of administering them."
When a statute gives a judge a discretion, what is meant is a judicial discretion, regulated according to the known rules of law, and not the mere whim or caprice of the person to whom it is given on the assumption that he is discreet
1 Citers



 
 Brown v McLachlan; PC 11-Dec-1872 - [1872] EngR 39; (1872) 9 Moo PC NS 384; (1872) 17 ER 559
 
In re Bateman's Trust (1873) 15 Eq 355
1873


Constitutional
The queen is the queen of New South Wales.
1 Citers


 
In re Joseph Suche and Co Ltd (1875) 1 Ch D 48
1875
CA
Sir George Jessel MR
Constitutional
There is a a presumption, that legislation does not apply to actions which are pending at the time when it comes into force unless the language of the legislation compels the conclusion that Parliament intended that it should. It is "a general rule that when the legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them."
1 Citers



 
 Rustomjee v The Queen; QBD 1876 - (1876) 2 QBD 69

 
 River Wear Commissioners v Adamson; HL 1877 - (1877) 2 App Cas 743

 
 Attorney-General v Tomline (No 3); ChD 1877 - (1877) 5 Ch D 750

 
 Attorney-General v Great Eastern Railway Co; HL 1880 - (1880) 5 AC 473

 
 Caledonian Railway Company v North British Railway Company; HL 1881 - (1881) 6 AC 114

 
 Beatty v Gillbanks; 1882 - [1882] 9 QBD 308
 
Charles Russell v The Queen [1882] UKPC 33; (1882) 7 App Cas 829
23 Jun 1882
PC
Sir Barnes Peacock, Sir Montague E Smith, Sir Robert Collier, Sir James Hannen, Sir Richard Couch
Commonwealth, Constitutional
(New Brunswick) The defendant had been convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating Licquor contrary to the 1878 Act. He challenged his conviction saying that the Act had been outwith the powers of the Parliament of Canada as provided for by the 1867 Act. Held: The Court discussed the "true nature and character" of a statute. Where a measure does not fall within the matters assigned by s. 92 to the Provinces, the Parliament of the Dominion, under the general power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada, may obtain authority to enact it.
Canada Temperance Act 1878 99 - British North America Act 1867 91 92
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Richard Coomber v The Justices of the County of Berks [1883] 9 AC 61
1883
HL
Lord Blackburn
Income Tax, Police, Constitutional
The central issue was whether a block of buildings comprising county assize courts and a police station were liable to income tax under Schedule A. If they had been erected as part of the function of government in the administration of justice, then notwithstanding the fact that they were built by the county and paid for out of the county rates, the Crown's exemption from payment of taxes would apply. Held: They were both exempt, the police being ultimately a crown responsibility
Lord Blackburn said: "I do not think it can be disputed that the administration of justice, both criminal and civil, and the preservation of order and prevention of crime by means of what is now called police, are among the most important functions of Government, nor that by the constitution of this country, these functions do, of common right, belong to the Crown.
In England a subject may have a franchise, giving him the right to administer justice in a particular locality in courts held by him; and he may also have a right to name the constables. In early times, such local franchises were of value for the revenue derived from the fees, and, no doubt, as increasing the local influence of the grantee. But it was always held that on a proceeding in quo warranto the Crown could call on the person in possession of such a franchise to shew his title, on the ground that they were among the matters quae mere spectant ad regem, and that unless he shewed a title by grant from the crown, or by prescription, the franchises were seized and he was ousted. (See Comyn's Digest, Quo Warranto A, and the authorities there collected). In the present case there is no question raised as to any franchise in the hands of a subject.
From very early times, judges acting under the King's Commission went down to administer justice in counties. The sheriff, the head officer of the county, but appointed by the Crown, was always called upon to attend them, and to provide lodging and accommodation for them. He did this at the cost of the county. I do not stop to inquire by what machinery the cost was in early times defrayed. It is now provided for by the statutes referred to, and comes out of the county rate.
The sheriff also was bound to raise the hue and cry, and call out the posse comitatus of the county whenever it was necessary for any police purposes; in so doing he was acting for the Crown, but the burthen fell on the inhabitants of the county. By modern legislation, the county police are arrayed at the expense of the county, defrayed by a police rate on the county, supplemented, in some cases, by grants from the imperial revenues.
1 Citers


 
Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 117
1883
PC
Lord FitzGerald, Sir Barnes Peacock
Constitutional

1 Citers


 
Miles v Mcilwraith [1883] UKPC 6; (1882-83) LR 8 App Cas 120
27 Feb 1883
PC

Constitutional
(Queensland)
[ Bailii ]
 
Hurtado v California (1884) 110 US 516
1884

Matthews J
Constitutional, International
(US Supreme Court) Matthews J spoke of the need for the common law to move forard: "as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and shape it into new and not less useful forms."
1 Citers


 
Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271; 32 WR 552; 53 LJQB 209; 50 LT 620; [1884] EWHC 1 (QB)
9 Feb 1884

Lord Coleridge, Stephen J
Constitutional
Bradlaugh, though duly elected Member for a Borough, was refused by the Speaker to administer oath and was excluded from the House by the serjeant at arms. B challenged the action. Held: The matter related to the internal management of the House of Commons and the Court had no power to interfere.
Lord Coleridge said: "There is another proposition equally true, equally well established, which seems to me decisive of the case before us. What is said or done within the walls of Parliament cannot be inquired into a Court of law. On this point all the judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subject - Burdott v Abbott (1811) 14 East 1 and Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 9 Ad & E 1 - are agreed, and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the Houses over their own members, their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive."
Stephen J said: "I think that the House of Commons is not subject to the control of Her Majesty's Courts in its administration of that part of the statute law which has relation to its own internal proceedings, and that the use of such actual force as may be necessary to carry into effect such a resolution as the one before us is justifiable" and "The only force which comes in question in this case is such force as any private man might employ to prevent a trespass on his own land. I know of no authority for the proposition that an ordinary crime committed in the House of Commons would be withdrawn from the ordinary course of criminal justice. One of the leading authorities on the privilege of Parliament contains matter on the point and shows how careful Parliament has been to avoid even the appearance of countenancing such a doctrine."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Riel v The Queen (1885) 10 App Cas 675
1885
PC

Constitutional
A power given to a Parliament to "make laws for the peace, order and good government" is "apt to authorize the utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects pointed to"
1 Citers


 
Powell v Apollo Candle Co Ltd (1885) 10 App Cas 282
1885
PC

Constitutional
The Board declared firmly that the earlier decisions had put an end to the doctrine that a colonial legislature is a delegate of the Imperial legislature.
1 Citers


 
Rex v Bunting (1885) 7 OR 524
1885


Commonwealth, Constitutional
(Supreme Court of Ontario) A conspiracy to bring about a change in the Government of Ontario by bribing members of the Legislative Assembly to vote against the Government was an indictable offence at common law committed at the time of the conspiracy itself and within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
1 Citers



 
 Tuck and Sons v Priester; 1887 - (1887) 19 QBD 629
 
The Bank of Toronto v Lambe [1887] UKPC 29
9 Jul 1887
PC

Constitutional
(Quebec)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Cox v Hakes; HL 1890 - (1890) 15 AC 506; (1890) 60 LJQB 89

 
 Davis v Beason, Sheriff; 3-Feb-1890 - 133 US 333 (1890); 33 L Ed 637; 10 SCt 299
 
Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107; (1891) 60 LJQB 145; (1891) 7 TLR 333
1891

Lord Herschell, Lord Halsbury LCJ, Lord Watson, Lord Bramwell
Litigation Practice, Banking, Constitutional
The court considered the interpretation of the 1882 Act, which was said to be a codifying Act. Held: An Act is to be ascertained in the first instance from the natural meaning of its language and is not to be qualified by considerations deriving from the antecedent law.
Lord Watson said: "The decision of the Queen's Bench in Robarts v. Tucker 16 QB 560 has, ever since its date, been accepted in mercantile practice as determining the obligations incumbent upon bankers who agree to retire acceptances on account of their customers. It casts upon them the whole duty of ascertaining the identity of the person to whom they make payment with the payee whose name is upon the bill. They may pay in good faith to the wrong person, in circumstances by which the acceptor himself or men of ordinary prudence might have been misled; but they cannot take credit for such a payment in any question with the acceptor. It has been said by one of the learned Judges that the rule is a harsh one, and it is possible that in some circumstances it may operate harshly; but it appears to me to be settled beyond dispute, and I see no reason for suggesting any doubt that it puts a reasonable construction upon the contract constituted by the agreement of the banker to pay his customers' acceptances when they fall due. In the absence of any special stipulations it construes the arrangement so constituted as importing that, on the one hand, the customer is to furnish or repay to the banker the funds necessary to meet his obligations as acceptor; and that, on the other hand, the banker undertakes to apply the money provided by the customer, or advanced on his account, so as to extinguish the liability created by his acceptance. Accordingly, no payment made by the banker which leaves the liability of the acceptor undischarged can be debited to the latter."
Lord Herschell said: "I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law, and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then, assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view." and "If a statute, intended to embody in a code a particular branch of the law, is to be treated in this fashion, it appears to me that its utility will be almost entirely destroyed, and the very object with which it was enacted will be frustrated. The purpose of such a statute surely was that on any point specifically dealt with by it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used instead of, as before, by roaming over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior decisions, dependent upon a knowledge of the exact effect even an obsolete proceeding such as a demurrer to evidence."
Lord Halsbury LCJ said: "It seems to me that, construing the statute by adding to it words which are neither found therein nor for which authority could be found in the language of the statute itself, is to sin against one of the most familiar rules of construction, and I am wholly unable to adopt the view that, where a statute is expressly said to codify the law, you are at liberty to go outside the code so created, because before the existence of that code another law prevailed.”
Bills of Exchange Act 1882 7(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Lane v Esdaile [1891] AC 210; [1891] UKHL 4
5 May 1891
HL
Lord Halsbury LC
Constitutional
The court considered the extent of the House's jurisdiction as an appellate court. Section 3 of the 1876 Act provided that an appeal should lie to the House of Lords from "any order or judgment of . . Her Majesty's Court of Appeal in England". The court of appeal had refused leave to appeal against an interlocutory order. Held: The section clearly anticipated a range of matters in the Court of Appeal from which appeal would not lie, and ought to be construed to disallow frivolous appeals. A provision requiring the leave of a court to appeal will by necessary intendment exclude an appeal against the grant or refusal of leave, notwithstanding the general language of a statutory right of appeal against decisions of that court.
Lord Halsbury LC accepted that the words "order or judgment" in section 3 were capable of including a decision to refuse leave. The question was whether such a construction could be reconciled with the terms and purpose of Ord LVIII r 15. At p 211, he said: "But when I look not only at the language used, but at the substance and meaning of the provision, it seems to me that to give an appeal in this case would defeat the whole object and purview of the order or rule itself, because it is obvious that what was there intended by the Legislature was that there should be in some form or other a power to stop an appeal - that there should not be an appeal unless some particular body pointed out by the statute (I will see in a moment what that body is), should permit that an appeal should be given. Now just let us consider what that means, that an appeal shall not be given unless some particular body consents to its being given. Surely if that is intended as a check to unnecessary or frivolous appeals it becomes absolutely illusory if you can appeal from that decision or leave, or whatever it is to be called itself. How could any Court of Review determine whether leave ought to be given or not without hearing and determining upon the hearing whether it was a fit case for an appeal? And if the intermediate Court could enter and must enter into that question, then the Court which is the ultimate Court of Appeal must do so also. The result of that would be that in construing this order, which as I have said is obviously intended to prevent frivolous and unnecessary appeals, you might in truth have two appeals in every case in which, following the ordinary course of things, there would be only one; because if there is a power to appeal when the order has been refused, it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence that you must have a right to appeal when leave has been granted, the result of which is that the person against whom the leave has been granted might appeal from that, and inasmuch as this is no stay of proceeding the Court of Appeal might be entertaining an appeal upon the very same question when this House was entertaining the question whether the Court of Appeal ought ever to have granted the appeal, My Lords, it seems to me that that would reduce the provision to such an absurdity that even if the language were more clear than is contended on the other side one really ought to give it a reasonable construction."
Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 3
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Walker v Baird and Another [1892] UKPC 47; [1892] AC 491
4 Aug 1892
PC
Watson, Hobhouse, Herschell, MacNaghten, Morris, Hannen, Shand LL< Sir Richard Couch
Constitutional, Commonwealth
(Newfoundland) A treaty, which does not terminate a state of war, has no legal effect upon the rights and duties of the subjects of the Crown and speaking generally no power resides in the Crown to compel them to obey the provisions of a treaty, or to expel them without supporting legislative authority.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
The Attorney General for New South Wales v Rennie (New South Wales) [1896] UKPC 23
9 May 1896
PC

Constitutional, Commonwealth
(New South Wales)
[ Bailii ]
 
Jackson v Stevenson (1897) 2 Adam 255
1897


Police, Constitutional
At common law, it is contrary to constitutional principle and illegal to search someone to establish whether there are grounds for an arrest
1 Citers



 
 Dona Maria Abeyesekera Hamini and Others v Daniel Tillekeratne; PC 26-Feb-1897 - [1897] AC 277; [1897] UKPC 6
 
In re Athlumney [1898] 2 QB 547
1898

Wright J
Constitutional
Wright J said: "Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this - that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only."
1 Citers



 
 London Street Tramways v London County Council; HL 25-Apr-1898 - [1898] AC 375; [1898] UKHL 1
 
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